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Abstract 
Ibis study explores Scott's vision of historical progress and how its impact on various 
as~ls of hWlli:m lift: is rdlt:d.cu iu his Swlli:sh llovds. Ct:uiral lo lhis :sludy alt: l;i Vil; 
and heroic virtues in the contexts ofreligio~ family, nationalism, politics, economy, law 
!"-!n.d J~u~ti·ce. It f:all", m' to Qll m' t .. nAn"tl·on <:'1V "hQptp .. <:, and Q con"hus' nn Th ..... .I.e 
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introduction sets these concerns in the context of Scottish philosophy and history and 
argues that Scott rejects Burke's absolutism but looks for a more flexible and rational 
evolution of the institutions and principles that make for social cohesion. 
The fIrst chapter argues that Scott's historicism is not the product of a mixture of 
Romantic and Enlightenment attitudes, of sympathy or nostalgia and rationalism or 
progressivism. Rather it is derived from the so-called "philosophical" historians of the 
Sl;olli:sh Eu1ighlt:IIIUt:llL For tilt::st! wrilt:rs, tilt: inui viuualislll of llloUClll OOIlllIlt:ll;ial 
society had been a problematic development, since unchecked individualism might 
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the inheritor of a rationalist, progressive philosophy of history, but one with well-
defmed reservations about progress and modernity. 
The second chapter questions the traditional reading of Waverley as a mixture of 
Romantic nostalgia and Enlightenment skepticism about "primitive" societies. Scott's 
Highlanders, I argue, function not simply as colourful quasi-Romantic primitives, but as 
the embodiment of civic and heroic virtues, which renders the novel a Scottish 
Elllighlt:lJlllt:ul parablt: 011 Ult: illui~]Jt:IlSabili l y of "l;i Vil; virlUt:." 
The third chapter deals with Old Mortality, a novel now often read as a sort of 
Hobbesian critique of the seventeenth-centut'Y British civil wars. Indeed, the civic virtue 
of the parties involved in the conflict is displayed in such a light that selfIsh 
individualism might seem preferable. But on comparing the novel's treatment of the 
civil wars to that of David Hwne's History of England, I show that Old Mortality is a 
profOlll1d meditation on the fundamentally social constitution of human nature, and that 
it defends rather than belittles public-spiritedness. 
In the fourth chapter I show how Scott undercuts the political conflict in Rob Roy by 
reducing it to a sorl of dash of cullures which nt:verlhdess share ct:rlain values. Using 
J.G.A. Pocock's seminal work, Virtue, Commerce, and History, I suggest that Scott calls 
for a.~ updating of civic virtue. Chivalric Honour mutates into Credit to meet comnlercial 
needs, and to defme social relationships. Also, Scott attempts a synthesis of the 
otherwise antagonist principles of Burke and Paine concerning family affairs. The virtue 
of paternal piety, as a cohesive force, is redefmed as mutual understanding rather than 
dictatorship. Scott recognizes the law of inheritance but submits it to civil law. 
The fIfth chapter deals with The Heart of Midlothian. The novel, I argue, gives civic 
virtue a religious dimension by making it providentially recognized. Skeptical of secular 
valut:s in establishing lhe gtmuine civil society, lht: novd legilimizes a moral aUlonomy 
that derives from rational and progressive religion. Moral autonomy in this sense defInes 
actions of mundane authority in whatever capacity, domestic, political, e"""nomical and 
judicial. Updating religion in one of its aspects, I show, aims at asserting Scottish 
national and cultural identity, given the fact that historically the Kirk has always been 
one of its crucial components. On the other hand, the novel attempts to define the tense 
relationship between Scotland and England within the Union in terms of moral values. 
Taken in the context of colonization, the novel focuses on vices infIltrating into English 
commercial society, which in a similar manner are transferred into Scottish society, and 
illlt:Utcn iht: 1ll0lalily of illt: Brilish nalion allalgt:. 
The sixth chapter on Redgauntlet focuses on Scott's treatment of loyalty as a civic 
viItue illlllOl~ than Ull~ OOl1l~xL In Ul~ oolli~xi uflaw am1 ju~li~, luyalty i~ IIH.xlifit!d lu 
operate under the rubric of personal integrity and civil courage ° In the political context, 
lOt 1°" defimp,.l mO tPT'Tn" of T'I<>t;on<>l consenssu" Tn the Pr'AnoTn l°(' context ;t "up~rt" 
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advancement as long as it operates within commtmal interest. 
The concluding chapter uses Guy Mannering~ The Antiquary and The Bride of 
Lammermoor to support the thesis that Scott's fictional dealings with history in the 
"Scottish" novels is directed to an accommodation of ancient virtues with present forms 
of society and nationhoodo 
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Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with Sir Walter Scott's vision of historical progress and 
how its impact on various aspects of human life is reflected in his Scottish novels. My 
emphasis is on civic and heroic virtues in the contexts of religion, family, nationalism, 
politics, economics, law and justice. My argument will be primarily working within 
the field of intellectual history, or the history of ideas as applied to literary texts and 
involving literarylhistorical analysis of Scott's career. The suggestion that Scott's 
fiction involves some sort of insight into historical process is not new and was 
recognized by Scott's contemporary critics, Francis Jeffrey, T.B. Macaulay and 
William Hazlitt, but without identifying it with any systematic philosophy ofhistory.i 
Perhaps Coleridge is the first writer to define the representation of history in Scott's 
novels in terms of a complete theory based on Scott's ambivalent attitude toward the 
past and the present. Scott's novels, according to this theory, dramatize two major 
forces that shape historical process: one is nostalgic and reflects the desire for 
permanence and continuity, while the second is progressive and reflects the natural 
passion for "progression and free agency.,,2 Even twentieth-century "revisionist" 
critics of Scott, David Daiches and Georg Lukacs, employ Coleridge's thesis 
repeatedly in their attempt to explain Scott's novels in general, and his view of history 
in particular. 3 
On the other side, writers like Duncan Forbes and Peter Garside, guided by Scott's 
biographical links to various "philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment 
(which Scott himself acknowledges in the "Ashestiel" autobiographical fragment 
attached to Lockhart's Life) argue that Scott's writings breathe the philosophy of 
history and progress. 4 Unfortunately, their argument is limited to Scott's non-fiction. 
This discovery led later literary critics, A vrom Fleishman, David Brown, Graham 
McMaster and many others to break with a longstanding tradition that Scott's insight 
into history is untouched by any sort of systematic philosophy, and to postulate that 
Scott's novels dramatize ideas latent in the Scottish Enlightenment. 5 Although, like 
these writers, my approach in investigating the historicism underlying Scott's fiction 
follows the same trajectory of "influence hunting," yet my reading of Scott's novels 
does not converge with their views. The way they interpret the implications of the 
representation of history in the Scottish Enlightenment philosophy itself, as I attempt 
to show, is misleading and projecting it on to Scott's fiction leads to faulty 
conclusions. 
Scott's sense of history and progress and his understanding of human nature. I 
would argue, were the product of a complex of intellectual ideas, which he shared 
with the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, particularly Adam Ferguson, in a 
tradition basically influenced by Montesquieu to which Edmund Burke also adhered. 6 
The way these writers understood history, progress and human nature, provided them 
with a theoretical framework which prioritized the social-moral. They looked tor 
what was in the public interest in a changing world and what was not, regardless of 
antiquity or modernity, conservatism or progressivism. In particular, I would like to 
situate Scott's writing within the debate between those who espoused the values of a 
modem commercial state and those who adhered to the older model of civic 
humanism, a debate intensified in the period of the French Revolution. 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, David Hume, Adam Smith, William Robertson, 
John Millar and Adam Ferguson developed theories of social and economic progress 
in which they stressed the social and progressive nature of man and the natural 
evolution of his institutions. Yet the combination ofliberal and conservative leanings 
that marked their writings show that they perceived of Progress as a Janus-faced 
process. Natural sociability, in their view, had produced the commercial society as 
the fmal stage of social evolution which contributed to materialistic advancement, the 
triumph of rationality and toleration over superstition and fanaticism, individual 
freedom and economic independence, justice, comfort, security and luxury. But it 
had also fostered selfishness, divisiveness, insubordination and lack of military and 
national vigour. From this perspective, commercial society was profoundly anti-
social and anti-moral in that it was likely, especially in the context of the division of 
labour, to produce a way of life that would threaten the strength and cohesion of 
society and weaken civic virtues characteristic of primitive or semi-primitive 
societies. While Scottish writers merely registered these disturbing features of 
inevitable social progress or proposed ad hoc remedies, Burke staged a full defence of 
the civic virtues of former ages in the face of threatening radical French ideas 
preached by such writers as Rousseau and the later so-called English Jacobins, 
lnomas Paine and William Godwin. For Burke, an inherited monarchy and landed 
aristocracy based on martial virtues constituted a state sanctioned by religion with 
hierarchy and subordination dictating relations in society and family. 
2 
Scottish philosophers 
The Scottish philosophers believed in the unifonnity of human nature, at least at 
the level of passions. For them, the passion of selfishness had always been the 
driving force for progress and evolution, which are achieved despite their immediate 
motives according to the law of heterogeneity of ends. Many, with questionable 
consistency, contrived to criticize selfishness morally as a source of vice and social 
depravity. Only Smith robustly accepted the primacy of the selfish motive in 
economic and social progress, which he inherited from Mandeville. In Smith's view, 
the individual is "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his 
attention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he generally intends to promote it.,,7 Yet far from being absolute in his 
judgment, Smith draws attention to the fact that commercial ideas might lead to 
violating moral rules based on benevolence and sympathy. Smith writes of merchants 
as "an order of men ... who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress 
the pUblic. ,,8 But his overall assessment of the negative aspects of selfishness 
associated with commerce seems to be far outweighed by the benefits. Commerce, 
Smith argues, "gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the 
liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who have 
before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile 
dependency upon their superiors.,,9 
Economic independence in Smith's statement, taken within the context of J.G.A 
Pocock's analysis of eighteenth-century polemics about the relationship between 
political economy and virtue, more likely relates to "commercial hwnanism" than the 
"civic humanism" intended in Ferguson's Essay, as I show below. As Pocock points 
out, the economic independence of the citizen, as a civic virtue in the classical 
republican sense, means "autonomy of real property" which is defmed in terms of 
land ownership and the right "to bear arms in order to assure it to him." Following 
the ancient Roman tradition, this also enables the citizen to be "virtuous in his 
devotion to the public good" through his active participation in political aft airs, that 
is, through his "engagement in relations of equality and ruling-and-being-ruled, but 
virtuous also in his independence of any relation which might render him corrupt." 
In the commercial stage of society the criteria of wealth and property is no more 
solely anchored in the possession of land but also includes paper currency, stocks and 
shares which are recognized by government and warranted by law. It follows that the 
economic independence praised by Smith, according to Pocock, is "constructed 
within the law-centred paradigm/' and not the "paradigm of virtue and corruption"olO 
as might be understood by Ferguson. It is also different from Burke's version, which 
seems to limit economic independence to the aristocracy and landed gentry within his 
hierarchical model of dependence, as I show below. 
In an attempt to contain or mitigate the impact of the selfish trend on moral values, 
it was necessary for thinkers in the Scottish School to adopt a philosophy which 
focuses on constructing what looks like a collective consciousness among members of 
a given society so that each member realizes that his/her interest is part and parcel of 
a whole. As a beginning they rejected contract theory not only on the grOllllds of it 
being bad history or bad anthropology-it considers society as a rational construct-
but it was also, in their eyes, morally and politically dangerous. If men come to think 
of themselves as Lockean individualists, bound to society only by contract, what is to 
prevent them from breaching that contract when it no longer serves their private, 
selfish interests? In the event of an invasion, for example, what is to prevent an 
individual from cooperating with the enemy if by so doing he is better able to 
preserve his property? What, in short, becomes of the traditional notion of "public 
good"? From such doubts arose the "philosophical" historians' vigorous attack on 
"selfish" or "licentious" moral systems, as well as the definitive defence of "civic 
virtue" for which they are probably best known. 
Locke's predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, had seemingly dealt the notion of civic 
virtue a death-blow in his Leviathan (1651). Earlier political philosophers, taking 
their cue from Aristotle, had believed that man is a "political animal "--one that 
flourishes, or realizes his true form, only in a polis or civil society.ll They had 
therefore viewed the state (that is, govenunent) as a moral tutor whose object is to 
guide its subjects toward the human ideal by inculcating political, or "civic," virtues. 
Among these they had included domestic virtues like loyalty, dutifulness, and 
generosity, as well as more heroic virtues like courage and fortitude that could be of 
service in a society's defence. Hobbes, however, was struck by the insight that this 
moral perfectionism, with its austere, aristocratic ideals, had been much to blame for 
the civil and religious strife that had plagued the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
He therefore proposed, as Locke did afterwards, to anchor political science in a 
strictly empirical study of man. Political science should begin, he argued, by asking 
not what men ought to be, but what they actually are-or would be, without the 
interference of the tutor -state. 
By nature, Hobbes proposed, men are not moved by civic ideals; they are moved 
only by private appetites and aversions, the most obvious and basic of which are the 
appetite for continued life and the aversion to death. Consequently, the state can 
dispense with the quest for the "good life" and concern itself strictly with the 
preservation of bare life. Its only legitimate object is the reduction of strife among its 
subjects; the chief duty of the subjects is to avoid strife. Hobbes, in effect, reduced 
civic virtue to mere peaceableness. Every other form of human excellence ceased to 
be a virtue. In his view, the traditional civic virtues are simply additional "appetites," 
and often socially undesirable ones at that. Courage, for instance, is in one sense 
merely an appetite for self-preservation in dangerous situations. In another sense 
(here Hobbes uses the word "vainglory"), it is an appetite for fame and the spoils of 
war. In the latter sense, courage not only serves "no useful purpose,,,12 as Daiches 
would say, but is clearly dangerous to society in that it encourages disruptive 
aristocratic rivalries. 13 
The Scots generally accepted Hobbes' and Locke's empirical approach to political 
science, but they were deeply concerned about its moral implications. They were 
therefore compelled to fight the Englishmen on their own grounds-to seek empirical 
evidence that the traditional or "metaphysical" civic virtues were necessary and 
"natural" to human society. 14 This project was one of the most important sources of 
the Scots' pervasive interest in the customs and social institutions of primitive peoples 
such as the American fudians and the Highlanders of their country. Their interest in 
the Highlanders had an immediate practical incentive, as well. The 1745 rebellion 
chronicled in Waverley had produced a sensation in Edinburgh at about the time 
Adam Smith and other "philosophical" historians were beginning their academic 
careers there. Philosophers and citizens alike were struck by the contrast between 
their own manners and way of life and those of the occupying Highlanders, whose 
hills were only a few miles distant. The progress of industry and urbanization among 
the Lowlanders had opened a much wider cultural gulf between them and their 
northern neighbours than anyone had previously imagined. If this discovery led in 
some quarters to self-congratulation, it led in others to more sober reflections. 
John Millar was the most consistent Whig among the "philosophical" historians 
and, through his pupil James Mill, an ancestor of nineteenth-century Utilitarianism 
and British Liberalism generally.I5 Commenting on the relationship between 
economics and morals, Millar observes that the virtues of rude nations are 
"diametrically opposed to those of a commercial people. ,,16 Men in "commercial" 
societies have a far more acute sense of justice than their forebears: yet the 
Highlanders and other "rude" nations, who lack this sense, have much more exacting 
notions of loyalty, which sometimes make them capable of astonishing acts of 
generosity. As an illustration of this paradox, he cites an anecdote reminiscent of 
Scott's characterization of the Highlanders in Waverley: 
In the highlands of Scotland, stealing cattle was denominated lifting; a term 
to which no blame appears to have been attached; and it is a well-known 
fact, that an inhabitant of that country, who, upon the suppression of the 
rebellion of 1745, had the Pretender under his protection, and who had not 
been tempted to deliver him up by the great premium offered by 
government, was at a subsequent period tried at Inverness, and condemned 
to a capital punishment for horse-stealing. 17 
Millar's prognosis for modern "commercial" societies that have dissolved the old 
personal loyalties in an impersonal "cash nexus" is surprisingly pessimistic for a 
Whio· o· 
[I] n a country where no body is idle, and where every person is eager to 
augment his fortune, or to improve his circumstances, there occur 
innumerable competitions and rivalships, which contract the heart, and set 
mankind at variance. In proportion as every man is attentive to his own 
advancement, he is vexed and tormented by every obstacle to his prosperity, 
and prompted to regard his competitors with envy, resentment, and other 
malignant passions. 18 
For the Scots, the Hobbesian-Lockean state, where each man is left to pursue private 
interests, is not completely successful even in its own terms. Its object is peace; but 
lacking an adequate civic ideal, it merely replaces one form of strife with another at 
least equally destructive. Indeed, left to its own devices, such a state is in danger of 
self -destructi on. 
A particularly striking but not otherwise unusual atTumation of this thesis can be 
found in Adam Smith's Lectures on JUrisprodence (1766): 
Another bad effect of commerce is that it sinks the courage of mankind, and 
tends to extinguish martial spirit. In all commercial countries the division 
of labour is inftnite, and every one's thoughts are employed about one 
particular thing. A man has then time to study only one branch of business, 
and it would be a great disadvantage to oblige every one to learn the 
military art and keep himself in the practice of it. The defence of the 
country is therefore committed to a certain set of men who have nothing 
else to do; and among the bulk of the people military courage diminishes. 
By having their minds constantly employed on the arts of luxury, they grow 
effeminate and dastardly. 
This is confmned by universal experience. In the year 1745 four or five 
thousand naked unarmed Highlanders took possession of the improved parts 
of this country without any opposition from the unwarlike inhabitants. They 
penetrated into England and alanned the whole natioR and had they not 
been opposed by a standing anny they would have seized the throne with 
little difficul~. 200 years ago such an attempt would have rouzed the spirit 
of the nation. 9 
For Smith and his contemporaries, the '45 was not the "anachronistic and historically 
meaningless" affair that Daiches and literary critics in general have thought it. 20 It 
did anything but suggest that "military courage" now lacked a socially useful purpose. 
In fact, the amazing success of the Highlanders was often pointed to by advocates 
of military reform, especially those interested in re-establishing local militias and 
resuming universal military training. 21 The "philosophical" historians, not 
surprisingly, were active participants in the national debate on the Militia Issue. 22 
While many intellectuals supported reestablishment on the grounds that militias are 
less dangerous to civil liberties than standing armies, the Scots essentially supported 
reestablishment because they saw the militia as a means of inculcating civic virtue 
and combating the deleterious effects of Hobbesian-Lockean individualism. Ferguson 
illustrates this case in his 1750 pamphlet Reflections Previous to the Establishment of 
a Militia: 
[National] self defence is the business of all: and we have already gone too 
far in the opinion that trade and manufactures are the only requisites in our 
COlIDtry. In pursuit of such an idea, we labour to acquire wealth; but neglect 
the means of defending it. We would turn this nation into a country of 
manufacturers, where each is confined to a particular branch, and sunk into 
the habits and peculiarities of his trade. In this we consult the success of 
manufacture, but slight the honours of human nature: we furnish good work, 
but educate men gross, sordid, void of sentiment and manners, who may be 
pillaged, insulted, trod upon by the enemies of their country. 23 
7 
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith, similarly, argues that military exercises should re 
incorporated into public education; for even if martial spirit were of no use towards 
the defence of society, such exercises would still be a useful antidote to the "mental 
mutilation, deformity and wretchedness" that necessarily accompany the division of 
labour in a commercial society.24 For both Ferguson and Smith, even modem 
government cannot dispense entirely with its role as moral tutor. Adroit intervention 
in the moral sphere is necessary if commercial society is to continue to thrive. 
It is probably no coincidence that Scott, as a student of the 'philosophical" 
historians, served so eagerly as a quartermaster to a cavalry regiment in the restored 
Scottish militia during the Napoleonic Wars, when Scotland was threatened by French 
invasion. 25 Scott's The Antiquary, in fact, dramatizes an imagined French invasion 
and shows how citizens, in a quasi-militia, could gather to fight the enemy. Critics 
and biographers have sometimes dismissed this episode of Scott's life as yet another 
expression of his romantic longing for a return to the Age of Chivalry, or as an 
outgrowth of his Legitimist political philosophy. Yet romance and reaction played no 
part in the pro-militia arguments of Scott's mentors. John Robertson's comments on 
Ferguson's militia pamphlet are helpful here: 
Ferguson is not simply claiming that commerce corrupts: his tract is not a 
fatalistic and indiscriminate jeremiad after the manner of the English patriot 
moralists. Rather Ferguson appears to be arguing that commerce and the 
military spirit can subsist together-If only they remain independent of each 
other. Thus the benefits brought by commerce in undermining the Gothic 
society of the past are to be welcomed, but they should not be allowed to 
alter men's continuing adherence to traditional martial values.26 
For the Scots, virtues like military courage are indeed alien to modem, 
individualistic societies~ they normally arise and thrive only in traditional, hierarchical 
societies like that of the Scottish Highlanders. Wholesale restoration of the heroic 
virtues--a return to the Age of Chivalry-is therefore not only undesirable but 
perhaps also impossible. Nevertheless, historical experience suggests that such 
virtues cannot be discarded altogether, and the uniformity of human nature guarantees 
that they are at least in some measure always recoverable. With proper cultivation, 
then, such virtues can and ought to be made to coexist with their opposites. TIle 
efforts of Scott's mentors to propagate "military courage" were thus, in their O\\TI 
view, entirely practical. 
Among the "philosophical" historians, it is Ferguson who provides the most telling 
sociological insights into the contradictory tendencies and dangers of emerging 
commercial society; it follows that civic concerns are most pronOlIDced in the works 
of Ferguson, the thinker to whom Scott has most often been compared. 21 Though he 
never studied under Ferguson, as he did under some of the other "philosophical" 
historians, Scott seems to have regarded him as an especial mentor. Ferguson (1723-
1816) was a Perthshire Highlander by birth. Trained for the ministry like his father, he 
served as Chaplain to the famous "Black Watch" regiment of pro-government 
Highlanders during the '45. He never lost his use of the Gaelic language and retained 
many friendships whose devotion to the Good Old Cause he could not share. 
Ferguson's divided heritage, his unusual career, and his moderate politics are all oddly 
suggestive of the "middle-of-the-road" heroes of Scott's Scottish novels. 
In his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), Ferguson speaks not of the 
Highlanders but of the Greeks and early Romans. Praise of these nations' civic virtues, 
perhaps, could have been the reason that led Hume to dislike the book and to describe 
it as "enthusiastic in its moral prescription. ,,28 In other words, Hume could have 
found in it a vision of an ideal society that heeds less what is and over-emphasizes 
what ought to be. However, a deep reading of the Essay, I would argue, reveals that 
Ferguson's invoking of past models does not imply an apology for old social and 
political establishments, but rather a way to analyze the ills of modern life. 
According to Ferguson, progress and luxury have substituted "external conveniences" 
for merit and virtue as objects of esteem and social honour, thus weakening the bonds 
of affection among individuals on the one hand and individuals and their commitment 
to their country on the other: 
Men are so far from valuing society on account of its mere external 
conveniences, that they are commonly most attached where those 
conveniences are least frequent; and are there most faithful, where the 
tri bute of their allegiance is paid in blood. Affection operates with the 
greatest force where it meets with the greatest difficulties: ... hence the 
sanguine affection which every Greek bore to his country, and hence the 
devoted patriotism of the early Roman. Let those examples be compared 
with the spirit that reigns in a commercial state, where men may be 
supposed to have experienced, in its full ex1ent, the interest which 
individuals have in the preservation of their country. It is here indeed, if 
ever, that man is sometimes found a detached and a solitary being: he has 
found an object which sets him in competition with his fellow-creatures, 
and he deals with them as he does with his cattle and his soil, for the sake of 
the profit they bring. 29 
In the fmal section of the Essay, Ferguson reveals the practical or pedagogical 
purpose of such comparisons far more explicitly than Smith or Millar. Here Ferguson 
emphasizes the role of the individual as an active politician not distinct from the state 
and vice versa. For him, "if the object of policy" is to "secure the person and the 
property of the subject, without any regard to his political character, the constitution 
indeed may be free, but its members may likewise become unworthy of the freedom 
they possess, and unfit to preserve it." What concerns Ferguson, it seems, is not to 
reverse history, nor to attack the benefits of progress, but to prioritize "attention to the 
commonwealth" over the interest of the individual. If the "end of political struggles" 
is "securing to the individual his estate, and the means of subsistence," he argues, this 
"may put an end to the exercise of those very virtues that were required in its 
execution. ,,30 
For Ferguson, a society of acquisitive individualists envisioned by Hobbes and 
Locke is necessarily a failure. Having abolished civic virtue, such a society grows 
incapable of maintaining itself and so undermines its own achievements in the realm 
of freedom and individual rights. Yet Ferguson reserves his strongest censure not for 
Hobbes and Locke, but for the Literati who followed in their wake. According to 
Ferguson, the eighteenth century was full of poets and critics who regarded the 
celebrated ardour, generosity, and fortitude of former ages as mere frenzy, and 
retirement from public affairs as virtue. Such writers, he asserts, "flatter their own 
imbecility under the name of politeness. ,,31 Readings of the Waverley novels like that 
of Daiches who links them with such "imbecilities" seem to ignore Scott's 
relationship to Ferguson. 
Notwithstanding his vehement defence of traditional civic and heroic virtues, 
Ferguson does not encourage us to overlook the moral failings of past societies. As a 
historian, he is actually something of a hanging judge. In his Essay, for instance, 
Ferguson spends as much time criticizing the classical world's unthinking acceptance 
of slavery and its subjugation of women as he does praising its devoted patriotism. 
Ferguson associates slavery with epithets like "avarice," "lucrative property," 
"injustice," "servility," "profit," "luxury," "corruption" and "mercenary.,,32 If these 
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are to be regarded as moral and social failings in ancient societies, they are equally 
moral and social defects in the present society and, perhaps, still worse in the contex1 
of colonization. Scott, similarly, touches upon the issue of trade in slavelJ' in the 
West Indies colonies and connects it with "avarice" and "luxury" in more than one 
place in his novels. In The Heart of Midlothian , for instance, Scott attempts to show 
the impact of trade in slavery on morals and how by colonial infection it spoils 
character in the mother country. 
1broughout the Essay, past and present are judged by the same standard of hlllllan 
flourishing, external to either, though present in part in both. Ferguson offers a 
succinct summary of his position toward the end of the Essay: 
The manners of rude nations require to be reformed. Their foreign quarrels, 
and domestic dissensions, are the operations of extreme and sanguinary 
passions. A state of greater tranquility hath many happy efTects. But if 
nations pursue the plan of enlargement and pacification, till their members 
can no longer apprehend the common ties of society, nor be engaged by 
affection in the cause of their country, they must err on the opposite side, 
and by leaving too little to agitate the spirits of men, bring on ages of 
languor, if not of decay. 33 
Ferguson, in short, is no historicist or cultural relativist. Though he never, perhaps, 
defmes the ideal society in any detail, the notion of an ideal toward which all societies 
strive is as central to his political philosophy as it is to Plato's. Several of the 
passages I have cited here have also been cited by previous critics in attempt to 
compare Scott with Ferguson. Similarity between the two can certainly be found, but 
it has often been misunderstood. The strong moralizing strain in Ferguson's Essay 
should not be understood as simply engaging in a relativistic appreciation of past 
cultures, as some critics have suggested. 34 At the same time, Ferguson's practical 
orientation, his desire to apply the lessons of the past to the present, indicates that he 
was not exercising some "nostalgic sense," either. If Scott is like Ferguson, as critics 
have argued,35 it makes no sense to go on speaking of his "relativistic" or "nostalgic" 
attitude toward the past, nor of an unchecked complacency toward the present. 
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Scott and Burke 
Critics who seem to be less certain of Scott's progressive attitude prefer to 
interpret Scott's historicism in terms of Burke's conservative philosophy. Scott, in 
other words, is a reactionary who idealizes the past order as an attempt to support the 
status quo as a natural evolution of that order. According to Leslie Stephens, Burke, 
in the name of prescription, rejected all reformation that would touch upon inherited 
establishments and beliefs and so did Scott, who "stirred ... when any sacrilegious 
reformer threatened to sweep away any part of the true old Scottish system. And this 
is, in fact, the moral implicitly involved in Scott's best work. ,,36 But by the time Scott 
was writing his novels, Burke's legacy as an extreme conservative had few followers, 
even though anti-Jacobins invoked his support of tradition and the status quo. 
Therefore that Scott was a furious anti-Jacobin, like Burke, is not a strong reason to 
ascribe to him Burkian sentiments indiscriminately. Ferguson was also conservative 
and perforce anti-Jacobin but no one can say that his understanding of history, based 
on stages of progress, converges with Burke's, although their divergent arguments 
and objectives rest on the same assumptions. For instance, both postulate that man by 
nature is a social and progressive creature. Also, as a corollary, they believe in the 
fundamental sociological concept that views society as a spontaneous outgrowth of 
human affection rather than a rational construct. But when it comes to defining the 
means by which to preserve naturalness and virtue against the depredation of 
artificiality and corruption in the course of historical change, the disparity becomes 
quite clear between Burke on one side and the speculative historians and Scott on the 
other side. 
r would suggest, the main disparity between the two stems from the fact that Burke 
tends to define all change that had occurred or should occur in the future as rooted in 
long inherited traditions. A central idea in Burke's Reflections is that change is only 
''reparation'' or restoring and continuing a relatively unchanging tradition. By 
contrast, Scott's novels seem to approach change in a d),namic, progressive, or 
pragmatic way. One reason for this variance could be seen as a natural reflection of 
their different historical experience. Scott is affected by Scotland's turbulent histOIy' 
that had witnessed dramatic changes in its social, economic and political structure, 
while Burke is affected by the essentially tUlchanging nature of British society and 
politics. The dethronement of the Stuarts was of greater moment in Scotland than the 
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"glorious Revolution" in England-it paved the way for two major uprisings, the '15 
and the '45. Scott was aware of the violence it provoked and its connection with the 
Union and the passing of an older way of life in terms of culture and national identity. 
As a result, he could not insist as strongly as Burke did on constancy in political, 
economical and social affairs. Instead, I would argue, his novels grappled with these 
tensions as he tried to find a basis for the unity of society in tradition. To confront the 
emerging tensions of the nineteenth century it was necessary for him to work out 
more modern approaches to economic and political change, the defence of an 
established church, social mobility, family ties and the claims of tradition itself. 
In political theory, Burke talks in his Reflections (1790) about the necessitv of a 
means of progression: "a state without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation. ,,37 But, ironically, his conservatism makes it clear that 
political evolution of the Constitution is a necessity up to 1688 but no further, since, 
for him, "its fundamental principles" were "for ever settled.,,38 Scott's political 
journalism also engaged in polemics from the conservative side, and Hazlitt put the 
case for seeing his novels in a Burkian framework. But Hazlitt acknowledged that his 
novels gave "fair play" to opposing forces, in fact opposing ideologies. 39 To Hazlitt, 
as to many modern commentators, Scott's novels could give feelings of nostalgia for 
the days when political conflicts gave rise to high heroism. This leads to a "profit and 
loss" approach to what is presented as modern prosaic but more humane and just 
dispensation. 4O Further, they can be seen as separating old "romance" from modern 
"reality" too absolutely in a didactic effort to naturalize the status quo and suppress 
dissent by aesthetic means. But I would argue that though Scott's political impulse 
certainly was not democratic, it could not be viewed as prejudiced, either. Rather it is 
compromising and reconciliatory, as I show, in the course of this thesis. 
Similarly, in social theory Burke seems opposed to the social evolution welcomed 
by the Scottish School and Scott because his philosophy makes the political and the 
social look like mirror images and both operate in accordance with constant ideas, 
most prominently the law of inheritance. The compromising spirit in his statement, 
"in what we improve we are never wholly new, in what we retain we are never wholly 
obsolete," within the context of his fixed hierarchical model of dependency in all 
social institutions, could be seen as a subtle argument to mask restrictions on any real 
modifications that might allow social mobility, as well as flexibility in religious and 
familial issues. 41 Burke's ideas of dependency, prescription, strict inheritance, 
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paternal authority, and reliance on the wisdom of ages are stated absolutely in the 
Reflections in accord with his vision of an organic society. Burke's idea of the 
organic society seems to be based on his belief that all aspects of social life affect one 
another and change continuously and therefore they must be well suited to each other, 
so that no really deep-seated tensions and conflicts can arise in the national course of 
social development. Institutions and prejudices grow together and so must be 
mutually compatible. 42 
Scott indeed shares this view with Burke as he does with Ferguson with its 
emphasis on the interrelation and continuity of human activities rather than on 
separation into spheres of interest, each governed by its own laws, in opposition to the 
selfish and individualistic disposition dominant in Locke's philosophy. He also shares 
the implications that each mind is a particular growth conditioned by the rest and 
incapable of fully living if it detaches itself from the rest; the notion of gradual 
progress as against radical changes, and consensus as opposed to individual judgment, 
as we shall see in Redgauntlet. But for Scott, as for the "philosophical" historians, it 
remains hard to accept many of Burke's conditions for maintaining the organic 
society, his insistence on maintaining "a condition of unchangeable constancy," given 
the former's contention that the nature of progress and evolution demands devising 
new conditions and new values for organizing social life. 43 
In The Antiquary and Guy Mannering, Scott supports but redefmes the idea of the 
organic society in an attempt to fmd a basis for the unity of society in tradition. 
Besides their emphasis on human affection as a natural bond that ties people together, 
the two novels present the new social relationships as based on mutual moral 
responsibility and functional interdependence. Most importantly, they present status, 
rank and virtue as no more defined mainly in terms of inherited privileges as Burke 
suggests but also in terms of personal merit. The hero rises socially and owes his 
success to his superior talents, merit, and honest exploits; then afterwards he is re-
established as an aristocrat. 
Burke's criticism of the new rebellious commercial spirit, guided by some abstract 
theory of the universal rights of man, and its social-political-economical implications 
in terms of virtue and social cohesion resonates in Ferguson's Essay which attacks the 
idea of society as being a rational construct, and correlates the decline of civic virtue 
with the emerging commercial spirit. But Ferguson employs this criticism not in 
favour of a specific social class, as a more eligible agent in maintaining the organic 
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society and in practising virtue, but rather seems to address all citizens in a given 
community as patriots, economically independent, and equally committed to public 
good through their active and responsible participation in political affairs. Burke, as I 
show below, employs his criticism in defence of a small segment of society, the 
aristocracy and landed gentry to whom he entrusts economical independence and 
political activity and by doing so he undercuts virtue. 
In fact, the target for Burke's criticism is the emerging middle class, whom he 
proposes to suppress by keeping it under the patronage of the traditional aristocracy. 
For Burke, as Pocock points out, the emerging middle class is a threat because "its 
agents were literati, bureaucrats and technocrats, and the form it took was 'energy', 
'talent', 'a new, pernicious, desolating activity.,,44 With these characteristics, and as 
upstarts who lack the hereditary aristocratic "manners," members of this class are 
expected to do anything amoral to promote their status economically, socially and 
politically. It is true that Scott's novels critique upstarts, who employ commercial 
amoral means in promoting themselves and praise committed and virtuous aristocrats 
but, in the meantime, they do de-emphasize heredity as the sole criteria for status and 
virtue. His novels show that not all members of the middle class are morally bad and 
not all aristocrats are morally good. If Scott aligns with Burke in his rejection of 
democracy, his novels present him as at least an advocate of social mobility. This is 
no surprise, for Scott's "literary ambitions" as Leith Davis points out, "are directly 
cOlUlected to his class ambitions." Davis quotes Carlyle's opinion, which presents 
Scott as a suburbanite who aspires to aristocratic heights: "Walter Scott, one of the 
gifted of the world, must kill himself that he may be a country gentleman, the founder 
of a race of Scottish lairds." Davis interprets Carlyle's notion of the "country 
gentleman" as implying Scott's "middle-class. ,,.fS Scott's own personal experience 
offers good reason for us to believe that he, unlike Burke, not only legitimizes 
crossing social boundaries but also has faith in the middle class in terms of virtue. 
Under the impact of the French Revolution, Burke's historicism seems to politicize 
almost every thing in defence of his conservative ideology. Thus, throughout the 
Reflections, he never ceases to remind us of "jobbers," "usurers," atheists," and the 
"monied interest" and their role in destroying ancient institutions lUlder the mask of 
progressivism and reform. Such selfish interests, Burke argues, best thrive when the 
social-moral heritage of a given society, as a binding force, is swept away and 
individuals exist in a state of disharmony and are alienated from each other even in 
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the same family. In his view, that is what precisely the above coalition did in France 
in order to accelerate the revolution and seize power: a systematic digging at the root 
of family structure, religious establislnnent and virtue. For him, the construction of 
family, traditionally and naturally, rests on interrelated foundations: hierarchy, 
"natural feelings" or "paternal affection" and religion. Duties and rights whether 
between parents and children or between husbands and wives, socially and morally, 
are defmed by and established on these conceptions. Operating outside these 
conceptions infects social-moral and political life with anarchy, individualism, and 
paves the way for corruption. 
Burke regards Rousseau-and implicitly such English Jacobins as Thomas Paine 
and William Godwin-as instructors in the "ethics o/vanity. ,,46 He argues that in the 
name of "universal benevolence," natural rights of man, egalitarianism and absolute 
liberty for the individual, Rousseau has rendered the virtue of paternal piety and a 
wife's obedience to her husband a sort of bondage, "natural feelings" as some thing 
artificial, and social hierarchy a contrivance to legalize inequality. 47 According to 
Burke, this rebellious education "vitiate[s] the whole community"; it "subvert[s] those 
principles of domestic trust and fidelity, which constitute the discipline of social 
life. ,,48 It "propagate [s] principles by which every servant may think it, if not his 
duty, at least his privilege to betray his master." Finally, by this education "every 
considerable father of a family loses the sanctuary of his house. ,,49 
The tensions in Scott's fonnulations of the domestic and paternal relationships and 
the way he proposes to solve them show that he resists Burke's idea of "feelings" that 
underpin absolute loyalty and obedience (thus also underpinning absolute loyalty to 
the monarch) but also rejects the absolute rational individualism of Godwin. In 
seeking to resolve this tension perhaps he approaches the "contractualism" suggested 
by Mary Wollstonecraft in maintaining the right to revolt when paternal (or spousal or 
monarchical) authority becomes obviously tyrannical. Yet Scott never presents a 
contract of mutual respect for the others' interests as a wholly rational procedure but 
one that expresses an original bond of feeling involving not only interest but identity 
also. Many of the plots of the novels, especially in Rob Roy and Redgaulltlet, explore 
this tension and move towards the reestablishment of a different kind of paternal 
authority and filial respect. 
Burke, analyzing French affairs, shows how the efforts exerted to destroy the 
family were equally accompanied by efforts to destroy religion, which he describes as 
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the "basis of civil society, and the source of all good and comfort. ,,50 According to 
him, "the literary cabal," Rousseau especially, "had some years ago formed something 
like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion. ,,51 This plan reached 
its climax when the land of the church was expropriated. Burke's account of the 
process by which Church property was fIrst confIscated and then fed into the market 
reveals how much he was appalled to see that the power of money could determine 
the future of a whole nation. The few, "economists and calculators," who possess the 
money are now the real authority on all levels. 52 They, directly or behind the scene, 
can appoint clergy, steer the economy, engineer politics, invent laws, and introduce 
new social-moral values in a way that serves their own individual interests at the 
expense of public interest. Robbing the Church of its means of financial independence 
(independence is a key word for civic virtue) exposes the whole institution to the 
"depredation of the market. ,,53 It is clear that while Burke presents religion as a 
source of moral values he does not deal with any progression in religious views. 
Ironically, he neglects the expropriation of Church lands under Henry VITI which 
founded the Church of England, something that might spring to mind in connection 
with the French disestablishment of the Catholic Church. Burke's defence of the 
Church seems to be only instrumental and does not reflect a serious willingness to 
give the Church a sort of political power, though apparently it seems to have a role in 
supporting the status quo. By the time Burke was writing, the Church itself as a 
political force had already become marginalized, as Musselwhite points out. For 
Musselwhite, Burke, like Coleridge, defends the Church as a notion or "Idea ... of a 
kind of civic institution responsible for welfare and learning," and as "some kind of 
bastion against the unbridled materialism which he sees coming into being with the 
French Revolution. ,,54 In this sense, it could be argued that Scott converges with 
Burke in his recognition of the role of religion in social-moral affairs but, unlike 
Burke, his view of religion is critical and progressi ve, as we shall see in the chapters 
on Old Mortality and The Heart of Midlothian. 
It is not unnatural to argue that unbridled materialism III economy is like 
"fanaticism" in religion. Both operate according to wild inhumane passions and lead 
to the destruction of natural society. Pocock fmds a similarity between Burke's usage 
of the term "energy" in dealing with hard commerce, speculation in the public credit 
and selling and buying bonds and stock shares, and Hume's view of the term 
"enthusiasm" in dealing with religious fanaticism. Both passions suspend "all the 
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nonnal relations between effects and their causes which accounted for social 
behaviour.,,55 "Neither David Hume, Adam Smith, nor Burke," according to Pocock, 
"was free of the nightmare that multiplying paper credit might end by destroying the 
value and even the meaning of property, the foundation alike of virtue, manners and 
natural relations of society. ,,56 If Scott suggests in Old Mortality a dose of toleration 
as a way of curbing fanatic passions in the religious sphere, Burke proposes, in 
Pocock's view, a strategy based on refIning and polishing "manners" for controlling 
the explosive "energy" in the economic sphere under a rubric of "commercial 
humanism." But even here Burke's paradigm of "commercial humanism" seems to 
take a bent different from that of Hume or Smith. Burke invokes Chivalric mrumers 
associated with ecclesiastical and aristocratic ideals, for its foundation. According to 
Pocock, Burke asserts that commerce "can flourish only under the protection of 
manners, and that manners require the pre-eminence of religion and nobility, the 
natural protectors of society. To overthrow religion and nobility, therefore, is to 
destroy the possibility of commerce itself ,,57 Hume and Smith understand the 
relationship between manners and commerce the other way round. The nature of 
commerce, in their view, imposes new values that determine morality and shape 
social relationships in a way that makes, for instance, credibility, punctuality, and 
abiding by tenns of contracts, no less committing than the notion of honour as 
employed in the chivalric sense. 
Chivalry in Burke's lexicon is in the main employed to support his overall 
ideology which at least in the case of France rests on exempting kings and queens, 
aristocracy, priests and magistrates from any accountability for their misconduct. In 
this sense, the "age of chivalry is gone" indeed.58 But if he means by chivalry a code 
of virtue: helping the weak against oppression and cruelty, generosity, loyalty and so 
on, then Burke's argument is ambiguous-the French Revolution could be 
considered, perhaps, an act of chivalry when it alleviates the oppression, grievances 
and deprivation exercised by king, queen, nobility, priest and magistrate imposed on 
the majority of poor people. 
Scott's novels pose the question of chivalric virtues in a different way in that he 
works out compromises and reinterpretations that would keep their positive values 
intact. He approaches chivalric virtues not in tenns of the Middle Ages, but rather 
attempts to transfer them to the present context (often using anachronisms as in Rob 
Roy or Redgauntlet) and extends them to all members of a given society so that it 
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becomes a code of social-moral behaviour in which all individuals, regardless of 
status and rank, are bolllld to behave honourably to each other. The villain in Scott's 
novels is the one who violates this code. While in some cases magistrates, priests and 
even queens are presented as dishonest, in other cases ordinary people are presented 
as symbols of chivalry. Scott, unlike Burke, is not a political theorist but rather a 
social and moral scientist whose philosophy is based on close observation of the 
workings of historical forces in shaping and reshaping culture in its entirety. 
Scott and Nation 
For Scott, Scottish history is a vital resource, as a kind of laboratory specimen of 
cultural change. It can display the integrity of a national tradition, giving a guide to 
values which English society is in danger of losing itself and destroying in Scotland 
by "colonial" assimilation. In this aspect Scott is linked to writers like Robert Burns 
and James Macpherson, who "create" Scotland's national identity during the 
eighteenth century. These writers stress that the British nation is not homogeneous. 
Their writings present a complicated view of the divisions between Scottish and 
English identity, showing the existence of difference within an ostensible picture of 
national unity. Given such complication, Scott's model of history and progress, unlike 
Burke's, suggests that the English model alone is not an ideal which deserves 
hegemony, at least in terms of culture and virtue, over the British nation. Scott's 
experience of the way of life of the Borderers enables him to offer a more practical 
model for the British nation based, in Leith Davis's words, on "an ideal mixture of 
unity with diversity. ,,59 
Union with England for the Scots, separatists and pro-unionists, was most often 
viewed as problematic when it comes to Scotland's real representation at the level of 
nation in terms of identity, culture and interest. Murray Pittock points out that while 
"Passionate anti-Unionists" viewed the Union as "an act of slavery, which cut their 
COlllltry adrift from its past, and bound it to English ends," pro-Unionists "were 
conscious of its dual interpretation: in Scotland, a partnership; in England, 
possession. ,,60 Despite Scott's pro-Union attitude, in the tradition of the Scottish 
Whigs, Smith, Hume and Millar, Scott's awareness of this dual interpretation surfaces 
in almost all his novels in the form of resistance to English cultural pressure to 
assimilate Scotland. Leith Davis shows that Scott's work, both his poetry and novels, 
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follow the trajectory of writers like Robert Burns and James Macpherson in this 
respect. These writers, according to Davis, display resistance to the idea of Britain as 
represented by one ethnic group, the English, but view the British nation as an 
invention, which should recognize the heterogeneity of cultures and histories of its 
component nations. "Inventing" Britain on this basis, they suggest, could be achieved 
through a continuous process of cultural "Dialogism" or "negotiation." Their \\Ti tings 
struggle with finding a way in which "to simultaneously acknowledge and also 
downplay internal difference.,,61 In fact, the relationship between Bailie Nicol Jarvie 
and Rob Roy in one of its parts serves this "Dialogism." 
Yet, as Davis points out, Scott's method and intention in inventing the Scottish 
cultural identity and presenting it to the British nation show differences between him 
and his predecessors. Macpherson's Ossian, a bold forgery, highlights ''the 
impressive spirit of chivalry of the Scots" but lacks "accuracy." Burns, on the other 
hand, offers an authentic image of Scotland but lacks the "chivalrous feeling" and 
"the masculine energy which Scott wanted to associate with the Scottish nation." 
Scott's model of a national identity "combined masculine chivalry with 
authenticity.,,62 While the first reveals Scott's interest in the values connected with 
heroic and civic virtues, the second reveals Scott's scientific approach in the tradition 
of the Scottish Enlightemnent in tracing cultural change especially in his novels that 
deal with Scottish-English conflict, most prominently in Waverley. Ifwe are allowed, 
using Edward Said's rhetoric, to draw an analogy between the effort exerted by the 
Orientalists to present the Orient to the Occidental world as they wanted it to be for 
ideological reasons, Scott's representation of Scotland to English readers could be 
seen as confronting rather than serving their prejudices. 63 Ideologically, Scott's 
realism contributes to Britain's present in two ways. In one way, it can give a guide to 
the process of change itself, "mirroring" contemporary experience and suggesting 
ways of containing the anarchic forces threatening both realms. In another way, 
"writing the Union," Scott attempts complex acts of reconciliation in a literary 
anticipation of future joint progress, most obviously in the conclusion of The Heart of 
Midlothian. 
Scott, in short, seems to suggest that recognition of cultural heterogeneity and 
partnership rather than a sense of prejudice and superiority can be a source of richness 
and complementation in an imagined Britain, instead of being a source of division or 
conflict. The exploits of the Highland troops in the later eighteenth and earl\' 
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nineteenth centuries, as Pittock points out, "provided the seed com for a resuscitation 
of the Jacobite 'patriot Highlander' motif in the guise of the adoption of tartan by 
lowland Scots who would have despised it and its wearers 50 years earlier. ,,64 The 
military prowess of the "patriot Highlander," although it uniquely refers to an ethnic 
culture, is defmed in terms of and contributes to the British nation as a whole. 
Prospectus 
The first chapter argues that Scott's historicism is not the product of a divided 
personality: a mixture of Romantic and Enlightenment attitudes, of sympathy or 
nostalgia and rationalism or progressivism. Rather it is derived from the so-called 
"philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment. For these writers, 
individualism of modem commercial society had been a problematic development, 
since unchecked individualism might ultimately undermine social cohesion necessary 
for all human flourishing. Scott is thus the inheritor of a rationalist, progressive 
philosophy of history, but one with well-defmed reservations about progress and 
modernity. To support my argument I attempt to investigate Scott's view of history 
and progress in his non-fictional Tales of a Grandfather. 
The second chapter questions the traditional reading of Waverley as a mixture of 
Romantic nostalgia and Enlightenment scepticism about "primitive" societies. 
According to this reading, Edward Waverly, through his participation with a Highland 
clan in the doomed Jacobite insurrection of 1745, learns that the heroic virtues of the 
past, though "valid" in their own day and still emotionally attractive, are no longer 
viable and must give way to the duller but more civilized values of the present. 
Scott's Highlanders, I show, function not simply as colourful quasi-Romantic 
primitives, but as an embodiment, in certain respects, of civic virtue. Waverley 
himself, I argue, is not the hero of a conventional bourgeois Bildungsroman, but a 
representative modem type, the post civic Man of Feeling, targeted by the cultural 
criticism of the Scottish Enlightenment. Taken as a whole, the novel could be seen as 
a Scottish Enlightenment parable on the indispensability of "ci vic virtue." 
The third chapter deals with Old Mortality, a novel now often read as a sort of 
Hobbesian critique of the seventeenth-century British civil wars. Indeed, the civic 
virtue of the parties involved in the contlict is displayed in such a light that seHish 
individualism might seem preferable. But on comparing the novel's treatment of the 
21 
civil wars to that of David Hume'sHistory of England, I show that Old Alortality is a 
profoWld meditation on the fundamentally social constitution of human nature. 
Scott's derisive treatment of the Puritans and mildly preferential treatment of the 
Royalists is not motivated by some Tory bias, but, as with Hume, by an intense 
distrust of radical Protestant individualism. Scott is in fact defending rather than 
belittling pUblic-spiritedness. 
ill the fourth chapter dealing with Rob Ray, Scott, I argue, undercuts the Jacobite-
Hanoverian political conflict by reducing it to a sort of clash of cultures, which 
nevertheless share certain values. The contrast highlights the merit of civic virtues, 
loyalty and altruism, and calls for updating and integrating them in the present. Using 
Pocock's seminal work, Virtue, Commerce, and History, I show that the novel 
attempts a combination of Honour and Credit within a legal and humane framework 
to meet commercial needs, mitigate hard commerce and defme social relationships. 
Through the hero and the heroine, Scott attempts a synthesis of the otherwise 
antagonistic principles of Burke on the one hand, and Paine and Godwin on the other, 
concerning domestic and filial affairs. The virtue of paternal piety, as a cohesive 
force, is redefmed as mutual respect for one another's interest not on a wholly rational 
basis but according to the original bond of feeling. By the same token, Scott 
recognizes the law of inheritance but submits it to civil law. 
The fifth chapter deals with The Heart of Midlothian. Unlike Old Mortality, it 
calls, through the enlightened minister, David Butler, for regenerating the 
establishment of religion on a rational, progressive and humane basis for ideological 
reasons connected with civic virtue, Scottish identity, and contemporary debate 
envisaging a resolution for social and economical problems. Scott, through the 
heroine, Jeanie Deans, who guided by religious teachings in developing moral 
autonomy, proposes to define virtue in teffils of religious piety instead of relating it to 
economic independence. The novel, I show, treats mundane authority, unified and 
fragmented, as fragile in teffils of virtue and humanity and falls short of maintaining 
justice unless it is guided by moral autonomy. Through his pedagogical-ideological 
project, Scott, I argue, establishes a sort of dialogue between Scotland and England in 
a literary anticipation of future joint progress, most obviously in the conclusion of the 
novel. This dialogue displays the integrity of a national tradition, giving a guide to 
values, which English society is in danger of losing itself through luxury and trade in 
slavery and destroying in Scotland by "colonial" assimilation. 
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The sixth chapter on Redgauntlet attempts to seek an answer for Scott's retwn to 
the subject of Jacobitism. The major answer, I argue, reflects Scott's interest in 
highlighting the social and moral values of ancient virtues, particularly the notions of 
loyalty and honour, and how and why they become problematic in the process of 
cultural transformation. The novel, I show, suggests that total abandoning of such 
virtues in favour of excessive individualism, as the hero, Darsie Latimer does, is no 
less alienating and unacceptable than Redgauntlet's literal adherence to old principles. 
In order to solve this paradox, the novel transfers the spirit of these virtues to the 
present, extending it to various contexts. In social relationships loyalty is defmed as 
behaving honourably by others regardless of affiliation, while in the context of law 
and justice, it is modified to operate under the rubric of personal integrity and civil 
courage. In the political context, it is determined by national consensus. In the 
economic context, it supports advancement as long as it operates within communal 
interest. 
The concluding chapter uses Guy Mannering, The Antiquary and The Bride of 
Lammermoor to support the thesis that Scott's fictional dealings with history in the 
"Scottish" novels is directed to an accommodation of ancient virtues with present 
forms of society and nationhood. 
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Chapter One 
Scott's Historicism 
In his 1992 article in The New Republic, Irving Howe remarks that for a century 
Sir Walter Scott 
not only remained the great favourite of the reading public but also e'\erted 
a major influence on writers in Europe and America. But then-it's hard to 
give an exact date-something remarkable happened. Scott lost his grip on 
the imagination of the public, and except in schools, where Ivanhoe was still 
wearily assigned, he came to be treated as a worthy historical relic. 1 
What can explain this fall from canonicity? How could a writer freely coupled with 
Shakespeare for much of the nineteenth century have been reduced to a footnote in 
the twentieth? Howe's answer reflects what has long been and perhaps is still the 
prevailing view of Scott among Anglo-American readers: 
At fIrst, the culture of romanticism welcomed his gift for the picturesque; 
but then that culture came to favour a complex psychology of character that 
was quite beyond Scott's reach. Dickens and George Eliot borrowed here 
and there from Scott, but they also left him far behind. 2 
The values that determine canonicity, however, have to a great extent swung back to 
those of the nineteenth-century, though with far greater critical rigor and self-
consciousness. Individual psychology and "character" have given way to larger ideas 
of nationalism and colonialism, while interest in Gothicism and romance has 
reopened discussion of Scott's technique3. 
Now Scott is the subject of an increasing number of books and articles, the evident 
aim of which is to carve out a place for him at the centre of contemporary literary and 
cultural studies. Scott seems to be of special interest to critics of a new-historicist or 
cultural-materialist bent. Marlon Ross, for example, has suggested that Scott's 
medievalism provides a key to the ideological structure of British Romanticism-that 
Scott, for so long excluded from the company of his "High Romantic" contemporaries 
is in certain respects the archetypal Romantic Tory, indulging in unchecked nostalgia 
for a romanticized past. 4 It is worth noting here that Ross is writing about Scott's 
poetry rather than his novels; and therefore, his characterization of Scott is deeply 
problematic at least from the perspective of other "revisionist" criticism that has 
generally rebutted charges such as Ross's and has ditTerentiated sharply between 
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Scott's Torysim, grounded, at least in part, in eighteenth-century rationalism, and th~ 
misty organicism of the Lake School and other Romantic converts to the right. In 
Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries, for example, Marilyn Butler couples Scott 
with Maria Edgeworth as an Enlightenment intellectual, socially conservative but 
reformist in principle. Despite the avowed Toryism of his real-life politics, she 
argues, "Scott in his writing is less clearly sectarian"; his novels, in fact, "read like 
those of an out-and-out liberal. ,,5 Given the Marxist cast of Ross's essay it is 
. , 
surprising that he is silent about Lukacs, probably the most important of Scott's 
"revisionists." When Ross claims that Scott is "rewriting history as a romance, ,,6 or 
distorting the past for right-wing ideological purposes, he is simply recapitulating the 
view of Scott that Lukacs dismissed over fifty years ago as "vulgar sociology.,,7 A 
full discussion of the intellectual basis of Scott's politics will be conducted in the 
course of this chapter. 
Other critics have made even more startling revisionist claims, transforming Scott 
from the patron saint of Biedenneyer to an early post-modernist. For Bruce 
Beiderwell, Scott's novels anticipate Foucault, "both comment ring] upon and 
represent [ing] ... the shift from thinking of punishment as the infliction of pain to 
thinking of punishment as part of an elaborate machinery of control. ,,8 Judith Wilt, 
meanwhile, offers us a Derridean Scott, who "dramatizes in ways that seem quite 
recognizable to contemporary thought the victory of two linked modem principles, 
male rationality and textualized language, over their progenitors, female enchantment 
or mystery and performati ve speech." Lest we mistake Scott for a phallogocentrist 
who might welcome this victory, Wilt hastens to assure us that The Author of 
Waverley was all along "lay [ing]. .. mines under history, rationality, knowability, 
textuality, the novel, and himself. ,,9 James Kerr, similarly, presents Scott as a radical 
historicist and precursor of Hayden White: 
Scott constructed his fictional project around the relationship between the 
language of fiction and historical reality, the possibility of grasping the 
movements of history in the language of fiction, and the denial of that 
possibility. .., "Fiction" and "history" are verbal worlds for Scott, forms of 
understanding that appear at one moment radically disparate, at another 
virtually indistinguishable. 10 
Given this revival of interest in Scott, we might consider turning Howe's question on 
its head: Why has Scott, left for dead for the better part of a century, been resuscitated 
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by a generation of critics who have set themselves the task of laying so many other 
"worthy relics" of the nineteenth century to rest? 
Luckily, this question does not require us to navigate any impassable critical gulfs. 
"Revisionist" criticism of Scott is not a sudden growth. In fact, the current 
revisionism grows out of an earlier revisionist episode that began as early as the 
1950's, when Scott's reputation had reached its nadir. 1bis episode was initlated 
largely by David Daiches' essay on "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist" (1951) and 
Georg Lukacs' laudatory treatment of Scott in The Historical Novel (first available in 
English translation in 1962). Books and articles followed through the '60's and '70's, 
so that by the mid-1980s, when the second wave of revisionism began to advance, 
there was already a solid body of work at hand, much of it purporting to show that 
Scott was, if not post-modern, at least profoundly modem. The fIrst wave made the 
second plausible and perhaps inevitable. 
Both waves of revisionists attempted to save Scott for the twentieth century by 
making him into a novelist of ideas. This transformation may have been necessitated 
by a growing awareness of the artistic deficiencies noted by Howe, but it was 
successful (at least where it was not ignored) because the ideas attributed to Scott 
were attractive to contemporary readers. Here again, the first wave anticipated the 
second, focusing on Scott's treatment of history and cultural change. Edgar Johnson, 
Scott's chief modem biographer, summarizes the new view with the help of G. M. 
Trevelyan, one of its earliest exponents: 
What Scott does-and for the first time in either fiction or history-is to 
dramatize the basic processes of history. He created a revolution, Trevelyan 
notes, by being the frrst to show that "thoughts and morals vary according to 
the period, the province, the class, the man. " ... Without Scott to have 
shown the way, Carlyle, Macaulay, Parkman, Motley, Prescott, Froude, 
Michelet, Taine, Greene, Trevelyan, Bryant, and even Toynbee could hardly 
have achieved their triumphs. II 
To this impressive list Hugh Trevor-Roper adds Leopold Ranke, who claimed that 
reading Quentin Durward was the crucial event in his career as a historian. 12 For the 
first revisionists, then, Scott, was no longer a hack novelist, a century out of date, but 
a man ahead of his time: the father of the "historical school" and the frrst historicist 
historian. 
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Much of the flrst revisionist criticism was dedicated to elucidating the nature and 
implications of Scott's supposed historicism. For Trevelyan, Scott's historicism seems 
to have consisted mainly of determinism-the notion that individual behaviour is 
dictated by varying historical, social, or economic circumstances. Other revisionists, 
however, claimed to see an even deeper historicism. Scott, in their view, was the fIrst 
imaginative \\Titer to abolish the transhistorical "Man" of the Enlightenment and 
earlier ages, the frrst to see that not just the outward forms of behaviour but even 
human nature itself is subject to historical change. Like Hegel, he saw that each 
nation and period of history is a unique and incommensurable being, with its O\\>TI 
Zeitgeist (soul). Like Herder, he saw that each nation and period expresses its unique 
being in an equally unique Weltanschauung (world-view), its own set of morals, 
political, aesthetic, and perhaps even scientifIc "truths." Scott, in short, was an 
intuitive cultural relativist, who recognized and affirmed the equal validity of 
incommensurable cultures. This advance, revisionists argued, is what made Scott the 
flrst real historical novelist, since it allowed him to treat pre-modem characters both 
more realistically and more fairly than his predecessors had. He understood that pre-
modern men must be expected to act and think differently from modem men and that 
it was useless to blame them, as Enlightenment historians so often had, for doing so. 
Thus, when the second wave of revisionists had appeared on the scene, they found 
a Scott already palatable to a post-modernist sensibility. In other words, Scott had 
somehow learned to "historicize" everything-{)r almost everything. All that was left 
was for Scott to historicize the intellectual operations by which he had arrived at his 
supposed historicism-to lay mines under history, rationality, and knowability. Past 
cultures would then be not simply incommensurable with modernity but actually 
unintelligible to it; history would become just another kind of flction, a tabula rasa 
waiting for the impress of some contemporary ideology. Having just taken this last 
step themselves, perhaps Scott's critics thought it churlish to leave their author behind. 
At any rate, Scott now appears to have graduated from the historicism of Herder and 
Hegel to the radical historicism of Nietzche, Heidegger, and their French disciples. 13 
While I agree with both waves of revisionists that Scott's understanding of history 
is profoWld and worthy of study, I would argue that the flrst wave erred in flnding 
historicism as the basis of that understanding and that the second wave has simply 
compounded the error. Lack of space makes this and the following sections mainly 
concerned with the argument of the frrst wave, which I take to be more plausible and 
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probably more durable than its successor. Further, the second wave's arglll11ent is 
logically and genealogically dependent on the fIrst wave's; if the former arglll11ent 
falls, so does the latter. For if Scott is not a historicist at all, he can hardl y be a radical 
historicist. In the flIst section of this chapter I will flIst attempt to show how Scott's 
first revisionists arrived at their answer, in which they refer the origin of Scott's 
alleged historicism to a tale of two Scotts, and to suggest why they are mistaken. I 
will then open the main argument of the following sections: that Scott's treatment of 
history is best understood not in the light of nineteenth-century Continental 
philosophies of history but in the light of a philosophy of historicism much nearer to 
home-that of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment. 
For many of the flISt revisionists, the case for Scott's historicism rests on his 
apparent rejection of the Enlightenment notion of historically uniform human nature. 
As Donald Davie remarks, "it is ... one of the most serious questions that can be asked 
of the whole Waverley series, whether in these novels Scott believes in a constant 
'nature' in this sense, or not. ,,14 Davie and a majority of other revisionist critics 
believe that he does not. Whatever conviction this view of Scott carries, it carries 
mainly because of his representations of character and event, not because of any 
authorial comments on the "historical process." As Georg Lukacs argues, Scott's 
alleged predecessors generally failed to see their characters "historically." Thus 
Lesage, for instance, was "able to transfer his highly truthful pictures of the France of 
his day to [medieval] Spain and still feel quite at ease. ,,15 In Scott, on the other hand, 
we have characters like Baron Bradwardine in Waverley, whose insistence on 
removing the boots of Prince Charles after the Battle of Prestonpans seems 
inexplicable except in historical terms-in this case the mixture of chivalry, pedantry, 
and family pride that constituted the culture of an eighteenth-century Scottish 
aristocrat. ill their thoughts and actions, Scott's great characters really do differ from 
us, and in a way that clearly reflects their different cultural inheritances. Such 
characters are certainly more historically realistic than those of earlier historical 
novelists, and perhaps even more than those who peopled the genuine histories of 
David Hwne and other Enlightenment historians. 
But no nwnber of examples to this effect would be sufficient to prove Scott a 
historicist. 16 One of Lukacs' virtues as a critic of Scott is that his understanding of 
intellectual history prevents him from making such an argument, as literary critics 
~1 
who admire Scott have so often done. "When analyzing the prehistory of the 
historical novel," he writes: 
One must break with the Romantic-reactionary legend which denies to the 
Enlightenment any sense or understanding of history and attributes the 
invention of the historical sense to the opponents of the French Revolution: 
Burke, de Maistre, etc. One need only think of the extraordinan' historical 
achievements of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Gibbon, etc. , in order" to cut this 
legend down to size. 17 
While retaining the idea that human nature is at some level uniform, the historians of 
the Enlightenment were nevertheless perfectly aware that the Greeks or Romans or 
medieval men they wrote about were not simply modern French or Englishmen in 
fancy dress, and that earlier peoples' habits of feeling or thought were not always 
identical to their own. 18 Nevertheless, for the Enlightenment, all such differences 
were adventitious, mere accidents of history in no way affecting essential human 
nature. It therefore remained possible for a Hume or a Gibbon to examine and 
criticize the beliefs and institutions of past societies according to what he believed to 
be transhistorical standards. Some beliefs and institutions allowed human nature to 
flourish; others merely corrupted it. The "historical sense," as Lukacs understood it, 
preceded historicism proper. It is therefore difficult to locate a historicist idea or 
intention behind Scott's novels, however clearly they illustrate their author's 
remarkable "historical sense." Scott might simply have been improving on the 
Enlightenment's historiographical techniques without departing from its basic belief. 
Recourse to Scott's discursive prose does not help to clarify his position, at least to 
the satisfaction of those who wish to place him among the fathers of historicism. In 
fact, the relevant statements, though few, are well known and cannot in any way be 
construed as favouring the historicist position. The locus classicus is the introductory 
chapter of Waverley itself, where Scott discusses the difficulties of dealing with 
events "Sixty Years since": 
Considering the disadvantages inseparable from this part of my subject, I 
must be understood to have resolved to avoid them as much as possible, by 
throwing the force of my narrative upon the characters and passions of the 
actors;-those passions common to men in all stages of society, and which 
have alike agitated the human heart, whether it throbbed under the steel 
corslet of the fitleenth century, the brocaded coat of the eighteenth, or the 
blue frock and white dimity waistcoat of the present day. Upon these 
passions it is no doubt true that the state of manners and laws casts a 
necessary colouring; but the bearings, to use the language of heraldry, 
remain the same, though the tincture may not only be different, but opposed 
in strong contradistinction. The wrath of our ancestors, for example, was 
coloured gules; it broke forth in sanguinary violence against the objects of 
its fury. Our malignant feelings, which must seek gratification through more 
indirect channels, and lll1dennine the obstacles which they cannot openly 
bear down, may be rather said to be tinctured sable. But the deep-ruling 
impulse is the same in both cases; and the proud peer who can now onl\' 
ruin his neighbour according to law, by protracted suits, is the genuin~ 
descendant of the baron who wrapped the castle of his competitor in flames, 
and knocked him on the head as he endeavoured to escape the cont1agration. 
It is from the great book of Nature, the same through a thousand editions, 
whether black-letter, or wire-wove and hot-pressed, that I have venturously 
essayed to read a Chapter to the Public. 19 . 
"This," as Donald Davie points out, "constitutes a plea for the thoroughly neoclassical 
principle that the business of the artist is with 'nature,' meaning by that the constant 
elements in human nature to be detected beneath the adventitious distinctions of 
period, race, trade." At the same time, Davie rightly reminds us, the quoted passage 
comes from one of the chapters of Waverley written in 1805, before Scott turned 
novelist in earnest, and does not necessarily apply to the rest of the novel, which was 
written about seven years later. 20 For David Devlin and many others, the 
"understanding of history" demonstrated there and in the following novels was 
possible only when Scott "began to qualify the Enlightenment view that human nature 
was lUlchangeable. ,,21 We are once again thrown back on our interpretation of the 
novels themselves: as Lukacs says, "Scott ranks among those great writers whose 
depth is manifest mainly in their work. ,,22 
The apparent circularity of this reasoning might tempt us to argue that Scott's most 
important revisionist critics, beginning with Lukacs, have been historicists 
themsel ves, and that they have simply read their own historicism into Scott in their 
efforts to save him for modernity. But I do not think that this is the case. Scott's 
critics have turned him into a historicist not by wilfully misreading his novels, but by 
over-emphasizing a misleading psycho-biographical subtext in them. Scott, in this 
view, has no conscious philosophy of history, so it is useless for us to expect him to 
articulate one in either his fiction or his non-fictions. The basis for his treatment of 
history is to be sought not in some idea or theory underl~ing his novels, but in his 
complex, ambivalent attitude toward his historical subject matter. Scott has thus been 
made into a novelist of ideas at the expense of his own. 
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Scott's ambivalence about the past has always been recognized. Even Lockhart, 
for example, noted the telling passage in Scott's letters where he declines to \\Tite a 
biography of Mary, Queen of Scots because "his opinion" of her, as an enlightened 
modern historian, is "contrary to his feeling" as Scotsman.23 Another letter, to a Miss 
Clephane, apparently conveying Scott's attitude toward the Jacobite rebellion depicted 
in Waverley, is cited at some point in nearly every full-length study of his novels: 
Seriously I am very glad I did not live in 1745 for though as a lawyer I 
could not have pleaded [prince] Charles's right [to the throne] and as a 
clergy man I could not have prayed for him yet as a soldier I would I am 
sure against the convictions of my better reason have fought for him even to 
the bottom of the gallows. 24 
Virginia Woolf was on the same track in her review of the Tait edition of Scott's 
Journal, where she singles out the incident of his installing gas lighting in relic-filled 
Abbotsford as deeply characteristic of the Author of Waverley. 25 Scott, in short, was 
a "divided personality." On the one side, he was a reactionary, longing for the past; 
on the other, he was a progressive, pleased with the present and certain that the past 
was beyond recall. 
The first writer to translate this biographical subtext into a complete theory of 
Scott's novels seems to have been Coleridge. According to Coleridge, the Waverley 
novels embody 
the contest between the two great moving principles of social humanity[:] 
religious adherence to the past and ancient, the desire and admiration of 
permanence, on the one hand; and the passion for increase of knowledge, 
for truth as the offspring of reason-in short, the mighty instincts of 
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progressi on and free agency, on the other. 
Twentieth-century revisionists have echoed this argument repeatedly, explaining 
Scott's novels in general, and his view of history in particular, in terms of tension or 
conflict between two "mighty" but opposite "instincts." 
The first revisionist to derive Scott's view of history from his temperament was 
Lukacs, whose rigorous materialism compelled him to reject all attempts to locate 
textual sources for Scott's historicism. 27 F or Lukacs, Scott was a great historian 
because his personal honesty compelled him to see and represent the world as it really 
is· his "realistic mastery" of his material allowed him to escape the "personal views 
, 
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and prejudices" he may elsewhere have entertained.28 But paradoxically, Lukacs 
adds, "this objectivity" is actually 
heightened by Scott's conservatism. His world-view ties him very closely 
to those sections of society which had been precipitated into ruin b\" the 
industrial revolution and the rapid growth of capitalism. Scott beiongs 
neither with the ardent enthusiasts of this development, nor \\ ith the 
pathetic, passionate indicters. . .. Scott ranks among those honest Tories in 
the England of his time who exonerate nothing in the deVelopment of 
capitalism, who not only see clearly, but also deeply sympathize with the 
~n~ding misery of the people which the collapse of the old England brings 
ill Its wake; yet who, precisely because of their conservatism, display no 
violent opposition to the features of the new development repudiated hv 
them. 29 . 
Scott's native conservatism thus seems to have pulled him two ways at once, enabling 
him to see the past more clearly and more favourably than "ardent" bourgeois 
progressives did and yet preventing him from falling into the "passionate" 
reactionaryism of the Romantic Tory. In a sense, Scott carried on with himself the 
debate that Robert Southey and T. B. Macaulay were to carry on in public, and from it 
emerged a more subtle understanding of history than either public debater could 
claim. For Lukacs, the key to Scott's novels is not some overt philosophy of history 
but their author's "divided personality." 
The classic "divided personality" formula was established by David Daiches in his 
seminal essay on "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist" and a later essay on "Sir Walter 
Scott and History." In the latter essay, however, Daiches appears to be less adverse to 
the notion of influence-hunting than Lukacs, and refers Scott's personal ambivalence 
back to the two ways that Scots in general learned to cope with the absorption of their 
once independent kingdom into Great Britain. On the one hand, he argues, were 
Anglicizing philosophers and economists like David Hume and Adam Smith, who 
proudly emphasized the rapidity of their country's modernization since the Union, and 
tended to look patronizingly on its past. On the other hand were the poets and 
antiquarians, such as Robert Bums and Allan Ramsay, who "tried to compensate" for 
Scotland's loss ofpolitica1 independence "on the cultural level" by reviving interest in 
old poetry and in the now debased Scots English dialect in which it had been 
written. 3O According to Daiches, Scott "drew equal nourishment" from both the 
"progressive" and the "nostalgic" movements of his era?l Or, as Daiches suggests in 
his Introduction to Scott's Heart of Midlothian, Scott was a man whose "head urged 
the necessity of coming to tenns with progress, with commercial civilization, with the 
non-heroic modem world," while "his heart yearned for the 'crowded hour of glorious 
life' which only the old way of life could provide. ,,32 
This "dual vision" is probably most apparent in those novels which deal with the 
Jacobite cause, often thought of as the last grasp of the old romantic Scotland. 33 
"Underlying ... these novels," Daiches argues in his first essay on Scott: "is a tragic 
sense of the inevi tabili ty of a drab but necessary progress, a sense of the impotence of 
the traditional kind of heroism, a passionately regretful awareness that the Good Old 
cause was lost for ever and the glory of Scotland must give way to her interest. ,,34 
Scott, in other words, understood the ambiguities of progress. He accepted both the 
complacent superiority of the economists and the sentimentality of the poets; he saw 
with the "nostalgic" movement the value of the old ways, and with the "progressive" 
their inevitable obsolescence. Thus, although "there is no overt philosophy about the 
meaning of history in Scott's novels," they do "attain to a fresh and deeper reading of 
the events" they deal with than history books had in the past. 35 
This "fresh and deeper reading," I would argue, amounts to a sort of makeshift, 
sub-philosophical historicism, although Daiches never actually calls it that. When he 
attempts to characterize the intellectual concerns that emerge from Scott's emotional 
ambivalence, Daiches maintains that Scott is above all interested in the viability of an 
older social code. Through the chivalrous Baron Bradwardine in Waverley, for 
instance, Scott exposes the danger and absurdity of clinging to a code which has 
outlived its purpose and no longer operates usefully in society. At the same time, by 
developing sympathy for characters who cling to such codes, he suggests that "though 
progress is inevitable and desirable, the agents of progress are not always morally 
good nor are its victims morally bad. ,,36 Scott's mix of "nostalgia" and 
"progressivism" thus leads him to adopt an essentially historicist outlook: past social 
codes are no longer valid; yet they are not to be judged in hindsight by current 
standards or by some absolute, transhistorical standard like "nature," as the 
Enlightenment thought, but on their own tenns-that is, by their fitness or viability 
with respect to the specific historical situations in which they originally arose. 
Thomas Crawford draws the conclusion toward which Daiches' argwnent naturally 
leads when he writes that history in Scott, as in Hegel can be understood as a "war of 
good against good," as a constant struggle between a social code relative to a passing 
historical situation and a code relative to an emerging one. 37 
Later revisionist critics have been less conservative than Daiches in inferring 
historicism from Scott's emotional ambivalence. In his own essay on "Sir Walter 
Scott and History," the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, for example, argues that Scott, 
"more than any other writer, forced the transition from the 18th-century philosophy of 
history ... to the 19th -century philosophy of history." The weakness of the earlier 
historians, says Trevor-Roper, was their "lack of sympathy with the past," their 
insistence on measuring the past by the present, "as if the values of the present were 
absolute. ,,38 Scott, like these historians, remained committed to the present: 
Where he differed from his predecessors was in his sympathy. Admitting 
the advantage, or necessity, of progress, he nevertheless sought to 
appreciate a different form of society within its own context: to allow that 
the past is autonomous, that it is not to be judged by the present, that its 
values are its own and having their own coherence, are as legitimate as 
ours. 39 
This sympathy, according to Trevor-Roper, is "essentially 'romantic'." Thus, although 
Scott's "sympathy was controlled by his understanding" and his historical 
"imagination" governed by his reason,,,4Q he 
was also, in some sense, a romantic: a part-time romantic perhaps ... but a 
genuine romantic still-a romantic in the style of Herder. It was from this 
combination-this unresolved conflict, perhaps--of romanticism and 
modernity that he drew his peculiar historical philosophy. 41 
In short, romantic sympathy with the past plus Enlightenment rationalism and belief 
in progress equals historicism. 
The longstanding conception of Scott as a divided personality and the possibility 
of biographical interpretation of his novels need not be debunked; yet I would simply 
like to dispute the link that I have been attempting to expose between that conception 
of Scott and a partiCUlar interpretation-the historicist interpretation--of his novels. 
The biographical information upon which the historicist interpretation is built is much 
less telling than we might like to imagine. No one would call Dr. Johnson, for 
example, a historicist, though he, like Scott, was a notoriously divided personality in 
his attitude toward the past. We know, for instance, that he both recommended 
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Jacobitism to pretty girls and accepted a pension from the Hanoverian government. ~2 
We know too that he both held that the fIrst Whig was the Devil and scoffed at the 
idea, common among Jacobites and Tory diehards, that history was all downhill.43 
Even Johnson's attitude toward Scotland seems to have been affected by this "dual 
vision": thus, although he often made merry at the expense of the coarse, oat-eating 
Lowland Scots, he was also one of the fIrst Englishmen to travel extensively in the 
truly backward Highlands and became a great admirer and defender of the Highland 
character. 44 In some cases, there is such a striking similarity between Johnson's 
opinions and Scott's that we may suspect that Scott is unconsciously echoing the 
Ultimus Anglicornm.45 Compare, for example, Scott's oft-quoted letter to Miss 
Clephane with Johnson's comment to Boswell "that ifholding up his right hand would 
have secured victory at Culloden to Prince Charles's army, he was not sure that he 
would have held it up. ,,46 It follows that if we are unwilling to impute historicism to 
Johnson on the basis of such anecdotes, we should be less willing to impute it to 
Scott. 47 
Again, even granted that Scott was a "divided personality," his personal 
ambivalence certainly did not always issue in a "double vision" of history. Several of 
the original revisionist critics broke ranks with orthodoxy for that reason. Take 
Robert Gordon, for instance, who focuses on Daiches' own favourite "problem of 
heroic action" in the unheroic modern world, a problem with which I will deal at 
length in individual novels. 48 Scott, according to Daiches, admired the heroic ideals 
of pre-modern cultures and regretted their disappearance, but he also saw that a virtue 
like "military courage" could serve "no useful purpose" in the present. 49 As Gordon 
remarks, Scott often seems to express precisely the opposite view outside his 
novels-particularly in his historical works like Tales of a Grandfather (a series of 
semi -scholarly histories of England, Scotland, and France), The History of Scotland (a 
short lay history written for Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopaedia), and The Life of 
Napoleon Buonaparte. 50 Here Gordon points to dozens of passages, much of which 
were written after he turned to the novel, in which Scott the historian refers repeatedly 
to a "problem of heroic action," but for him the problem is not that heroic action lacks 
a useful purpose in the modern world, but that the modern world produces too little 
heroism. hl his Life of Napoleon, for instance, Scott argues at length that the 
backward Spanish and Russian peasants, in whom traces of old heroic codes had 
survived, had offered much more successful resistance to French imperialism than the 
more modern., bourgeois populations of the Netherlands or Germany. 51 For Scott the 
historian, Gordon suggests, "a people persistently militant may well be persistently 
valuable," whatever sentimental interest their way of life may evoke. 52 Gordon, a 
former subscriber to the "divided personality" theory, thus challenges us to reread 
Scott's historical fiction in light of his historical non-fiction. 53 
A more significant challenge to the prevailing wisdom has come from intellectual 
historians. Duncan Forbes, a Scottish historian of ideas, was the first writer to break 
with a longstanding tradition that, as a writer, Scott was at best a gentleman amateur, 
his view of life untouched by any sort of systematic philosophy. According to 
Forbes, Scott was in fact "equipped ... with presuppositions, a manner of thinking and 
a historical method" that descended to him from Montesquieu through the so-call ed 
"philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment, a group including Adam 
Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, William Robertson, and even, in some respects, 
David Hume. 54 Forbes' work, though it preceded the first burst of revisionist 
criticism in the 1960s, has had a little impact on the course that criticism has taken. In 
truth, the classical revisionist formula, with its emphasis on Scott's "divided 
personality," carried on with the view that Scott was basically unphilosophical. 
The problem is not that Revisionist critics have not recognized some connection 
between Scott and the Scottish Enlightenment, but that they have failed to explore its 
implications. David Daiches, as we have seen, traces Scott's "rational" or 
"progressive" tendencies, but not his overall understanding of history, to Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers like Smith and Hume. More recent critics, who have been 
willing to accept the possibility that Scott derived a full y-fledged philosophy of 
history from the Scottish Enlightenment, have often identified "philosophical" history 
as a sort of proto-historicism, thus confmning their view that Scott was an early 
historicist. Forbes, however, wrote his essay in part to refute G. M. Trevelyan's claim 
that Scott was a historicist. 55 
In fact, several aspects of Forbes' argument have a direct bearing on the issues 
raised by the revisionist reading of Scott's novels. Firstly, as Forbes suggests, the 
"philosophical" historians developed a profound "historical sense," the result of their 
fascination with the study of pre-modem "states of society," not only in Europe but 
also in Asia and America. They did not, however, depart from the first principle of all 
Enlightenment historians: 
ffitimately, the rationalist historians of eighteenth century Scotland were 
interested in "states of society" because they were students of human nature. 
They viewed the world as a vast laboratory in which an original element-
human nature-was variously conditioned by different social states. In 
order to discover the real, abiding nature of~ it was necessary to make a 
comparati ve study of these various social compounds and to observe an\' 
"experiments" which history had to offer. 56 • 
According to Forbes, then, what Scott got from the "philosophical" historians is not 
some sort of proto-historicism, but rather a comparative sociology premised on the 
Enlightenment doctrine of the uniformity of human nature. The "great book of 
Nature" passage in the introductory chapter of Waverley might thus be read as a brief 
"philosophical" history of the British aristocracy, consistent with Scott's overall 
understanding of history, rather than a blind recital of "neoc1assical" principles that he 
had come to reject. 
Although the "philosophical" historians shared with the mainstream Enlightemnent 
historians the belief in human uniformity, yet their understanding of the past differed 
in some important ways; for instance, unlike Voltaire or Gibbon, they generally did 
not view the past patronizingly or with contempt. 57 While they saw progress as 
desirable and are now well known for attempting to work out the "laws" of progress, 
the "philosophical" historians nevertheless found virtues in pre-modern societies 
corresponding to what they saw as deficiencies in the modern bourgeois societies that 
had replaced them. Adam Ferguson, for instance, never "tired of ... demonstrating 
from history the dangers in an advanced state of civilization, especially the retreat of 
patriotism and civic virtue before selfishness and political quietism. ,,58 Even the 
unromantic Adam Smith, as Forbes points out in his essay on "'Scientific' Whiggism," 
never failed "to emphasize the very grave disadvantages that the progress of society 
brings with it," particularly "the selfish narrowness of the 'commercial spirit'" and "the 
extinction of martial ardour and the nobler virtues. ,,59 Such views, in fact, correspond 
exactly with those we find Scott expressing in his historical writings particularly the 
Tales of a Grandfather. The Tales is a work not only about progress and civilization 
but also a series of parables of civic virtues, as I show later. 
In short, it may be possible to dispense with the "divided personality" theory, 
according to which Scott's "nostalgic" and "progressive" sides combine to produce an 
intuitive historicism~ and instead we may hypothesize that Scott's treatment of history 
is the product of a more or less unitary philosophy of history derived from the 
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"philosophical" historians. Such a hypothesis would enable us explain more and 
ignore less in Scott's work. Firstly, it would explain why Scott, who never read Herder 
or Hegel and who never alludes to or expresses a historicist idea or opinion, 
nevertheless has a much stronger "historical sense" and a much less patronizing 
attitude toward the past than mainstream Enlightenment historians. Secondly, it will 
allow us to explain how Scott's strong "historical sense" could coexist with equally 
strong belief in the historical uniformity of human nature. And it would allow us to 
explain how his intense admiration for the past could coexist with equally intense 
belief in progress. Consequently, Scott would cease to be a paradox or "great 
unknown," belonging neither to the eighteenth or the nineteenth century and therefore 
largely ignored by scholars of both periods. He would appear, instead, to fit into an 
unambiguously eighteenth-century context-albeit one with which we are not now 
generally familiar. Finally, Scott would cease to be, as Daiches puts it, half "prudent 
Briton" and half "passionate Scot. ,,60 He would be simply a Scot, neither less prudent 
nor more passionate than others who shared his cultural background. 
In the following section I will continue the exploration of Scott's connection with 
the "philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment with partiCUlar attention 
to Scott's connection to Adam Ferguson, his early friend and mentor. Ferguson's 
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) anticipates the critique of modern society 
that, as we have seen, runs through Scott's non-fictions. Though Ferguson, in typical 
Scottish Enlightenment fashion, argues that progress is a law of history and attempts 
to elucidate its workings among peoples, his Essay is also a reflection on the 
destructive effects of progress on "civic virtue" and a powerful brief for the deliberate 
cultivation of old-fashioned virtues in the modern world. 
The discovery of Sir Walter Scott's connection with "philosophical" historians of 
the Scottish Enlightenment came as a surprise to mid-twentieth century literary 
critics, who were accustomed to thinking of him as the least philosophical novelist. 
But they need not and should not have been so unprepared. In the "Ashestiel" 
autobiographical fragment attached to Lockhart's Life, Scott himself had 
acknowledged the importance of the Scottish school to his own development as a 
thinker. Of his boyhood rambles in the Border country of his ancestors Scott writes: 
The philosophy of history ... was ... a sealed book at this period of my li~e~ 
but I gradually assembled much of what was striking and picturesque In 
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historical narrati ve~ and when, in ripen years, I attended more to the 
deduction of general principles, I was furnished with a powerful host of 
examples in illustration of them. I was, in short, like an ignorant gamester, 
who kept a good hand lUltil he knew how to play it. 61 
The "philosophy of history" that was later opened to Scott was that of his professors 
at Edinburgh College who formed the second-generation "philosophical" historians. 
Scott mentions that he "made some progress in Ethics" at the hands of John Bruce, 
read an essay before William Robertson, and "was farther instructed in Moral 
Philosophy at the class of Mr. Dugald Stewart. ,,62 Scott later studied law illlder 
Baron David Hume, whose lectures were modelled on the approach of the 
"philosophical" historians. Hume, says Scott, was not "satisfied with 
presenting ... laws in their present state, but combining the past state of our legal 
enactment with the present, and tracing clearly and judiciously the changes which 
took place, and the causes which led to them. ,,63 As a student at Edinburgh in the 
eighties and nineties, Peter Garside argues, "Scott would have been soaked with 
'philosophical' history. ,,64 
Even Scott's nineteenth-century biographers and critics had pointed to such 
connections. An early Lzfe of Scott, for example, spoke of his debt to Dugald Stewart, 
in whose lectures Scott had "found a principle which breathed a living soul into his 
hitherto desultory studies, and gave the results form and consistency. ,,65 Much later 
in the century, Walter Bagehot of the London Economist observed that Scott's 
analysis of the "political economy" of the Highlands in Waverley was closely akin to 
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. 66 Yet even among critics who did not know of (or 
did not mention) Scott's intellectual connections, there was little doubt that his 
treatment of history was at least intellectually respectable. Among Scott's 
contemporaries, Whigs like Francis Jeffrey and the historian Macaulay, and even 
liberals like Hazlitt, all regarded the Tory Scott's novels as worthy of serious 
consideration as historical novels. In a review of Waverley for the Edinburgh Review, 
Jeffrey praises Scott for presenting "a faithful and animated picture of the manners 
and state of society that prevailed in the northern part ofthis island, in the earlier parts 
of the last century. ,,67 In a discussion of the ideal historian, Macaulay praises Scott 
for his use of "those fragments of truth which historians have scornfully thrown 
behind," for constructing "out of their gleanings works which, even as histories, are 
scarcely less valuable than theirs. ,,68 For Hazlitt, meanwhile, Scott "is only the 
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amanuensis of truth and history. ,,69 Hazlitt maintains that, in his Scottish novels, in 
particular, "the candour of Sir Walter's historic pen levels our bristling 
prejudices ... and sees fair play between Roundheads and Cavaliers, between 
Protestant and Papist. ,,70 
Nor did the idea that Scott was intellectually respectable disappear overnight. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Leslie Stephen saw that the apparent 
conservative bias of the novels had a sophisticated theoretical basis, though he found 
it in the writings of Edmund Burke rather than in those of the Scottish school. 71 As 
late as the 1 940s, older historians like G.M. Young and G.M. Trevelyan were 
claiming that Scott was a major influence on nineteenth-century historical writing.72 
But by this time Scott's own intellectual roots were forgotten; meanwhile, literary 
critics had begun to regard The Author of Waverley as a hack romancer who indulged 
in nostalgia and pageantry, not in real history. 
In 1953, with his essay "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," Duncan Forbes re-
established Scott's intellectual merit. Despite ranking Forbes' work with that of 
Lukacs and Daiches, its overall impact on our understanding of Scott remains less 
profound. The reason is that Forbes and a later scholar, Peter Garside, who \\Tote two 
follow-up essays, focus primarily on the relationship of "philosophical" history to 
Scott's non-fictions and on Scott's biographical links to various "philosophical" 
historians. 73 The three essays were limited to influence study, thus leaving detailed 
examination of Scott's fiction to literary critics, as Garside points out. 74 But the 
literary critics who acknowledged Forbes' work had only a second-hand knowledge of 
the "philosophical" historians, almost all of it derived from Forbes' own brief 
summary of their leading ideas. 75 Consequently; it was easy for them to jump from 
the notion that Scott's view of history had an intellectual basis to the unwarranted 
assumption that this view was akin to that of contemporary intellectuals-that is, to 
historicism. In the course of the following section I will be concerned to rectify some 
of the mistakes these critics have made and examining in details several features of 
"philosophical" history that are significant to Scott's novels. 
The "philosophical" historians, with Vico and Hegel, as many critics have urged, 
thought that temporally and geographically diverse cultures advance through the same 
set of historical stages or "states of society," and that this process is governed by 
intelligible "laws of history." They were also deeply interested in the structural and 
epistemological differences between these stages, and in the ways these ditTerences 
were conditioned by material circlllIlstances. For instance, John Millar devotes the 
first chapter of his work Origin of Ranks (1806) to exploring the evolution of the 
social status of women. In the hunting-and-gathering economy of a "rude" or 
"barbarous" society, according to Millar, child-bearing women are dependent on men 
and so reduced to almost complete servility. But as the society progresses through its 
pastoral (nomadic), its agricultural, and, [mally, its commercial stage, economic 
scarcity gives way to "opulence," and increasing importance is attached to intellectual 
refinement (that is, technical skills and "elegant arts"). As a result the gap of 
distinction between the sexes gradually narrows, and women begin to approach men 
in terms of rank. For Millar, the social status of women is thus directly related to the 
structure of a society's economy and its degree of material improvement. The Origin 
of Ranks, in fact, is often regarded as one of the origins of modern sociology. 76 
Yet despite their interest in cultural change and cultural differences, the 
"philosophical" historians did not deny the Enlightenment doctrine that human nature 
is always and everywhere the same. As I have pointed out earlier, Forbes, denying 
Trevelyan's assertion that Scott was a prototype of the nineteenth-century "historical 
school," had assumed Scott's affiliation with the Scottish branch of the 
Enlightenment. Literary critics succeeding Forbes seem to have ignored or 
misunderstood this point. Thomas Crawford, one of the first literary critics to make 
significant use of Forbes' observations, points out to Scott's inheriting "that 
historicism which was one of the greatest achievements of eighteenth-century 
Scotland. ,,77 After Crawford, Francis Hart, having discovered that the historical 
thought of the Enlightenment was not uniformly "anti-historical," took it for granted 
that he could speak of an Enlightenment "brand of historicism" and attribute it to 
Scott.78 This was an important step in the reconstruction of the "historicist" Scott's 
intellectual genealogy, since no one really supposed that The Author of Waverley 
could have read Hegel. More recently, Avrom Fleishman and David Brown have 
made systematic attempts to trace Scott's historicism back to Adam Smith and Adam 
Ferguson. 79 Brown, at least, puts historicism in quotation marks, as ifhe were aware 
that he is using the word imprecisely. Lukacs is almost alone among Scott's critics in 
avoiding such imprecision. 80 
In spite of Scott's critics, it should be emphasized that the historical uniformity of 
human nature was essential to the thought of the "philosophical" historians. Adam 
Ferguson, whom Fleishman and Brown consider as the closest philosophically of this 
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group to Scott81 , argues in the opening pages of his Essay on History of Civi I Society 
(1767) that the study of man in history has often "served to mislead our attention": 
We observe the progress [mankind has] made~ we distinctly enumerate 
many of its steps~ we can trace them back to a distinct antiquity: of which 
no record remains, nor any monument is preserved, to infonn us what were 
the openings of this wonderful scene. The consequence is, that instead of 
attending to the character of our species, where the particulars are vouched 
by the surest authority, we endeavour to trace it through ages and scenes 
unkno~ and, instead of supposing that the beginning of our story was 
nearly of a species with the sequel, we think ourselves warranted to reject 
every circumstance of our present condition and frame, as adventitious, and 
foreign to our nature·82 
In fact, Ferguson's argument presents a refutation of Rousseau's claim that we can 
know about men in the state of nature from the analogy of other animals, for instance, 
orang-utans. Unlike Rousseau, whose Second Discourse offers a vague 
"perfectibility" as the only generally human characteristics, Ferguson devotes the 
entire fIrst part of his essay to enumerating "the General Characteristics of Human 
Nature." 
The Scottish school's boldest claims concerning the uniformity of the human 
nature came from its greatest sceptic, David Hume, who asserts it at the level of the 
paSSIOns: 
It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the 
actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still 
the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always 
produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes. 
Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit~ 
these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, 
have been from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the 
actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind·83 
In accounting for the conduct of his subjects, the historian can therefore discount, to a 
large extent, adventitious cultural characteristics: 
Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the 
Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper of the French and English: You 
cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the fonner most of the 
observations which you have made with regard to the latter. 84 
This suggests, as Forbes puts it, that history is only a "laboratory," that helps the 
social scientist "discover the real abiding nature of man" by studying a variety of 
social "experiments. ,>85 Or as Hume argues more explicitly: 
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs 
us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to 
discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by shO\~ing 
men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with 
materials, from which we may form our observations and become 
acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.86 
Such views represent a complete rejection of the historicism then emerging in 
Continental thought. 
Comparing Hume's argument with the much-debated "great book of Nature" 
passage in the introductory chapter of Waverley reveals that both writers concede that 
the specific fonns human behaviour takes can vary widely from time to time and 
place to place. In the meantime, both insist that all human behaviour springs from the 
same basic motives or "passions," and is therefore intelligible, at least in principle, to 
men of different times and places. In other words, social paradigms are not absolute. 
When Scott declares that he throws the force of his narrative on "those passions 
common to men in all stages of society," he believes that he can overcome the 
conceptual difficulties inherent in writing historical fiction. To put it rather 
differently, without that uniformity of passions, the past would be unintelligible and 
therefore wrrepresentable. Hume describes this dilemma more forcefully in his 
question: "What would become of history had we not a dependence on the veracity of 
the historian according to the experience we have had of mankind?,,87 
An important difference for our purpose between the "historical school" and the 
"philosophical" historians is connected with the notion of "cultural relativism." I 
would argue that the "philosophical" historians were not what we could call "cultural 
relativists." Scott's critics usually miss this point. For instance, Avrom Fleishman 
views the social evolutionism of the Scottish school as a sort of Hegelian dialectic in 
which the values of past societies are "fulfilled and outlived," and in which "no 
political or social group can make an unqualified claim to credence, though they may 
temporarily stand for progress. ,,88 Such a view is a perverse reading of the 
"philosophical" historians, who deliberately set out to combat the incipient relativist 
tendency they perceived in the writings of their English predecessors, particularly 
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Mandeville and Hobbes. Fear of this tendency and of its moral consequences may 
well be thought of as underlying their historical production. 
In his essay on Scott, Forbes, in fact, points to the notion of social evolutionism, or 
the belief that the progress of society is a "law" of history, as the "leading principle" 
of the "philosophical" historians. 89 He also remarks that this belief was a prop, not an 
impediment, to their moral concerns. For the Scots, he contends, "The idea of the 
progress of society did not abolish naturrechtlich thinking ... but perfected it. ,,90 John 
Millar, for instance employs the notion of progress of society through different stages 
"requiring different laws to account for those 'diversities of laws which must 
otherwise have appeared irreconcilable with the idea that there is anything stable or 
precise in the moral sentiments of mankind. ,,91 Millar believed that many apparent 
divergences could be reconciled with the law of nature by considering the different 
moral import of the same action under different economical conditions. In a primitive 
society like the Tahitians', he observed, men's wants are few and well supplied, so that 
most thefts there cannot be regarded as serious crimes. 92 The sort of sociological 
analysis that we have seen in Millar's Origin of Ranks is thus employed as a weapon 
against what we could call "cultural relativism." Versions of Millar's project are 
amply apparent in the writings of the "philosophical" historians. Scott's college 
philosophy professor, Dugald Stewart explains the variations in moral judgement in 
terms of "the unequal degrees of civilization" which different societies have attained, 
and for the "diversity of their speculative opinions, arising from their unequal 
measures of knowledge or of capacity. ,,93 The discovery of "natural right," 
presupposes the development of reason, which in "savage" societies is incomplete. 94 
Scott's explanation of the anachronism of Macpherson's Ossian follows the same 
tradition of the "philosophical" historians: "The passions and feelings of men in a 
savage state are as desultory as their habits of life~ and a model of perfect generosity 
and virtue, would be as great a wonder among them, as a fine gentleman in a birth-
day suit. ,,95 In short, "progress" for the "philosophical" historians is not understood 
in terms of mere technological advancement, but rather, and perhaps more 
importantl y, in terms of improvement in man's moral judgement. 
Notwithstanding the apparent similarity between philosophical history and 
historicism, it should be owned that the "philosophical' historians are not historicists: 
although they did, for instance, presuppose a kind of cultural determination of 
individual thought and behaviour. Let us consider Ferguson's most famous dictum: 
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Mankind are to be taken in groups, as they have always subsisted. The 
history of the individual is but a detail of the sentiments and thoughts he has 
entertained in the view of his species: and every experiment relative to this 
subject should be made with entire societies, not with single men. 96 
What seems to be a cultural determinism here is only used as methodological 
principle rather than an absolute doctrine. The "philosophical" historians always 
thought that men lived in groups, and to study the solitary individual, as Rousseau in a 
certain sense had done, would mislead the "student of human nature." Even though 
cultural determinism is employed by the "philosophical" historians as a method, yet 
this determinism is tempered by a recognition of the great diversity within a given 
culture. Consider Ferguson himself: 
Every nation is a motley assemblage of different characters, and contains, 
under any political form, some examples of that variety, which the humours, 
tempers, and apprehensions of men, so differently employed, are likely to 
furnish. Every profession has its point of honour, and its system of 
manners ... Every station, age, a dress, a ceremonial, by which it is 
distinguished, and by which it suppresses the national character under that 
of rank, or of the individual. .. A rude or simple observer would remark the 
variety he saw in the dwellings and in the occupations of different men, not 
in the aspect of different nations. He would fmd, in the streets of the same 
city, as great a diversity, as in the territory of a separate people.97 
Nonetheless, Ferguson warns modern historians and social scientists not to fall in the 
trap of making a generalization: 
It belonged to the constitution of Athens, to have produced a Cleon, and a 
Pericles; but all the Athenians were not, therefore, like eleon, or Pericles. 
Themistocles and Aristides lived in the same age; the one advised what was 
profitable; the other told his country what was j ust. 98 
Ferguson's history, then, is indeterminist, open-ended. That the majority in a 
particular culture are expected to think and act in a certain way or style is not a 
sufficient evidence that could be extended to apply to all individuals. The fact that 
there are individual differences should not be ignored. Such notions could be 
discerned in Scott's works, though some critics, David Brown, for instance, sees the 
contrary. Brown, following Lukacs, who emphasizes the notion of determinism in the 
Waverley Novels, cites Scott's heroine in The Fair Maid of Perlh: "men rarel\ 
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advance in civilization or refmement beyond the ideas of their O\\TI age.,,99 But does 
the word "rarely" imply "never',? Between the meaning of this and the meaning of 
that, in fact, lies an important distinction between Scott and the "philosophical" 
historians on the one hand and the heirs of the "historical school," on the other. 
Another important point that characterizes the "philosophical" historians and 
distinguishes them from the mainstream Enlightenment that prevailed in the 
eighteenth century is their account of historical change. Historians of the 
Enlightenment, generally, explain history in idealistic terms. They attribute all 
changes in social institutions to deliberate, rational and pre-determined actions on the 
part of individuals. It was just such an interpretation that allowed Condorcet, for 
example, to speak of history as a grand March of Mind. On the other hand, 
"philosophical" historians, given their scepticism about social contract theory, 
developed what Duncan Forbes calls an "anti-rationalistic insight into historical 
happening. ,,100 It is not surprising, then, that Ferguson also questioned the notion of 
human-directed rational progress. Here, Ferguson not only diverges from the 
Philosophes and Libertines who prepared for the French Revolution, but perhaps 
anticipates Burke. Ferguson describes the so-called law of "the heterogeneity of 
ends" or 'unintended establishments," as "like the winds, that come we know not 
whence, and blow whithersoever they list, the forms of society are derived from an 
obscure and distant origin." For Ferguson: 
Every step and every movement of the multitude, even what are termed 
enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future~ and nations 
stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of hlUIlan action, 
but not the execution of any human design. . .. They proceed from one form 
of government to another, by easy transitions, and frequently under old 
names adopt a new constitution. The seeds of every form are lodged in 
. d' ·th 101 human nature; they spnng an npen WI season. 
The anti-idealistic insight, especially as applied by Smith and Ferguson to economic 
history, anticipates and was by Marx's own account an eminent influence on the 
theory of historical materialism. 102 This explains why a Marxist critic like Lukacs, 
though he lacked the knowledge of any connection between Scott and the 
"philosophical" historians, was the first to show how their insight operates in Scott's 
novels. Where Scott the historian is most like Marx-in downplaying the Great Men 
of History and concentrating on the petty hopes and fears of ordinary men and 
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women-he is simply following his own and Marx's Scottish teachers. Yet none of 
this makes Scott an historicist in the sense I have been using the \vord here. The 
"philosophical" historians did not, as I have shown, believe that all thought was 
historically determined; they simply limited the role of thought, or rationality, in the 
genesis of human institutions. 
Nor does Scott's reading of history prove him a closet leftist, as Lukacs seems to 
suppose. We should recall that Scots' anti-idealistic reading of history typically led 
them rather to the right than to the left of their idealist contemporaries. Hilllle is a 
case in point. In fact, Hume's understanding of existing institutions as "unintended 
establishments" made him deeply resistant to all attempts to reconstruct them along 
purely rational lines. This conservative attitude is reflected in Hilllle's essay "of the 
Original Contract" (1777): 
Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as 
is the case with silk-worms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense 
enough to choose their government, which surely is never the case with 
men, might voluntarily, and by general consent, establish their own form of 
civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents, which prevailed 
among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man 
every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in 
order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should 
conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the 
path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of their fathers, had 
marked out to them. 103 
For the same reason, Hume took a decidedly dim view of all revolutions: "more ill 
than good is ever to be expected from them." 104 If magnificent human institutions 
had been the gradual creation of complex, irrational forces, the Scots argued, it was 
mere hubris to suppose that a generation of philosophers could do much to improve 
upon them. Conscious planning, in other words, might do more damage than good. 
The adherents of Scottish philosophy thus gravitated toward what is probably the 
central tenet of modern conservatism. I 05 
As we have seen, Scott has often been understood as a paradoxical mixture of left 
and right, of progressive Enlightenment thought and a native temperament that 
favoured romantic conservatism. Yet insofar as Scott is like the speculative 
historians, such Wlderstanding is obviously inadequate. The speculative historians 
were on the whole Enlighteners and Whigs~ yet, as I have just suggested, their 
philosophy of history has a strongly conservative tendency. William C. Lehmann 
highlights this point through his comparison of Smith and Ferguson: 
The student familiar with [Smith's] writings ... will fmd in many features a 
remarkable similarity with Ferguson, worked out with a detail cmd a logical 
consistency not always found in the writings of the latter. There is, \\ith all 
his individualism, ... the same organic conception of society, the same 
impatience with attempts either to explain the state as an artificial 
construction or to reconstruct its institutions on purely rational patterns in 
defiance of sentiment, custom, and the deep roots of centuries of 
intertwining, the same sense of the sway of custom and fashion in tastes and 
morals, the same insistence on the "instinctive," the unreflective, the 
uncontrived, the same radical denial of the hegemony of abstract reason as 
the arbiter of life and the sole principle of scientific analysis. 106 
The similarity between Smith and Ferguson in these respects is not very much 
different from that between them and their contemporary Edmund Burke,107 although 
Avrom Fleishman is at pains to win Scott away from the "conservative" school of 
Burke, in which Leslie Stephen had placed him. Fleishman's attempt to relate Scott 
solely to the more progressive school of the speculative historians is therefore 
misleading. lo8 If Scott is like Smith and Ferguson, as Fleishman maintains, he is also 
perforce like Burke. In short, Scott's ambivalence cannot be easily distinguished. His 
allegedly romantic conservatism was as much a product of the Enlightenment as the 
progressive tendencies attributed to him. However, once we understand the 
relationship between the speculative historians and the Enlightenment in general 
perhaps it becomes easier to understand Scott's vision of history as applied in his 
novels in his treatment of civic virtues and social, moral, economical, and political 
issues. In what follows I will attempt to highlight this relationship in a way that 
serves our purpose in discussing Scott's Scottish novels. 
Among Scott's recent critics, only Graham McMaster in Scott and Society (1981) 
seems to have understood that to link Scott with the Scottish Enlightenment is to set 
him apart from nineteenth-century historicism. McMaster, however, fails to realize 
some of the positive implications of this connection and, as a result, tends to 
underestimate the scope of Scott's debt. His thesis, in fact, is that while Waverley 
"exemplifies textbook doctrine," the later novels represent a steady retreat from 
Scottish Enlightenment thought. 109 In the later novels, he argues, Scott came more 
and more to doubt the Enlightenment belief in progress, progress in the sense that life 
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itself is constantly improving in terms of indi vidual satisfaction, not merely changing. 
Even here, he admits that Scott "was to a certain extent deVeloping ideas that had 
been latent in the Enlightenment itself. ,,110 The point that McMaster misses and that 
I will attempt to clarify here is that the ideas which he describes as "latent" in the 
Enlightenment are, in fact, manifest in the Scottish Enlightenment. In Ferguson's 
work such ideas are central and in Smith's they are expressed openly and often. 
It could be argued that the Scottish Enlightenment was in some aspects a sort of 
reaction against the French and English philosophers, particularly toward their notion 
of human nature. For the English and French philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau, man originally or by nature is solitary. Consequently, they consider civil 
society as only a convention, the product of an agreement or "contract" among 
solitary individuals. For them, therefore, "nature" and "society" in a certain way stand 
in opposition, though Locke, at least, tended to mitigate the stark contrast drawn by 
Hobbes. The speCUlative historians rejected this opposition altogether; civil society is 
itself "natural" to man. The opening pages of Ferguson's Essay, for instance, are a 
spirited attack on the Enlightenment notion of a state of Nature. "In framing our 
account of what man was in some imaginary state of nature," Ferguson complains, 
"we overlook what he always appeared within the reach of our own observation, and 
in the records ofhistory."lll But this is to distort the facts for the sake of theory. For 
him, "the society appears to be as old as the individual." And "if there was a time in 
which he had his acquaintance with his own species to make, and his faculties to 
acquire, it is a time of which we have no record, and in relation to which our opinions 
d rt d b ·d ,,112 F th 1 t· can serve no purpose, an are suppo e y no eVI ence. or e specu a 1 ve 
historians, then, human nature is not only uniform, but also uniformly social. In this 
respect their views go back to pre-Hobbesian political science-to the Aristotelian 
and classical conception of man as a Zoon Politikon, or "political animal. ,,113 The 
immediate source of their views, however, was the embryonic anthropology of 
Montesquieu, whose famous dictum the "philosophical" historians quote repeatedly: 
. b . . d th h . ,,114 
"Man IS om m SOCIety, an ere e remams. 
This premise directed the way Montesquieu's Scottish disciples read history, 
especially very early history. The Enlightenment philosophers had supposed that as 
one went back in history, one after another layer of human society would be sloughed 
off--or as Ferguson ironically put it, that "the most conunon establishments of human 
society" could be "classed among the incroachments which ... busy invention [had] 
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made upon the reign of nature. ,dI5 In this way, the speculative historians argued, 
their Enlightenment predecessors had inadvertently undennined their own belief in 
the unifonnity of human nature. For man in a primitive or relativelv "natural" society 
. , 
would be little like modern man, the product of a complex and highly "artificial" 
social environment. But if man is naturally social, as the "philosophical" historians 
believed, the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" societies collapses, 
Ferguson underlines this point most eloquently when he says: 
If we ask therefore where the state of nature is be found? We rna\' answer, 
it is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to spe'ak in the 
island of Great Britain, at the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits of 
Magellan. . . .If the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less; and the 
highest refinements of political and moral apprehension, are not more 
artificial in kind than the first operations of sentiment and reason, 116 
It is clear that the speculative historians rejected the temptation to historicize human 
nature and that they were able to see complexity and sophistication in earlier social 
organizations, where the Enlightenment has seen only chaos and grim barbarism. 
Nor do the "philosophical" historians agree with the Enlightenment's conception of 
society itself. Ferguson, Smith, Millar, and Hume all rejected the "social Contract" 
theory, particularly as posited by Hobbes and Locke, according to which society had 
been instituted by a special agreement among solitary individuals in a state of nature 
initiated primarily for private selfish reasons. According to Locke, "Men" are "by 
Nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and 
subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent." And when men 
agreed to give up their natural liberty and put "on the bonds of Civil Society ... and 
unite into community," Locke argues, it was "for their comfortable, safe, and 
peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their properties, and a 
. . th t f't ,,117 In th ds be 'd ' greater secunty agamst any at are no 0 1. 0 er wor, SI e man s 
absolute freedom, he also lived in a state of what Hobbes called the war of all against 
all that demanded the emergence of civil society. Civil society, therefore, is merely a 
rational vehicle for the efficient pursuit of each individual's private, essentially selfish 
ends or interests. It promotes no higher ends other than those that had already existed 
in the assumed natural state. 
For the Scots, all the evidence suggests that society was "ith man before the 
development of his rational powers. Society cannot, therefore, be attributed to any 
deliberate, rational consideration of private interests. Nor can it be attributed to 
contract, since a man incapable of considering his own interests cannot in any 
meaningful way consent to a contract. The real basis of society, the Scots reasoned, 
must therefore lie elsewhere. Ferguson's explanation is once again typicaL 
In accounting for actions we often forget that we ourselves have acted; and 
instead of the sentiments which stimulate the mind in the presence of its 
object, we assign as motives of conduct with men, those considerations 
which occur in the hour of retirement and cold reflection. In this mood 
frequently we can fmd nothing important, besides the deliberate prospects 
of interest~ and a great work, like that of forming a society, must in our 
apprehension arise from deep reflections and be carried on with a view to 
the advantages which mankind derive from commerce and mutual support. 
But neither a propensity to mix with the herd, nor the sense of the 
advantages enjoyed in that condition, comprehend all the principles by 
which men are united together. Those bands are even of feeble texture, 
when compared to the resolute ardour with which a man adheres to his 
friend, or to his tribe, after they have for some time run the career of fortune 
together. Mutual discoveries of generosity, joint trials of fortitude, redouble 
the ardours of friendship, and kindle a flame in the human breast, which 
considerations of personal interest or safety cannot suppress. I 18 
For Ferguson, as for the conservative Burke, society is not a rational construct but a 
spontaneous outgrowth of ordinary human affection. With this vision of history, 
progress, human nature and the evolution of man socially, politically, economically 
and morally, the "philosophical" historians called for an education that embodies this 
vision: an education that lays emphasis on civic virtues and altruism as a fOWldation 
for strengthening social ties and moral values in its various forms and in various 
spheres-family, community and nation. Scott, in his non-fiction, presents the same 
VISIOn. 
Scott's non-fictional history of Scotland in his Tales of a Grandfather, not only 
reveals him as a "philosophical" historian, but also guides us toward the sorts of 
things we should look for in his Scottish novels, particularly those connected with 
civic virtues. The Tales is replete with historical parables designed to illustrate the 
continuing necessity of civic virtue very much akin to those we have seen in 
Ferguson's Essay and in Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence. Both early and recent 
criticism remark that the Tales is not only serious history; but it is also probably the 
most "philosophical" piece of history that Scott ever wrote. For instance, the 
Westminster Review compares Scott with Hume, "whose history [of England 1 the 
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author may be presumed to have had frequently in his hands of late. ,,119 The title of 
Chapter 34-"Progress and Civilisation in Society"-is enough to suggest roots in 
Scottish Enlightenment thought. Duncan Forbes, for instance, describes this chapter 
as "pure 'conjectural' history. ,,120 
In tracing the "progress of Civilisation," Scott, much like Adam Ferguson, begins 
with the family as the smallest society whose individuals are connected to each other 
by the "love and affection between the offspring and the parents." Scott attributes 
such affection to the unusual length of human childhood. Thus, while affection 
"among the brute creation is the produce of mere instinct, and continues for a very 
short time," it "becomes in the hmnan race a deep and permanent feeling." As a result 
human children "feel no desire to desert their parents, but remain inhabitants of the 
same huts in which they were born. ,,121 This pattern multiplies and several families 
are combined to form a tribe and several tribes become a nation. In short, Scott 
would say, society is not the outgrowth of a "contract" or considerations of private 
interest; nor does it progress, at least at fIrst, by deliberate innovation. 
Scott exposes the stages of progress of society and its institutions, in a way much 
similar to that of a "philosophical" historian. As an assembly of family groups 
expand and their affairs grow more complicated, it becomes necessary to choose a 
chief to be the "arbiter of their disputes in time of peace and their leader or captain 
when they go to war." (23:223) The tribal society, however, is still largely egalitarian 
or, as Scott puts it, "republican." As Scott comes to speak about the development of 
ranks as a result of the division of labour, he seems to make an abstract from the fIrst 
three chapters of The Wealth of Nations. 122 The division of labour begins with the 
transition from a simple hunting and agricultural economy, where each man's 
subsistence depends on his "personal skill" at hunting or farming, to the more 
"convenient" barter economy, where each man becomes more specialized, that is, 
"following a separate occupation" in which he excels and trades for those goods he no 
longer produces on his own. (23: 225-226) When man discovers that barter itself 
does not solve the problem of the surplus produce, the introduction of currency 
becomes more convenient to accrue surplus wealth. This surplus in turn allows some 
men to "hire the assistance of others to do their work," thus sinking them "to the 
capacity of servants" and is therefore regarded by Scott as the origin of ranks in 
society. (23: 227-228) Scott summarizes the stages of progress in a way that reveals 
his overall philosophical orientation in the following passage: 
In this way the whole order of society is changed, and instead of presenting 
the unifonn appearance of one large family, each member or which has 
nearly the same rights, it seems to resemble a confederacy of association of 
different ranks, classes, and conditions of men, each rank filling up a certain 
department in society, and discharging a class of duties totally distinct from 
those of the others. The steps by which a nation advances from the natural 
and simple state which we have just described, into the more complicated 
system in which ranks are distinguished from each other, are called the 
progress of society, or of civilisation. It is attended, like all things human, 
with much of evil as well as good; but it seems to be a law of our moral 
nature, that, faster or slower, such alterations must take place, in 
consequence of inventions and improvements of succeeding generations of 
mankind. (23: 228-229). 
Scott, like his mentors, believes that progress is a "natural law" of human history, 
something inevitable as a result of our social nature and not a product of rational 
artifice. Finally, progress, though a law, is still an object of moral concern since, 
potentially, it carries within its folds "evil" effects. Here, it becomes clear that if Scott 
tends to do justice to earlier stages of progress, it is not because he views them on a 
groWld of "feeling for 'relativism'," as some critics have suggested; but because, like 
Ferguson and, and to some extent, even Smith, he does not believe that progress-
economic progress, at least-is an absolute good but also has evil repercussions. 
Although he does not discuss the "evils" attendant upon progress, Scott does call 
attention to the impact of progress/commerce on martial spirit through his comments 
in the section about "The Fall of Edinburgh." Although the city was able to muster a 
volWlteer defence force to face the attack of the Highlanders Wlder the leadership of 
Charles I, the city was not quite willing to send its men into battle: "the relatives of 
the vohmteers crowded aroWld them, weeping, protesting, and conjuring them not to 
expose lives so invaluable to their families to the broadswords of the savage 
Highlanders." (26: 124-25) Scott's description of the morale of the citizens in 
Edinburgh and the excuses of both the officers and the volunteers to avoid the combat 
demonstrates the limit of courage in a relatively civilized society: "In some 
companies, the men said that their officers would not lead them on; in others, the 
officers said that the privates would not follow them." (26:125) Scott's account of 
the fall of Edinburgh comes to the same conclusion which Adam Smith made in 
describing the same events: "commerce sinks the courage of mankind, and tends to 
extinguish martial spirit." 
Like the "philosophical" historians, Scott treats the decline of "military courage" as 
a serious social problem. Examining a nmnber of similar passages in the Tales and 
elsewhere contrasting the bravery of the Highlanders with the cowardice of their more 
civilized opponents, Robert Gordon argues that Scott appears to be a Legitimist, a 
defender of backward "patriots" against degenerate cosmopolitanism. 123 But this is 
an overstatement. Like Ferguson in his 1750 militia pamphlet, Scott is far from 
presenting a jeremiad against modernity. His interest seems mainly to focus on 
finding some means of accommodating martial virtues within the context of modern 
society. Thus, in his last chapter on the '45, Scott praises "the genius of the Earl of 
Chatham," William Pitt the Elder, who enrolled the Highland clans in regular army 
regiments, officered by their former chieftains, thus opening "a fresh career to the 
martial spirit of the Highlanders." (26:429) The whole chapter, in fact, could easily 
be read as a sort of parable on the decline of civic virtue, especially of "military 
courage" and its revival. 
Ample episodes are found in the Tales that highlight the merit of civic virtues. 
The chapters on the '45 are no less suggestive than the earlier chapter on the fall of 
Edinburgh in this respect. For instance, Scott's account of Prince Charles's escape 
from Scotland after the defeat at Culloden is intended to underline the merit of the 
virtue of loyalty motivated by the notion of honour in the chivalric sense: 
During his wanderings, the secret of the Adventurer's concealment was 
intrusted to hundreds of every sex, age, and condition; but no individual was 
found, in a high or low situation, or robbers even who procured their food at 
the risk of their lives, who thought for an instant of obtaining opulence at 
the expense of treachery to the proscribed and miserable fugitive. Such 
disinterested conduct will reflect honour on the Highlands of Scotland while 
their mountains shall continue to exist. (26: 374-375) 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that Scott alludes in this passage to the same anecdote of 
the loyal cattle-thief that John Millar employed to demonstrate the contrast between 
virtues in the 'rude" and "commercial" societies. For Scott, as for Millar, such an 
episode was no mere curiosum. Of course such virtues of the past, though attractive, 
are outmoded in the present, according to Millar, yet the absence of personal loyalty, 
he thought, would make commercial society vulnerable to "envy, resentment, and 
other malignant passions." Scott, in the same manner, suggests that loyalty in the 
"rude" society is always associated with the notion of honour, which even the thief is 
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committed to despite necessity. Here, the merit of loyalty becomes apparent 
especially when we recall that in a "commercial" society the thoughts of "obtaining 
opulence" are not so easily resisted. 
Perhaps the purport of the above passage becomes more forceful when We take it 
in the context of Scott's account of the '45. If we juxtapose the Highlanders' conduct 
toward Charles with the recommendations and expectations of Robert Walpole, the 
genius of that "commercial" age, described at the outset of his account of the '45, we 
understand the sharp contrast between the two cultures, one quasi-primitive and the 
other commercial: 
[T]his great statesman was a man of a coarse mind, who altogether 
disbelieving in the very existence of patriotism, held the opinion that every 
man had his price, and might be bought ifhis services were worth the value 
at which he rated them. His creed was as unfavourable to the probity of 
public men, as that of a leader who should disbelieve in the existence of 
military honour would be degrading to the character of a soldier. The 
venality of Sir Robert Walpole's administration became a shame and a 
reproach to the British nation, which was also burdened with the means of 
supplying the wages of the national corruption. (26: 53-54) 
ill short, the Jacobite Highlanders, may have acted against the progressive political 
and economical rhetoric of their age; but they also acted against what Scott saw as its 
regressi ve moral tendencies, especially the one Millar, Smith, and, above all, 
Ferguson had attacked and warned against-the encroachment of some detrimental 
commercial values on inappropriate spheres of life. Indeed, Scott's Tales of a 
Grandfather is, like Ferguson's Essay, broadly didactic. This makes us expect that his 
Scottish novels will also embody the notion of historical progress and its impact on 
moral values and civic virtues in various aspects of human life. The next chapter 
examines Scott's ftrst novel, Waverley, in the light of these considerations. 
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Chapter Two 
Waverley (1814) 
In the last sentence of the "Introductory" chapter of Waverley, Scott speaks of the 
novel's "moral lessons," which, he says, "I willingly consider as the most important 
part of my plan. ,,1 When critics have not dismissed this sentence as an afterthought 
or a bow to convention, they have generally thought it quite clear what these "moral 
lessons" are. Scott's historicist understanding of history, critics argue, led him to an 
anti-heroic moral theory. David Daiches argues that the novel's main lessons are 
associated with "the impossibility of the older heroic way of life" and the altemati ve 
is to accept a "drab but necessary progress" instead. 2 In the same direction, David 
Devlin asserts that "the aim of the whole book" is "to recognize the worth of old-
fashioned heroism and to look away from it to the 'quiet virtues' .. , which alone are 
required in the present. ,,3 
However, the novel's epigraph provided a good reason for twentieth-century 
reading to be not merely historicist. The emphasis of this reading is generally guided 
by the supposed progress of Edward Waverley, the novel's young protagonist, brought 
up with history and fiction, from a "romantic" to a "realistic" view of life, a progress 
complicated by his engagement in the romantic Lost Cause of the '45 rebellion. 
Support for such a reading can no doubt be found in a number of passages that 
undeniably reflect the Bildungsroman tradition: 
And it was in many a winter walk by the shores of Ulswater, that he 
acquired a more complete mastery of a spirit tamed by adversity, than his 
fonner experience had given him; and that he had felt himself entitled to say 
finnly, though perhaps with a sigh, that the romance of his life was ended, 
and that its real history had now commenced. He was soon called upon to 
justify his pretensions to reason and philosophy. (283) 
Now, how changed, how saddened, yet how elevated was his character, 
within the course of a very few months! Danger and misfortune are rapid, 
though severe teachers. "A sadder and a wiser man," he felt, in internal 
confidence and mental dignity, a compensation for the gay dreams which in 
his case experience had so rapidly dissolved. (296) 
However, to explore the "moral lessons" by applying the Bildungsroman approach 
or any other approach remains a controversial issue. In his treatment of Redgauntlet 
and Waverley, Devlin points out that these two novels "are Scott's most successful 
attempts to defme his feelings towards the old Scotland and the new ... " and "Scott's 
attitude to this past and to the less glamorous present is what gives pressure to all his 
finest Scottish novels. ,,4 On the other hand, Graham McMaster argues that the "moral 
lessons" to be derived from Waverley on the basis of Bildungsroman reading is not 
convincing and even do "not seem very real or very interesting, and certainly not 
absorbing enough," to provide the foundation for not just one but ten novels, as 
Devlin and others suggest. Yet, McMaster is ready to accept Devlin's view if it is 
framed by a social, political and economic conflict, in a sense such that, "within this 
political drama is the personal story of a young man who must choose between past 
and present. ,,5 
The above argument raises another question that has to do with the unity of the 
novel. This issue had been touched upon by Stewart Gordon in his article "Waverley 
And The Unified Design'." Gordon's argument endeavours to show that the lesson to 
be learnt from the novel is only associated with the protagonist's narrative, thus 
reducing "the whole movement of the novel" to "one of progressi ve enchantment and 
disenchantment" with the heroic way of life displayed by the Jacobite rebels, 
partiCUlarly the Highlanders. 6 Yet, in the end, Gordon fmds himself forced to admit 
that the most striking episodes which conclude the novel, the trial and execution of 
Fergus and Evan Dhu, do not fit "this reading of the work. ,,7 This means that the 
Bildungsroman reading which attempts to see the narrative of Edward Waverley as 
the sole unifying design of the novel is bound to fail. 
On the other hand, it seems that neglecting the protagonist's experience and 
approaching the novel on a purely historical basis makes the whole novel look like a 
book of history which narrates the stages that led to the defeat of the Jacobite 
rebellion. For it is only through the protagonist's background and its bearing on his 
narrati ve that the narrator is able to reveal and dramatize how history works on people 
in tenns of social and historical forces. That is why a Marxist critic like David Brown 
who proposes to emphasize the historical side of Scott's "historical romance," reaches 
more or less the same conclusion: 
Considering Waverley as a whole, a common movement can be seen in both 
the "private" and "public" histories which the novel narrates. On the private 
scale Edward Waverley'S youthful romanticism and idealism is , . . 
progressively destroyed by the rationalism and common sense necesSaIy! for 
h7 
survival in the "civilized" society to which he finds he ultimately belongs. 
On the public scale, the heroic culture of clanship and of the feudal 
aristocracy comes to appear, through the events of the rebellion, hopelessly 
unrealistic and inopportune when confronted by the new order in Lowland 
Scotland and England, to which it finally gives way. The movement in both 
plots is to some extent analogous, provoking the same, contradictory 
responses from the reader, and this is largely the reason for the formal unitY 
and cohesion of the novel. 8 
The "to some extent" in the last sentence is an indication that attempts to identify the 
nature and extent of the analogy between the "private" and "public" plots remain 
unresolved. 
It is worth observing, however, that nineteenth-century readers had no such 
problems. They even seem to have taken the novel's disunity for granted, and tended 
to denigrate Waverley's private experience. Take John Croker, for instance, writing 
for the Quarterly Review shortly after the novel's publication in 1814: 
We shall conclude this article by observing what, indeed, our readers must 
have already discovered, Waverley, who gives his name to the story, is far 
from being its hero, and that in truth the interest and merit of the work is 
derived, not from any of the ordinary qualities of a novel, but from the truth 
of its facts, and the accuracy of its delineations. 9 
Croker's review seems to reduce the novel to a series of episodes "valuable as 
specimens of national manners. ,,10 An anonymous reviewer in the British Critic 
wrote about Waverley: "We are unwilling to consider this publication in the light of a 
conunon novel ... but as a vehicle of curious accurate information [that delineates] the 
history and manners of a very, very large and renowned portion of the inhabitants of 
these islands"; of Waverley himself, he says "we shall say but little, as his character is 
far too conunon to need conunent. ,,11 For Francis Jeffrey, "the object" of the novel is 
"evidently to present a faithful and animated picture of the manners and state of 
society" that once prevailed in Scotland; however, the novel's early chapters, which 
are allocated to Waverley's private experience, are "the worst part of the book by 
far. ,,12 This particular complaint is echoed even by Lockhart, Scott's biographer. 13 In 
short, and apart from whatever interest nineteenth century readers had in Edward 
Waverley's private experience, they emphasized the historical aspect of the novel. 
Consequently, they did not preoccupy themselves with seeking or demanding any 
connection or analogy between the two. 
These views of nineteenth-century critics are consonant with what Scott himself 
says of his work. In his "General Preface" to the 1829 edition of his works, Scott 
admitted that in writing Waverley, he had sacrificed plot unity to historical and 
geographical detail: 
And here I must frankly confess that the mode in which I conducted the 
story scarcely deserved the success which the romance aftenvard attained. 
The tale of Waverley was put together with so little care, that I cannot boast 
of having sketched any distinct plan of the work. The whole adventures of 
Waverley, in his movements up and down the country ... are managed 
without much skill. It suited best, however, the road I wanted to travel, and 
permitted me to introduce some descriptions of scenery and manners to 
which the reality gave an interest which the powers of the author might 
otherwise have failed to attain for them. (354) 
Elsewhere, Scott expresses a view of Edward Waverley compatible with that of most 
nineteenth-century critics: 
The heroe [sic] is a sneaking piece of imbecility and if he had married Flora 
she would have set him up on the chimney-piece as Count Boralaski's wife 
used to do with him. 14 
Combining the two quotations I would argue that Scott was not all that interested in 
writing a Bildungsroman. In other words, a "unified design" connecting Waverley's 
private experience and the novel's historical material was eventually beyond his 
scope. If this is the case, why, then, do modern critics who emphasize the historical 
implication of the novel fmd it impossible to abandon the Bildungsroman 
interpretation? The reason could be that, if Waverley's private experience were left 
out altogether, the interpretation of the novel's "moral lessons" would collapse, 
lessons which could be supplied by Hobbes' Leviathan: 
The vain-glory which insisteth in the feigning of abilities in our selves, 
which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by 
the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant persons; and is corrected often times by 
Age, and Employment. 15 
The equation which Brown establishes by drawing an analogy between "the 
heroic culture of c1anship" and "youthful romanticism and idealism" has no logical 
foundation. For instance, that Waverley perceives the "heroic culture of c1anship" in a 
youthfully romantic and idealizing way does not make that culture itself in any sense 
"romantic" or "idealistic." The culture is there with or without Edward Waverley's 
imagination. To put it another way, there seems to be a wide gap between histon' as 
the narrator himself represents it and history as experienced by the protagonist. 
Historically-minded critics tried to bridge this gap by dealing with it under the old 
formalist rubric of "appearance vs. reality." Episodes like Waverley's first foray into 
the Highlands provide the grist for this mill. Following Evan Dhu in search of the 
cattle-thief Donald Bean Lean, Waverley is temporarily left to himself on the 
benighted shores of a Highland loch, where he soon begins to romanticize his 
situation, imaginatively substituting Robin Hood for the shabbier Donald. Scott, 
however, plIDctures these fantasies with satire: 
What a variety of incidents for the exercise of a romantic imagination, and 
all enhanced by the solemn feeling oflIDcertainty, at least, if not of danger. 
The only circwnstance which assorted ill with the rest, was the cause of his 
journey-the Baron's milk-cows! This degrading incident he kept in the 
backgrolIDd. (78) 
Consider how Brown deftly reads the satire: 
[Waverley] fails to perceive that, far from being just a romantic "incident," 
the creagh is an integral part of the economic system that supports the 
Highland clans. It is highly significant that the first contact we see between 
the Baron of Bradwardine and Clan Ivor is antagonistic, for the only way 
Fergus can provide for the huge number of clansmen in his "tail," while 
keeping up the hospitality displayed at the feast Waverley attends, is if the 
clan survives at the expense of estates like Tully-Veolan, either by raiding 
them or blackmailing their owners. Milk-cows, in other words, instead of 
being "incidental," are the main means of subsistence, and the prime cause 
not only of Waverley's journey but of much of the Highland way of life. 16 
If the above episode served Brown to apply his "analogy" by juxtaposing Waverley's 
romantic perceptions with the concrete reality of the social and economic 
backwardness of the Highlanders, other episodes show that it is not always the case. 
In other words, there are episodes in the novel that would suggest that Scott's aim is to 
debunk the Highlanders, if he were to imply an "analogy" between Waverley'S 
youthful romanticism and the supposedly outmoded virtues of Highland culture. Yet 
the implied message is the opposite. The episode of Waverley's disillusionment upon 
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getting a "near view" of the Jacobite army the day of the march to Edinburgh, is a 
case in point 
A near view, indeed rather diminished the effect impressed on the mind 
rather by the more distant appearance of the army. The leading men of each 
clan were well armed with broadsword, target, and fusee, to which all added 
the dirk, and most the steel pistol. But these consisted of gentlemen, that is, 
relations of the chief, however distant, and who had immediate title to his 
countenance and protection. Finer and harder men could not have been 
selected out of any army in Christendom; while the free and independent 
habits which each possessed, and which each was yet so well taught to 
subordinate to the command of his chief, and the peculiar mode of 
discipline adopted in Highland waifare, rendered them equally formidable 
by their individual courage and high spirit, and from their rational 
conviction of the necessity of acting in unison, and of giving their national 
mode of attack the fullest opportunity of success. 
But, in a lower rank to these, there were found individuals of an inferior 
description, the common peasantry of the Highland country, who, although 
they did not allow themselves to be so called, and claimed often, with 
apparent truth, to be of more ancient descent than the masters whom they 
served, bore, nevertheless, the livery of extreme penury, being indifferently 
accoutred, and worse armed, half naked, stinted in growth, and miserable in 
aspect. (213-214, emphasis mine) 
This passage is fit to be read according to the "appearance vs. reality" model. Yet in 
the midst of it, Scott, intentionally, presents some details about the Highlanders. 
These details could have been omitted, or at least, articulated with less emphasis, if 
the passage were solely intended to contrast the reality and the original appearance of 
things to Waverley. It is quite evident that the italicised information in the above 
quotation is dissociated from what Stewart Gordon refers to as Waverley's experience 
of "progressive enchantment and disenchantment." In truth, such details recall the 
"philosophical" attitude and appraisal of the Highlanders that we find in Adam 
Smith's account of the fall of Edinburgh in his Lectures on JUrisprudence or in Scott's 
own account of that event in Tales of a Grandfather. This amOllllts to the assumption 
that Scott may have two contrasts in mind. The explicit one has to do with the 
contrast between romantic "appearance" and bare "reality" and an implicit contrast 
between the Highlanders and opponents who lack their "rational conviction of the 
necessity of acting in unison." Waverley is not aware of this second contrast, if 
intended, because what concerns him from the episode is the sense of disparity 
between his first romantic and second realistic impressions. 
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This, and many other similar passages in the novel are significant for two reasons. 
First, they allude to an eighteenth-century military debate in which Scott's 
"philosophical" mentors had engaged. 17 Further, the Highland charge was, in fact 
much feared by the English army and gave rise to specialized bayonet drills to 
withstand its fury. Scott perhaps evokes this fear in the passage. Second, they 
suggest a disjunction, more radical than most critics have allowed between the , 
protagonist's experience of history and Scott's own vision of it. TItis disjunction 
brings to the foreground the question of whether or not history mediated in the noYel 
need be interpreted as Waverley himself sees it, as a conflict between a romantic but 
obsolete way of life and a realistic Hobbesian prudence of the present. If not, the 
"moral lessons" that Scott speaks of in his "Introductory" chapter are not so clear as 
Daiches and many critics have assmned. Such assumption suggests that these lessons 
may never fmd their way into the consciousness of the hero. They may be intended 
for the reader. 18 Hence it is not surprising, that early reviewers of the novel, as we 
have seen, paid less attention to Waverly's story and concentrated instead on episodes 
illustrating "national manners." Jeffrey's review could be regarded as the most 
striking in this respect. For him, Scott's distinction lies in his choice of subject for his 
narrative~ since the 1745 rebellion afforded him "a fair opportunity for bringing out 
all the contrasted principles and habits which distinguished the different classes of 
persons who then divided the country, and formed among them the basis of almost all 
that was peculiar in the national characer." 19 
Adding a twist to Jeffrey's suggestion, James Buzard, in a recent study, reads the 
novel as a "fictional auto-ethnography of Scotland and an important rehearsal for the 
intertwined ideals of culture formulated later in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. ,,20 According to Buzard, Edward Waverley's excursion into the Highlands 
is the "ethnographer's double journey," that enables him and the reader, as well, to 
understand an "alien culture." In this light, the novel's generic status of 
Bildungsroman is not at issue. He goes on to suggest: "the culturing of Edward as a 
mature English landlord is inextricably bound up with ethnographic romance of 
defmitively apprehending 'Scottish culture.' Waverley's (and Waverley's) progress is 
not from romantic fancy to sober fact, but rather from fragmented to unified vision, 
irom ethnocentric first impression to ethnographic total view. ,,21 Buzard finds in the 
cultural project embodied by the novel a sort of "fictional translation of Scotland's 
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Gaelic culture" within the context of "internal colonization" in the course of Anglo-
British national consolidation. 22 
Once again, however, if we are to ignore, temporarily, WaverleyJs personal 
experience of history, then where do the novel's "moral lessons" lie? The last 
sentence in the "Introductory" chapter guides us to the answer: 
Some favourable opportunities of contrast have been afforded me, by the 
state of society in the northern part of the island at the period of my history, 
and many serve at once to vary and illustrate the moral lessons, which I 
would willingly consider as the most important part of my plan~ although I 
am sensible how short these will fall of their aim, if I shall be found unable 
to mix them with amusement,-a task not quite so easy in this critical 
generation as it was "Sixty Years Since." (5) 
Scott's statement above is a clear indication that the "moral lessons" he proposes to 
inculcate are not to be sought in the private romance of the protagonist but rather in 
the narrative's cultural "contrasts." It is what we might call lessons in comparative 
anthropology, for which Waverley's experience provides a framework. To put it more 
succinctly, Scott acts not only as a moralist and nationalist but also as a social 
scientist. 23 
Waverley's presence in episodes that imply anthropological lessons is crucial. It is 
through him that the reader is able to explore these lessons. Scott's skill in the 
technique of argument among his characters serves this purpose. As Waverley lacks 
knowledge about the Scottish "manners," he therefore needs to ask questions, the 
answers to which help in revealing the nature of these "manners." Here, we discern 
that the dialogue structures most often employed in the novel take the form of what 
might be called the "catechism." When Waverley beholds any behaviour which 
seems odd to his culture, he never hesitates to ask for explanation. Usually, a 
knowledgeable Scot provides a short and pithy answer. The ftrst lesson the reader 
learns through these "catechisms" takes place the morning after Waverley's night in 
the cave of the Highland bandit Donald Bean Lean, when Waverley expresses his 
regret for the "perilous and disma1life" of Donald's daughter Alice: 
"Oich! For that, " said Evan, "there is nothing in Perthshire 
that she needs want, if she ask her father to fetch it, unless it be 
too hot or too heavy." 
"But to be the daughter of a cattle-stealer-a common thien" 
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"Common thief1--m no such thing; Donald Bean Lean never 
lifted less than a drove in his life. " 
"Do you call him an uncommon thief, then?" 
"No-he that steals a cow from a poor widow or a stirk 
from a cotter is a thief; he that lifts a drove from a Sassenach 
Laird is a gentleman-drover. And, besides, to take a tree from 
the forest, a salmon from the river, a deer from the hill, or a 
cow from the Lowland strath, is what no Highlander need ever 
think shame upon. " 
"But what can this end in were he taken in such an 
appropriation?" 
"To be sure he would die for the law, as many a pretty 
man has done before him. " 
"Die for the law!" 
"Ay, that is, with the law, or by the law, be strapped up on the kind 
gallows of Crieff, where his father died, and his goodsire died, and where 
I hope he'll die himsell, if he's not shot or slashed in a creagh. " 
"You hope such a death for your friend, Evan?" 
"And that I do e'en; would you have me wish him to die 
on a bundle of wet straw in yon den of his, like a mangy tyke?" (85-86) 
It is conspicuous that besides the Bildungsroman reading of this passage a sort of 
sociological and anthropological inquiry is embedded in it. In this respect, a reader 
needs to bypass the idea that Scott is simply doing to debunk the Highlanders for 
Waverley's benefit. Focus should be on his attempt to juxtapose the "dismal life" of 
Donald Bean Lean's cave with the Highlanders' acceptance of robbery and 
glorification of daring and valour. By doing so, Scott is establishing a relationship 
among the material circumstances, cultural institutions, and moral values of the 
Highlanders. Scott wants to explain this courage which makes a Highlander take the 
risk of losing his life in the act of robbing his neighbour in terms of economic 
circumstances. In such circumstances the equation is reduced to: not to steal to secure 
a living is to live and die like a dog "on a bundle of wet straw." It follows that 
robbery must be institutionalized as a profession; consequently, it is legitimized. 
Evan's emphasis that Donald is no "common thief' but a "gentleman-drover," and that 
he "lifts" property rather than steals it means in a sense that he is doing an honest job. 
However, I do not think that Scott employs the observed differences in moral ideas 
and practices in the above anecdote as an argwnent for the cultural relativity of 
morality, but rather, like similar passages in the works of the "philosophical" 
historians, to show that even seemingly exotic ideas like those of the Highlanders arc 
derivations from normative moral ideas. Thus, Evan's argument for "lifting" is not an 
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arbitrary assertion of new moral definitions, but of a narro\\ ing of the commonplace 
moral definitions he and Waverley hold in common: "he that steals a cow from a poor 
widow or a stirk from a cotter is a thief; he that lifts a drove from a Sassenach laird is 
a gentleman-drover." In the first case the act is unrespectable and shamefut whereas 
in the second, it is exceptional and that "no Highlander need ever think shame upon. " 
When Evan argues that "lifting" is not theft, meanwhile accepts the proposition that 
the "lifter" should "die for the law," he emphasizes the notion of honour rather than 
denying the moral authority of the law. Evan admits that "lifting" is "an offence that 
carries the death penalty, and therefore has the same honourable character as war or 
duelling. ,,24 So, in his view, it is better for Donald to die risking his life, like his 
ancestors, than to die at home in bed. Moreover, a thief might do the job of stealing 
with less risk, but with more inhumanity. Stealing from poor people aggravates their 
misery, "lifting" does not seriously affect the lairds economically. Evan's argument 
brings Donald to a situation close to an honourable rebel that matches Robin Hood. 
Such implications of the passage are not apparent to Waverley, nor do they seem to 
have any direct bearing on his supposed progress from "romantic" delusion to 
"realistic" prudence. In the end, Waverly belongs to a different culture. 
Scott reveals more aspects of the Highlanders' culture in the episode in which 
Callum Beg, Waverley's Highlander page offers to kill Ebenezer Cruikshanks, whom 
Waverly has hired to guide him back to Edinburgh, assuming that he is a Hanoverian 
spy. In this episode, Scott's concern seems to be in demonstrating not only the 
strength of clan ties in the Highland culture and their bearings on moral ideas, but also 
to show how the notion of loyalty works in this milieu. Waverley, as an English 
gentleman, has nothing in common with Callum both culturally and in blood yet the 
latter is prompt to kill in favour of the former. This commitment to sacrifice is only 
because Callum has been assigned to Waverley by Fergus and instructed to protect 
and obey him, so that Waverley now stands in the place of Callum's chief. Even this 
is temporary tie, cemented by a gratuity, of course, is sufficient to motivate Callum to 
assassinate a stranger on Waverley's behalf. The notion of loyalty in the Highlander 
lexicon is not a universal absolute, that is, a philanthropic characteristic but rather 
takes the form of concentric circles where the chief is at the centre. Hence, the more 
remote the object of loyalty is from the centre the weaker the strength of the bond of 
loyalty will be. This episode thus prepares us for Callum's later attempt to assassinate 
Waverley himself for his perceived effrontery to Fergus, and for the great scene at 
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Fergus's trial where Evan offers to fetch six Highlanders including himself to die only 
to save his chiefs life. In this scene Scott is interested in showing the limitations of 
Waverley's England's 'equal law' applied to men from a culture with different 
conceptions of justice and morality. This is clear from Evan's reply when the English 
jury laughed at the offer: they "ken neither the heart of a Hielandm~ nor the honour 
of a gentleman." (320) 
A reader of the quoted passage above might conclude that it aims to represent such 
fierce loyalty as a culturally unique moral value yet I think that Scott's aim is to 
represent it as a modification of nonnative values. Callum puts it clearly that he is not 
going to kill Cruikshanks because the latter has done him any harm, but only because 
of respect for Waverley, his acting chief. What is important here is the odd way he 
reacts to this insult that could have ended in an unjustified violence. Waverley'S 
response to the incident takes the fonn of a shock and horror at the strangeness of 
Callum's views; while Scott, echoing the "philosophical" tradition, invites the reader 
to see their ordinariness-that is, to see them as the products of a unifonn human 
nature in eccentric social conditions. Thus, the incident, while retaining its anti-
idealizing force, becomes at the same time part of the way in which conventions 
unfamiliar to modern European societies but authentic in their own contexts, feature 
in this book. Readers in many parts of Africa are likely to grasp Scott's point. In other 
words, individuals in similar historical epochs under the same circumstances behave 
in the same way. It is the same human nature in similar stages in the line of historical 
progress. William Robertson expresses this with particular clarity: 
The characters of nations depend on the state of society in which they live 
and on the political institutions established among them; and ... the human 
mind whenever it is placed in the same situation will in all ages the most 
distant and in countries the most remote assume the same fonn and be 
distinguished by the same manners. 
Ifwe suppose two tribes, though placed in the most remote regions of the 
globe to live in a climate of the same temperature, to be in the same state of 
society and to resemble each other in the degrees of their improvement, they 
must feel the same wants and exert the same endeavours to supply 
them ... the disposition and manners of men are fonned by their situation and 
arise from the state of society in which they live. 25 
Thus, with the notion of the uniformity of human nature in mind, Scott and the 
reader are not astonished when Callum talks about dirking Cnrikshanks, but Waverley 
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comparing it to an English boy planning to raid an orchard is. It is no coincidence, 
then, that in the novel's "Introductory" chapter Scott speaks of cultural "contrast" at 
the end of the same paragraph in which he develops the metaphor of the "great book 
of nature, the same through a thousand editions." For Scott, as for the "philosophical" 
historians, the more contrasting cultures one observes, the more likely one is to grasp 
the real, abiding human nature. In short, "the dynamics of human nature are thus 
supposed to be the constant of history. ,,26 
Scott's interest in the anthropological and social analysis is not always mediated 
through the "catechism" device. There are instances where he articulates this interest 
directly while Waverley himself is reduced to a silent, passive observer. Chapter 20 
provides a good deal in this respect. Take, for instance the episode of the Highland 
feast at Glennaquoich in which Scott draws a connection between the "organically 
constituted Highland order," and the awareness of the Highlanders' historical 
inheritance: "what its codes and traditions are-in a word, of what it culturally is. ,,27 
The reader is made very conscious of this when Mac-Murrough, "the family bhairdh," 
gives his recital of Celtic verses: 
He seemed to Edward, who attended to him with much interest, to recite 
many proper names, to lament the dead, to apostrophise the absent, to 
exhort, and entreat, and animate those who were present ... the ardour of the 
poet appeared to communicate itself to the audience. Their wild and 
sunburnt countenances assumed a fiercer and more animated expression~ all 
bent forward towards the reciter, many sprang up and waved their arms in 
ecstasy, and some laid their hands on their swords. When the song ceased, 
there was deep pause, while the aroused feelings of the poet and of the 
hearers gradually subsided into their usual channel. (98) 
The passage is not meant to give merely romantic details, but to show the "corporate 
nature" of the clan which is the product of history. The role of the poet is to activate 
this history, to make it present such that the identity of each individual is the identity 
of the whole. This identity is nothing more than the common culture with all its 
dimensions. 
In the same chapter, Scott goes farther in his social analysis. In the scene of the 
feast, he depicts a picture of Highland society in which he demonstrates that although 
it is a hierarchical community, yet the stratification of men into distinct orders and 
functions fonns a composite whole. Scott develops the scene in cinematic detail: 
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At the head of the table was the chief himself, with Edward, and t\\'o or 
three Highland visitors of neighbouring clans; the elders of hi sown 
tribe ... sat next in rank; beneath them, their sons, nephews, and foster-
brethren; then the officers of the chiefs household, according to their order, 
and lowest of all, the tenants who actually cultivated the ground. Even 
beyond this long perspective, Edward might see upon the green, to which a 
huge pair of folding doors opened, a multitude of Highlanders of a vet 
inferior description, who, nevertheless, were considered as guests, and had 
their share both of the countenance of the entertainer, and of the cheer of the 
day. (96) 
Provision of meat and drink is made for each group of guests according to their rank: 
Nor did this inequality of distribution appear to give the least offence. Every 
one present understood that his taste was to be formed according to the rank 
which he held at table; and, consequently, the tacksmen and their 
dependents always professed the wine was too cold for their stomachs, and 
called, apparently out of choice, for the liquor which was assigned to them 
from economy. (96) 
Once again, Scott's aim is not to debunk the Highlanders and the details here have 
nothing to do with Edward's history of disillusionment with an "older heroic way of 
life." Apart from the sting of irony in the tacksmen's profession that wine is "too cold 
for their stomachs"; the overall intention of the passage is to highlight the 
homogeneity and close-knit texture in a patriarchal society, as Buzard puts it: 
"positing an absolute concord of personal desire and social order. ,,28 Scott here 
emphasizes the importance of two points in cementing the bonds in such a 
community: the economic factor and a sort of paternalism, which softens the 
authoritarianism of patriarchal societies. Fergus alludes to these points during the 
feast in an aside to Waverley: 
"these stout idle kinsmen of mine," he said, "account my estate as held in 
trust for their support; and I must find them beef and ale, while the rogues 
will do nothing for themselves but practice the broadsword, or wander about 
the hills, shooting, fishing, hunting, drinking, and making love to the lasses 
of the strath. But what can I do, Captain Waverley? Every thing will keep 
after its kind, whether it be a hawk or a Highlander." (97) 
According to Scott, then, clanship was, to some extent, a model of civic virtue where 
he asserts that "though despotic in principle, its duties were reciprocal. ,,29 This 
reciprocity is what he saw regrettably absent from modem life. A "moral lesson" thus 
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begins to emerge from Scott's anthropological inquiry. TIris lesson is best sought in 
the episode which occurs during the march of the lacobites on Prestonpans when 
Waverley comes across an enemy wounded soldier and hurries to aid him. Before we 
know all the details about the event, we immediately tend to appreciate his humanitv: 
"for the love of God," said the wounded man, as he heard Waverley's step, 
"give me a single drop of water! " 
"you shall have it, "answered Waverley, at the same time raising him in his 
arms, bearing him to the door of the hut, and giving him some drink from 
his flask. (217) 
but, then, this appreciation is shaken, when we realize that the wounded man is 
Houghton, a tenant at Waverley-Honour who recruited "'lth the "young squire" and 
accompanied him to Scotland, only to be deserted there. Graham McMaster's 
treatment of this passage is striking: 
Although the deed itself is a worthy one, we are made to feel in an instant 
that Waverley himself is not worthy of the action, that he is reprehensible 
and contemptible. "'! should know that voice,' said the man; but looking on 
Waverley's dress with a bewilderment look--'no, this is not the young 
squire! '" The implications of this, in their dramatic way, are obvious; it is 
the person of the young squire, but he is not playing the part as he should. 
He has, as both squire and captain, shamefully betrayed his charges to "that 
fiend of the pit, Ruffm." His justification sounds pathetically weak: "I 
assure you Houghton, you have been vilely imposed upon." It is strongly 
contrasted with the sergeant's rejoinder, with its uncomprehending, matter-
of-fact despair: "I often thought so ... though they showed us your seal; and 
so Tims was shot, and I was reduced to the ranks." Waverley's failure to 
look after his men makes doubly ironical the opinion of clan Maclvor that 
"Waverley's conduct was that of a kind and considerate chieftain who 
merited the attachment of his people. ,,30 
According to McMaster, the "moral lesson" to be derived from this episode is 
represented in the "dramatic confrontation" ( or "contrast" to use Scott's word) between 
Waverley and the Highlanders. It gives a reader an insight into the limitations of 
"bourgeois individualism." McMaster, I would argue, is correct in his reading, as far 
as it goes, and in his observation that the episode is "close to the novel's center. ,,31 
Yet I believe he has failed to exhaust that episode's anthropological riches. Fergus is 
impatient with the delay and is only reconciled to it by the knowledge that Houghton 
is Waverley's "follower." Both Fergus and Callum 
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Would not have understood the general philanthropy which rendered it 
almost impossible for Waverley to have passed any person in such distress; 
but as apprehending that the sufferer was one of Waverley's tollowing, they 
unanimously allowed that Waverley's conduct was that of a kind and 
considerate chieftain, who merited the attachment of his people. (217 - 218) 
The last sentence in this passage is revealing. Scott's "contrast" goes farther than that 
between "bourgeois individualism" and clan communalism. It is a contrast between 
the extensive but weak social morality of modern England, which mediates itself as 
"general philanthropy," with the narrower but much stronger social morality of 
clanship. Chris Jones, in the introduction to his Radical Sensibility (1993), highlights 
this point in terms of the contention between radical and conservative discourses in 
the 1790s. According to Jones, both camps emphasize the merit of benevolence as a 
natural social feeling that characterizes man as a social animal. Yet they differ in 
their vision of the limit to which the passion of benevolence might be extended 
without the loss of the emotional charge which keeps the social bonds strong enough. 
Radicals or Jacobins believed, as Jones points out, that men's rational and social 
capacity qualifies them to seek the "widest communal good" not merely through 
narrow allegiance to family and local connections, but also through extending their 
allegiance to wider spheres through universal benevolence or general philanthropy. 
Such an argument, as Jones maintains, affirmed "the authority of personal experience 
over precept and custom" on the one hand and the authority of reason over natural 
feelings on the other. The reaction came from the conservatives in the light of the 
outcome of French Revolution, which seemed to have belied the notion of universal 
benevolence in fulfilling its morality. Thus, Burke and the "philosophical" historians 
recognized benevolence as a natural feeling but rejected the radicals' attempt to 
rationalize natural feelings by extricating them from the sphere of the instinctive and 
innate and employing them in the abstract as a fOlmdation for creating the ideal 
society in which private 'partiality' gives way to public good in the name of universal 
benevolence or general philanthropy. For the conservatives, then, moral behaviour 
can be sought only within providential design of human passions as they are and not 
by submitting these passions to reason and reflection. Jones summarizes the 
conservatives' view as follows: 
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To those like Smith and Burke who apparently believed that passions which 
lead men to action are divinely implanted instincts which ensure the good, 
and specially the stability, of the whole, little reflection on individual acts is 
required. Man's natural reverence for his superiors and partiality towards 
his family and immediate circle are justified by Providential scheme 
whereby this unthinking loyalty is made the means of sustaining the whole 
system of society. It is even blasphemous to imagine that humanity can 
improve on this universal administration and extend beneficence to those 
whose situation excludes them from private partiality. 32 
If Scott's contrast above is viewed in the context of the debate in the 1790s, the 
contrast, then, cuts both ways; yet it does, as McMaster observes, articulate a sort of 
warning to modern society. The passage as a whole is a dramatization of one of the 
lessons from Ferguson's Essay: 
In proportion as territory is extended, its parts lose their relative importance 
to the whole. Its inhabitants cease to perceive their connection with the 
state, and are seldom united in the execution of any national, or even of any 
factious, designs. Distance from the seats of administration, and indifference 
to the persons who contend for preferment, teach the majority to consider 
themselves as the subjects of a sovereignty, as the members of a political 
body. 33 
The problem for Scott, as for Ferguson, is not so much the rise of "bourgeois 
individualism" as the decline of civic virtues as a result of a society outgrowing its 
clan and feudal origins. The technique of "contrast" which Scott had employed in his 
anthropological and social analysis reflects a realistic approach that elucidates the 
relation of individuals to history: man is the product of the conventions, customs, 
religion, economy and politics around him, all these forces that shape his culture. In 
Scott's contrast, the effect is neither to dismiss pre-modern societies as barbarous and 
irrational, nor to defend them on relativist grounds, but to indicate in their way of life, 
at that stage of progress, something lacking but necessary in ours-what the 
philosophical historians called civic virtue. Therein lies the "moral lesson" of 
Waverley. Hence the notion of loyalty and honour forms one of the major issues 
mediated in the novel. This notion is presented and tested in close relationship with 
the problem of choice. It is a hard choice in a historical moment, when two cultures 
clash in the light of new facts, new circumstances and new social and political norms. 
In this context, I would suggest that Scott's novels attempt to investigate the problems 
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of a proto-colonialist union of nations and the possible substitutions in an advanced 
nation for the unifying bonds of a pre-commercial state. 
In 1814 Scott was concerned for the British nation. The threat of nationalism was 
felt from abroad and domestically. Napoleon's conquest of nations gave rise to the 
need for stronger feelings of patriotism. This was to be sought in the nation's history, 
invoking its customs and habits which provide a people with a sense of pride. Scott 
believed that in doing so he would limit uprisings which grew from discontentment 
with harsh economic conditions. The apparition of the French Revolution loomed on 
the horizon of every small outbreak of unrest, reminding the establishment of what 
the continent endured. Why then would Scott choose this time to remind the British of 
another period of unrest, the Jacobite insurrection of barely a generation before? It 
was clearly not, as many critics would have it, to remind readers of the greatness of 
the past. If this were all, why not choose a more distant past and one not quite so 
controversial? Instead, Scott took the opportunity to present for readers civic virtues 
that existed in the Jacobites, and that he wished to translate them into modem terms 
so that they could be accommodated in the modern world. Scott does not expect, or 
even want the loyalty exhibited by the Highlanders duplicated in the present. 
Waverley clearly emphasizes this. This loyalty dies with Evan Dhu, being dependant 
on particular historical and cultural conditions. But loyalty, Scott insists, in a varied 
form, must exist if society is to exist, as we will see in the course of this thesis. In 
fact, his employment of characters that bridge the worlds of past and present serve 
this purpose. Scott regards the element of loyalty crucial not only as an effective 
cause in insurrections, but also in creating extreme political and religious fanaticism, 
as it is obvious from Rob Roy, Redgauntlet and Old Mortality. By and large, 
whatever the theme embodied in Scott's novels is, the element of civic virtues remains 
central in the process of historical change. It determines the various relationships: the 
relationship between members of the family, the individual and his tribe, the 
individual and his country and the individual and his political and religious 
affiliations. 
Hence, despite the disjWlction between Waverley's experience of history and 
Scott's view of it, I do not think that we can simply consign Waverley to oblivion. 
Though the novel is not "unified" in the way critics have generally argue<L neither 
does it break neatly into public history and private experience. Yet Waverleys 
private experience is called into question by the "moral lessons" of history as Scott the 
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"philosophical" historian sees them. In this sense, we have to attend to the 
Bildungsroman tradition which critics generally adopt in interpreting Waverley's 
experience. It is undeniable that Waverley is an object of Scott's criticism, yet I 
would argue that this criticism is primarily not on account of his being a developing 
character, but rather on account of being a type. When Waverley "by the shores of 
Ulswater," announced that "the romance of his life was ended and that its real history 
had now commenced.," Scott tells us that he was deep in "reveries." This casts 
suspicion on Waverley's seriousness concerning his change, best reflected in Scott's 
comment at the end of the same paragraph: "he was soon called upon to justify his 
pretensions to reason and philosophy." (283) When he returns to Tully-Veolan in the 
aftermath of the uprising, he is described, with allusion to Coleridge's "Rime," as a 
"sadder and wiser man." (296) Yet, unlike the Wedding Guest returning to the feast 
after hearing the Mariner's tale, or Wordsworth returning to Tintem Abbey as an older 
man, Waverley, in the last instance, is returning to a changed environment-the ruins 
of Baron Bradwardine's mansion-rather to an unchanged environment to be viewed 
from a changed mental perspective. This leads us to ask whether and to what extent 
Waverley's mental perspective has changed. Is he really in any respect comparable to 
Wordsworth or the Wedding Guest? 
In support of my claim that Scott intends us to view Waverley as a type and not as 
a character who has recovered from his "romantic delusions," let us consider Flora's 
MacIvor's often-quoted prophecy about Waverley'S adult life: 
He would never have been his celebrated ancestor Sir Nigel, but only Sir 
Nigel's eulogist and poet. I will tell you where he will be at home, my dear, 
and in his place,-in the quiet circle of domestic happiness, lettered 
indolence, and elegant enjoyments, of Waverley-Honour. And he will refit 
the old library in the most exquisite Gothic taste, and garnish its shel ves 
with the rarest and most valuable volumes; and he will draw plans and 
landscapes, and write verses, and rear temples, and dig grottoes,-and he 
will stand in a clear summer night in the colonnade before the hall, and gaze 
on the deer as they stray in the moonlight, or lie shadowed by the boughs of 
the huge old fantastic oak;-and he will repeat verses to his beautiful wife, 
who will hang upon his arm;-and he will be a happy man. (250) 
This passage is usually quoted with approval even by critics who follow the 
BildWlgsroman interpretation of the novel and see a significant change in the 
protagonist's outlook and behaviour. Donald Davie, for instance, argues that Flora's 
critique of the mature Waverley is but a representation of an emerging historical type, 
which is the product of dictated circumstances: the eighteenth-century "man of 
feeling," for whom "barbaric honour" has been supplanted as a moral criterion by "the 
intensity of one's emotional reactions. ,,34 David Brown supports this view, describing 
Flora's words as "shrewd prophecy," and that "Waverley's future position is not that of 
the feudal aristocrat-it is nearer to the way of life of Jane Austen's leisurely, upper-
middle-class world. ,,35 Steward Gordon, approvingly, discerns in Flora's speech a 
sign of Edward's "true character," which begins to emerge in contrast with that of 
Fergus. 36 
But if Flora's accoWlt is trustworthy, then the change in Waverley's life would not 
be conceived of as a radical change~ that is, a change from youthful romanticism to a 
"prosaic" adulthood, but rather from one sort of romanticism to another dictated by 
the new changes in the social and political trends. As J. H. Raleigh points out, 
Waverley's new life would be a retreat to the "withdrawn romanticism" of his 
boyhood at Waverley-Honour. 37 In fact, it is a natural conclusion for Waverley to 
follow this path after experiencing the inexorability of real history. In other words, 
Waverley is no longer interested in exchanging the vicarious pleasures of the 
imagination for a real-world adventures. Waverley's new life, in which "barbaric 
honour" has given way to the virtues of peace and prosperity, might still be thought of 
as an enactment of the novel's supposedly Hobbesian "moral lesson"~ yet that life 
appears trivial, and those lessons problematic. It is the human psyche that finds 
happiness more in engagement with than in withdrawal from the affairs of life, as 
Ferguson puts it: happiness "arises more from the pursuit, than from the attainment of 
any end whatever. ,,38 In this respect, one might argue that Flora is presenting what 
could be regarded as a "philosophical" critique of Waverley, as a representative 
modern type. In this sense she echoes what the "philosophical" historians had warned 
of.-the disappearance of the traditional civic virtues. What supports this view is the 
striking similarity between Ferguson's depiction of the modern man and the emerging 
Man of Feeling delineated by Davie. Consider what Ferguson says: 
The period is come, when, no engagement remaining on the part of the 
public, private interest, animal pleasure, become the sovereign objects of 
care. When men, being relieved from the pressure of great occasions, 
bestow their attention on trifles~ and having carried what they are pleased to 
call sensibility and delicacy, on the subject of ease and molestation, as far as 
real weakness or folly can go, have recourse to affection, in order to 
enhance the pretended demands, and accllll1ulate the anxieties, of a sickly 
fancy, and enfeebled mind. 
In this condition, mankind generally flatter their own imbecility under the 
names of politeness ... they congratulate themselves on having escaped the 
storm which required the exercise of ... arduous virtues; and with the vanity 
which accompanies the human race in their meanest condition, they boast of 
a scene of affection, of languor, or of folly, as the standard of hllll1an 
felicity, and as furnishing the properest exercise of a rational nature. 39 
1brough Flora Scott is able to mediate his "philosophical" ideas in two ways. 
First, Flora's loyalty to her cause is pure and constant to the point that some critics 
described her as idealist. Here she contrasts with Waverley who, influenced by his 
early education, never thinks in terms of public interest. This type of Flora's loyalty 
devoid of any self-interest is one of the civic virtues that Adam Ferguson, in 
particular, and the "philosophical" historians in general had emphasized as one of the 
victims of modern society. Second, in certain instances, Scott makes Flora speak for 
him in such a way that her language and sentiments make her sound "Augustan," thus, 
echoing eighteenth-century Scottish moralists. Ibis is reflected in her hopes for 
Scotland that anticipate the "Age ofhnprovement" that will change Scotland forever: 
"But let us hope that a brighter day is approaching, when a Scottish country-
gentleman may be a scholar without the pedantry of our friend the Baron; a 
sportsman without the low habits of Mr. Falconer; and a judicious improver 
of his property, without becoming a boorish two-legged steer like 
Killancureit. " 
Thus did Flora prophesy a revolution, which time has indeed, but in a 
manner very different from what she had in her mind. (Ill) 
Flora's sentiments are based on the civic virtues that represent the elevation of public 
concerns above "private interest and animal pleasure." She is described in the 
narration as being "prepared to do all, to suffer all, to sacrifice all. Her loyalty, as it 
exceeded her brother's in fanaticism, excelled it also in purity." (100) With these 
qualities, Flora cannot but be consistent with herself in contrast with the wavering seU' 
of the protagonist. This provides her with insight where Waverley is most blind. The 
two characters are in fact complementary, each provides a commentary on the other. 
Scott uses them to evoke a morally suggestive "contrast" parallel to those evoked by 
the novel's anthropological episodes. The passage in which Flora rejects Waverley's 
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marriage proposal conveys an explicit contrast between Flora's doctrine and 
Waverley's view of life: 
"I dare hardly," she said, "tell you the situation of my feelings, they are 
different from those usually ascribed to young women at my period of life; 
and I dare hardly touch upon what I conjecture to be the nature of yours, lest 
I should give offense where I would willingly administer consolation. For 
myself, from my infancy till this day, I have had but one wish-the 
restoration of my royal benefactors to their rightful throne. It is impossible 
to express to you the devotion of my feelings to this single subject; and I 
will frankly confess, that it has so occupied my mind as to exclude every 
other thought respecting what is called my own settlement in life. Let me 
but live to see the day of that happy restoration, and a Highland cottage, a 
French convent, or an English palace, will be alike indifferent to me. " 
"But, dearest Flora, how is your enthusiastic zeal for the exiled family 
inconsistent with my happiness?" 
"Because you seek, or ought to seek in the object of your attachment, a 
heart whose principal delight should be in augmenting your domestic 
felicity, and returning your affection, even to the height of romance. To a 
man of less keen sensibility, and less enthusiastic tenderness of disposition, 
Flora Mac-Ivor might give content, if not happiness; for were the 
irrevocable words spoken, never would she be deficient in the duties which 
she avowed." (135) 
Waverley represents the Man of Feeling, for whom the quality of private life or 
domestic life is given the priority. As a modern man, his credo embodies a retirement 
from public affairs and real indifference to what lies beyond his domestic sphere. On 
the other hand, Flora represents the old classical type who perceives of man as 
essentially a political animal, and, therefore, she refuses to separate her private life 
from her public concerns. With such pUblic-spirited loyalty, she represents, in some 
respects, a model of the civic virtues whose absence in Scotland she deplores. 4O For 
Hart, Flora's critique of Waverley should not be understood as reflecting the narrator's 
view. If so, "here is a rhetorical flaw" because Flora's "tragically limited vision could 
not possibly allow her to judge Waverley fairly." According to Hart, her idealism is 
"self-petrifying," and she is the "nun-bride of her political idealism; all her pleasures 
and passions are ideal, indistinguishable from duty. ,,41 It is a fact that her views are 
extreme and narrow. She not only devotes her private life to public concerns, but she 
actually refrains to give private concerns any weight at all; in this respect, she elevates 
the public self above the private self in exactly the same way Waverley seems to 
elevate the private above the pUblic. hl this sense, we might situate her in the sphere 
of the Platonic Republic which cannot be established except on the private 
unhappiness of all its citizens. Scott seems to suggest some thing of that sort, in a 
crude way, by sending her off to a nwmery at the end of the novel, as Alexander 
Welsh points out, which reflects a retreat from the world by an excessive idealism. 
Yet, even this idealism is not sterile and "petrifying" as Hart argues. The nobleness 
and disinterestedness that characterize her loyalty cannot be conceived of, in a world 
full of the turncoats, except through an idealist perspective. An evidence of her noble 
commitment to what she believes to be the right choice is her refusal to submit to her 
brother's Machiavellian tactics to push her to marry Waverley in order to advance the 
Jacobite cause. Yet, Scott, the rational, the pragmatic and moderate, cannot find her a 
place in society that had witnessed new historical changes and new facts, where 
extremists seem to be aliens even if they are noble. She needs to belong to a world 
that still recognizes her extreme devotion-a nunnery. Scott shows the reader the 
importance of loyalty as one of the sublime civic virtues that characterized older 
societies, but, in the meantime, he warns of excessiveness in a world where public 
concerns have retreated to the background. If Flora's pUblic-spiritedness is excessive, 
Waverley's is deficient; if her Republic is founded on the unhappiness of its citizens, 
his, the republic of Men of Feeling, would not stand at all: the absence of civic virtue 
would destroy it. "The moral lesson" of this character contrast is thus identical to that 
of the anthropological contrast. 
The contrast between Waverley and Bradwardine is, perhaps, the most suggestive. 
The Baron, as introduced by Scott is a combination of the "pedantry of a lawyer" and 
"the military pride of a soldier." Add to this, "his prejudice of ancient birth and 
Jacobite politics, greatly strengthened by habits of solitary and secluded 
authority" ( 41). The Baron is easily represented as the archetype of the long line of 
single-minded eccentrics that inhabit the Waverley novels. Moreover, as Daiches 
argues, his chief eccentricity lies in his strong adherence to feudalism which "outlived 
its purpose and no longer operates usefully in society. ,,42 This, according to Daiches 
makes of the Baron an anachronism. 
Francis Hart adds more to this line of argument. In his view, the Baron, like 
Fergus and Flora, is an "ideologue," but he is comic rather than a tragic one. He is, 
moreover, "attractive," and benevolent, two qualities that qualified him to survive 
after the collapse of his "ideology." As an "ideologue," instead of disappearing, we 
find that the emerging man, the uncommitted, "post-ideological" Waverley, who acts 
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as his protector after Cul1~ rebuilds his ruined estate, and marries his daughter. 43 
Following Karl Kroeber's argument, Hart reads Waverley as "an ex1ended 
dramatization of the valuable diversities and complexities of mankind asserting 
themselves against laws too abstract, too rigid, too impersonal. ,,44 Despite the 
reservations which he expresses toward Daiches' anti-heroic reading of the novel, 
Hart seems to offer a subtler version of Daiches' thesis. For Daiches, modernity, 
which is "drab but necessary progress," triumphs over antiquity, which represents an 
"older heroic way of life"; while for Hart, modern flexibility, pragmatism, and 
"humanity" triumph over "ideology," or history.45 
However, I would argue that the "ideological"I"post-ideological" contrast is not 
what Scott intends to convey to the reader. Here, I would assume that the Baron fits a 
moral schema in which the contrast is between the magnanimous diehard, or "Old 
Trojan," as Scott sometimes called the type46 and the self-promoting Machiavellian, 
for whom principles are a means to an end. In other words, Scott's interest is less in 
the conflict between pragmatism and "ideology" than in that between moral heroism, 
even in a bad or indifferent cause, and moral cowardice, even in a good one. In this 
sense, Baron Bradwardine does not contrast with Waverley but, as Hart suggests, 
stands as the antithesis of the "opportunists": Waverley's "flexible" father, who 
recants his old loyalty to the Jacobite cause and turns Whig to get a place in the 
Hanoverian establishment, or the "pragmatic" Fergus Mac-Ivor, who fmds Jacobitism 
a means to an earldom. 47 As far as ideology is concerned, Scott always expresses his 
sympathy and admiration for the sincere "ideologue." If Scott is willing to forgi ve 
mistakes in judgement and presents noble characters in all factions, he is not willing 
to forgive misconduct that reveals disloyalty. fudividuals are judged in the view of 
the motive that underlies a given behaviour. 
This schema resonates throughout Scott's life and works. He makes it clear that he 
did not wish his historical writings to show the probity of a particUlar faction, but 
rather the virtue of individual actions. Lockhart's anecdote about Murray of 
Broughton is suggestive in this respect. Murray, says Lockhart, who was "attending 
Prince Charles Stuart as his secretary throughout his expedition, condescended to 
redeem his own life and fortune by bearing evidence against the noblest of his late 
master's adherents." It happened that the disgraced MlUTay was a client of Scott's 
lawyer father, and eventually made occasional visits to the Scott home. Always 
travelling incognito, he aroused the curiosity of Scott's mother. Not satisfied by her 
husband's vague replies to her questions, Mrs. Scott interrupted his meeting with the 
stranger one evening under the pretence of offering a refreshment of tea: 
The stranger ... accepted a cup; but her husband knit his brows, and refused 
very coldly to partake the refreshment. A moment afterwards, the visitor 
withdrew-and Mr. Scott, lifting up the window-sash, took the cup which 
he had left empty on the table, and tossed it out upon the pavement. The 
lady exclaimed for her china, but was put to silence by her husband's saying, 
"I can forgive your little curiosity, madam, but you must pay the penalty. I 
may admit into my house, on a piece of business, persons wholly unworthy 
to be treated as guests by my wife. Neither lip of me nor of mine comes 
after Mr. Murray of Broughton's. " 
The saucer belonging to Bro~ton's tea-cup chanced to be preserved; and 
Walter had made prize of it." 
The significance of this anecdote is that in Scott's mind, as in his devoutly Whiggish 
father's, Broughton's treachery was much worse than his Jacobite "ideology." Among 
the other things, beside Broughton's Saucer, which Scott preserved "A claymore and 
Lochaber axe, given him by old Invernahyle, mounted guard on a little print of Prince 
Charlie. ,,49 Alexander Stewart of Invernahyle, is described in great detail in the 1829 
Introduction to Waverley (386-388). Scott points out that Invernahyle's narrative of 
the '45' is embedded in the narratives of both Waverley and Baron Bradwardine. 
Invernahyle rescued an enemy officer, Colonel Whitefoord, at the battle of 
Prestonpans who was about to be struck down by a Highlander. Whitefoord later 
returned the favour by making Invernahyle's peace with the government after the 
defeat of the rebellion. The same episode is dramatized in Waverley. Waverley 
rescues Colonel Talbot and the latter returns the gratitude. At the same time, like 
Baron Bradwardine, Invernahyle survived the wave of persecution that followed the 
defeat at Culloden by hiding in a cave on his forfeited estate with the help of his loyal 
fonner tenants. The sympathetic "ideological" diehard deserves his good fortune in 
contrast to turncoat Broughton who deserves his disgrace. 
From another perspective, Invernahyle serves another significant role in Scott's 
moral imagination, as well: he is the epitome of public-spiritedness. Years after the 
'45' when the American revolutionary John Paul Jones threatened Edinburgh with 
"three trifling sloops or brigs, scarce fit to have sacked a fishing village," Invernahyle 
"was the only man who seemed to propose a plan of resistance." Scott records the 
episode in his 1829 Introduction: 
He offered to the magistrates, if broadswords and dirks could be obtained, to 
find as many Highlanders among the lower classes as would cut otT any 
boat's crew who might be sent into a town full of narrow and \\1ndi~ 
passages, in which they were likely to disperse for plunder. I know not if 
his plan was attended to; I rather think it seemed too hazardous to the 
constituted authorities, who might not even at that time, desire to see arms 
in Highland hands. A steady and powerful west wind settled the matter, by 
sweeping Paul Jones and his vessels out of the Firth. (388) 
This passage is reminiscent, both in its tone and sentiments, of Scott's account of the 
sack of Edinburgh by the Highlanders in Tales of a Grand Father. The following 
sentences in which Scott shifts forward in time to the threatened Napoleonic invasion 
of Britain, supports this connection: 
If there is some thing degrading in this recollection, it is not unpleasant to 
compare it with those of the last war, when Edinburgh, besides regular 
forces and militia, furnished a volunteer brigade of cavalry, infantry, and 
artillery, to the amount of six thousand men and upwards, which was in 
readiness to meet and repel a force of a far more formidable description than 
was commanded by the adventurous American. Time and circumstances 
change the character of nations and the fate of cities; and it is some pride to 
a Scotchman to reflect, that the independent and manly character of a 
country willing to entrust its protection to the arms of its children, after 
having been obscured for half-a-century, has, during the course of his own 
lifetime, recovered its lustre. (388-389) 
Critics who have taken note of the Invernahyle/ Broughton contrast have not 
usually seen all its implications. It is clear that Scott splits Invemahyle between 
Waverley and Baron Bradwardine, yet, Francis Hart, in particular, emphasizes the 
first connection and ignores the latter. Drawing a parallel between Invernalyle's 
rescue of Colonel Whitefoord and that of Waverley's of Colonel Talbot, Hart explains 
the latter act in a way as to show that philanthropy prevails over "ideology": 
[Waverley] follows his humane and courageous defense of Colonel Talbot 
against the Jacobites, and with this act begins his alienation from his new 
cause and the process leading to his survi va1. As a proof of a more hllll1ane 
fidelity, that transcends the historic accident of commitment to a cause 50 
In fact, Hart's argument at one point asserts that Waverley's harsh experience elevates 
him from the narrow partisan commitment to a broader human one that qualifies him 
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to set an example for others who are still captives of their narrow prejudices. "Talbot 
is a bigot; Talbot learns humanity from Waverley [who] has achieved a fuller 
humanity as a result of the involvement. Waverley's experience is the broadest, his 
humanity the most attractive and fruitful, in the book. ,,51 
A question jumps to the foreground about Scott's implied aim of making Waverley 
in his fiction take the role of Invernahyle in history. But before we answer this 
question let see how Scott depicts Invernahyle in his 1829 Introduction to Waverley: 
The author knew him well, and has often heard these circumstances from 
his own mouth. He was a noble specimen of the old Highlander, far 
descended, gallant, courteous, and brave, even to chivalry. He had been out, 
I believe, in 1715 and 1745, was an active partaker in all the stirring scenes 
which passed in the Highlands ... was remarkable, among other exploits, for 
having fought a duel with the broadsword with the celebrated Rob Roy 
MacGregor. (388) 
Why, then, does Scott derive Waverley's act which is not ideological but "human" 
from the act of a diehard Jacobite "ideologue" like Ivernahyle, that is, from an act 
suggestive more of old-fashioned chivalry than of a new-fashioned humanity? I think 
that Hart's term "humanity" which he uses to describe Waverley's act is vague. Thus, 
if we substitute more specific terms for "humanity" such as courage, charity or 
generosity, loyalty and disinterestedness, our understanding of Waverley's behaviour 
and its place in the novel changes radically. These virtues, true as they stand, may 
"transcend commitment to a cause, " but they are best mediated not by the 
uncommitted, "post-ideological" Waverley, but by the committed, "ideological" 
Baron Bradwardine. In this view, Waverley is not a new type of human 
transcendence but merely an emulation of the old model epitomized by the Baron. 
In this sense, the episode of a peasant woman, Janet Gellatley in the Baron's 
narrative is revealing. Janet was accused of witchcraft "on the infallible grounds that 
she was very old, very ugly, very poor, and had two sons, one of whom was a poet, 
and the other was a fool" (61). Rose Bradwardine tells us that the Baron was the only 
one to defend her, when, in a miserable condition, she was brought before a court of 
"Whiggish gentry and ministers" so as "to make open confessions of her sorceries": 
My father went to see fair play between the witch and the clergy, for the 
witch had been born on his estate. And while the witch was confessing that 
the Enemy appeared, and made his address to her as a handsome black 
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man-which if you could have seen poor old blear-eyed Janet, retlected 
little honour on Apollyon's taste-and while the auditors listened \\ith 
astonishment ears, and the clerk recorded with a trembling hand, she, all of 
a sudden, changed the low mumbling tone with which she spoke into a shrill 
yell, and exclaimed, 'look to yourselves! look to yourselves! I see the Evil 
One seated in the midst of ye.' The surprise was general, and terror and 
flight its immediate consequence. Happy were those who were next the 
door, and many were the disasters that befell hats, bands, cuffs, and wigs, 
before they could get out of the church, where they left the obstinate 
prelatist [the Baron] to settle matters with the witch and her admirer, at his 
own pleasure. " 
"Risu solvuntur," said the Baron: when they recovered their panic 
trepidation, they were too much ashamed to bring any wakening of the 
process against Janet Gellatley." (61) 
One direct conclusion could be drawn from this episode: Scott as an Episcopalian is 
deriding and criticizing the fanaticism and superstition of the Scottish presb~terians. 
But once we finish reading the novel we tend to derive other implications. The 
episode reveals the significance of the civic virtues, especially, courage and loyalty in 
the old-fashioned society. First, the courage of the Baron is reflected in standing up 
to the clergy. Second, his loyalty to his tenants is rewarded later, when Janet and her 
son Davie, the fool, aided him by bringing him food and decoying the government 
troops when he was hiding after the defeat of the rebellion. The aid the Baron 
received from his tenants resembles the aid which Invernahyle received in return for 
his aiding an enemy officer. The Baron's virtues, Scott suggests, form strong bonds 
that bring people closer in the times of hardship. 52 
On examining the acts of the Baron toward his tenants, Invernahyle toward 
Colonel Whitefoord, and Waverley toward Colonel Talbot, we fmd that although the 
social consequences are the same, yet they differ in accordance with the difference of 
motives that brought on such acts. Waverley acts mainly on the impetus of his own 
spontaneous feelings of sympathy for victims, while the Baron, like Invernahyle, acts 
on principle. The difference is reflected even in the different styles of narration 
employed in the two episodes. Rose's version of the trial of Janet Gellatley is a sort of 
Augustan satire of religious fanaticism and superstition; the Baron himself, in fact, is 
a model satirist, interested in "fair play" because, while he is appalled by at least some 
of his society's defects, he also recognizes and upholds his own obligations (as a 
feudal land-lord) within that society. Waverley'S adventures at Prestonpans, on the 
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other hand, are like a dream-sequence. 53 Scott describes Waverley's situation before 
the battle as if trapped in a dream: 
Looking around him, he saw the wild dress and appearance of his Highland 
associates, heard their whispers in an uncouth and unknown language, 
looked upon his own dress, so unlike that which he had worn from his 
infancy, and wished to awake from what seemed at the moment a dream. 
strange, hOrrible, and unnatural. (221) 
In the same scene a Highlander was preparing to kill Waverley's old superior, Captain 
Gardiner and "Edward felt as if he were about to see a parricide committed in his 
presence" (221). The next day, another incident occurs when Waverley amidst the 
"confusion and terror," of the Highlanders' charge sights an English officer in a 
critical condition. Waverley "struck with his tall, martial figure," was eager to save 
him from inevitable destruction." The officer, who turned out to be Colonel Talbot, 
in his turn, was "struck with Edward's generous anxiety for his safety" (225). 
Waverley acts generously and courageously, of course, but his generosity and courage 
seem to spring largely from subjective considerations-not, as in Baron 
Bradwardine's or Invernahyle's case, from an articulate view of life and its civic 
virtues. 
Earlier in the novel, Scott comments on Waverley's courage as being limited, the 
courage of a Man of Feeling: 
His passion for the wonderful, although it is the nature of such disposition 
to be excited by that degree of danger which merely gives dignity to the 
feelings of the individual exposed to it, had sunk under the extraordinary 
and apparently insurmountable evils by which he appeared environed at 
Cairnvreckan. In fact, this compound of intense curiosity and exalted 
imagination fonns a peculiar species of courage, which somewhat resembles 
the light usually carried by a miner,-sufficiently competent, indeed, to 
afford him guidance and comfort during the ordinary perils of his labour, 
but certain to be extinguished should he encounter the more fonnidable 
hazard of earth-damps or pestiferous vapours. (181) 
For Waverley, courage is not taken as a virtue to be exercised, but as a mere passing 
response to certain situations; whereas for the Baron it forms part and parcel of his 
"ideology," as a matter of principle. Consequently, if Waverley lacks the Baron's 
"ideology," he also lacks his principles. 
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It seems that this is not restricted to the virtue of courage, but it extends to the 
virtue of disinterestedness, which Scott's of "middle-of-the-road" heroes are usuallv 
said to exemplify, in order to bring on reconciliation between the con11icting parties, 
on the one hand, and to shun all sorts of fanaticism and extremism on the other. Thus, 
in certain instances, we fmd Baron Bradwardine, in spite of his ideological 
commitments, not less fair than Waverley to political opponents. In other words, 
disinterestedness could be one of the ingredients of an ideology, even we might say 
that Waverley himse1fwas a beneficiary of this virtue early in the novel. On his first 
night at Tully-Veolan, when the drunken Jacobite Laird Balmawhapple offers a toast 
in which he implicitly means an offence to the established government of whom 
Waverley is an officer, the Baron took a tough stance on behalf of Waverley: 
But, ere he [Waverley] could interfere, the Baron of Bradwardine had taken 
up the quarrel. "Sir," he said, "whatever my sentiments, tanquam privatus, 
may be in such matters, I shall not tamely endure your saying anything that 
may impinge upon the honourable feelings of a gentleman under my roof. 
Sir, if you have no respect for the laws of urbanity, do ye not respect the 
military oath, the sacramentum militare, by which every officer is bound to 
the standard under which he is enrolled? Look at Titus Livius, what he says 
of those Roman soldiers who were so unfortunate as exuere 
sacramentum,- to renounce their legionary oath; but you are ignorant, sir, 
alike of ancient history and modern courtesy. (49) 
Although the Baron is a diehard Jacobite, he accepts Balmawhapple's challenge to a 
duel next day, and defeats him. For the Baron the whole act is a matter of principle. 
Waverley's role was to make peace between the two in such a way as to spare the 
feelings of both. 
This comic episode is suggestive in many ways. If we compare Waverley's 
disinterestedness with that of the Baron we might put our fmger on the difference. 
Waverley's role (as Scott wants it to be) or middle-of-the-road-hero, makes him 
almost always equidistant from the combatants because he has been involved or has 
personal attachments to both. Thus, when he returns to the Hanoverian camp he does 
not show any ill feelings to the Jacobite, in contrast with his friend, Colonel Talbot, 
whose bigotry makes him repeatedly berate Waverley's Scottish Jacobite friends. For 
instance, he 
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characterized the Baron as the most intolerable formal pedant he had ever 
had the misfortune to meet with, and the chief of Glennaquoich as a 
Frenchified Scotchman, possessing all the cunning and plausibility of the 
nation where he was educated, with the proud, vindictive, and turbulent 
humour of that of his birth. "If the devil," he said, "had sought out an agent 
expressly for the purpose of embroiling this miserable country, I do not 
think he could have found a better than such a fellow as this, whose temper 
seems equally active, supple, and mischievous, and who is followed, and 
implicitly obeyed, by a gang of such cut-throats as those whom you are 
pleased to admire so much. (246-247) 
Even the Scottish ladies were not far from Talbot's mockery as Scott points out: 
Now all this was mere spleen and prejudice in the excellent Colonel, with 
whom the white cockade on the breast, the white rose in the hair, and Mac 
at the beginning of a name, would have made a devil out of an angle; and 
indeed he himself jocularly allowed, that he could not have endured Venus 
herself, if she had been announced in a drawing-room by the name of Miss 
Mac-Jupiter. (247) 
Apart from what Talbot's position embodies-political and cultural prejudice54, what 
concerns us here is Waverley's response-in fact, nil--compared to that of the 
Baron's when Waverley was insulted. For Waverley, disinterestedness is a matter of 
experience, not of principle as it is for the Baron. There is therefore no rational 
argument to which he can appeal. 
The episode could be seen from another perspective. When the Baron defends 
Waverley against Balmawhapple, he, in fact, invokes the patriarchal principle of 
unconditional hospitality to acknowledged guests: Waverley's opinion must be 
respected, says the Baron, while he is "under my roof." Put differently, while his 
disinterestedness does somehow transcend his ideology it is also rooted in it. For 
Waverley virtue is detached from ideology. It might be said that Waverley has 
extended the range of the virtue's application to a sort of uni versaI benevolence or 
"general philanthropy," yet, in some respects, he reduced its efficacy, as a man of 
feeling he can feel disinterestedness, but he cannot practice it. This point here seems 
to be the same as that of the "dying sergeant" episode in chapter 45: the progress of 
civil society entails some potentially dangerous limitations on the human spirit. As 
Peter Garside points out: "a more modern 'general philanthropy' can seem hopelessly 
opaque, literary and ineffectually abstract. ,,55 Yet Garside observes a positive aspect 
of "sentiment" when he draws an analogy between the scene in which Waverley begs 
Baron Bradwardine for the hand of his daughter Rose and a scene from Mackenzie's 
The Man of Feeling. It seems Scott employs this scene, according to Garside, to 
celebrate "the breaking down of feudal conventionality," and "the forging of a 
working Anglo-Scottish alliance." Here, "the man of feeling has suddenly acquired a 
new social significance. ,,56 
Seen in this light, even Baron Bradwardine's notorious eccentricities are suggestive 
of something other than the obsoleteness of the feudal doctrine. In this sense, Scott 
seems to play the Baron's card in two ways. Through the Baron's eccentric adherence 
to the feudal rituals he alerts the reader not to the anachronism in the Baron's 
behaviour, but to the significance of clinging to that behaviour. In one anecdote the 
Baron shows a strong will to disinherit his beloved daughter Rose in favour of a 
distant male relative, whom he knows to be his enemy, in order to uphold the charter's 
Salic stipulations. The Baron's argument recalls Burke's view concerning the notion 
of inheritance and its role in maintaining social and political stability. In another, he 
insists on removing Prince Charles' boots after the battle of Prestonpans because the 
charter suggests that, hundreds of years before, the barony was a reward to his family 
in return for this service. Apparently, these actions indicate a sort of antiquarian 
obsession, but in reality they mean an insistence to live the good life in the classical 
sense-that is to fulfill all of one's obligations as a citizen, and to allow public 
considerations to inform and shape the conduct of the individual's life. However, it 
should be owned that Scott alludes to his reservations regarding specific applications 
of the Baron's view of life, yet he emphasizes other positive aspects of this view. This 
is reflected in the protagonist's approval, in parts, of the Baron's practices. Thus, when 
Fergus criticizes the Baron mockingly for his being preoccupied with performing his 
duties of pulling the prince's boots, Waverley shows objection by commenting: "And 
how can you take pleasure in making a man of his worth so ridiculous?" (232). 
In the end, Waverley returns to his normal life, that is, to his "real history," almost 
to be what Flora had predicted for him. Whether he learned any thing from his 
association with the Baron remains unclear as we know little of his life after the '45 
and his experience does not mean that he had developed any ideology in his life. His 
private life necessarily would be consistent and derived from the nature of the life 
prevailing in a civilized society, that of English culture. In short, his life would consist 
largely of the private "emotional reactions" consistent to that of the Man of Fec1ing. 
What he learns from the uprising is less a stock of "moral lessons" than a stock of 
aesthetic experiences for future reflection, best reflected: 
In the painting, representing Fergus MacIvor and Waverley in their 
Highland dress, the scene a wild, rocky, and mountainous pass, down which 
the clan were descending in the background. (338) 
The nightmare of the workings of the historical forces in a critical moment, instead of 
being a complication in Waverley's subconscious mind, is projected on the wall to be 
seen as something static and eventually peaceful. By doing so Scott makes his hero 
pursue his domestic life as a blank page. For Francis Hart, this operation may be 
subsumed under the rubric of a justifiable "escape from history. ,,57 Not only for 
Waverley, but for anyone who had experienced the bitterness of a civil war such an 
escape is understandable; and, therefore, there is no need to argue, as some critics 
have, that Waverley's stance at the end of the novel is the object of open satire. 58 Yet 
the novel's denouement at least suggests that the post-civic Man of Feeling is, for 
Scott, something less than the ideal human type. By and large, the whole rhetorical 
structure of Waverley~ with its large network of "contrasts," mediates the limitation of 
the protagonist's view of life no less than that of the Jacobite "ideologues" and the 
virtues of that ideology, mainly loyalty, remain predominant even after its defeat. 
At any rate, the conventional "Hobbesian" or anti-heroic reading of Waverley, as I 
have suggested at the outset of this chapter, is closely linked to the historicist reading. 
The '45 in this view, appealed to Scott not as a source of moral exemplars but as an 
illustration of the historical process, through which, as David Daiches puts it, a "social 
code" viable in one era "outlive[s] its purpose" in the next, and "no longer operates 
usefully in society. ,,59 Thus the idealistic Flora and the high-minded Baron 
Bradwardine often appear to be anachronisms even among their fellow Jacobites: 
Waverley had, indeed, as he looked closer into the state of the Chevalier's 
court, less reason to be satisfied with it. It contained, as they say an acorn 
includes all the ramifications of the future oak, as many seeds of tracasserie 
and intrigue as might have done honor to the court of a large Empire. Every 
person of importance had some separate object, which he pursued \\ith a 
tUry that Waverley considered as altogether disproportioned to its 
importance. Almost· all had their causes for discontent, although the most 
legitimate was that of the worthy old Baron, who was only distressed on 
account of the common cause. (250) 
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Later in the chapter which this passage introduces, Fergus, outraged by Prince 
Charles' refusal to recognize his patent for an earldom or permit him to marry Rose 
Bradwardine, seems to renounce the most crucial articles of the Jacobite faith: 
"Would you believe it, I made this very morning two suits to the Prince, 
and he has rejected them both: what do you think of it?" 
"What can I think," answered Waverley, "till I know what 
your requests were?" 
"Why, what signifies what they were, man? I tell you it was I that 
made them,-I, to whom he owes more than to any three who have joined 
the standard; for I have negotiated the whole business, and brought in all the 
Perthshire men when not one would have stirred. I am not likely, I think, to 
ask any thing very unreasonable, and if I did they might have stretched a 
point." 
"After this, put your faith in princes!" (252-253). 
The doctrine of royal absolutism and passive obedience of the subject no longer make 
sense, even to their fiercest proponents. "By manipulating the Prince," as Brown puts 
it, "his followers show they no longer really believe in the ideology of their own 
cause, and that the values of the bourgeois Lowlands and England have in fact 
become their values. ,,60 Or as Lukacs argues, Scott is demonstrating the historical 
necessity of the "downfall of gentile [that is, 'patriarchal' or 'heroic'] society. ,,61 
But as Scott's own words suggest, the "internal contradictions" of the Jacobite 
court are not peculiar to late patriarchal society: "the tracasserie and intrigue" of that 
court, made up mostly of petty aristocrats and clan chiefs, are only a sort of demotic 
version of the plots that plague the more sophisticated court of "a large empire," like 
that, perhaps, of modern Britain. The latter is certainly no less troubled by the 
"bourgeois" values of its self-seeking adherents. In fact, in his rage at the thwarting of 
his aristocratic ambitions, Fergus simply echoes the rationale of Waverley's father, 
who latches on to an attempted coup within the Hanoverian court in hopes of 
advancing his lagging bureaucratic career: "rll tell you what I could have done at that 
moment--sold myself to the devil or the elector, whichever offered the dearest 
revenge." (254) As Buzard puts it: "Fergus exemplifies a modem selthood corrosive 
of feudalism. ,,62 Scott's interest seems to be less in the unique manifestations of the 
historical process than in unifornlity of human passions such as selfish ambition, 
which produce similar effects in different stages of society or within ditTerent 
ideological frameworks~ he presents a critique less of Jacobitism per se than of selfish 
ambition as it affects Jacobites. Insofar as Scott deals with Jacobitism per se, his 
approach is not at all historicist. In a sense, his purpose is not to depict Jacobitism as 
a once coherent ideology in the act of becoming incoherent, but, as we have seen, to 
discriminate among the moral tendencies inherent in it, to separate the virtues from 
the vices and make the virtues available to modern society. This is nowhere more 
apparent than in the treason trial of Fergus Mac-Ivor in Chapter 21-one of the 
greatest scenes that Scott's nineteenth-century admirers no doubt had in mind when 
they compared him with Shakespeare. 
The scene in which Evan Dhu, foster brother of Fergus, is sentenced is highly 
expressive. The judge, considering that Evan is "ignorant" and, therefore, the act of 
his loyalty is a mere blind tradition, engages in what amounts to sociological or 
anthropological analysis: 
"For you, poor ignorant man," continued the Judge, "who, following the 
ideas in which you have been educated, have this day given us a striking 
example of how loyalty due to the king and state alone, is, from your 
unhappy ideas of clanship, transferred to some ambitious individual, who 
ends by making you the tool of his crimes--for you, I say, I feel so much 
compassion, that if you can make up your mind to petition for grace, I will 
endeavour to procure it for you-otherwise-" 
"Grace me no grace," said Evan; "since you are to shed Vich Ian Vohr's 
blood, the only favour I would accept from you is-to bid them loose my 
hands and gie me my claymore, and bide you just a minute sitting where 
you are." (320-321) 
Evan's loyalty to his chief is represented not as the expression of the unique moral 
system of an incommensurable culture but as a perverse variation on a moral norm, a 
product of human nature under eccentric social conditions. 
Yet this sociological critique is closely tied to a powerful "moral lessons." If 
patriarchal society produces notions of loyalty that are excessively narrow, those 
loyalties are remarkably deep-so deep, in fact, that members of a modern 
commercial society find them troubling and embarrassing. Thus Evan's extraordinary 
offer to the judge when sentence has been passed on Fergus: 
... that if your excellent honour, and the honourable court, would let Vich 
Ian Vohr go free just this once, and let him gae back to France, and no to 
trouble King George's government again, that ony six 0' the very best of his 
clan will be willing to be justified in his stead~ and if you11 just let me gae 
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down to Glennaquoich, TIl fetch them up ye mesell, to head or hang, and 
you may begin wi' me the very fIrst man. (320) 
The upshot amounts to what is probably Scott's most telling parable of civic virtue: 
Notwithstanding the solemnity of the occasion, a sort of laugh was heard in 
the court at the extraordinary nature of the proposal. The Judge checked 
this indecency, and Evan, looking sternly around, when the murmur abated, 
"If the Saxon gentlemen are laughing," he said, "because a poor man, such 
as me, thinks my life, or the life of six of my degree, is worth that of Vich 
Ian V ohr, it's like enough they may be very right; but if they laugh because 
they think I would not keep my word, and come back to redeem him, I can 
tell them they ken neither the heart of Hieland man, nor the honour of a 
gentleman. " 
There was no further inclination to laugh among the audience, and a dead 
silence ensued. (320) 
Jacobitism, for Scott, is in one sense simply the defunct philosophy of royal 
absolutism, the ideology of a "rude," patriarchal society; but it is also the simple 
courage and loyalty of Highland clansmen like Evan Dhu and the more sophisticated 
philosophy of civic virtue articulated by Flora Mac-Ivor and Baron Bradwardine. In 
the latter sense, Jacobitism will always remain "viable." How the essence of such 
virtues would be translated in the present is left for the following novels to answer. 
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Chapter wee 
Old lviortality (1816) 
Like Waverley, Old Mortality dramatizes a historical crisis. Scott's treatment of the 
late seventeenth-century conflict between Scottish Royalists or Cavaliers and 
presbyterian Covenanters is liable to psycho-biographical interpretation. The novel, 
in this light, is a reflection of the author's mixed feelings about the past-<Jf 
Enlightenment rationalism on the one hand and Romantic nostalgia on the other. Scott 
wrote jokingly of the dogmatic "cavalierism" of his youth. 1 Even as an adult, he 
wrote the imitation Royalist ballad "Bonnie Dundee," celebrating the exploits of John 
Grahame of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee, the arch-enemy of the Covenanters, and 
a portrait of Claverhouse adorned the library of Scott's Edinburgh home. 2 Equally, 
the young Scott was steeped in the tracts and martyrologies of the persecuted 
Covenanters, and even the adult Scott once proposed to install an aged Cameronian 
minister as chaplain at Abbotsford. 3 In a letter to his friend Lady Louisa Stuart, Scott 
boasted that he had made himself "complete master of the whole history of these 
strange times both of persecutors & persecuted. ,,4 Several critics have even pointed 
out that a perverse nostalgia for the period could be discerned surfacing occasionally 
in the novel, most remarkably in the denouement, where Scott's imagination is said to 
balk at the peaceful resolution of the Royalist-Covenanter conflict by the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 and the constitutional settlement of 1689. 5 
On the other hand, this nostalgia is generally assumed to have been held in check 
by Scott's rationalist sense that, however emotionally attractive, the heroic way of life 
described in the novel is outmoded. In fact, of all Scott's novels, Old Mortality seems 
to be most open to what I have called a "Hobbesian" reading, which does not favour 
religious toleration but does believe that the choice of religious doctrines should 
belong to the Sovereign (king or legislature) alone, rather than to the individual 
citizen. Indeed, it deals with events that are little more than a late edition of the 
seventeenth-century wars to which Hobbes was responding. It pits the party of self-
congratulatory aristocratic honour against that of religious fanaticism, and thus seems 
to discredit the heroic virtues of courage, devotion, and self sacrifice manifested by 
both parties involved in the cont1ict, the Royalists and the Covenanters. 
Critics have interpreted the novel in these or similar terms. For David Daiches, the 
novel dramatizes "a moment when the heroic attitudes of self-sacrificing religious 
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enthusiasts cannot be successfully mediated into the modern world. ,,6 Later critics 
have read the novel thematically as a portrayal of "opposing fanaticism" embodied by 
Burley and Claverhouse who are equally adverse to modern pluralism -:, or as 
"opposite types of heroism; each is in contradiction to the levelling grayness of 
historical necessity. ,,8 George Goodin offers a sound and systematic attempt to read 
Old Mortality along these lines. For him, many of the plot-motifs Scott uses, that is, 
the middle-of-the-road hero victimized by both parties involved in dispute, the cross-
political romance thwarted by politics, and so on-are designed to denigrate political 
commitment and "favor the 'passive conservatism' that Trotsky fOlmd characteristic of 
all art. ,,9 Despite the variety of their political stances and attitudes toward Scott, 
modern critics have almost all read the novel as being essentially concerned with the 
limitation of pUblic-spiritedness. 
Reading the novel from this perspective could have been derived from Scott's own 
comments. In his letter to John Richardson, an English friend, in which he explains 
the period of the novel. Scott writes: 
As to the Covenanters and Malignants [that is, Royalists] they were both a 
set of cruel and bloody bigots and had notwithstanding those virtues with 
which bigotry is something allied. . .. Neither had the least idea either of 
toleration or humanity so that it happens that so far as they can be 
distinguished from each other one is tempted to hate most the party which 
chances to be uppermost for the time. lO 
This passage does in fact suggest an attitude of cautious and studied neutrality 
between "opposing fanaticisms," and a preference for peaceable and pluralistic virtues 
like "toleration" and "humanity," as opposed to "those virtues with which bigotry is 
sometimes allied." This, of course, is attained as MacQueen remarks through 
"reconciliation symbolized by the wedding of old opponents," and hence, "the Killing 
Time is seen as a kind of baptism of fIre for the emergence of the new society." II 
Scott's letter, however, was written almost a decade after the publication of Old 
Mortality, and its rhetoric is arguably an indirect response to negative criticism that 
the novel received. In fact, the passage in question seems to be a direct reaction to 
Richardson's unfavourable comparison of Old Mortality with the recently published 
second series of Scott's Tales of a Grandfather. With the Tales, Richardson tells 
Scott, "you have paid a debt which you owed to the manes of the Covenanters for the 
flattering picture you drew of Claverhouse in Old Atortality. ,,12 
10') 
By and large, Old Mortality remains a novel about Scott's view of history and the 
historical process, and the benefits the knowledge of history can contribute to society. 
In this respect, Scott's history is one of flesh and blood, not merely peopled with 
distant figures and battles. TIris conception of the notion of history, Lukacs argues, 
enabled Scott to explode myths such as the peaceful transition of the "Glorious 
Revolution" of 1688 by showing the struggles endured by individuals. Scott's realism 
and objectivity, according to Lukacs, made him "keenly observant of the real facts of 
social development," and showed in his works "that this peaceful development was 
peaceful only as the ideal of an historical conception, only from the bird's-eye view of 
a philosophy of history. ,,13 So instead of a "bird's-eye view," Scott endows the reader 
of Old Mortality with a series of filtering narrators, firmly on the ground, and 
therefore obviously open to the bias that their perspectives allow. First, as David 
Brown states, "by fictitiously citing Old Mortality as the inspiration for the novel, 
Scott establishes for the reader the essential, human link with the past. ,,14 However, 
Old Mortality's dedication to the past is a form of what Ina Ferris refers to as "faithful 
and loyal memory,,,15 the type of historicism practiced by Scott's contemporary 
novelists who wrote of the "Killing Time," including James Hogg and John Galt, 
rather than historical knowledge or experience. Nor does Old Mortality contorm to 
the established historic version by Robert Wodrow who depicted heroic Covenanters 
battling against Anglicized, even "Popish Stuarts. ,,16 With the "human link," Scott 
offers an invitation for his readers to profit from his historical fiction, in a manner in 
which he himself reads history. As a result of this strategy, his treatment of the late 
seventeenth-century conflict between Scottish Royalists or Cavaliers and Presbyterian 
CovenantersI7 in Old Mortality demanded a sort of revision of the documented 
history. This daring attempt was at odds with comfortable reliance on traditional 
memories, which made Scott at best liable to the charge of distorting the historical 
facts and at worst as biased to the Royalists. 
Although Old Mortality has supplanted Waverley in the estimation of many 
twentieth-century critics, its original reception was hostile, particularly in Scotland. 
As Francis Jeffrey points out in the Edinburgh Review, Scott's treatment of the 
Covenanters gave rise to an unprecedented public controversy: 
It is a singular honour, no doubt, to a work of fiction and amusement, to be 
thus made the theme of serious attack and defense upon points of historical 
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and theological discussion, and to have grave dissertations \"ritten by 
learned contemporaries upon the accuracy of its representations of public 
events and characters. 18 
Detecting both Tory prejudices and a touch of religious latitudinarianism in the 
novel's treatment of the Covenanters, Jeffrey argues that Scott "scarcely disguises his 
preferences for a Cavalier over a puritan. ,,19 While Jeffrey acquits Scott of the charge 
of distorting history, other critics were less generous. 20 An anonymous critic in the 
British Review argued, for instance, that Scott's portrait of the Covenanters is a mere 
caricature and "displays too little sensibility of the crimes and cruelties of the 
Royalists. ,,21 
But the most substantial attack on Old Mortality came from Dr. Thomas Mcrie, a 
presbyterian clergyman. His critique of the novel in which he exposes Scott's "glaring 
partiality" toward Royalists and "injustice" to "Covenanters," in many ways, 
anticipates that of Alexander Welsh, especially in its attack on Henry Morton, Scott's 
middle-of-the-road presbyterian hero: 
It is no apology ... that the author, in a general statement, opposed the 
tyranny of the government, and military violence, to the turbulence and 
fanaticism of the Covenanters; for he has dwelt upon the latter, and only 
glanced at the former in a transient manner. ... had he only introduced the 
leading facts in a conversation between Henry Morton and a rational 
presbyterian, (if such a personage could have entered into the author's 
conception), he might have given a higher tone to his work, and invested the 
nominal hero with the real character of a patriot, instead of making him a 
mere everyday person of romance-a puppet, alternately agitated by love, 
and jealousy, and personal resentment, and a vague and feeble wish for 
fame. 22 
Scott, according to MCrie, was incapable of making Morton a real, "committed" 
Covenanter-not because he wanted to preserve an anti-political neutrality, as Goodin 
suggests, but because he somehow sided with the Royalists. In short, many of Scott's 
contemporaries viewed Old Mortality, the novel modern critics have generally 
thought the clearest manifestation of his progressive or modernist trend, as the 
clearest manifestation of his Tory bias. 
In fact, from the perspective of the twentieth century, the controversy surrounding 
Old Mortality resembles the sort of controversy that enlpts when historical 
revisionism calls into question some group's cherished and longstanding notions of its 
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past-in this case, the Scottish presbyterian version of Scottish history. Actually, 
MCrie's criticism suggests that he is reacting not simply to "bias" but to the 
discomforts of revisionism, which he regards as offensive to the Scottish national 
pride. Accordingly, he describes Scott not only as a Tory but also as "a Scotsman 
retailing English blunders, and dressing the most crude materials, with laborious 
trifling, to feed English prejudice at the expense of his country's honor. ,,23 Scott's 
friend James Hogg (the Ettrick Shepherd) had an even more striking response: the 
"picture of the times" presented in Old Mortality was untrue, he told Scott, because it 
conflicted with "the picture I have bred up in the belief 0' sin ever I was born, and I 
had it frae them whom I was most bound to honour and believe [that is, his parents 
and clergyman]. ,,24 As the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper points out in his defense of 
the novel, Scott, in writing about the Covenanters, was forced to confront a dubious 
"official tradition": 
In Scotland, ever since the Reformation, the Kirk had set itself up as the 
guardian of historical as well as of divine truth, and history had been written 
largely by the presbyterian clergy, who wrote .. .in the black-and-white terms 
of the old Testament books of Kings and Chronicles. The 17th century, in 
particular, was presented by them as a long epic in which the forces of light, 
represented by the theocratic Kirk and its 'Covenants', had waged a heroic 
struggle against the forces of darkness, represented mainly by [the] 
Anglicized, even popish Stuart kings. 25 
In this context, few later historians dared to challenge this tradition. Except for the 
agnostic David Hume, who covers the 1679 uprising briefly in his History of England, 
the Scottish Enlightenment historians generally shied away from seventeenth-century 
history. William Robertson, for example, tactfully concluded his History of Scotland 
with the Union of Crowns in 1603. Most of the "philosophical" historians were at 
least nominal presbyterians, and many were actually clergymen themsel ves 
(Robertson) or sons of clergymen (Ferguson). The extreme creed of their forebears 
had fallen by the wayside, and the Covenanting period had probably become more an 
embarrassment than a source of pride. Yet the continued authority of the Kirk, even 
in the academic world, seems to have deterred them from attempting too close an 
examination of the Covenanters. Thus it was that Scott, a self-employed novelist and 
Episcopal convert, became the frrst revisionist of seventeenth-century Scottish 
history. By doing so, he abandoned the traditional memories. After all, to rely on 
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such traditions would be to accept the animosities and possibly to prolong the 
bloodshed of the Restoration in Scotland. Scott has his fictional narrator, Pattieson, 
close his introduction with a plea not to inflame the discord of the past that caused so 
much destruction. 26 
As I have pointed out earlier in the introduction, Scott had emphasized the role of 
historical fiction in educating the reader and making him learn from the experiences 
of the past so that he can avoid the horrors which are likely to recur in the present: the 
constant elements in human nature make it possible that history repeats itself but in 
different versions. With historical experience it would be possible to treat problems 
in the present with more rationality rather than submit to the wild passions that would 
lead to destruction. Old Mortality's use of the "Killing Time," presents a diagnosis of 
the causes that helped in inflaming the di visi ons in Scotland, and a warning of what 
Scott felt might happen in his present time. In the year 1815, while Scott was writing 
Old Mortality, disunity was looming in the horizon of his country. Graham McMaster 
states that the time was "characterized by an outstanding degree of conflict and 
divisiveness. ,,27 The external threat posed by Napoleon was defeated, but internal 
threat, mostly owing to post-war economic issues began to surface. According to 
MacQueen, "Old Mortality, basically, is the story of a Whig uprising in the West of 
Scotland, and, as such, could not be without its painful relevance to the period which 
immediately followed the Napoleonic Wars. ,,28 The present threat seemed too 
difficult to be solved by either an army or governmental interference: "traditional 
divisions between Whig and Tory appeared quite minor compared to those between 
town and country, merchant and landlord, farmer and labourer, and industrial and 
rural haves and have-nots. ,,29 However, it should be owned that Scott did not mean 
to equate his time with the "Killing Time," but he was alarmed seeing in both 
situations the dangers posed to society when individual concerns and resentments led 
to zealotry and fanaticism, usurping feelings of patriotism and humanity. Therefore, 
it was necessary for Scott to reconstruct past events not chronologically, but with 
rational analysis. 
In this chapter I will argue that Old Mortality is not presenting a mere Tory 
apologia for that period, but offers something like a "philosophical" history. Also, I 
will argue that this "history" manifests a cultural criticism of the period of religious 
conflict different in some respects from the anti-heroic and anti-political one offered 
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by Hobbes. Finally, I will argue that the virtue of loyalty remains a central issue for 
Scott that contributes to the stability of the nation. 
It is usually asswned that, as historians, Scott and David Hwne are at opposite 
poles: Hwne is "judgmental," Scott "sympathetic"; Hwne, as a child of the 
Enlightenment, sneers at the folly of past generations, while Scott, the proto-
historicist, attempts to enter the consciousness of his subjects even when he reproves 
their conduct. Thus, for example, Cockshut: 
Hwne was one of those immensely persuasive men who employ brilliant 
intellectual powers in simplifying. Thus the simple antithesis of the 
"fanatic" or "enthusiast" (the covenanting type) and the "superstitious" (the 
Royalist Anglican) satisfies him. Those who are not covered by either term 
are simply selfish men without principle, like the hypocritical blacksmith, 
on one side, or violent, sensual men like Bothwell on the other. Scott is 
intent on showing how much more complex these psychological questions 
reallyare?O 
The "key point" here, according to Cockshut, "is Hwne's use of the word 'fanatic,'" 
which in the History "invariably signals a fixed judgment and a closed question." In 
Old Mortality, he argues, Scott "was reopening the supposedly closed question, 'what 
is fanaticism?",3l 
This view is the offspring of considering Hwne as a representative Enlightenment 
historian. Here it should be recalled that Hwne's notion of historiography is much 
akin to those of his "philosophical" Scottish contemporaries, who in many respects 
dissented from the British and Continental Enlightenment. On reading his History of 
England, it is not difficult to see that when he deals with the "fanatics" he shows little 
sympathy; but the word "fanaticism" does not invariably denote a "fixed judgment" in 
the sense of black and white. This fact could be sensed from his coverage of the 
British Civil War epoch. Here, Hwne's painstaking work is to interpret the genesis, 
growth, and diversification of "fanaticism." 
Cockshut emphasizes that Scott's superiority over Hwne lies in the depth and 
subtlety of the former's insight into the past as well as in his presentation of the 
psychological mosaic among "fanatics": The all-enduring Bessie MacIare, the 
pedantic and cowardly Gabriel Kettledummle, the selfless and unworldly Ephrainl 
Macbriar, the ambitious and energetic John Balfour of Burley, and the lunatic 
Habbakkuk Mucklewrath are each "fanatical" to a ditTerent degree and in a different 
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way. 32 Yet, Hume's history affords similar distinctions. Consider, for instance, the 
passage on the Civil War distinguishing between the English presbyterians and the 
more radical Independents (or "puritan") faction of Oliver Cromwell, which emerged 
from Wlder their wings: 
The enthusiasm of the presbyterians led them to reject the authority of 
prelates, to throw off the restraint of liturgies, to retrench ceremonies, to 
limit the riches and authority of the priestly office: the fanaticism of the 
independents, exalted to a higher pitch, abolished ecclesiastical government, 
disdained creeds and systems, neglected every ceremony, and confoWlded 
all ranks and orders. The soldier, the merchant, the mechanic, indulging the 
fervours of zeal, and guided by the illapses of the spirit, resigned himself to 
an inward and superior direction, and was consecrated, in a manner, by 
immediate intercourse and communion with heaven. 33 
In fact, the significance of this passage, nevertheless, is not limited to its distinction 
between types of "fanatics," but it extends to the relationship it establishes between 
these types and the historical process: 
The presbyterians, imagining that such clear and certain tenets, as they 
themselves adopted, could be rejected only from a criminal and pertinacious 
obstinacy, had hitherto gratified, to the full, their bigoted zeal in [the 
persecution of other sects]: the independents, from the extremity of the same 
zeal, were led into the milder principles of toleration. Their mind, set afloat 
in the wide sea of inspiration, could confme itself within no certain limits; 
and the same variations, in which an enthusiast indulged himself, he was 
apt, by a natural train of thinking, to permit in others. Of all Christian sects 
this was the first, which, during its prosperity as well as its adversity, 
always adopted the principle of toleration; and it is remarkable that so 
reasonable a doctrine owed its origin, not to reasoning, but to the height of 
extravagance and fanaticism. 34 
What we Wlderstand is that Hume's "principle of toleration" is an upshot of the 
"extravagance and fanaticism" of the Independents and not from "reasoning." This 
conclusion serves as an illustration of the law of heterogeneity of ends, one of the 
central tenets of "philosophical" historiography. In this light, the development of the 
modern British Constitution seems to be a consequence of the diversification of 
"fanatical" types. 
Hume's analysis of the phenomena of extreme "fanaticism" as a sort of solipsism is 
important to his reading of the downfall of the puritan Commonwealth of 1649-60. 
In his accoWlt of the Civil War, Hume views the Stuart Monarchy as a source of order 
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and law, whereas the "fanatical" puritan opposition is a source of chaotic and socially 
disruptive individualism. This conservatism ofHrune's History is a direct result of his 
"philosophical" Wlderstanding of human nature as essentially social, and of society as 
a prerequisite for human progress. Of course, this philosophical attitude stands at 
odds with the "inward" doctrine adopted by fanatics, which could reduce society to 
gatherings of totally autonomous but isolated individuals having no common pmpose 
or interest. Even individuals in the same group might see purposes which are set 
before them as incompatible depending on the intensity of each individual's o\\TI 
"light." In this context, Hume looks to the creed that governs the fanatics as inimical 
to society. The "inward light" doctrine acknowledges no human laws and institutions, 
only the will of God. This opened the way for a sort of religious amoralism, as well 
as for religious toleration. Resigned to "inward and superior direction," the fanatic 
could justify exempting himself from the exterior and inferior laws of the state. In 
Hume's view, a society constituted like the puritan Commonwealth would necessarily 
prove Wlgovernable and lead to disintegration. The History, to a large extent, 
attempts to demonstrate this proposition. 
Hume's treatment of the Covenanters, the radical sect of the presbyterians, follows 
the same line of thought discussed above. Hume's accoWlt of the Covenanter uprising 
of 1679 covers four pages in his History, yet despite its brevity it is suggestive. Hume 
Wlderlines the theme of social disintegration through his accoWlt of the 
Comprehension, a compromise offered by the government to reorganize the national 
Church of Scotland according to the aspirations of the presbyterians: 
As rigour and restraint had failed of success in Scotland, a scheme of 
Comprehension was tried; by which it was intended to diminish the 
authority of bishops, to abolish their negative voice in the ecclesiastical 
courts, and to leave them little more than the right of precedency among 
presbyters [that is, elected church officials]. But the presbyterian zealots 
entertained great jealousy against this scheme. . .. Should the ears and eyes 
of men be once reconciled to the name and habits of bishops, the whole 
power of the fimction, they dreaded, would soon follow: The least 
comtnWlication with unlawful and antichristian institutions they esteemed 
dangerous and criminal: Touch not, taste not, handle not~ this cry went out 
amongst them: And the king's ministers at last perceived that they should 
prostitute the dignity of government, by making advances, to which the 
malcontents were determined not to correspond?5 
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Hume proceeds to show that the late Indulgence, although it allowed the Presb\terian 
ministers to settle in the vacant parishes "without requiring any terms of submission 
to the established religion," was not welcomed. The same reasons accounted for its 
failure: the Covenanters rejected all offers of mere toleratio~ for they believed that 
their acceptance meant a recognition of the supremacy of human institutions over the 
will of God. 36 For the Covenanters, human institutions could not be validated and 
recognized except under a theocracy. Though he was himself certainly no friend of 
the established church, Hume's attitude toward this obstinacy is clearly irreverent. 
Hume's view in this respect is that the Covenanters were calling not for freedom of 
religion so much as for the abolition of civil society. 
On the other hand, Hume admits that the strict measures taken by the government 
after the failure of the accommodation only compounded the problem, aggravating the 
self-imposed social isolation of the "fanatics." One of the most rigorous measures 
applied was to "intercommune" Covenanters. As Hume puts it, "whoever afterwards, 
either on account of business, relation, nay charity, had the least intercourse with [an 
intercommuned person], was subjected to the same penalties as could by law be 
inflicted on the criminal himself. ,,37 Under such circumstances, all social 
relationships were undercut. Still worse, in an attempt to conceal from the king in 
England the cruelty of this measure, the Scottish Privy Council took a further step to 
augment the isolation of the dissidents; it "forbad, under severe penalty, all noblemen 
or gentlemen of landed property to leave the kingdom. ,,38 Thus, isolated from the rest 
of humanity and denied access to legitimate authority to complain, the Covenanters, 
already disposed to regard themselves as answerable only to the commands of God, 
came to think of themselves as exempt from human law and even from ordinary 
human moral sentiments. Hume's remarks in his account of the assassination of 
Archbishop Sharpe, the event that triggered the 1679 uprising suggests as much: 
It is indeed certain, that the murder of Sharpe had excited an universal joy 
among the Covenanters, and that their blind zeal had often l~d ~em, in the~r 
books and sermons, to praise and recommend the assassmatIon of theIr 
enemies, whom they considered as the enemies of all true piety and 
godliness. The stories of Jael and Sisera, or Ehud and Eglon, resounded 
from every pUlpit. 39 
The last sentence refers to the Covenanters' belief that, like the Israelites in the Old 
TestaInent, they enjoyed a special dispensation to kill their enemies indiscriminately, 
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contrary to the stipulations of the third commandment. Hume thus suggests that the 
amoral tendency latent in the English Independents had, partly as a result of 
oppression, become apparent in the Scottish Covenanters. 
Before turning to Old Mortality itself, it would be of some advantage to note that 
Scott's non-fictional treatment of the Covenanters in the Tales is very much 
compatible with that of Hume. His account of them is, to a great extent, based on 
their exclusion from society. Like Hume, he lays much emphasis on the extraordinary 
practices to which the government resorted, such as the "intercommuning" of the 
religious dissidents: 
The nearest relations were prohibited from assisting each other, the wife the 
husband, the brother the brother, and the parent the son, if the sufferers had 
been intercommuned. The government of this cruel time applied [this and 
other] ancient and barbarous statutes to the outlawed presbyterians of the 
period, and thus drove them altogether from human society. In danger, 
want, and necessity, the inhabitants of the wilderness, and expelled from 
civil intercourse, it is no wonder that we fmd many of these wanderers 
avowing principles and doctrines hostile to the govenunent which oppressed 
them, and carrying their resistance beyond the bounds of mere self-
defense. 40 
Scott similarly attributes some of the Covenanters' peculiar religious views to their 
exclusion from society: 
Superstitious notions also, the natural consequences of an uncertain, 
melancholy, and solitary life among the desolate glens and mountains, 
mingled with the intense enthusiasm of this persecuted sect. Their 
occasional successes over their oppressors, and their frequent escapes from 
the pursuit of the soldiery, when the marksmen missed their aim, or when a 
sudden mist concealed the fugitives, were imputed, not to those natural 
causes by means of which the Deity is pleased to govern the world, and 
which are the engines of his power, but to the direct interposition of a 
miraculous agency, over-ruling and suspending the laws of nature, as in the 
period of Scripture history.41 
Scott, it seems, is wittingly making the connection between social isolation and 
"fanaticism" that underlies, but remains unstated, in Hume's treatment of the 
Covenanters. Scott may, as some thought, have painted a less flattering portrait of the 
Royalists in the Tales than in Old Mortality, but he certainly does not seem to have set 
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out to flatter the Covenanters instead by making them look more rationa1~ he is simply 
trying, like Burne, to show their irrationality. 
In his Scott and Society, Graham McMaster has observed that images of isolation 
or exclusion from society abound in Old Mortality. Be attributes this emphasis on 
social disintegration to a general shift in Scott's perspective from a historical 
optimism, supposedly inherited from the "philosophical" historians and given full 
expression in Waverley, to a historical pessimism and disillusionment with modern, 
socially atomized Scotland. This shift, in McMaster's view, is accompanied by a 
corresponding shift from the basically discursive, analytical examination of 
"manners" that we fmd in Waverley to political allegory and symbolism: 
The superiority of Old Mortality is to be found in the way in which Scott 
provides a convincing socio-psychological context for the exclusion theme. 
For this was the fundamental point about the Covenanters, not their 
"fanaticism". . .. They are linked in Scott's work with gypsies, pirates, 
MacGregors and other outcasts, and ultimately with the victims of social 
and economic injustice in post-Waterloo Britain. 
If the exclusion theme is primary, then social history, and the cultural 
changes of the novel, are of secondary importance~ they are there because 
Scott's imagination and the taste of his readers insisted that in prose fiction 
at least a character or psychological condition could not interest without a 
context that guaranteed some degree of probability. 42 
Yet the "theme of exclusion" is itself a "philosophical" one. Adam Ferguson and 
Adam Smith were both keenly aware of the dangers posed by unchecked economic 
individualism, which they saw as excluding not only certain classes of victims but 
even its apparent beneficiaries from society. 43 It is apparent that there is a sort of 
dialectic relation between the "theme of exclusion" and "fanaticism" whether in 
Burne's treatment of fanaticism or in Scott's treatment of the Covenanters in his 
"philosophical" Tales. Consequently, it might be argued that in Old Mortality the 
"theme of exclusion" is part and parcel of the "social history," and that the novel is in 
some ways as analytical and as "philosophical" as Waverley. 
In the "preliminary" chapter of the novel itself, Peter Pattieson, the fictional 
narrator, suggests that his goal is to describe "the operation which their opposite 
principles produced upon the good and bad men of both [the Royalists and 
Covenanters] parties"(35)-very much as Scott, at the outset of Waverley, speaks of 
the "favourable opportunities of contrast" afforded him by the Highland and Lowland 
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cultures of 1745 Scotland. In his letter to Louisa Stuart, Scott makes it apparent that 
the novel could be conceived as a "philosophical" scheme that attempts to investigate 
the impact of different cultural "principles" on "manners" or behaviour: 
It is a covenanting story. The time lies at the era of Bothwell Brigg, the 
scene is Lanarkshire: there are noble subjects for narrative during that 
period full of the strongest light and shadow, all human passions stirr'd up 
and stimulated by the most powerful motives, and the contending parties as 
distinctly contrasted in manners and modes of thinking as in political 
principles. 44 
Emphasizing this argument, an anonymous writer in the Critical Review, who takes 
Scott's intention "to portray the manners of his countrymen" as primary, wishes that 
Scott had published Old Mortality before The Black Dwaif so that "not only the 
historical transactions, but the manners and habits of the people, might have been 
displayed chronologically. ,,45 Scott's seriousness about "portraying manners" is also 
demonstrated by his detailed reply to M'Crie's accusation of his inaccuracy in 
presenting the times. The reviewer writes of Scott "taking his seat on the bench of the 
historians of his time and country" and goes on to confirm that he is: 
At once a master of the great events and minuter incidents of history, and of 
the manners of the times he celebrates, ... his judgement enables him to 
separate those traits which are characteristic from those that are generic; 
... not less accurate, and discriminating than vigorous and vivid, presents to 
the mind of the reader the manners of the times, and introduces to his 
familiar acquaintance the individuals of his drama as they thought and 
spoke and acted.46 
In this respect, the opening episode, the wappenschaw, forms the most analytical part 
of the novel. David Brown and others conceived this episode as concrete social 
history. According to Brown it serves as context to demonstrate the breakdown of the 
Scottish feudal system, of which the wappen-schaw, a military muster accompanied 
by games and dancing, was part: 
The wappenschaw is intended to manifest the feudal order of Scotland 
under the Stuarts; in theory, it is a gathering of the aristocratic hierarchy, 
supported by their retainers and vassals in the lower orders. Yet as the 
scene progresses it becomes clear that the assembly is actually a 
monmnental fa~ade, a ceremony reintroduced by the Stuart government 
long after any significance it has had as an actual expression of feudal 
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relationships has disappeared, and impressing on them that the traditional 
order and authority are still in existence. 47 
At the beginning of the episode Scott does in fact describe the reinstitution of the 
wappen-schaw in 1679 as a part of a desperate effort by "the last Stewarts ... to 
counteract. .. the strict or puritanical spirit which had been the chief characteristic of 
the republican government." (37) The individualism and social disengagement of the 
radical Protestants were to be held in check by "those feudal institutions which united 
the vassal to the liege lord, and both to the crown." (37) The episode, in this view, 
suggests that the effort was doomed to failure. Unable to levy the required number of 
retainers from among their recalcitrant Presbyterian tenantry. the Bellendens of 
Tillietudlem are compelled to enlist the services of their imbecillic fowl-keeper Guse 
Gibbie, whose martial incompetence threatens to turn the wappen-schaw into farce. 
The feudal order in effect collapses because the old feudal ties no longer bind vassal 
to liege lord. 
Meanwhile, Scott does not present the breaking of these bonds as he would if he 
were merely a neutral observer of the passing of an outmoded social order. Although 
he admits the absurdity of forcing people "to dance and be merry by authority" (37), 
Scott speaks of the "rigour of the strict Calvinists" in tones reminiscent of Humean 
derision: 
A judaical observance of the Sabbath-a supercilious condemnation of all 
manly pastimes and harmless recreations, as well as of the profane custom 
of promiscuous dancing, that is of men and women dancing together in the 
same party (for I believe they admitted that the exercise might be 
inoffensive if practised by the parties separately)-distinguishing those who 
professed more than ordinary share of sanctity, they discouraged as far as 
lay in their power, even the ancient wappen-schaws. (37) 
Scott not only presents the extremism of the religious sect but, like Hume, he otTers 
an explanation for this attitude: 
The preachers and proselytes of the more rigid presbyterians laboured, 
therefore, by caution, remonstrance, and authority, to diminish the 
attendance upon these summonses, conscious that in doing so, they lessened 
not only the apparent, but the actual strength of the government, by 
impeding the extension of that esprit de corps which soon unites yOlmg men 
who are in the habit of meeting together for manly sport, or military 
exercise. (38) 
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Like Hume, Scott's analysis of seventeenth-century "fanaticism" sees it not simply as 
an attack on royal prerogatives or feudal institutions, but also, eventually, as an attack 
on public spirit, or as M'Crie understood it: Scott is charging the Covenanters \\ ith 
being "unsocial. ,,48 
The wappen-schaw episode seems to deal with a narrower issue, as well. As I 
have pointed out earlier in this thesis, the "philosophical" historians did not believe 
that the "feudal militia"( 44), as Scott calls it was outmoded in the same way that the 
feudal system as a whole was. Adam Ferguson, in fact, personally took part in the 
campaign to restore the Scottish militia, on the grounds that public military exercises 
might rebuild some of the public spirit or "esprit de corps" that had been lost in the 
transition from feudalism to early capitalism. Henry Home, Lord Kames, as Chris 
Jones points out, devotes a large proportion of his book, Sketches of the History of 
Man, which appeared in 1774, "to his scheme for establishing a national militia," 
which would reinforce public spiritedness and inculcate "manly virtues," in an attempt 
to immunize the individual against the potential effects of "luxury, selfishness and 
sensuality. ,,49 Moreover, such exercises help in creating the feeling of commitment to 
society and state. Ferguson asserts: "Institutions that fortify the mind, inspire 
courage, and promote a national felicity, can never tend to national ruin," since a 
"nation consisting of vigorous, public-spirited, and resolute men, is strong. ,,50 Scott 
not only has the same attitude as his mentors, but, like Ferguson, he even served in the 
restored Scottish militia during the Napoleonic Wars. 51 
It is true, as Brown argues, that the wappenschaw ends in farce; but the central 
event, the shooting match between the moderate presbyterian Henry Morton and the 
Royalist Lord Evandale, puts the whole episode in a different light. Some of the 
presbyterians present temporarily forget their objections to the wappen-schaw in 
rooting for Morton, and the good sportsmanship displayed by both contestants 
becomes the basis of their later transpolitical friendship. Thus, another contribution 
of the wappen-schaw seems to contain the rivalries, natural to man, threatening 
Scottish society and even to redirect them in a socially useful way, just as Ferguson 
suggests: 
Man ... is disposed to opposition, and to employ the forces of his nature 
against an equal antagonist; he loves to bring reason, his eloquence, his 
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courage, even his bodily strength, to the proof. His sports are frequently an 
image of war; sweat and blood are freely expended in play, and fractures or 
death are often made to terminate the past time of idleness and festi vi ty. 
Without the rivalship and the practice of war, civil societv itself could 
scarcely have found an object, or form and he who has never struggled with 
his fellow-creature, is a stranger to half the sentiments of mankind. 52 
The Covenanters' non-participation in the wappenschaw is once again made to appear 
as "unsocial" act. 
Like Hume, Scott does not hold the Covenanters solely responsible for the 
disintegration of Scottish society. "Their minds," he concedes had been "fretted, 
soured and driven to desperation, by the various exactions and cruelties to which they 
have been subjected." (228) A desperate person, according to McMaster, is one 
whom society has in some way excluded with "nothing to bind him to the normal 
community. ,,53 The early chapters of Old Mortality provide ample instances of this 
type, most notably Mause Headrigg and her son Cuddie. Mause, despite her hardline 
Covenanting rhetoric, is attached by long habit to her haughty Royalist landlord, Lady 
Margaret Bellenden, who, also by long habit, returns her affection. Even when Lady 
Margaret comes to chastise Mause for absenting her son from the wappenschaw, 
traces of the old ties remain. Mause's first instinct is to point "to the chair, which on 
former occasions, Lady Margaret had deigned to occupy for half an hour at a time, 
hearing the news of the country. "(85) When, at the height of their dispute, Lady 
Margaret calls Mause a "fause-hearted vassal," Mause, "bursting into tears," protests: 
"I am sure they belie baith Cuddie and me sair, if they said he wadna fight ower boots 
in blude for your leddyship and Miss Edith, and the auld Tower ... and I would rather 
see him buried beneath it, than he suld gie way. "(86) The upshot of this confrontation 
led to evicting the Headriggs from the Bellenden estate and Cuddie ultimately joins 
the Covenanting army that besieges "the auld Tower" his mother would have him die 
defending. The Headriggs are loyal to their masters and this loyalty helps them to Ii ve 
peacefully with the Bellendens without siding effectively with anyone of the 
disputing parties. Lady Margaret's excessive political loyalty to the Royalists 
destroyed the noble loyalty that binds her tenants to her~ consequently, driving her 
tenants to "desperation." Scott suggests here that the Royalists inadvertently 
undermine their own position, sundering the ties of social affection that held the 
Scottish feudal order together. 
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The case of Henry Morton, the novel's middle-of-the-road presbyterian hero, 
parallels that of the Headriggs. Although Morton from the very beginning is 
politically neutral, his relationship with the Royalist Bellenden family in general is 
intimate, in part due to his attachment to Lady Margaret's granddaughter Edith. 
However, when Morton mistakenly assumes that Edith has transferred her afTections 
to Lord Evandale, "the depth of despair ... seemed to destroy every feeling for which 
he had hitherto lived ... desperate himself, he determined to support the rights of his 
country, insulted in his person." (160) Despair, excl us ion from "the normal 
community," and the breaking of the ties of affection that hold such a community 
together are all inherent in Scott's analysis of the phenomena of "fanaticism. " 
Like Hume, Scott considers the law of intercommunion as crucially responsible for 
nurturing and reinforcing "fanaticism." Morton's engagement with the rebellion is, in 
fact, the consequence of his violation of this law after sheltering the fugitive Burley. 
Sergeant Bothwell illustrates the purpose of the law as to isolate each dissident by 
prohibiting even his family "to correspond with him by word, writ, or message, or to 
supply him with meat, drink, house, harbour, or victual." (102) Such policy, in 
Scott's analysis is detriment to society in the long run. Its effect, eventually, is to 
isolate every body, to engender tension or destroy all human relationships in an ever-
widening circle. First, Morton is placed in a position in which he has to take a painful 
choice: either to obey the despotic law or to be consistent with his filial piety, which 
obliges him to shelter Burley because Burley once saved his father's life. Under the 
pressure of his loyalty to his father, Morton allows the intercommuned Burley to 
spend the night in the barn at Milnwood, thus exposing his old timid uncle to real 
danger by incriminating him and making his property liable to forfeiture. The effect 
of Morton's action extends negatively to the Headriggs. When Bothwell's troop of 
Life-Guards come to question Morton, Mause, mabIe to control her excitement, 
bursts into "testimony" against the Royalist soldiers. The scene ends in the arrest of 
Morton himself, while both Mause and her innocent son are evicted yet again, this 
time at the hands of a fellow presbyterian, Mrs. Alison Wilson, old Milnwood's 
housekeeper. 
The parting dialogue between Mause and Alison, who blames Mause and Cuddie, 
rather than the government's policy for Morton's arrest, presents a striking example of 
the desperation produced by Royalist policies: 
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"Ill luck be in the graning corse 0' thee~ The prettiest lad in Clydesdale this 
day maun be a sufferer, and a' for you and your daft whiggery! 
"Gae wa', replied Mause~ "I trow ye are in the bonds of sin, and in the 
gall of iniquity, to grudge your bonniest and best in the cause of Him that 
gave ye a' ye hae- I promise I hae done as muckle for Mr. Harry as I wad 
do for my a~ for if Cuddie was found worthy to bear testim~ll\· in the 
Grassmarket [that is, be hanged in Edinburgh]-', . 
"And there's gude hope 0'1," said Alison, "unless you and he 
change your courses. " 
"And if," continued Mause, disregarding the interruption, "the bloody 
Doegs and the flattering Ziphites [that is, the Royalists] were to seek to 
ensnare me with a proffer of his remission upon sinful compliance, I wad 
persevere natheless, in lifting my testimony against popery, prelacy, 
antinomianism, erastianism, lapsarianism, sublapsarianism, and the sins and 
snares of the times." (109-110) 
The above quotation gives us a clear idea of a society so radically disturbed that 
natural allies become enemies, even the tearing of the social fabric reaches the most 
sacred basic human relationships, like that of mother and child. (Maus's "testimony" 
against antinomianism is ironic: her readiness to sacrifice her son, Cuddy, suggests 
that she herself has turned out a victim of this heresy.) Scott wants his reader to grasp 
the negative social effects engendered by the tactics of oppression applied by the 
government against its SUbjects. This sort of disintegration sets every individual 
against every other, reducing all to a sort of Hobbesian state of nature. 
Scott, like Hume, does not deny that the antisocial inclination is a part of the 
nature of "fanaticism," but he is always keen to show that oppression is only 
exacerbating such inclinations. Burley's attempt to persuade Morton to join the 
uprising indicates clearly how deep these inclinations are: 
"Think ye," he continued, "to touch pitch and remain undefiled? To mix in 
the ranks of malignants, papists, papal-prelates, latitudinarians, and scoffers; 
to partake of their sports, which are like the meat offered unto idols; to hold 
intercourse, perchance, with their daughters, as the sons of God with the 
daughters of men in the world before the flood-Think you, I say, to do all 
these things, and yet remain free from pollution! I say unto you, that all 
communication with the enemies of the church is the accursed thing which 
God hateth! Touch not-taste not-handle not! And grieve not, young 
man, as if you alone were called upon to subdue your carnal affections, and 
renounce the pleasures which are a snare to your feet. (n) 
Such a mentality foments further divisions. Scottish presbyterians, much like the 
English Independents, are sharply divided among themselves. Scott makes this point 
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early in the novel with an innovative use of the technique of the "catechism" device 
employed in Waverley. Having secured employment at Milnwood, Cuddie naively 
expresses his satisfaction with the religious principles of his new landlord: 
"And now we're settled ance mair," said Cuddie to his mother, "and if were 
no sae bien and comfortable as we were up yonder, yet life's life ony gate, 
and we're wi' decent kirk-ganging folk 0' your ain persuasion, mither; there 
will be nae quarrelling about that. " 
"Of my persuasion, hinniel" said the too-enlightened Mause; "wae's me for 
thy blindness and theirs. 0' Cuddie, they are but in the court of the 
Gentiles, and will ne'er win farther ben [that is, will never get to the ilmer 
court], I doubt; they are but little better than prelatists [that is, 
Episcopalians] them sells. They wait on the ministry of that blinded man, 
Peter Poundtext, ance a precious teacher of the word, but now a backsliding 
pastor, that has, for the sake of stipend and family maintenance, forsaken 
the strict path and gane astray after the black Indulgence. 0, my son, had ye 
but profited by the gospel doctrines ye hae heard in the Glen of Bengonnar, 
frae the dear Richard Rumbletree, that sweet youth, who suffered 
martyrdom in the Grassmarket, afore Candlemasl Didna ye hear him say, 
that Erastianism was as bad as Prelacy, and that the Indulgence was as bad 
as Erastianism?" (94) 
Mause's speech reflects the opinion of one of the covenanting factions. This opinion 
is in its essence an overt call for rejecting any form of official toleration, including the 
so-called Indulgence. For Mause Headrigg, as for the rest in her religious sect, 
accepting the Indulgence means recognizing the primacy of merely human 
institutions, or falling into the heresy of "Erastianism." Accordingly, it is not 
surprising, that she views a moderate presbyterian like the Indulged minister Peter 
Poundtext as a criminal betrayer. It is true that the Covenanters lack the mutual 
toleration of the English Independents, as Hume demonstrated, yet the same engine of 
the "inward light" propels their doctrine to a socially disruptive end. The moderate 
Poundext, in this context, is necessarily viewed as blinded to this light. 
Jolm Balfour of Burley most embodies Scott's depiction of the "inward light" 
doctrine. Some critics regarded Burley as a product of Scott the romancer rather than 
of Scott the historian. 54 Indeed, at first sight, Burley looks like a sort of Gothic 
villain, tracing his ancestry from Macbeth, motivated by "the vices of revenge and 
ambition" (232) and agonizes from repressed blood-guilt and hallucinations. Yet, in 
some respects, Burlev's characterization appears to be consistent with Scott's 
"philosophical" scheme of demonstrating the "operation" of "principles." As 
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Cockshut has pointed out, Burley's exchange with Morton in the bam at Milnwood 
leads to a deliberate presentation of the doctrine of the "inward light. ,,55 Alluding to 
and justifying his murder of Archbishop Sharpe, Burley accosts Morton with a series 
of questions that explain his views and reveal a fully-fledged antinomianism. Burley 
admits "sympathy for carnal sufferings" in executing "judgments of Heaven," in the 
meantime he discharges this sympathy of its human meaning by sacrificing it in 
favour of what he describes as "strong impulse" to take action. (73) Conceiving that 
Burley's meditation stands in contradiction with normalcy and the very postulates of 
mind, Morton responds with a broad emphasis on natural law: "I own I should 
strongly doubt the origin of any inspiration which seemed to dictate a line of conduct 
contrary to those feelings of natural humanity, which Heaven has assigned us as the 
general law of our conduct." (73) While Morton's argument seems to call Burley's 
attention to the contradictions embodied in his doctrine, the latter evades this notice 
by accusing Morton of being "yet in the dungeon-house of the law." (73) Burley'S 
doctrine makes it unacceptable to "keep the moral law as far as our carnal frailty will 
permit." The alternative for him is to take action and "smite the ungodly, though he 
be our neighbour, and the man of power and cruelty, though he were of our own 
kindred, and the friend of our own bosom." (74) Morton reminds Burley that these 
are the very sentiments that the Royalists impute to the Covenanters: "They affirm, 
that you pretend to derive your rule of action from what you call an inward light, 
rejecting the restraints of legal magistracy, of national law, and even of common 
humanity, when in opposition to what you call the spirit within you." (74) It is the 
doctrine of "Inward light" that summarizes Burley's and the Covenanters' ideology: 
the only valid law is the perceived will of God. This ideology, in fact, provides the 
rationale for Burley's acts of violence and ambition, which frightens Morton himself, 
who, after paying farewell to Burley soliloquizes with concern: "how dangerous 
would be the society of such a companion!" (78) Scott explains that the "inward 
light" doctrine, leads also to a sort of solipsism or radical isolation of the individual. 
By throwing away the feelings of common humanity or carnal affection, the 
Covenanters unwittingly, destroy the ties of their own community and, consequently, 
blow up their cause. Making of neighbourhood, kinship, and friendship only barriers 
to jmnp over, Burley appears as a Gothic solitary even companionless among the 
Covenanters, whom he deals with less as allies than as pa\\TIS to be manipulated. 
From the very first moment Burley found in Morton a pawn that enhances his scheme 
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to draw more moderate presbyterians into the insurgents' camp. Burlej)s own small 
sect, the Cameronians, apply a similar attitude even toward their comrades: 
Burley and his confederates had drawn together a considerable body of 
these sectaries, amounting to a hundred horse and about fifteen hundred 
foot, clouded and severe in aspect, morose and jealous of communication, 
haughty of heart, and confident, as men who believed that the pale of 
salvation was open for them exclusively; while all other Christians, however 
slight were the shades of difference of doctrine from their own were in fact , 
little better than reprobates. These men entered the presbyterian camp, 
rather as dubious and suspicious allies, or possibly antagonists, than as men 
who were heartily embarked in the same cause, and exposed to the same 
dangers, with their more moderate brethren in arms. (316) 
With their "inward light" doctrine which, ultimately, denigrates the feelings of 
common humanity, it is not surprising for such sectaries to view others only as a 
means to an end, or, in short, to be Machiavellians. However, it should be owned that 
there is an important difference here between Burley and Fergus Mac-Ivor of 
Waverley, with whom he is sometimes compared. Fergus's attempt to use Waverley 
as a political pawn does not [mally preclude the possibility of real friendship between 
the two. This is not to say simply that Scott prefers Jacobites to Covenanters, but that 
he sees Jacobite "fanaticism" as qualitatively different from Covenanter "fanaticism," 
which not only permits but actually requires such behaviour on principle. 
Returning to Burley, we see that after the triumph of the Presbyterian cause in 
1688, he continued to fight as a solitary outlaw instead of joining his former comrades 
in the new church settlement, which he still regards as excessively "Erastian." When 
Burley isolates himself in a secret cave, "a place of almost unapproachable seclusion," 
(438) he, in fact, intercommunes himself. Alexander Welsh's argument that Scott 
"succumbs to the stock material of fairy tales," in the apparent "obliteration of Burley 
in a mist of Satanism and sublime nature,,,56 sounds permissible; yet Scott's "stock 
material," as Welsh himself asserts, "overflows with thematic significance. ,,57 Scott's 
detailed description of Burley's environment in chapter 43: a cave surrounded by 
impenetrable wilderness, opening on a waterfall whose roar overpowers all outside 
noise, and accessible only by way of a fallen oak tree is the perfect type of an 
introvert mind that focuses only on an "inward light" and totally cut off from the 
external world, including human contact. Bearing in mind that Scott's reading of 
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fanaticism as fundamentally an antisocial phenomenon makes of the "stock material," 
at least thematically, a natural doom for a fanatic. 
If the Covenanters share with the English Independents the same doctrine of 
"inward light," they, on the other hand, lack the Independents' mutual tolerance; a 
circwnstance that deprived them of any sort of consensus even on crucial matters that 
threatens their existence. David Brown attributes the chaos that followed the 
Covenanters' victory at Drwnc10g to their individualistic political and religious 
principles. 58 "The camp of the Covenanters, even in the very moment of their 
success, seemed about to dissolve like a rope of sand, from want of the original 
principles of combination and union." (206-207) For Scott, as for Hwne, since man 
is social by his nature and since he can not carry on in an individualisic mentality, 
"fanaticism" undermines itself with its radical individualism, which makes 
conununity and conununal life unbearable. 
A similar analysis underlies many of the novel's later public events. The 
Covenanters' want of the original "principles of combination and union," contrary to 
the situation of the Jacobites in Waverley, is demonstrated a second time in the camp 
outside Glasgow. Morton struggles with little success to introduce some degree of 
discipline in an army of men who regard discipline a "yoke," and prefer "avowedly 
the more zealous leaders, in whose ranks enthusiasm in the cause supplied the want of 
good order and military SUbjection, to the restraints which Morton endeavoured to 
bring them under. "(282) The Covenanters' deficiencies become more apparent in the 
outright schisms that weakened their forces before the [mal battle at Bothwell Bridge. 
Scott, here, draws a deliberate contrast between the "the spirit of insubordination" that 
was "conununicated" to the insurgents by Habakkuk Mucklewrath's speech (331) with 
some of Morton's most public speech: 
What signifies quarrelling on minute points of church-discipline, when the 
whole edifice is threatened with total destruction? 0, remember, my 
brethren, that the last and worst evil which God brought upon the people he 
had once chosen-the last and worst punishment of their blindness of heart, 
was the bloody dissensions \vhich rent asunder their city, even when the 
enemy were thundering at its gates. (332) 
In the end, Scott relates the total defeat of the Covenanters, historically, to the same 
deficiencies, when "there remained none either to command or to obey." (336) 
Scott's analysis of "fanaticism" amounts to two significant conclusions: first, it 
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undennines the civic virtues, combination and union, necessary for any society to 
exist. Second, it undercuts the heroic virtues like military courage in which the 
Covenanters do not at fIrst seem to be lacking. 
The later passages recall the opening episode of the wappen-scha\\':, for the feudal 
militia exercises were not only designed to promote social harmony, but also to build 
up the military courage of the Lowlanders, whose lands were constantly raided by the 
more warlike Highland clans. For Scott and the "philosophical" historians, civic and 
heroic virtues cannot be separated: the heroic virtues are never simply personal; they 
always have a civic or social context. The contrast between the Covenanters and 
"Lennox-Highlanders," or MacFarlanes, at the battle of Bothwell Bridge highlights 
this point. The MacFarlanes' military courage seems to be a consequence of their 
possessing the spirit of "combination and union," best reflected in their collective 
response to the clan's war-cry. The courage of the Covenanters, meanwhile, comes 
from individual "enthusiasm," from a sense of "inward and superior direction," as 
Hume describes it, which they mistakenly take as an adequate substitute for 
externalities such as "discipline" and "good order." The Covenanters' courage 
manifests a limitation in certain respects. It is true that the covenanting ethic may 
produce men like Burley, willing to live for years in a cave, and die by drowning 
rather than to give up his principles, or Ephram Macbriar, willing to stand torture and 
even suffer individual mart}Tdom for his cause; but it cannot produce a Baron 
Bradwardine or an Evan Dhu, men equally willing to sutTer privation or death, but 
also willing to command with discretion and obey disinterestedly. In short, as the 
novel progresses, the Covenanters' opposition to the wappen-schaw, where heroic 
virtues are built on a civic foundation, looks increasingly ironic. 
Yet this ironic turn of events is anticipated even in the novel's "Preliminary" 
chapter, where Old Mortality, from whom the narrator claims to have received his 
story, laments the decline of the Covenanting spirit in eighteenth-and nineteenth-
century Scotland: 
"We," he said in a tone of exultation,-"we are the only true Whigs. Carnal 
men have assumed that the triumphant appellation, following him whose 
kingdom is of this world. Which of them would set six hours on a wet 
hillside to hear a godly sermon? I trow an hour o't wad staw them. .. .nae 
wonder they dread the accomplishment of what was spoken by the mouth of 
the worthy Mr. Peden, (that precious servant of the Lord, none of whose 
words fell to the groWld,) that the French monzies [that is, monsieurs] saIl 
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rise as fast in the glens of Ayr, and the kenns of Galloway, as ever the 
Highlandmen did in 1677. And now they are gripping to the bow and spear, 
when they suld be mourning for a sinfu' land and a broken covenant. (32) 
Old Mortality here compares the occupation of the Royalist Highland anny of 
disaffected areas in the Scottish Lowland in 1677 with the prospected invasion of the 
Napoleonic armies to Britain two years before the action of the novel begins. Just as 
the original Covenanters objected to feudal militia training on narrowly religious 
grounds, so Old Mortality apparently objects to the drilling of the restored Scottish 
militia, believing that only a return to the old faith can save the COlll1try. If the 
Covenanters failed to resist the Highlanders in 1677 and 1679, \\ill a new dose of 
"whiggery" be enough to resist the French now? Therefore, it is not "the modenl 
world," as Daiches contends, but the Covenanters' own radically individualistic 
"principles" that undercut the heroic virtues. 
Despite Scott's "Tory" bias, for reasons I will discuss later, the 1679 uprising was 
for him as for many others, Burke one of them, a historical necessity to achieve the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which maintained religious and other individual 
liberties. Such an achievement could have been next to impossible in the light of 
seventeenth-century Royalist principles. 59 Of course, the Covenanters, as the 
"revisionist" Scott represents them, are no more favourable to religious liberty than 
the Royalists, except where their own sect is concerned. Although Rev. Gabriel 
Kettledrumble, for instance, once proclaims "the right of every freeman to worship 
God according to his own conscience," his sermon issues in a call to sweep "the 
sanctuary" clean of all non-Covenanters-of "Papists, Prelatists, Erastians, and 
Quakers." (208) But by demanding liberty for themselves, the Covenanters open the 
possibility of liberty for others. Like Hume, Scott is invoking the law of the 
heterogeneity of ends to explain the development of the British Constitution. In a 
letter to Major Bellenden, Henry Morton himself seems to invoke this law to explain 
his engagement with the "fanatical" Covenanters: "Providence, through the violence 
of the oppressors themselves, seems now to have opened a way of deliverance from 
this untolerable tyranny ... But God, who knows my heart, be my witness, that I do not 
share the angry or violent passions of the oppressed and harassed sutferers with whom 
I am now acting." (268) In accordance with the law of the heterogeneity of ends, 
Morton attempts to distinguish between the intentions of the Covenanters, of which he 
disapproves, and the possible long-term benetits of their actions. Like Adam Smith 
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explaining the workings of the free market, he invokes the "invisible hand" of 
"Providence," which brings order out of chaos and good out of bad. This passage is 
thus an important instance of what Lukacs calls a "necessary anachronism," which 
consists in the historical novelist's "allowing his characters to express feelings and 
thoughts about real, historical events in a much clearer way than actual men and 
women of the time could have done. ,,60 The "feelings," in this case, are those of 
Hume and the "philosophical" historians as they looked back on the seventeenth 
century. 
It is not surprising, then, that Morton, in the same letter, should also echo Hume's 
conclusions about the state of affairs in late seventeenth-century Scotland. Here is 
Hume: 
There was here, it is apparent, in the political body, a disease dangerous and 
inveterate; and the government had tried every remedy, but the true one, to 
allay and correct it. An unlimited toleration, after sects have diffused 
themselves, and are strongly rooted, is the only expedient which can allay 
their fervour, and make the civil union acquire a superiority above religious 
distinctions. But as the operations of this regimen are commonly gradual, 
and at fIrst imperceptible, vulgar politicians are apt, for that reason, to have 
recourse to more hasty and more dangerous remedies. . .. [T]he government, 
in stead of treating [the Covenanters] like common madmen, who should be 
soothed, and flattered, and deceived into tranquility, thought themselves 
entitled to rigid obedience, and were too apt, from a mistaken policy, to 
retaliate upon the dissenters, who had erred from the spirit of enthusiasm. 61 
And here is Morton: 
My most earnest and anxious desire is, to see this unnatural war brought to a 
speedy end, by the union of the good, wise, and moderate of all parties, and 
peace restored, which, without injury to the king's constitutional rights, may 
substitute the authority of equal laws to that of military violence, and, 
pennitting to all men to worship according to their own consciences, may 
subdue fanatical enthusiasm by reason and mildness, instead of driving it to 
frenzy by persecution and intolerance. (268) 
Both Hume and ScottIMorton are good British Constitutionalists, but the emphasis of 
their constitutionalism appears to be less on individual rights than on the health of 
society as a whole: both conceive of "fanatical enthusiasm" as a "disease" or 
"unnatural" state of society, for which a religious toleration is the only cure. 62 
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Herein lies a significant difference between Hwne/ScottIMorton's interpretation of 
the Civil War era of and that Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes did not, of course. favour 
religious toleration. 63 But his intellectual heir, John Locke, did so, because, 
following Hobbes, he believed that society is artificial and founded only on a contract 
among individuals. Politics, according to this theory, should be understood not as a 
whole society's project for pursuing the common good, but as a framework allowing 
individuals to defme and pursue their own private goods, including their own 
religious goods. 64 Hume and ScottIMorton, on the other hand, favour toleration 
because they believe precisely the opposite: that human beings are naturally social 
and that society is not founded on a contract. The individual carmot, in short, be 
abstracted from a social context. Given that religious views differ widely and that 
these differences often lead to disastrous social divisions, a toleration of private goods 
in the religious sphere is a useful expedient, guaranteeing that other goods may still be 
pursued in common. 65 Through religious toleration, the "civil union," as Hwne puts 
it, "may acquire superiority above religious distinctions." Or, as ScottIMorton puts it, 
toleration will "subdue fanatical enthusiasm"-that is, lure isolated or excluded 
"fanatics" back into "the union of the good, wise, and moderate of all parties." 
Hobbes and Locke understood the calamities of the Civil War era as so many 
arguments against classical ideas of pUblic-spiritedness or ci vic virtue~ Scott and 
Hume understand the same calamities as powerful argwnents in their favour. 
It might still be argued that the Royalists of the novel are no less fanatical than 
their opponents, the Covenanters-that although they abj ure the doctrine of the 
"inward light," their behaviour is virtually identical to those who hold it. This is the 
argument of Francis Hart, who deals with the novel under the rubric of "opposing 
fanaticism and the search for humanity." Hart argues that Burley and Claverhouse are 
"equals in the contempt of life" and for what Morton calls the "feelings of natural 
humanity." Here, Morton represents the modem liberal, whose heroism transcends 
"ideological commitment" and affirms "life and hwnanity. ,,66 Claverhouse himself 
provides ammwtition for this argument, especially in the famous speech in Chapter 35 
where he concedes that both he and Burley are "fanatics." When he attempts to 
distinguish between "the fanaticism of honour and that of dark and sullen 
superstition," between shedding the blood of "psalm-singing mechanics" and 
shedding that of "gallant soldiers and noble gentlemen," Morton answers him 
indignantly: "Your distinction is too nice for my comprehension ... God gives every 
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spark of life--that of the peasant as well as of the prince; and those who destroy his 
work recklessly or causelessly must answer in either case." (355-356) This passage 
can obviously be taken as suggesting that Royalists and Covenanting "ideologues" are 
simply mirror images of each other. 
There is more than one instance where Claverhouse's rhetoric is identical to that of 
Burley's. When Morton is held a prisoner at Tillietudlem, Lord Evandale mediates so 
that Claverhouse can spare Morton's life, the latter replied addressing Morton: "Be it 
then ... but young man, should you wish in your future life to rise to eminence in the 
service of your king and COtllltry, let it be your first task to subject to the public 
interest, and to the discharge of your duty, your private passions, affections, and 
feelings. . .. And if I yield this point, in compliance with your urgency, my present 
concession must exempt me from future solicitation of the same nature." (164) 
Claverhouse, in short, opposes "duty" to "private passions, affections and feelings" in 
much the same way that Burley and the adherents of the "inward light" oppose the 
perceived will of God to "carnal affection." The only difference is that, for 
Claverhouse, government has replaced God as the excuse for atrocities. This suggests 
that the terms of civic humanism embodied in Claverhouse's discourse suffer a 
makeshift breakdown in times of deep division of the "public" sphere. 
In this light, unlike Waverley, where there is less doubt as to what is the "public" 
good and what state commands loyalty, Old Mortality is more problematical; 
consequently the identification of "private passions" or "carnal affection" that might 
support or threaten the public good becomes ambivalent. Yet Claverhouse's urging 
Morton to quit sensibility and commit himself to serving what the former considers to 
be the public good deserves serious attention; since Claverhouse reminds us of Flora's 
critique of Waverley's sensibility. Here it might be argued that Morton's virtue of 
sensibility, like Waverley's, is anachronistic in anticipating the late eighteenth century 
man of feeling, though in a less critical light; since, in the context of the seventeenth 
century, at least, Morton's sensibility is not yet contaminated with commercial values. 
Further Morton's transactions show that the sort of sensibility he displays is not of the , 
radical type that would call for excessive individualism that would weaken social 
relationships, but is rather presented as the rudimentary natural feeling, which is more 
alive to the emotions of public spirit and disinterested benevolence. In short, the 
narrati ve, following the "philosophical" historians, other than Hlllile, Adam Smith, 
Kames, William Robertson, for instance, seems to recognize "varieties of sensibility," 
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emphasizing the role of noble natural feelings-benevolence, sympathy, friendship, 
gratitude and so forth-in maintaining social relationships without being 
contradictory with civic virtues, but rather a prerequisite for them. 67 With his eye on 
what is social, Scott confers such qualities, though with less intensity than Morton, on 
Claverhouse himself, who is supposed to represent the virtue of civic humanism (or 
classical republicanism). 
Many of Scott's contemporaries, as I have pointed out, in particular Thomas 
MCrie, had accused Scott of whitewashing the historical Claverhouse and Royalist or 
Tory in the novel68 . From a historical point of view, it is undeniable that Scott's 
treatment of Claverhouse differs significantly in many respects from his treatment of 
Burley. In his depiction of Claverhouse, Scott, like Hume, is keen to show that the 
Royalists in general, including Claverhouse, do not consider "duty" and "affection" as 
absolutely opposite; whereas, the antinomian Covenanters, including Burley, do. 
Thus, in Scott's view, although the Royalists perpetrated crimes equal to or worse than 
those of the Covenanters, yet, they did not in principle reject the "carnal affections" 
that hold society together, and ultimately did not threaten to uproot society altogether. 
To put it rather differently, "carnal affections" are necessary for creating a sort of 
social life at the minimum level, but not sufficient to create the solid social bonds that 
prevail in a tribal community, for instance, where civic virtues are of the first order in 
tenns of moral hierarchy. 
In more than one place, Scott endeavours to make this distinction clear to his 
readers without dogmatic assertion. Thus his characterization of Claverhouse as 
possessing social virtues and graces-a characterization whose import has often 
puzzled modern critics: 
The severity of his character, as well as the higher attributes of undaunted 
and enterprising valour which even his enemies were compelled to admit, 
lay concealed under an exterior which seemed adapted to the court or the 
saloon rather than the field. The same gentleness and gaiety of expression 
which reigned in his features seemed to inspire his actions and gestures~ 
and, on the whole, he was generally esteemed, at first sight, rather qualified 
to be the votary of pleasure than of ambition. (144) 
Claverhouse's self-comparison with Burley is preceded by Morton mentally 
contrasting the two: 
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The gentleness and urbanity of that officer's manners, the high and 
chivalrous sentiments of military devotion which he occasionally expressed, 
his deep and accurate insight into the human bosom, demanded at once the 
approbation and the wonder of those who conversed with him~ while, on the 
other hand, his cold indifference to military violence and cruelty seemed 
altogether inconsistent with the social, and even admirable qualities which 
he displayed. Morton could not help, in his heart, contrasting him \\-i th 
Balfour of Burley. (355) 
Unlike Burley, Claverhouse seems to unite "social qualities" with "military devotion." 
Further, ifhis "military devotion" leads to cruelty, it is more a matter of circumstance 
than of conscious principle or ideology, as it is with Burley. As Scott puts it: 
This leader was cool and collected in danger, fierce and ardent in pursuing 
success, careless of facing death himself, and ruthless in int1icting it upon 
others. Such are the characters formed in times of ci viI discord, when the 
highest qualities, perverted by party spirit, and inflamed by habitual 
opposition, are too often combined with vices and excesses which deprive 
them at once of their merit and their lustre. (144) 
Associating Claverhouse with a sense of sociability makes Hart's argument that the 
"feelings of natural humanity," which he attributes to the "unideological" Morton, 
also exist, at least in principle, within the Royalist "ideology." 
Scott points more emphatically to this conclusion by making Claverhouse act 
ultimately as Morton's benefactor. After the battle of Bothwell Bridge Morton falls 
into the hands of a band of vindictive Covenanters, who blame their defeat on his 
moderation and propose to execute him at midnight. Claverhouse arrives just before 
the appointed hour to rescue him (Ch. 33). Later, in chapter 36, he uses his influence 
to extricate Morton from his treason trial and fmds him a military post on the 
continent, where Morton is sent in exile. Claverhouse's behaviour is interpreted as 
repaying a personal debt to his friend Lord Evandale, who is in turn repaying a debt of 
gratitude to Morton, who saved his life during the skirmish at Drumclog. In addition, 
Claverhouse has himself developed an admiration for Morton as a good soldier and 
worthy opponent and feels bound by professional honour to assist him. From Burley's 
point of view, Claverhouse has allowed his "carnal atTections" to get the better of him. 
It is true, as Welsh points out, that Claverhouse's change of heart toward Morton is 
also prompted by class prejudices. 69 When Claverhouse intended to execute Morton 
at Tillietudlem, he was under the false impression that Morton was a mere "psalm-
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singing mechanic\ but now he knows better. As he explains to Morton before the 
battle of Bothwell Bridge: "I trust I shall always make some difference between a 
high-minded gentleman, who, though misguided, acts upon generous principles, and 
the crazy fanatical clowns yonder."(325) In the context of the 1679 rebellion, 
however, even Claverhouse's prejudice constitutes a moral advance. Claverhouse is 
willing to acknowledge that a political enemy can be related to him by class, as well 
as by profession, while, for Burley and the Covenanters, an enemy is an enemy even 
if he is one's own kindred. 
For MCrie, of course, Claverhouse's efforts on Morton's behalf amotmt only to a 
Tory deux ex machina.70 Scott, however, seems to have intended it as an example of 
the way a web of "carnal affections" can, to some limit, hold a society together even 
in the worst of times. However great their crimes and cruelty, the Royalists do not, 
like the Covenanters, demand that this web be cut away. In this respect, Scott's 
treatment of the Royalist trooper, Sergeant Bothwell provides another example. 
Despite his cruelties and his humiliating of Covenanters in his jurisdiction, yet, like 
Claverhouse, Scott depicts Bothwell as capable of recognizing social ties and moral 
obligations to enemies. When, in a wrestle, Burley knocked Bothwell down, his 
comrade Tom Halliday tried to interfere against Burley, but Bothwell's conception of 
military honour compelled him to refuse, considering the fight as a fair play. He 
admits his defeat, shakes hands with Burley, and with a mixture of mockery of 
Burley's creed and respect for his skill in wrestling, attempts to do him a good turn: " 
Well, beloved... if thou be'st a Whig, thou art a stout and a brave one, and so good 
even to thee-Hadst best take thy nag before the Comet makes the round; for, I 
promise thee, he has stay'd less suspicious-looking persons." (59) It might be argued 
that Bothwell's orthodoxy fades away when we recall that he accepted bribes from 
terrified civilians like Morton's uncle, but Scott soon deflates this argmnent by 
making Bothwell apply the "cutter's law," when he offers a share of old Milnwood's 
gold to Morton on the ground: "we must not see a pretty fellow want, if we have cash 
ourselves." (112) Once again, Scott shows that the Royalists are capable of "carnal 
affection" toward an enemy. M Crie may have had Bothwell as well as Claverhouse 
in mind when he argued that Scott intended to "exalt the military character. ,,71 
Scott's attitude towards presenting the importance of "carnal affections," which the 
Covenanters despise, in cementing the social relationships, is almost always mediated 
through the Royalists characters. Scott makes an even stronger case for Major 
Bellenden, a Royalist veteran of the civil war, and his sister-in-law Lady Margaret, 
the novel's archetypal "superstitious" Royalist, for whom preserving the memory of 
Charles IT's single breakfast at Tillietudlem has become a sort of secular religion. 
Despite their strong commitment to the ruling government, the Bellendens exhibited 
deep feelings for Claverhouse's decision to execute Morton: 
Old Lady Margaret, who, with all the prejudices of rank and party, had not 
laid aside the feelings of her sex, was loud in her intercession. 
"0 Colonel Grahame, " she exclaimed, "spare his young blood! Leave him 
to the law-do not repay my hospitality by shedding men's blood on the 
threshold of my doors!" 
"Colonel Grahame," said Major Bellenden, "you must answer this violence. 
Don't think, though I am old and feckless, that my friend's son shall be 
murdered before my eyes with impunity. I can fmd friends that shall make 
you answer it. " 
"Be satisfied, Major Bellenden, I will answer it," replied Claverhouse, 
totally unmoved; "and you, madam, might spare me the pain of resisting this 
passionate intercession for a traitor, when you consider the noble blood your 
own house has lost by such as he is." 
"Colonel Grahame, "answered the Lady, her aged frame trembling with 
anxiety, "I leave vengeance to God, who calls it his own. The shedding of 
this young man's blood will not call back the lives that were dear to me; and 
how can it comfort me to think that there has maybe been another widowed 
mother made childless, like mysell, by a deed done at my very door-stane!" 
(162) 
This plea of the Bellendens to save Morton's life is an indication that, for the 
Royalists, "carnal affection" and "duty" can exist on the same plane without the 
necessity of the one to neutralize the other. The Major's obligation to Morton's father 
is translated into a unique human enthusiasm, which transcends any sort of political or 
even religious prejudice. For Lady Margaret, "duty" takes other dimensions. The 
first has to do with "the feelings of her sex," while the second has to do with the old 
Scottish code of hospitality, which makes it a shame, not less than a treachery, to shed 
the blood of others at one's own "door-stane." It seems that under the cloak of 
chivalry the Royalists adopt a tradition, which sometimes make them violate their 
"duty" to treat all their political opponents as enemies. 
Bessie Maclare, the one Samaritan among the Covenanters, who hides Lord 
Evandale after the skirmish at Drumclog and eventually prevents his being captured 
and killed, is not less charitable than the Bellendens. Like Lady Margaret, Bessie is 
"as enthusiastically attached" to her cause "as to the duties of humanity," (432) and 
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her benevolence to Evandale in some respects goes on the same line of argument as 
that of Margaret's to Morton. ill spite of the fact that the Royalists have murdered her 
two sons, and her sadness caused the damage of her sight, Bessie, in a rational tone 
says: "But, alas! Betraying Lord Evandale's young blood to his enemies' sword wad 
ne'er hae brought my Ninian and Johnie alive again." (428) Unlike the Bellendens, 
however, Bessie resorts to her religion to derive a formula for bridging the gap 
between "duty" and "carnal affection." While talking to Morton she says: "They said 
I should hae been to him [that is Evandale] what Jael was to Sisera--But weel I wot I 
nae divine command to shed blood, and to save it was baith like a woman and a 
Christian." (428) This broad conception of Christianity soon shrinks under Bessie's 
own narrow version, when, following the manner of Burley, she attacks the moderate 
presbyterian church established in Scotland after the Glorious Revolution, concluding 
that its ministers offer nothing but "a dry clatter of morality." (431) In contrast with 
the Bellendens, Bessie's benevolence, thus seems to be culturally anomalous. Scott's 
delineation of this character in the Quarterly Review is suggestive: 
A patient, kind, gentle, and generous being, even in the lowest state of 
oppression, poverty and blindness; her religious enthusiasm, unlike that of 
her sect, is impressed with the pure stamp of the Gospel, combining 
meekness with piety, and love to her neighbour with obedience and love of 
the Deity. 72 
Old Mortality, in exploring the operation of the contrasting principles of the Scottish 
Royalists and Covenanters, does not exhibit a neutral historicist examination of two 
equally outmoded ideologies. ill fact, Scott offers a revisionist defense on behalf of 
the Royalists much as Hume does of the English Royalists in his treatment of the 
Civil War. Yet, it is worth mentioning here that the Royalists policies are seen from 
two different perspectives. The crucial issues for the Royalists were to defend the 
Divine Right of kings and the authority of the Established Church; whereas, for Scott, 
as for Hume, the real issue is the coherence and stability of society. The principles of 
the Covenanters, like those of the English illdependents or Puritans, were such that 
they threatened not just king and church but every other social institution, as well. 
Consequently, "philosophical" historians like Scott and Hume fOWld themselves 
compelled to write "Tory" histories. Scott, in particular, wants to remind his 
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contemporary readers of the dangers of the present for the whole British society 
entailed by political divisions and excessive individualism. 
Finally, it remains to explore Morton's role in depth. John Plamenatz's statement 
is very much fitting to define Morton's dilemma and its ideological import both 
morally and nationally. According to Plamenatz, 
Man is more than just the product of his past; he is the product of his 
memory. The past 'lives on' in him, and he would not be what he is unless it 
did so. Thus, for him, as for no other creature, to lose his past, to lose his 
memory, is to lose himself, to lose his identity. History is more than the 
record of how man became what he is; it is involved in man's present 
conception of what he is; it is the largest element in his self-knowledge. 73 
We need to recall that Morton's dilemma, basically, begins when his memory is 
activated by Burley and his "self-knowledge" is brought under test. For Morton, as 
for Scott, the problem is not simply a matter of choosing between loyalty to a dead 
father or to a live uncle; rather it is to choose between two world-views. While 
Morton's father offers a model that embodies public spirit and civic virtue, his uncle 
presents a model of the withdrawn, inert and selfish man. 
Hart remarks that "from the beginning Morton is caught between two extreme 
alternatives: active commitment in his father's name, and cold prudence or miserly 
noncommitment after the manner of his uncle. ,,74 It is not without reason that Morton 
is introduced at the beginning as inert and hesitant. Morton's uncle is presented in a 
way as to be, by all standards, a bad example to be imitated. He is "an old 
miser. ., with whom a broad piece would at any time weigh down political opinions." 
(48) Elsewhere in the novel he is described as an "infmn, hypochondriac old man, 
who never meddles with politics, and loves his money-bags and bonds better than any 
thing else in the world." (71) However, nowhere is his character shown more clearly 
than when he hesitates offering the bribe that Alison has arranged in order to save his 
nephew from torture during his first arrest. (103) In short, Morton's cowardly uncle 
never operates outside the sphere of his own selfish interest in its most negative 
aspect. Scott makes it clear that the education of Morton's sympathies is stitled by his 
uncle's influence: 
The base parsimony of his uncle had thrown many obstacles in the way of 
his education; ... Still, however, the current of his soul was frozen by a sense 
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of dependence, of poverty, above all, of an imperfect and limited education. 
These feelings impressed him with diffidence and reserve. (155) 
Yet, Morton's temporary condition of passiveness is not fmal because his memory still 
stores the past bequeathed to him through his father. Tills is reflected, in the frrst 
place, in his decision made when he is forced to choose between obeying the law, in 
fact, his uncle's desire, and obeying his strong sense of filial piety, which obliges him 
to assist Burley because the latter once saved his father's life. Taking the risk, he 
resolves to shelter Burley. Henceforth, Morton's behaviour is guided by his father's to 
take an active role in the social and politicalhfe around him. This also awakens in 
him a sense of public spiritedness motivated by what he believes to be "public 
wrongs" committed by the prevailing "oppressive government," contrary to his 
uncle's selfish and isolationist tendency. (159) 
Ian Dennis argues that in Old Mortality Scott "comes close to doubting entirely the 
beneficial effects of memory.,,75 Yet should we apply this thesis to Morton, the 
outcome would be precisely the opposite. Following his father's example, Morton 
always argues from the past/memory to rectify errors in the present and to adjust 
stances in accordance with evolving public interest. Thus, when Morton expresses his 
doubts of the insurgents' conduct and divisions before he commits himself to them, 
Mucklewrath accuses Morton of betraying the cause his father has supported, and 
Burley compares the present insurgents to those of 1640. But Morton replies: 
But their affairs ... were wisely conducted, and the violence of their zeal 
expended itself in their exhortations and sermons, without bringing 
divisions into their counsels, or cruelty into their conduct. I have often 
heard my father say so, and protest, that he wondered at nothing so much as 
the contrast between the extravagance of their religious tenets and the 
wisdom and moderation with which they conducted their civil and military 
affairs. But our counsels seem all one wild chaos of confusion. (245) 
What we hear here is the voice of memory, which directs his moderation and active 
faith in the present. 
On the other hand, the "ambivalent legacy" of loyalty left by Silas to his son, 
Henry, is also suggestive. Silas fmds he must change sides to act properly when the 
sides themselves are modified by events. His loyalty to a specific party is not 
dogmatic or fanatic but rather a sense of loyalty within the parameter of honour and 
public interest. While Scott advocates consensus, he seems to dismiss blind 
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affiliation and to allow some space for individual responsibility in judgment, 
including an evaluation of the factions. Embodying his father's morality, Morton does 
not prove to be single-minded in affiliating with the Royalists, Silas's last 
involvement, but rather allies with the Covenanters, whom he assumes to embody the 
nation's interest in liberty and justice. Therefore, Morton's loyalty, like his father's, 
transcends any ideology and is directed to the welfare of Scotland as a nation. 
Morton abides by this notion of loyalty until the end: 
Silence your senseless clamours, yonder is the enemy! On maintaining the 
bridge against him depend our lives, as well as our hope to reclaim our laws 
and liberties. -There shall at least one Scottishman die in their defence. -
Let anyone who loves his country follow me! (332) 
This patriotic cry epitomizes all civic and heroic virtue, which Scott calls for 
inculcating in the present as a bastion against excessi ve individualism and 
divisiveness. Morton's constant identity is his commitment to his nation. The 
modifications in his identity lie only in the means of perpetuating this constancy in a 
changing world. 
According to Dennis, "Morton's national heroism, furthermore, his labours in the 
cause of a moderate and traditional Scotland, a Scotland of 'laws and liberties'," lie 
outside the history of Morton himself. This "anachronism" Dennis argues is "both his 
virtue and his problem, and he endures all the social penalties of being 'ahead of his 
time. ",76 This "anachronism," I would suggest, could be undercut when we consider 
it to be oriented toward the present. In the context of the divisions that threaten the 
British society in 1816, Morton's performance becomes a sort of artificial memory for 
the reader, much as Silas is the memory of Morton. 
Scott's portrayal of the uncertain times in which Henry Morton stri ves parallels the 
changes taking place in his own time. Marilyn Gaull points out that "just as the 
traditional relationship between man and God, man and nature, had been shifting, so 
the traditional relationships among men had been open to question, specifically to 
discover what the best and necessary relationships were. ,,77 Amid such changes 
Morton's virtues and his centrist policy serve as an ideal model to be imitated in the 
present. Dennis remarks that Old Mortality reflects Scott's "anxiety over the new 
cycle of escalating desires-revolutions of rising expectation-and the accompanying 
paroxysm of national violence and death through which not just Scotland, but all of 
Europe was currently passing. ,,78 This remark, in fact, makes sure that memory, at 
least in its positive aspects, remains important for guiding our foot steps in the 
present. Memorylhistory reminds generations now that the wars in Scotland were 
nurtured by divided loyalties. Second, the Glorious Revolution, which has brought 
settlement of the disputes, we assume is reached as a result of moderate solution, 
which anticipates the loyalty to the nation over the loyalty to faction or party. But the 
crucial question is: can we depend on these lessons from memory to solve 
contemporary problems? Dennis, like McMaster, fmds in the ending of Old A10rtality 
a sort of pessimism that manifests in Scott's doubts that the "individual life could even 
remain autonomous or provide centres of peace and accord independent of political 
and historical development." Dennis describes the union of Morton with Edith as 
"insubstantial,,,79 lacking the vitality and optimism which we discern in the case of 
Waverley and Rose. Does this mean that Scott has lost faith in the real value of 
progress? It could be, but his programme of progress and reconciliation proceeds till 
finally it gives a clear picture in The Bride of Lammermoor of how disastrous a 
society might look like in the absence of this programme. 
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Chapter Four 
Rob Roy (1817) 
Like Waverley and Old Mortality, Rob Roy takes place against a backgrOlll1d of 
rebellion, the Jacobite uprising of 1715. It is to be expected that the novel shares 
some features with its predecessors, despite the shift in Scott's narrative technique-
in Rob Roy the story is told as the fIrst-person autobiographical narrative of 
Osbaldistone's son Frank, addressed in old age to his reader and business partner of 
many years, Will Tresham. Thus for contemporary criticism the value of the book, 
along with the rest of the Waverley novels, lies in its realistic representation of 
"national manners. ,,1 Yet later criticism, observing that these ideals were almost dead 
by the time Scott wrote his novel, is reluctant to take this thesis at its face value. 2 
Critics, as a result, endeavour to explore any underlying moral lessons in Rob Roy, in 
the light of Scott's vision of history and progress. 
For David Daiches, the novel Juxtaposes two worlds of different manners or 
cultures; one feeds on "heroic violence," the other hinges on "enlightened prudence. ,,3 
Thus the main concern of the book is in dramatizing "the effect of historical process 
on older surviving social fonns, codes of behaviour and personal ideals. ,,4 For 
Daiches and in line with his well know schema, the underlying theme of the novel is 
"the necessity of sacrifIcing heroism to prudence, even though heroism is so much 
more attractive. ,,5 In the same vein, Donald Davie argues that Rob Roy displays a 
sort of apology for the emerging commercial world so that "the old gets less than 
justice. ,,6 The old is present in the novel, in his view, just to demonstrate changes in 
moral standards, for instance, an ancient virtue like "honour" mutates and takes the 
fonn of "credit" in the present. 7 
It is clear that both readings of Rob Roy tend to attribute to Scott unqualifIed 
commitment to progress and commercial ideals, in contrast to his position in 
Waverley. Perhaps the role of the protagonist and the unglamorous presentation of 
the Jacobites in the novel have led to such readings. Frank o sbaldi stone , unlike 
Edward Waverley, shows no attraction to the Jacobite cause and its heroic world 
(manners) from the beginning till the end. 8 Also the state of the clans in particular 
and the Jacobites in general is presented in Rob Roy as divided; each works for his 
own interest following bloodshed and intrigues. This dim picture, besides the 
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economic misery in the Highlands, stands in sharp contrast \\ith the brilliant picture 
Scott draws of the performance of the Jacobites in Waverley. 
Other critics, making use of the author's psychobiography, seem to read the novd 
in terms of Scott's ambivalence toward progress and civilization. In his article, "The 
Commercial Motif of the Waverley Novels," Lawrence Poston views Scott's position 
in Rob Ray toward the past and the present as divided: "Many of his sympathies lay 
with the money-making class to which he belonged; another side of him, retlecting 
his innate Tory paternalism, was appalled at the human waste that an unrestrained 
competitiveness could produce.,,9 Almost in similar terms, Bruce Beiderwell, in a 
more recent work, argues that Scott's contrast between the heroic world of the 
Highlands and the commercial world of the lowlands in Rob Roy is only an 
embodiment of the philosophical historians' view of the stages of progress. In his 
view, the narrative, through this contrast, "reveals the liabilities of the advanced, 
commercial state; it is a state, of course, that so greatly rewarded and eventually 
bankrupted him [Scott]." 10 
Robert C. Gordon, on the other hand, focuses in his reading of the novel on the 
issue of filial connection, which, in his view, occupies a considerable area in the 
novel. He views the novel not only as "Scott's variation on the parable of the Prodigal 
Son" but also asserts: "it is the issue of filial responsibility that unites Rob R~v. "ll 
Gordon treats the issue of "filial responsibility" according to the Bildungsroman 
tradition-the protagonist's obedient return to his father after being educated by more 
than one agent: Bailie Jarvie, Die Vernon and Rob Roy. However, this reading, true 
as it stands, remains incomplete; for the complications that govern family connections 
in the novel cannot be understood in isolation from historical progress and 
contemporary politics. We know that views about family are politicized in the 
writings of radicals such as Thomas Paine and conservatives like Edmund Burke. 
Both writers, in fact, elaborate on the aristocratic law of primogeniture and its effect 
on the stability of familial, social and political life, though, of course, in opposite 
directions. 12 
Myarglllllent shows that Rob Ray, like Waverley, uses socio-historic analysis, in 
the tradition of the "philosophical" historians, employing the notion of contrast of 
cultures for ideological effects that are complex rather than simply attributable to one 
contemporary ideology. Firstly, I would suggest, it serves to undercut the specific 
political contlict of the ' 15 by making it a modd of a clash of cultures that 
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encompasses all aspects of human life. Secondly, contrary to Daiches's thesis, it 
serves to assert the social-moral import of civic and heroic virtues and the possibility 
of transferring them into the present in new forms that match the new context. Within 
the framework of Pocock's seminal work Virtue, Commerce, and History (1985), I 
show how the virtue of "honour" could mutate, in terms of commercial humanist 
rhetoric, into the virtue of "credit." 1birdly, I expand Gordon's argument to show 
that Scott attempts to reach a synthesis of the otherwise antagonistic principles of 
Burke and Paine concerning family affairs. That is, he recognizes the significance of 
cohesion and hierarchy in family structure provided that traditional paternal authority, 
as a form of dictatorship, is redefmed to take the form of mutual understanding and 
respect, at least in the private sphere. Likewise, Scott recognizes the law of 
inheritance but submits it to civil law. Finally, I demonstrate that Scott's attitude 
towards the commercial world is based on social-moral considerations. 
Earlier and recent critics, who might have taken their cue from Scott himself, 
confmn that Rob Roy, in one way, is concerned with contrasting two cultures, semi-
barbaric in the Highland versus commercial in the Lowland. I3 In the long 1829 
Introduction to Rob Roy Scott writes: 
It is this strong contrast betwixt the civilized and cultivated mode of life on 
the one side of the Highland line, and the wild and lawless adventures which 
were habitually undertaken and achieved by one who dwelt on the opposite 
side of that ideal boundary, which creates the interest attached to his [Rob 
Roy's] name. 14 
This passage is reminiscent of the stages of progress as postulated by the 
"philosophical" historians, particularly Adam Ferguson. Unsurprisingly', anyone who 
reads Ferguson's Essay will come across similar passages that contrast the manners of 
primiti ve societies with commercial ones. Therefore we expect that Scott will employ 
this contrast much as Ferguson does to reveal codes that govern people's relationships 
in relatively primitive societies with particular emphasis on civic and heroic virtues 
and show how civilization and refinement could weaken them by excessive 
gravitation towards individual autonomy and selfishness. Scott, however, seems to 
pose the problem of apparent incommensurable cultural norms and then attempts to 
solve that problem by tracing divergent norms back to an original element-human 
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nature. This attempt in itself legitimizes accommodating ancient virtues to new 
contexts. 
The fIrst cultural contrast takes place in the episode of Glasgo\\Js tOW11 prison 
when the protagonist, Frank Osbaldistone, and Rob Roy meet the turnkey, Dougal. 
The picture Frank draws of the turnkey and the wann welcome the latter shows to his 
chief, Rob Roy is suggestive: 
He was a wild shock-headed looking animal ... In my experience I have met 
nothing so absolutely resembling my idea of a very uncouth, wild, and ugly 
savage adoring the idol of his tribe. He grinned, he shivered, he laughed, he 
was near crying, if he did not actually cry. He had a Where shall I go? 
What can I do for you?' expression of face, the complete surrender, and 
anxious subservience and devotion of which it is difficult to describe, 
otherwise than by the awkward combination which I have attempted. (193) 
Although Frank seems to comment patronizingly on the scene yet, in the wake of 
Frank's strained relationship with his father that has ended with alienation, Scott 
renders the whole scene as a comment on Frank himself, and in some sense a critique 
of his culture. Dougal is a typical ordinary member of Rob Roy's clan reminiscent of 
Evan Dhu. He is attached to Rob by ties of natural and genuine affections, the 
rudimentary cement for social cohesion. Also, he belongs to a patriarchal world 
wherein allegiance to the chief, tribe and parents, is irrational and absolute. Therefore, 
it is no surprise for Frank to describe what he sees as his fIrst experience. After all, he 
belongs to a relatively liberal and enlightened world; wherein the son can say his 
word and even rebel against his father's will. For Frank, as for the reader, who 
ignores clan culture and the strong bonds that attach members of a clan to each other 
and to their chief, the scene might present a sort of exaggerated compliment 
associated with a sense of servitude. However, to reveal the underlying social-moral 
import of this episode from a philosophical perspective, Scott designs another episode 
in which he transfers Dougal's feelings and real commitment from theory into 
practice allowing a moral lesson to emerge. Captain Thornton, in his campaign in the 
Highland to capture Rob Roy, takes Dougal as a captive and negotiates with him to 
capture Rob. 
"And now, my friend," said the Captain, "let us understand each other. You 
have confessed yourself a spy, and should string up to the next tree-but 
come, if you will do me one good turn, I will do you another. You, 
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Donald-you shall in the way of kindness carry me and a small party to the 
place where you left your master [Rob Roy] as I wish to speak a few words 
with him on serious afIairs~ and nilet you go about your business, and gi ve 
you five guineas to boot." 
"Oigh! Oigh!" exclaimed Dougal, in the extremity of distress and 
perplexity, "she canna do tat-she canna do tat-she'll rather be hanged." 
Hanged, then, you shall be, my friend," said the officer' "and your blood , . 
be upon your own head. -Corporal Cramp, do you play Provost-
Marshal-away with him! "(276) 
For the Captain, who, like Frank, ignores the clan culture, it is normal to think that his 
offer could induce Dougal to betray his master (Morris is a counter example of 
Dougal). For Dougal, it is a stunning offer, more horrible than death itself. Before 
the first picture, which associates Dougal with savagery and servility, crystallizes to 
take a heroic and civic dimension, we momentarily doubt his courage not to betray his 
master when he exclaims: "Shentlemans, stops-stops!-She1l do his honour's 
bidding- stops!"(276) Even Bailie Jarvie, an expert in clan culture, finds in 
Dougal's concession to betray his master an anomalous act that belies the notion of 
honour that governs the Highland culture. Such shameful act, in Jarvie's view, 
deserves death: "Away wi' the creature" said the Bailie, "he deserves hanging mair 
now than ever--awa wi' him, corporal-why dinna ye tak him away?" (276) Later, 
in chapter 31, we come to realize that Dougal is not showing weakness, but a canny 
tactic to lead the Captain and his soldiers into an ambush. 
Anthropologically, the suggestiveness of Dougal's episode could be explained in 
two ways, historical and moral. Historically, it shows that in the Highlands at this 
stage of historical progress it is difficult to break the tribal social bonds, regardless of 
hierarchy. For all objective reasons the interest of the clan member is part and parcel 
of the interest of the whole tribe. This dictates the absolute loyalty of all members to 
their clan in the figure of its chief. The chief "embodies the clan identity, rather than 
the essentially economic relationship of servant to master within the historical conte:\1 
of emerging capitalism. ,,15 This contrasts, for instance, with the relationship between 
Frank and Andrew Fairservice in which the latter acts autonomously without being 
morally obliged. In the case of Dougal, if the chief were lost, the clan would be 
nothing more "than a wasp without its head, which may sting once, perhaps, but is 
instantly crushed into annihilation." (306) It is historical necessity that has cultured 
Dougal and Evan Dhu in this manner. Their honesty is a cultural heritage not a willed 
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individual choice. Feudal society demands the fulfilment of roles in which loyalties 
are determined by birth; hence deviation from a given role results in disgrace. 
Morally, it shows no contradiction between what is public and what is individua1~ 
reciprocity that dermes social relationships in the tribe is adhesive rather than 
repUlsive. Here, the moral and the historical are one and the same. The morality 
behind this episode, then, is that loyalty, in general, is an integrative force that implies 
some sort of disinterestedness. Commenting on the episode, Brown states that "both 
the officer and the Bailie apply the typical standards of their own society, quite 
mistakenly, to Dougal: in fact the clansman is utterly incapable of being bribed to 
such an end. ,,16 
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon in Scott's fiction to present a traitor, at all times 
and by all standards, as dangerous for his family, society and nation-Rashleigh 
adduces a notorious example. But although in Dougal's critical case betrayal might 
be justifie~ yet by adhering to loyalty at the expense of his own life he ascends to the 
level of heroism. Here the civic and heroic are confounded~ occasionally, to achieve 
a civic virtue some sort of heroism is needed. For instance, though Jarvie detests "a 
warldly and a perfidious creature," and "filthy lucre of gain that men gies themsells up 
to" (276) we are not sure that he can match Dougal's heroism under the same 
circumstance. We are told earlier in the novel that in Jarvie's commercial lexicon 
honour is suicide and so we do not expect him to carry out such an enterprise. Such 
expectation is further reinforced when the corporal alludes to Jarvie's potential 
cowardice: "it's my belief and opinion, honest gentleman ... that if you were going to 
be hanged yourself, you would be in no such d-d hurry." (276) 
Although, apparently, the general atmosphere of the narrative tends to endorse 
Jarvie's attitude, which pits the virtue of rationality and personal safety against that of 
heroism, as most critics argue, yet in depth the case is not like that. The philosophical 
argument that supports the viability of civic and heroic virtues emerges when Captain 
Thornton himself becomes another civilized Dougal. Captain Thornton, unlike 
Dougal, belongs to an advanced stage of progress or to the world of commerce, yet he 
displays no less heroism than Dougal in his promptness to sacrifice his life for the 
sake of what he perceives as duty toward public interest. For him, fighting the "gang 
of ruffians, whose licence has disturbed the cOlmtry so long," (280) is a public interest 
that deserves sacrifice. When it comes to public interest, which, I think, constitutes 
one of Scott's concerns, heroism in response to honour or heroism in response to duty 
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becomes compatible in essence. This we might understand from Thornton's message 
to his commanding officer urging him to do his duty keeping Rob in captivity despite 
the fact that such a measure might lead to Thornton's death at the hands of Helen 
MacGregor: 
present my compliments ... to the commanding otlicer, and tell him to do his 
duty and secure his prisoner, and not waste a thought upon me. If I have 
been fool enough to have been led into an ambuscade by these artful 
savages, I am wise enough to know how to die for it without "disgracing the 
service. I am only sorry for my poor fellows,' he said, 'that have fallen into 
such butcherly hands. (302) 
AI though the uniqueness of each stage of progress suggests that chivalric heroism is 
almost alien to commercial culture in which priority is given to private interest, yet 
the narrative, in the context of the uniformity of human nature, also suggests that its 
social-moral meaning can be retained by education in various institutions that have 
replaced the patriarchal system. Defending public interest at all times is a moral duty, 
without being necessarily associated with violence and bloodshed. Jeanie in The 
Heart of Midlothian is also no less heroic in her exploits in defending the interest of 
her family, community and nation than those who resort to violence to achieve the 
same ends. 
Almost every episode in Rob Roy underlines the contrast between the Highland 
culture and the commercial one with sociological analysis and a moral lesson to be 
derived from it. The historical moment of the tribes, Scott points out in his 
Introduction, is the antithesis of a civilised society. The codes and way of life that 
govern their culture are alien to a civilised man like Captain Thornton, who, it seems, 
has forgotten that in the end he is an English stranger among the Highlanders. For 
instance, he thinks that the alliance of some tribes with him in their fight against Rob 
Roy would be absolute and extends beyond that mission to fight the Jacobites, but this 
opinion proves to be false. When the Captain points out that he has to arrest Frank 
and Jarvie on being Jacobite suspects, the alliance proves to be fragile: 
"We'll wash our hands 0' that," said Inverashallock. "I came here \\1' my 
men to fight against the red MacGregor that killed my cousin ... but I will 
hae nothing to do touching honest gentlemen that may be gaun through the 
country on their ain business." 
"Nor I neither," said Inverach. (270) 
An agreement or contract, according to Captain Thornto~ needs to be respected as the 
basis of a civilised society, while for the Highlanders it means only a circumstantial 
event. The Highlanders' loyalty to a government that embodies commercial ideals is 
tactical and ends with the death of Rob, but strategically they cannot but be loyal to 
the Jacobites by virtue of analogy between the clannish patriarchal tradition-
absolute allegiance to the chief-in partiCUlar and the Jacobite/Stuart ideology in 
generaL The latter is founded on the idea of Divine Right doctrine or absolute 
monarchy. This congeniality perhaps provides another explanation as to why the 
Highlanders are always the fIrst to support and fIght for the Stewarts in their claim to 
restore the throne. 17 Paradoxically, Major Galbraith, a Highlander participating in 
the mission to capture Rob Roy punctures this congeniality when he puts it succinctly 
for the English Captain: "There's the king that is-and there's the king that suld of 
right be-I say, an honest man may and suld be loyal to them both, Captain." (271) 
Yet Scott solves this paradox, dualism of loyalty, in terms of economy, as Jarvie 
demonstrates in chapter 26. After the death of Queen Anne, King George ceased to 
provide the chiefs of the clans with "neither like to be siller nor pensions," hence the 
alternative is "an outbreak for the Stewarts." (238-39). This explanation evacuates 
politics from ideology and asserts economy within a cultural context as the basis of all 
ideologies. ill the context of contemporary happenings, the message is quite clear, 
Scott seems to remind the authorities of the relationship between economic distress 
and rebellion, as he does in The Antiquary through the conversation between Oldbuck 
and Saunder Mucklebackit in chapter 34. Also by focusing on the economic factor, 
Scott seems to undercut the value of any political ideology that governs the 
Highlanders' allegiance. By adding a cultural twist to the factor of economy in 
determining the Highlanders' loyalty, Scott reduces the whole political affair of the 
'15 to a sort of breakdown in communication between two distinct cultures. 
Some Highlanders befriend the government forces only to help them in the act of 
revenge, one of the main features of clan culture in the Highlands. As Beiderwell 
points out, in a clan culture members of a clan "will not surrender their right to punish 
private affronts in exchange for public safety. ,,18 The notion of revenge, as another 
component of honour, is another reason for the loosening of bonds among the clans so 
that they become vulnerable against the government forces. However, when it comes 
to fighting the Jacobites it becomes an encroaclunent on the whole culture rooted in 
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the patriarchal ideology that preserves their own way of life. This fact, not apparent to 
Captain Thornton, is very clear to the Bailie Jarvie whose roots extend to the 
Highlands and knows about their mentality very well. When the Captain talks about 
his reliance on the Highlanders in his plan to fInish Rob Roy, Bailie Jarvie 
admonishes him: 
"I dinna ken," said the Bailie; "there's mair brandy than brains in 
Garschattachin's head this morning- And I wadna, an I were you, Captain, 
rest my main dependence on the Hielandmen-hawks winna pike hawks' 
een. They may quarrel amang themsells, and gie ilk ither ill names, and 
maybe a slash wi' a claymore; but they are sure to join in the lang run 
against a' civilized folk, that wear breeks on their hinder ends, and hae 
purses in their pouches." (280-281) 
Through this passage, the author shifts our attention from a political conflict about 
legitimacy to a cultural conflict based on a sharp economical discrepancy between 
those who have and those who do not have. 
Jarvie's analysis of the socio-psychological state of the clan society is that of a 
"philosophical" historian. For instance, Adam Ferguson describes the state of affairs 
of the tribes in a similar way: 
they [clans] require the exercise of foreign wars to maintain domestic peace: 
when no enemy appears from abroad, they have leisure for private feuds, 
and employ that courage in their dissensions at home, which, in time of war, 
is employed in defence of their country. 19 
In other words, if the law of concentric circles of loyalties justifIes various disputes 
among the clans, the very same law unites them to fIght a foreign enemy (or a foreign 
culture). It is worth noting here that while Ferguson describes the clan's external war 
as a "defence of their country," Bailie Jarvie calls it a war against "a' civilized folk, 
that wear breeks on their hinder ends, and hae purses in their pouches." The purport 
of the two descriptions is highly significant. In the fIrst case the Highlander's courage 
and military skill is associated with lack of luxury and a sort of politics and 
nationalism, while in the second it is associated with cultural-economical distinction-
savage against civilized and poor against rich. 
Unarguably, Ferguson, as well as Scott, views the Highlanders' "private feuds" as 
moral failing yet both for sure would exalt their spirit of milit.ary courage, at least it is 
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useful in defending the cOlmtry against external enemies. Jarvie, however, has his 
own reasons to mask the relationship between luxury and the spirit of military 
courage. After all, he is fmancially prosperous as a result of accepting Hanoverian 
rule and the growing commercial economy of Scotland. Jarvie's repeated justification 
of the Union is the opening of Scottish trade to America and the West Indies. TIlls, to 
a contemporary reader, would not only involve the "free-trade" ideology of the USA 
but also the issue of slavery. Jarvie tells us in chapter 26 that he "had learned the art 
of composing ... excellent liquor," by using "the limes" which "were from his own 
little farm yonder-awa," without locating it geographically. Significantly, Scott 
debunks Jarvie's ambiguous move when he comments between two brackets: 
"indicating the West Indies with a knowing shrug of his [Jarvie's] shoulders." (229) 
Scott seems to allude to the issue of slavery and the exploitation of slaves in 
plantations of the British colonies. As Jarvie appears to know its moral implication, 
he shrewdly keeps the location of his farm obscure. The recipe of luxury, free market 
economy, profit, slavery and colonization undercuts the concept of Jarvie's decency, 
credibility and honesty in the absolute ethical sense and confines it only to business 
and profit. Jarvie expresses his full satisfaction with luxury though he admits that the 
"good ware has aften come from a wicked market." (229) 
On the other hand, Scott, the anthropologist, through Jarvie, shows that economy is 
a crucial element in determining manners and social-moral values. Economy in the 
Highlands at this stage of progress for all objective reasons is based on a conflict for 
survival. The one who does not have in order to survive needs "to live by stealing, 
reiving, lifting cows and the like depredations!" It follows that "depredation", as a 
profession, needs physical strength and sometimes violence. In this context, as Jarvie 
explains, the Highlanders "take pride in it, and reckon driving a spreagh (stealing a 
herd) a gallant, manly action, and mair befitting of pretty men ... than to win a day's 
wage by ony honest thrift." (235) "Depredation," as Jarvie explains, may take the 
form of "blackmail." (237) Rob used to levy blackmail from farmers in return for 
protecting their cattle from looters. Interestingly, he performed his job honestly: "-
let them [farmers] send to him if they lost sae muckle as a single cIoot by thieving, 
and Rob engaged to get them again, or pay the value-and he ay keep it his word." 
(237) 
The fight for survival renders a blackmail system a sort of business recognized by 
both parties, the one who otTers protection and the other 'Who pays money protection, 
much like a gentleman's agreement that commits both parties to its terms. Rob views 
this commitment in terms of his own culture as an obligation dictated on him not by 
law but by a sense of chivalric honour, "he's easy wi' a' body that will be easy wi' him; 
but ifye thraw him, ye had better thraw the deevil." (237) This, ironically, looks like 
an inversion of legal business contract in the Lowland. While in the Lowlands a 
contract is based on credit and supported by the power of law, in the Highlands it is 
founded on honour and guaranteed by the power of the sword, or some sort of 
vengeance, to set the record straight. In Waverley, we recall what happened to 
Bradwardine's milk cow when he discontinued payments to Fergus. 
Economy in the Lowland is based on commerce and manufacture, which demands 
an authority to maintain stability and peace; one's survival rests on one's self-
independence, credibility and respect for law rather than on physical strength, heroism 
or symbiosis. Adam Smith describes the situation in a commercial stage as: 
Commerce and manufacture gradually introduced order and good 
government, and within them, the liberty and security of individuals, among 
the inhabitants of the country, who had lived before almost in a continual 
state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their 
superiors. 20 
As the economic factor shapes manners in a given society at a given historical 
moment, and ultimately brings cultures into distinction, it is no accident that Jarvie 
would be loathe to apply the term "honour" to his own character, as he tells Frank: 
But I maun hear naething about honour-we ken naething here but about 
credit. Honour is a homicide and a bloodspiller, that gangs about making 
frays in the street; but Credit is a decent honest man, that sits at hame and 
makes the pat play. (231) 
Judith Wilt points out that Bailie Jarvie's "conceit indicates an awareness that a 
change not merely material but psychic also is in the process, from an economy of 
honor to an economy of credit. ,,21 In his seminal study Virtue, Commerce, And 
History (1 985), Pocock highlights the relationship between economy based on 
commerce and exchange and the change in man's psyche. The very nature of 
economy, in his view, demanded the emergence of new types ofvirtues-"manners." 
According to Pocock, as economy shifted to commerce, man 
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entered an increasingly transactional universe ... in which his relationships 
and interactions with other social beings, and with products, became 
increasingly complex and various, modifYing and developing more and 
more aspects of personality. . .. Since these new relationships were social 
and not political in character, the capacities which they led the indi vidual to 
develop were called not 'virtues' but 'manners,' a term in which the ethical 
mores and the juristic consuetudines were combined, with the former 
predominating. The social psychology of the age declared that encounters 
with things and persons evoked passions and refmed them into manners; it 
was preeminently the function of commerce to refine the passions and polish 
the manners; and the social ethos of the age of enlightenment was built upon 
the concept of close encounters of the third kind. 22 
In the wake of Pocock's analysis, Jarvie's notion of credit becomes a sort of new 
social code or norm that determines individuals' conduct (manners) in commercial 
society with a presupposition of commitment to contracts, probity, punctuality and 
other virtues that contribute to the promotion of commerce and business. Still it is 
difficult, however, to treat credit and honour as two distinct virtues since common 
sense says that the former cannot hold without including the latter in some way. 
What Jarvie seems to be referring to as "honour" is, in part, the sense of honour, 
which is defined as a public esteem, or reputation, or fame. 23 But it may also be the 
"honor" with which Jarvie would be familiar that brings about clan feuds and the type 
of revenge practiced by Helen MacGregor, for instance. "Credit" is standing by one's 
word for Jarvie. Credit becomes the modem world's partial, but essential 
manifestation of honour, and Jarvie is its incarnation. However, credit adds a 
dimension of commerce to the virtue of honour, and though Jarvie may deny it, Scott 
has merged the two terms. Scott's biography provides good evidence that credit and 
"honour" constitute two faces for the same coin, as John Sutherland illustrates in his 
The Life of Walter Scott. 24 But when Frank asks Jarvie how he can help his father 
and maintain his own honour, the Bailie is appalled because to him honour is an 
empty concept, unless backed by credit. Unless Frank's father proves his credibility 
to his clients by restoring the lost papers, his career will be ruined even though he 
might be honest in earnest. Here Jarvie is emphasizing the spirit of "honour" which 
needs to be translated by practice, or as Ian Dennis puts it "the world of Nicole 
Jarvie" is one "where honour and credit can combine, and decency can determine 
behaviour without sacrifice of profit. ,,25 Such a formula, in Jarvie's view, can hold 
through prudence as a warrant for integrity and against loss of profit and, secondly, by 
abiding, literally, by the temlS of any transaction even it proved to be unfair to the 
other party. Frank's father's violation of the first rule has almost brought him 
destruction, while Rob's violation of the two rules did utterly destroy him. Yet. 
paradoxically, Jarvie does blame Rob for imprudence describing him as 
"venturesome" but, on the other hand, he praises him when violating the second rule 
by describing him as "baith civil and just in his dealings." 
Through Jarvie's defence of Rob's magnanimous behaviour, Scott seems to 
humanize commerce in a way that undercuts credit in its mathematical commercial 
sense. This he does by giving credit an injection of public responsibility, which 
proposes an amalgamation that concerts the operation of reason (Credit) with that of 
heart (magnanimity or benevolence): 
"Robi was anes a wee1-doing, pains-taking drover, as ye wad see amang 
ten thousand ... And he was baith civil and just in his dealings, and if he 
thought his chapman had made a hard bargain, he wad gie him a lucky-
penny to the mends. I hae kend him gie back five shillings out 0' the pund 
sterling. " 
"Twenty-five per cent" said Owen "a heavy discount." 
"He wad gae it though, sir, as I tell ye; mair especially if he thought the 
buyer was a puir man, and couldna stand by a loss." (236) 
When Owen considers a "Twenty-five per cent" a "heavy discount," (236) he 
implicitly testifies for Rob's extraordinary humane behaviour. Rob could have 
confmed his transactions to the ethical rule of commerce, which Owen simplifies in 
mathematical terms: "Let A do to B, as he would have B do to him" (12) without even 
impairing his credit, but his patriarchal tinged culture makes him feel morally, at least 
in his own eye, that he is dishonest and villain. Rob's sympathy with the poor man is a 
moral duty that supersedes credit without undermining it. It is derived from a simple 
hierarchical culture that determines the moral responsibility of each rank toward the 
lower in a sort of symbiotic relationship, which is, of course, beyond Owen's and 
Frank's recognition. Rob's action seems to be symbolic of the constructive role of the 
traditional aristocracy that began to stagger after the weight of economy began to 
anchor in commerce instead of land, and it may be a critique of the emerging callous 
capitalism. At any rate, this episode also reveals that though credit seems to be just 
and puts two parties on equal terms yet it remains a hard justice that needs to be 
mitigated with human sympathy. 
At this point, Rob Roy's chivalric performance seems to elevate honour above 
credit as the former is imbued with a sense of sympathy, humanity and benevolence. 
In this context, Rob's honour emerges as more practical than the credit of William 
Osbaldistone-based on speculation-yet closer to that of the Bailie Jarvie-based on 
prudence. Dramatizing Rob's benevolence in this heroic way-benevolence is also a 
heroic act after a sort- is stark evidence that refutes Daiches's claim above; it proves 
that heroism, in its positive aspect, as a virtue, is still viable and necessary in the 
present as long as there is a public interest. Scott, out of sociability and sensibility, 
much like Wordsworth and Coleridge, seems to exhibit a Romantic antipathy toward 
rational systems and abstract propositions; in a sense, he would embrace the attitude 
of "thought-in-feeling, rather than of pure ratiocination. ,,26 Credit as reflected by 
Frank's father tends to be purely rationalistic while Rob's reason tends to be mingled 
with a charge of feeling. Scott's credit, therefore, is a synthesis of both in a way that 
allows honour in the civic humanist tradition to survive. As Homer Obed Brown 
points out: Scott transfers "the language of chivalry to modem commerce. ,,27 
On the other hand, the narrative shows that if a later stage of progress can 
assimilate and adapt a given old value, it remains very difficult for an earlier stage of 
progress to assimilate this adaptation. This, of course, explains the impossibility of 
reversing the course of history, and poses the question of how to avoid cultural 
collision. None in the Highlands is pleased with the notion of Credit, because it 
embodies a complex structure of values. The Highlanders are unable to decode its 
symbols, for instance, probity, especially in keeping promises, punctuality, contracts, 
institutions, etc. This complex culture is heterogeneous to their simpler state of 
society. For them the culture of credit bears only profit connotation; and magistrates, 
the hand of law, are created to secure this profit. Take for instance, Garschattachin's 
furious comment when Jarvie, as a magistrate and merchant, reminds him of his "duty 
to his creditors": 
"D-n my creditors and you, if ye be ane o'them. I say there will be a new 
warld sune. And we shall hae nae Cawmils cocking their bonnet sae hie, and 
hounding their dogs where they dunrna came themsells, nor protecting 
thieves, nor murders and oppressors, to harry and spoil better men and mair 
loyal clans than themsells." (268) 
As Brown points out, credit for the Highlander represents "economic thraldom. ,,28 
The only way to break this bondage is by destroying the culture of credit and 
establishing a "new warld." (268) It is clear that each time the Highlanders express 
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their distress at the present order and their craving to restore the old one in the figure 
of the Jacobite uprising, Scott is keen to shift the reader's attention to issues connected 
with culture rather than politics. For example, Rob, though a Jacobite, does not use 
explicit political terms when he expresses his resentment against the present regime. 
The focus is on the old way of life and the new way of life, the old culture and the 
new one. Like Garschattachin, Rob is tormented by the "tharldom" of the institution 
of law: 
"I gie God's malison and mine to a' sort of magistrates, justice, bailies, 
sheriffs-officers, constables, and sic-like black cattle. that hae been the 
plagues 0' puir auld Scotland this hunder year. It was a merry warld when 
every man held his ain gear wi' his ain grip, and when the country-side 
wasna fashed wi' warrants and poindings and apprizings, and a' that cheatry 
craft." (226) 
This and similar passages should not be understood as reflecting Scott's nostalgia for 
"auld Scotland," nor as an attempt to debunk the mentality of uncivilized society; 
however, if taken alongside Rob's attitude to commercial professions, the meaning 
would emerge in a different light. Rob, in fact, loses no chance to this effect. 
Addressing his cousin Bailie Jarvie, he says: "to my own proper shame be it spoken! 
That has a cousin wi' accounts, and yam winnles, and looms, and shuttles, like a mere 
mechanical person." (205) In the same chapter he admires, and even honours Frank, 
just because the latter shows contempt to "weavers and spinners, and sic-like 
mechanical persons and their pursuits." (207) Towards the end of the narrative, when 
Jarvie offers to help him get his son apprenticed as a weaver, he looks at the offer as 
an insult: "My sons weavers! ... but I wald see every loom in Glasgow, beam, traddles, 
and shuttles, burn in hell-fIfe sooner!" (331) It could be an anachronism alluding to 
Adam Smith's notion of the division of labour and its impact on social-moral and 
political life. 29 Yet here Scott seems to be more concerned in dramatizing the 
historical process to show how large the gap has become between a civilized society 
and a society which is quasi-primitive. In this context, Rob's complaints become only 
a psychological symptom in a transitional period when society finds itself alienated 
and standing in no man's land and the individual becomes the victim of historical 
forces. This is best reflected in Rob's impressive speech to Frank: "'My cousin Nicol 
Jarvie means well ... but he presses ower hard on the temper and situation of a man 
like me, considering what I have been-what I have been forced to become-and, 
above all, that which has forced me to become what I am.'" (335) 
Rob tried to progress and confonn to the modern world and be what Jarvie is, but 
he failed. And when he moved to live in a world where he could hold "his ain gear wi' 
his ain grip" he became the victim of injustice in the form of the law. Scott is 
showing that it is to be expected that Rob resorts to the criminal exploits for which he 
gained renown. He had been left with nothing else, robbed of his honest means to 
earn his livelihood and thus stuck between two different worlds. By engaging in his 
exploits, he became a representative of his family's struggles to maintain identity and 
values, which were also the fundamental Highland struggles with the modern world. 
Hart may have well missed this point when he asserts: "The Highland grievances that 
led to the '15 are not those that turned Rob Roy into outlaw.,,30 They are indeed the 
same grievances, the continuous acts of repression sanctioned by laws, which 
represent the fears and shortsightedness of the Hanoverian government. It is not just 
that "Jacobitism relates strongly to their yearning for an older, simpler state of society 
in which the power of the clans was still unchallenged, ,,31 it is also the desire to 
maintain the values by which those clans have lived. It is no surprise, then, for Rob 
and the rest in the Highlands to refuse a culture whose laws fall short of implementing 
justice, on the one hand, and ignore their own way of life on the other. 
Scott himself was a lawyer and when he treats the issue of law in his novels, he 
considers it as a part of the whole cultural heritage of any community. Legal systems 
and moral jUdgment, according to Scott and his "philosophical" professors, were to be 
correlated with stages in the progress of civilization; they were not to be understood 
as arbitrary products of individual cultures. 32 Scott's understanding of law in this 
way reflects Montesquieu's contribution to the Enlightenment analysis of the nature of 
law: 
Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants 
of the earth; the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the 
particular cases in which this human reason is applied. They should be 
adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are made, as to render 
it very unlikely for those of one nation to be proper for another. ... They 
should be relative to the climate ... to the quality of the soil, to its situation 
and bigness, to the manner of the living of the natives ... to the religion of the 
inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, mnnber, commerce, manners, and 
customs. 33 
The problem with the law imposed after the Union, was that it was English law, 
which did not accommodate traditional Scottish values, and it was therefore viewed as 
a violation of Scottish national character. In this feeling the Lowlanders joined, 
although not aggressively, with the Highlanders. The lowlanders had accepted, even 
welcomed earlier Scottish laws, which secured their peace from the Highlanders as 
Scott writes in the Tales. 34 Such innovations Scott viewed as evolutionary in social 
development. The Lowland and Highland differences were settled by men who were 
products of their communities but who tried to resolve clashes on behalf of a greater 
good, a unified Scotland. The law imposed by the English had different intent and 
different consequences. English law was imposed by a society in a different stage of 
development, and therefore with considerably different values. The imposition of 
values is viewed as repressive, and repression, Scott is suggesting in his three Jacobite 
novels, may produce insurrection. As far as law and national identity are concerned, 
Scott's distress at the legal reforms pressed by a victorious Whig administration in 
1807, which, in his view, worked towards defacing the Scottish identity is highly 
revealing. 35 
Notwithstanding that the smoke of cultural conflict curtains the political dimension 
of the Jacobite uprising, yet restoration of the Stewart line means to the Jacobites a 
restoration of national honour. If we compare Helen MacGregor's exchange with 
Captain Thornton, the representative of the English law, and what Scott writes about 
the Clan Act of 1714, we, perhaps, get an additional latent clue as to why the uprising 
essentially broke out. Consider what Helen says: 
"What seek ye here?" she asked ... Captain Thornton. 
"We seek the outlaw, Rob Roy MacGregor Campbell," answered 
the officer." 
"Ay," retorted the Amazon, "I am no stranger to your tender mercies. Ye 
have left me neither name nor fame--my mother's bones will shrink aside in 
their grave when mine are laid beside them-Ye have left me and mine 
neither house nor hold, blanket nor bedding, cattle to feed us, or flocks to 
clothe us-Ye have taken from us all-all! -The very name of our 
ancestors have ye taken away, and now ye come for our lives." (283) 
And consider what Scott says about the Clan Act: 
TItis statute ... enacted 1. That if a feudal superior went into rebellion, and 
became liable to the pains of high treason, all such vassals holding lands 
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under him, as should continue in their allegiance, should in future hold these 
lands of the Crown. 2. If a tenant should have remained at the King's peace 
while his landlord had been engaged in rebellion, and convicted of treason, 
the space of two years gratuitous possession should be added to that tenant's 
lease. 3. If the superior should remain loyal and peaceful while the vassal 
should engage in rebellion, and incur conviction of high treason, then the 
fief, or lands held by such vassal, shall revert to the superior as if they had 
never been separated from his estate. 4. Another clause declared void such 
settlements of estates and deeds of entail as might be made on the 1 st day of 
August or at any time thereafter, declaring that they should be no bar to the 
forfeiture of the estates for high treason, seeing that such settlements had 
been frequently resorted to for the sole purpose of evading the punishment 
of the law. 36 
1bis is a systematic attempt by England to break the patriarchal system that holds the 
tenant to his master as a step to erase all the traditional Scottish values, especially in 
the Highland clans. In fact, it is there that the Union was followed by national 
discontent. Clearly, unlike Helen MacGregor, Rob, Garschattachin, and the 
Lowlanders embraced the disbanding of the clans as a measure of their own security. 
In the same way, they were much quicker to abandon loyalty to Scottish nationalism 
in favour of a British Empire that would privilege them with economical prosperity. 
Bailie Jarvie is here possibly preternaturally gifted with insight. When Andrew 
Fairservice criticized the Union he rebuked him severely: 
Whisht, sir! -whisht! it's ill-scaped tongues like yours, that make mischief 
atween neighbourhoods and nations. There's naething sae gude on this side 
0' time but might hae been better, and that may be said 0' the Union. Nane 
were keener against it than the Glasgow folk, wi' their rabblings and their 
risings, and their mobs, as they cal them now-a-days. But it's an ill wind 
blaws naebody gude-Let ilka ane roose the ford as they fmd it-I say, Let 
Glasgow flourish! (246) 
In short, although the uprising has historical political roots connected with Scottish 
national pride yet Scott wants to say that the Stuart-Hanoverian conflict is in the first 
place a cultural conflict or, as Daiches would like to say, a clash between two worlds. 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons that toward the end of the narrative, Scott leaves this 
issue open by disclosing the gap between Rob and Jarvie. They make offers for each 
other that neither will ever accept. Yet Scott makes it clear that if Rob and Jarvie 
diverge culturally, they converge in mutual loyalty as kinsmen in the first place and as 
friends, in the second: 
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Our host [Rob] took leave of us with great cordiality, and even atTection. 
Betwixt him and Mr. Jarvie, indeed, there seemed to exist a degree of 
mutual regard, which fonned a strong contrast to their different occupations 
and habits. After kissing each other very lovingly, and when they were just 
in the act of parting, the Bailie, in the furness of his heart, and \\ith a 
faltering voice, assured his kinsman, 'that if ever an hundred pund or even 
twa hundred, would put him or his family in a settled way, he need but just 
send a line to the Saut-market~' and Rob, grasping his basket-hild with one 
hand, and shaking Mr. Jarvie's heartily with the other, protested, 'that if ever 
any body should affront his kinsman, an he would but let him ken, he would 
stow his lugs out of his head, were he the best man in Glasgow. (347) 
They are separated by diversity of cultural values, but the values of loyalty and 
honour they share are strong enough, Scott is showing, to unite them in sympathy and 
friendship. The law of reciprocity that featured in the relationship between Waverley 
and Talbot, and Morton and Evandale is parallel to the relationship of Rob and the 
Bailie. Gordon observes that "the principle of honour and reciprocity not only links 
London with the Highlands, it also resolves the antithesis between the world of 
calculation and the world of heroism-the figures of arithmetic and the figures of 
heraldry. ,,37 From another perspective, if it is problematic for one culture to cancel 
another, at least in Rob Roy the tension is there and it would be wise if both cultures 
stand as complementary to each other. The power in the Highlands capitalizes on 
courage and valour and Rob is ready to put it under the service of Jarvie; whereas, the 
power in the commercial world relies on money and Jarvie is ready to employ it in the 
service of Rob when he needs it. Scott supports the Union between Scotland and 
England calling for respect of the specificity of each culture. Such compromise, Scott 
extends to the issue of family as I show below. 
It might be argued that the political conflict between the Stuarts and the 
Hanoverians is merely a conflict about who has the right to be in power yet the case is 
not simply so. As we have seen, the conflict is between two different ideologies or 
cultures in which the political leaves its impact on all aspects of society or in which 
almost everything becomes politicized. Accordingly, the pattern of family life, as a 
social institution, cannot but draw on these ideologies. In a recent study of Rob Roy, 
Homer Brown has pointed out that the two plots, the historical which involves the 
Stuarts and their Hanoverian cousins, and the private, which involves the individual 
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hero, are "mirror images of each other, and that image is refracted in all the paternal, 
avuncular, fraternal relationships that are multiplied" throughout the novel. 38 
This leads us to expect that Scott's projection of the historical into his fiction is in 
some way a projection of contemporary political debate between radicals and 
conservatives, who made the institution of family a crucial element in validating their 
political doctrines. In the wake of the French Revolution, English Jacobins, such as 
Thomas Paine, William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft adopted revolutionary 
ideology based on rationalizing all aspects of human life. Building on ideas of 
philosophers like Rousseau, they depicted society as enslaving the individual and 
confiscating his will. In the name of natural right in all spheres, these writers called 
for the emancipation of the individual, asserting his selthood outside social 
conventions and family traditions. Appalled by this rhetoric and its potential impact 
on familial and social relationships, anti-Jacobin novelists and writers, most 
remarkably Burke, reacted to "emphasize sociability and the individual's duty to 
social convention. ,,39 Burke, for instance, arguing from past experience, called for 
adhering to traditions with emphasis on hierarchy in family structure and paternal 
piety. 
Scott's focus on "national manners," like Burke's interest in traditions, is an 
attempt to invoke historical or past happenings to adduce a corrected version that fits 
the context of the present. My argument in this section shows that Scott's treatment 
of family affairs adopts a conservative-liberal strategy; in that Scott emphasizes filial 
changes within traditions embraced on emotional, imaginative, and rational grounds. 
Nevertheless, for a better understanding of how Scott employs history in his 
ideological fictional treatment of the issue of the family, a brief account of the Royal 
family disputes that preceded the Glorious Revolution might be helpful to our 
argument. 
Historically, the Stuarts ruled according to the Divine Right doctrine, which gave 
the King absolute authority in handling the country's affairs. Also, according to the 
law of inheritance, inherent in this doctrine, the King's elder son/daughter was 
naturally the legitimate heir to the throne. This pattern of political doctrine also 
extended to family construction, as far as hierarchy, inheritance and authority are 
concerned. Just before the Glorious Revolution (1688) the Catholic King James II, 
for religious reasons, violated the law of inheritance when he decided to disinherit his 
Protestant daughters, the older Mary and the younger Anne. The daughters 
disapproved of their father's arbitrary act, and with the help of William of Orange, 
Mary's husband, and the support of both Tories and Whigs, Mary led a coup against 
her father, and he abdicated. Finally, the Parliament, through the Bill of Rights dealt 
the notion of absolute authority a death-blow. 4O Necessarily, then, the fall of the 
"Divine right," by limiting the authority of the king in the political sphere, would 
entail corresponding changes in the social sphere and would, in particular, call into 
question the limits of future family relationships in terms of authority, piety, 
inheritance and liberty. Indeed, Rob Roy, in one of its aspects, attempts to adduce a 
solution for this question. 
The disagreement between William Osbaldistone and his son, Frank, in its 
simplest form appears to be a conflict of desires or as a breakdown in communication. 
The father wants his son to apprentice in commerce, on the assumption that his 
interest lies there, while the son, following his romantic inclinations, wants to be a 
poet. Yet in a more complex form, and in terms of real history and historical change, 
the tension between the father and the son could be viewed as analogous to the 
tension between king James II and his daughter Mary. In both cases, we assume a 
dictator father whose authority is absolute, and a rebellious son/daughter who fights 
for some sort of natural right to choose her religious creed or freedom at all cost. On 
the other hand, in the context of contemporary debate, Scott depicts the tension as 
embodying two trends neither of which seem to please him. The first trend presents a 
petrified conservative view that absolutely resists recognizing the facts of historical 
progress and hence denies any margin for private freedom, while the other presents a 
radically liberal view that calls for absolute freedom for the individual. King James II 
and Frank's father exemplify the first view, while Frank embodies the second. 
As early as the first chapters we come to understand that there is something wrong 
in the relationship between Frank and his father, which, basically, could be attributed 
to defining their relationship within a frame of materialism. Frank, defending his 
choice of future career, addresses his father impersonally: "I will never sell my liberty 
for gold." (19) The father, in his turn, comments: "that is to say, you wish to lean on 
my arm, and yet to walk your own way," (21) a proposition, which he strongly rejects. 
Symbolically, William Osbaldistone embodies the deformed creed practiced by 
absolute monarchs, which has become part of the past in the wake of a liberal 
environment. Thus, while he displays a liberal and progressive attitude in his 
business and social relationships, paradoxically, he insists not to apply this spirit to 
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his family. Scott seems to show that nothing is static, and that familial values like 
other social values, heroic and civic, are also liable to change and redefinition. 
The relationship between Frank and his father polarizes respectively into extreme 
liberality in the tradition of Paine and extreme conservatism in the tradition of Burke. 
As a result, Frank's claim for liberty transgresses any duty of respecting paternal will; 
the father, in his turn accepts the challenge and washes his hands of any responsibility 
towards his son. In this form, the paternal relationship deviates from the natural track, 
which keeps the family united. Scott seems to show that the son erred and the father 
compounded the error by alienating his son. Frank describes this situation as: 
There had been such unexpected ease in the manner in which my father slipt 
a knot, usually esteemed the strongest which binds society together, and 
suffered me to depart as a sort of outcast from his family, that it strangely 
lessened the confidence in my own personal accomplishments, which had 
hitherto sustained me. (23) 
The correction of the situation, then, needs more consciousness of the social and 
moral dangers of jumping over the duties and obligations that govern paternal 
relationship. Here, duties and obligations are founded not on paternal absolutism but 
rather on natural feelings and mutual respect in line with progress. 
Frank is left doubting whether his father ever had real affection for him: "I was not 
aware, that there are men who indulge their children at an early age, because to do so 
interests and amuses them, and who can yet be sufficiently severe when the same 
children cross their expectations at a more advanced period." (20) His father, 
however, seems to have erred in adopting "rational" criteria about rational partiality. 
Thomas Reid argues that there are two types of affection, one of which needs earned 
regard to exist: 
There are some affections which we may call rational, because they are 
grounded upon an opinion of merit in the object. The parental affection is 
not of this kind. For, though a man's affection to his child may be increased 
by merit, and diminished by demerit, I think no man will say, that it took its 
rise from an opinion of merit. It is not opinion that creates the atTection, but 
affection often creates opinion. It is apt to pervert the judgement, and create 
an opinion of merit where there is none. 41 
William Osbaldistone seems to have been giving his son the second type of atTection. 
Therefore, when he shifted his affections adopting the first t)pe, the relationship 
between the two became strained. William is actually follo'Wing the rationalist code 
of "Jacobins" like Godwin who denied the claims of mutual affection and insisted on 
real merit as the only standard of judgment. Extreme Jacobite and Jacobin doctrines 
are implicated in this breakdown, as they are in William's original rebellion against 
his father, when William's rationalism had been part of revolutionary self-definition. 
It is the son Frank's surviving emotional and "family" feeling that eventually redeems 
the rebel son William. Frank feels a loss of identity, only realized when he became 
aware of the damage he could have caused to his father as a result of his disobedience, 
and that his worth is only asserted by correcting his error. The reunion of Frank with 
his father takes place when the former realizes that obedience to the father is a social 
and moral duty motivated by natural feelings rather than a sense of servitude, and the 
latter understands that taking care of the son and respecting his aspirations is a 
responsibility defmed by the same motivation. To achieve this end Scott first designs 
a psychological shock that triggers Frank's feelings toward his father, then he 
introduces him to a variety of paternal paradigms that contribute to his education. 
Here enters another thin thread in the web of the narrative. Once agai~ Scott resorts 
to comparison and contrast to highlight the importance of keeping the paternal 
relationship warm as a necessary prerequisite for maintaining a healthy community, 
both socially and morally. Such qualification of this relationship, the narrative 
suggests, becomes more liberal, more a matter of mutual respect, but still invested 
with a special emotional charge. 
In contrast to Queen Mary and Frank, the heroine, Die Vernon, as her name 
suggests, is a self-sacrificing daughter who devotes all her life to the protection of her 
father. While her commitment to the Jacobite cause makes of her a version of Flora 
McIvor, her interest in the domestic reminds us of Rose Bradwardine. Furthermore, 
we are told by the end of chapter 37 that she is willing to abandon the world for a 
convent in order to honour a commitment her father has made. In short, she is 
acquiescing to an old ideology that equates politics with family in terms of absolute 
authority. However, through Vernon, given her paternal piety that erupts with 
feelings of devotion that bears social-moral and humane implications, Scott seems to 
show that not all aspects of traditions are deficient. These noble feelings, in his view, 
are the rudimentary cement that binds the family together in a stage where 
materialistic progress tends to render people callous. In this sense, it could be agued 
that Vernon is the antithesis of the heroine of sensibility, Julie, in Rousseau's 
masterpiece, La Nouvelle Heloise (1761). But in another way, Vernon's narrative 
seems to offer a critique of some aspects of old worn-out traditions connected with 
family affairs in tenns of absolutism, which render Vernon's condition almost tragic 
since the reins of her private life are not in her hands. Scott, metaphorically, likens her 
social capacities to "singing-birds ... which would have adorned society had they been 
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left at large. "(43) Here irrational social nonns, imposed upon her, show the other 
dark side of the picture associated with paternal obedience. We are told that "her 
father's commands, and a certain family contract, destined her to marry one of Sir 
Hildebrand's sons. A dispensation has been obtained from Rome for Diana Vernon 
to marry Blank Osbaldistone ... and it only remains to pitch upon the happy man, 
whose name shall fill the gap in the manuscript. " (107) In this context, her loyalty to 
her father is not unquestionable and her complaints become quite understandable 
when she says: "I should be rather like a wild hawk, who, barred the free exercise of 
his soar through heaven, will dash himself to pieces against the bars of his cage. " (43) 
In her case, we might have excused her protest, had she refused to bow to tyrannical 
social convention but for sure we might not have admired her so much had she failed 
to perform her duty towards her father, as Queen Mary did. In fact, her merit is 
correspondent to the dear tribute she is willing to pay in this direction. Vernon is an 
ideal, charming, virtuous, pure, committed, confident of herself, rational, as well as 
emotional; she has a "mingled character of shrewdness, audacity, and frankness. " (52) 
Such qualities qualify her to win Frank's confidence for "guidance and protection." 
(58) After all, she plays a crucial role in helping and directing Frank in the process 
of correcting his error of disobeying his father's will. Of course, her efforts would not 
have been fruitful had Frank remained a victim of his romantic sensibility about the 
meaning of liberty and paternal piety. 
Therefore Frank's waking up to his romantic delusions under the pressure of the 
disaster that could affect his father's health and honour, and his feeling of a sort of 
parricide is a prerequisite for taking the advice of others: "Good Heaven! How shall I 
redeem the consequences of my error!" (158) Frank is now not only conscious of 
the guilt of his rebellion against his father which has opened the path for Rashleigh 
and his intrigues but, more significantly, he becomes aware of the nature of the 
relationship that binds him with his father. For Scott, as for Burke and the 
"philosophical" historians, the nature of this binding force is innate afTections that 
cmmot be rationalized or ignored. Even when they appear to be absent, they are, in 
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fact, latent and soon surface when agitated as a sign of inescapable commitment. 
Vernon, significantly, reminds him of his fatal mistake: "Remember, had :"OU been on 
the post designed for you, this disaster could not have happened," and she urges him 
to act quickly so that the whole affair "may be possibly retrieved." (158) Frank 
learns the fIrst lesson of paternal piety at the hands of Vernon so that he is now 
prepared to quit the "foolish pride and indolence" (158) and follow his instinctive 
natural feeling in the process of uniting with his father. Yet he is still in need of 
further education to solidify this new attitude toward his father. 
Frank's father "as a man of business, looked upon the labour of poets with 
contempt; and as a religious man, and of the dissenting persuasion, he considered all 
such pursuits as equally trivial and profane." (15) In Glasgow, Scott provides Frank 
with another character, much similar to his father, to reinforce his consciousness of 
the value of taking his father's advice. Bailie Jarvie instructs Frank in this direction 
in various ways. He, in general, shows respect to his deceased father by constantly 
referring to him "the deacon my father" as a source of the values he lives by. For 
instance, when Frank asks Jarvie for help and advice that could assist his father in his 
critical situation the latter comments: "I am no the man that will refuse it to the son of 
an auld correspondent, and my father the deacon was nane sic afore me." (233) He 
also still remembers one of his father's recommendations: "never put out your arm 
farther than ye can draw it easily back again." (201) This advice is, in fact, a 
comment on the present situation of both, Frank and his father. Jarvie has sold this 
wisdom to William Osbaldistone, but "he dinna seem to take it a'thegither sae kind as 
I wished ... " (201) In contrast, William Osbaldistone remembers his father with a 
sort of reproach for disinheriting him of his legal right in the estate of the family. 
Secondly, as a businessman, he defends commerce as an honest profession, and not 
without having a fling at the unavailing way of following literature. Finally, he gives 
Frank guidance when the latter asked him how he could help his father. (230-33) 
Scott's manipulation of the "filial issue" shows that in all societies and in all stages 
of progress, the paternal relationship proves to be the origin of all loyalties that could 
extend to encompass human relationships in a wider sense. Rob, for instance, though 
he belongs to a world different from that of Frank's, serves as another example in 
adding a twist to what Jarvie and Vernon have accomplished. Learning the cause of 
the fight between Frank and Rashleigh, Rob is impressed with Frank's motive. Within 
Frank's hearing, he comments: "The ne'er a bit will I yield my consent to his being ill-
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guided, for standing up for the father that got him." (226) Perhaps this adds another 
reason for Rob to proceed in offering his help to Frank. It is worth noting that Scott 
extends the familial issue beyond the sphere of paternal relationship, within the law of 
concentric circles, so that it encompasses other relationships: husband and wife, 
brothers, cousins, and even distant kinship. For instance, Rob chastises both 
Rashleigh and Frank for dueling because for him it is a real crime to shed a relative's 
blood: "What! The sons of those fathers who sucked the same breast shedding each 
other's bluid as it were strangers! By the hand of my father, I \\111 cleave to the 
brisket the fITst man that mints another stroke!" (224) On another occasion, Rob, 
though one word from his cousin the Bailie Jarvie is enough to put him in prison, 
feels assured that the Bailie will not take any legal measure against him "for the sake 
of the auld wife ayont the fITe at Stuckavrallachan, that made some mixture of our 
bluids." Jarvie, in his turn, recognizes that "bluid's thicker than water." (205) 
Rob is presented through his clan culture as the embodiment of all types of familial 
ties. Rob's feeling toward his wife is the same feeling toward himself. Also he shows 
no less concern about his sons' future than about his wife. It is true that he refuses to 
apprentice them in any mechanical profession, for instance, "weavers" (331), yet he 
can not conceal his distress for his sons' situation: "-rm vexed for the bairns-fm 
vexed when I think 0' Hamish and Robert living their father's life." (336) He admits 
his responsibility for retarding his sons from improvement, although it is out of his 
hands due to his critical circumstances. 
Vernon's interest in helping Frank's father, though Hanoverian, and against her 
interest as a Jacobite, as well as Rob's effort in the same direction is an indication that 
family bonds could be extended to a wider sphere as a sort of social bond. Scott 
seems to present the idea of the family, though relatively a private affair, as more 
profound than the idea of the rebellion, which is a public one. We discern that the 
major part of the action concerns Jacobite figures interesting themselves in serving 
Frank's mission for his father, something foreign if not contrary to their interests in 
the rebellion. This also serves as another way of presenting the Jacobite uprising as 
no serious movement on the public level. Historically, we know that the rebellion 
"was the result of a private decision taken by one man because of his personal 
circumstances. The man was John Erskine Earl of Mar, and the circumstances were 
simply the complete collapse of his political career. ,,42 Scott in his Appendix A tells 
us that Rob himself was hesitant and even refused Mar's orders to participate in the 
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attack on the Government's positions. Rob's reply was: "No, no! if they cannot do it 
without me, they cannot do it with me." (413) Another suggestion still is that Scott 
wants to show that loyalty to family lies at the heart of Jacobitism as a patriarchal 
ideology regardless of any political considerations. 
At any rate, the renewal of the familial bond is marked when Frank performed his 
"duty to honour and obey" his father by retrieving the lost papers that threaten his 
career. Scott's depiction of the scene in which they were united is suggestive: 
Owen was not alone,-there was another in the apartment, - it 
was my father. 
The fIrst impulse was to preserve the dignity of his usual equanimity, -
'Francis, I am glad to see you.'- The next was to embrace me tenderly, -
'My dear--dear son.'-these scenes which address themselves to the eye and 
to the heart, rather than to the ear.-My old eye-lids still moisten at the 
recollection of our meeting~ but your kind and affectionate feelings can well 
imagine what I should fmd it impossible to describe. (350) 
The instinctive affection that enkindles in the father's breast redefines the relationship 
that binds him with his son. The callous, serious and absolute authority is absent 
here. We see a new attitude in which the father listens to his son and respects his 
choice. At the outset of the narrative, when Frank asked his father to allow him join 
the army, his father protested indignantly: "Choose the d-I ... I profess you make me 
as great a fool as you are yourself." (17) Consider how this stance on behalf of the 
father has undergone toward the end of the novel: 
I acquainted my father with my wish to offer my personal service to the 
government in any volunteer corps ... He readily acquiesced in my proposal; 
for, though he disliked war as a profession, yet upon principle, no man 
would have exposed his life more willingly in defence of civil and religious 
liberty. (355-356) 
However, William's acquiescence in Frank joining the militia reveals William's 
utilitarian and, perhaps, selfIsh nature when it is recalled that this concurs with his 
strategic vision in defending the existing government. William himself "agreed to 
support the credit of the government" (365) through his fInancial services. As a 
merchant, his power is part and parcel of the power of the existing regime~ and 
therefore it is hard to believe that William's attitude toward the military is ideological, 
that is, to defend "civil and religious liberty" in the patriotic sense but rather a pretext 
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that masks his real attitude which aims at protecting his own private interests. In the 
feudal era, traditional aristocracy, that is the owners of land, used to defend their 
interests by being always loyal to the then political system in the person of the king. 
The same story recurs in a different guise but with different social-moral import. 
Now wealth is no more defined mainly in terms of real property, land, but also in 
terms of fluid and imaginary property, cash money and stocks. Although, 
theoretically, in either case the power of the sovereign authority, more or less, still 
rests on property owners regardless of the type of property yet in the commercial 
stage the situation is more complicated and, perhaps, more drastic in terms of social 
and moral values. Rob Roy and the Waverley novels in general deal with this issue 
always from a moral and social perspective, as I show below. 
Yet the real change in paternal relationship in the narrati ve focuses on the limits of 
parents' authority on their sons and daughters, as a historical necessity that parallels 
the change of the notion of honour. Filial relationship, based on patriarchal tradition, 
has become problematic in the new world and refining it of its connotation of absolute 
authority requires reinterpreting it. The solution, the narrative suggests, lies not in the 
Jacobin ideology that elevates the individual's freedom above the social, which could 
lead to possible rebellion or atomization on the domestic level. Scott is close to the 
strong Romantic current that runs through the later Coleridge, Wordsworth and 
Southey who regard society and continuity in social tradition as a psychological need 
that evolves from the self and its feelings. Frank's return to family loyalty through 
"feeling" and his reinstitution of traditional relationships go in this direction and 
perhaps mask the moves away from paternal absolutism represented by Vernon and 
by Rob Roy himself. While Frank's father, "was sensible that, in joining him with 
heart and hand in his commercial labours, [Frank] had sacrificed [his] own 
inclinations," (384) Sir Frederick, Diana's father, whose wish was that she take the 
veil, "was understood to refer the matter entirely to her own inclinations." (384) Rob, 
aware of social progress and wishing to join it with his sons is forced back into his 
role by injustice and kept virtually a prisoner within it through loyalty to his wife and 
clan. All come to understand that progress is inevitable and therefore adhering to old 
attitudes is no less alienating than quitting them radically. The final settlement, in this 
direction, becomes a redefinition of the paternal relationship that recognizes both 
tradition and progress. Vernon and Frank are allowed to choose but \\ith parental 
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blessing, thus patriarchal absolutism is attenuated in a way that extricates the family 
from the danger of disintegration. 
Religion in Old Mortality is depicted as a main cause in social, political, national 
and even family disruption and bloodshed. By contrast, in Rob Roy and The Heart of 
Midlothian, progress renders religion, through toleration, an integrative and social-
moral value. The protestant William Osbaldistone has no objection that Frank is 
wedded to the Catholic Diana~ for him "so dutiful a daughter cannot prove but a good 
wife." (384) Once again, Scott's rationality endorses the "defence of civil and 
religious liberty" as means for maintaining social and political stability brought about 
by the Glorious Revolution, as he, Burke and the "philosophical" historians would 
argue. 
On the other hand, whether the Glorious Revolution was a public reaction to 
depose a "recalcitrant monarch who betrayed the terms of his trusteeship, ,,43 or an 
attempt by the British aristocracy to preserve their interests, still, in either case the 
event represents change in continuity. The issue of succession and inheritance, 
violated by King James II, is reafflrmed after purging it from absolutism by the effect 
of secular law. Similarly, in Rob Ray, within the context of familial relationship, the 
legitimacy of the law of inheritance or primogeniture is asserted but with a 
progreSSIve VISIon. Like the notion of honour it has to cope with the spirit of change 
in a commercial world. 
In fact, Scott raises this problem as early as the second chapter. Consider the 
paragraph in which William Osbaldistone recites to his son, Frank: 
I will cut all this matter very short-I was at your age when my father 
turned me out of doors, and settled my legal inheritance on my younger 
brother, with ten guineas in my purse, I have never crossed the threshold 
again, and I never will. I know not, and I care not, if my fox-hunting brother 
is alive, or has broken his neck~ but he has children, Frank, and one of them 
shall be my son if you cross me farther in this matter." (17) 
Using Paine's words, William is "thrown to cannibal for prey," and his ties with his 
brother, Sir Hildebrand, cut. Now, he is repeating his father's mistake when he 
threatens to disinherit his son in favour of his treacherous nephew, Rashleigh. Later 
in the narrative, that action recurs when Sir Hildebrand disinherits his remaining 
Ii ving son, Rashleigh, as a traitor to the Jacobite cause, in favour of Frank, \\'ho is 
actually the legitimate heir by his father's primogeniture. Rashleigh himself, for 
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political reasons, turned against his Wlcle and cousin and tried to destroy both. 
Apparently, William's speech above might give the impression that Scott, like Paine 
and Godwin, scoffs at the law of inheritance as potentially unjust and could cause 
disturbances in the family ties and by extension in the state. 44 But this impression 
soon melts away when we realize that Scott, in fact, is only establishing a case to 
defend the inheritance law within tradition legitimized by la\\' rather than tradition 
based on arbitrariness. In short, the problem is not with the legitimacy of the law of 
primogeniture itself (though common sense says it is unjust) but in the way of its 
illegitimate application. 1bis suggests that disturbances in the Osbaldistone family, as 
in the Royal family, have emerged as a result of the absence of legitimacy in 
operating the law and not in the law per se, as Paine and others would like to argue. 
And this absence of legitimacy is once again associated with the notion of absolutism 
and extremism that govern the paternal relationship in the narrative. Scott gives no 
reason as to why William's father has disinherited him. It could be a deliberate 
contri vance by Scott to assert the arbitrariness of the act, for in the absence of any 
convincing reason, the act itself becomes capricious. The narratives of both William 
and his brother present the former as more qualified than the latter to preserve the 
estate of the family from wreckage as Frank tells us: "My poor Wlcle, Sir Hildebrand, 
whose estate was reduced to almost nothing by his own carelessness and the expense 
and debauchery of his sons and household." (356) When, toward the end of the novel, 
Scott engineers the death of all Sir Hildebrand's heir sons, to restore Frank's father's 
right in the court, he, in fact, carries out another Glorious Revolution to protect 
traditions by adapting it to civil law and not through Burke's notion of prescription as 
an absolute right; otherwise absolutism would have triumphed. Frank makes this 
point clear when he tells us: "I was directed to apply to Squire Inglewood for the copy 
of my Wlcle's will deposited with him, and take all necessary measures to secure that 
possession, which sages say make nine points of the law." (360) Now the 
absoluteness of primogeniture is shifted to the absoluteness of civil law that covers 
and protects the former. 
However, by bringing the narrative to this end, Scott does not aim only to support 
the idea ofprimogeniture~ it seems that he "preaches a merging of the old and the new 
interests," that is, the "fluid wealth of the 'man of credit'" and the "wealth of the 'man 
of honour'" so that Scott's "doctrine" becomes "one of consolidation rather than 
expansion, the turning of new money into old, of tluid into fixed wea1th .... t5 Yet the 
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question that poses itself here is in what way could this ending be relevant to his 
ideological address other than updating the law of inheritance Wlder the banner of 
civil law? The answer to this question could be approached on two levels. The fIrst 
has to do with the negative aspects of progress/commerce on manners and morals and 
the second, a derivation from the fIrst, has to do with the loss of sense of commtmity 
based on traditional social relationships and social values. 
Like all the philosophical historians, Scott believes in the historical stages of 
progress. He also believes in the benefIt of trade and commerce in contributing to the 
"general commonwealth" and refIning manners. Yet, like his mentors, he also 
believes in the potential evils engendered by the transfer from land economy 
(agrarian) to the market economy (commercial and industrial) on social and political 
values. In fact, Rob Roy through symbolic characters reflects both the hopes and fears 
of this transfer. When William Osbaldistone celebrates commerce: 
It connects nation with nation, relieves the wants, and contributes to the 
wealth of all; and is to the general commonwealth of the civilized world 
what the daily intercourse of the ordinary life is to the private society, or 
rather, what air and food are to our bodies. (13) 
he, in some way, echoes the "philosophical" historians' view of its advantage. This 
aspect of commerce connected with exchangeable commodities in the form of trade is 
desirable and is as old as man himself when in earlier stages it took the form of barter. 
Many Scottish theorists welcomed the commercial age for its sociability, the 'douce 
commerce' as opposed to the 'hard' commerce of Osbaldistone, and it is the spirit that 
directs commerce and that determines its effects. 46 Therefore, what Scott seems to 
warn against is the other aspect of commerce which, as Pocock points out, was the 
target of "the polemic of Anne's reign and was directed against monied interest: 
against a speculative society typifIed less by merchants ... than by the stockjobbers, 
political adventures, and investors in the public fWlds. ,,47 
Rob's narrative highlights both sides of commerce, "douce" and "hard." As 
Bailie Jarvie tells Frank: "Robin was anes a weel-doing, pains-taking drover, as you 
wad see among ten thousand ... But the times cam hard, and Rob was venturesome." 
(236) As a result, he and his family were destroyed. Jarvie does not explain the type 
of venture Rob has been engaged in, but Scott in his Appendix A makes it clear that 
speculation was behind Rob's destruction: 
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"Sudden fluctuations~ and Rob Roy was-by a sudden depression of 
markets, and, as a friendly tradition adds, by the bad faith of a partner 
named Macdonald, whom he had imprudently received into his confidence, 
~d intrusted with a considerable sum of money-rendered totally 
Insolvent." (400) 
Scott himself has had the same fate as Rob. For him, the world of speculation is 
dangerous due to "sudden fluctuations," usually created deliberately by speculators 
for making profits at the expense of simple victims like Rob. In this light, 
"uncontrolled commercial and speCUlative instincts could bring disastrous crash to 
hapless people"48 hence, speculators are potentially morally corrupt and are not 
concerned with the public interest, but rather with their own interest, exhibited in a 
strong passion for acquisitiveness. 
On the issue of commerce, the narrative introduces a new and significant motif 
which shows that it is still more dangerous when speculation takes the form of 
"political adventures," wherein, politics and business become a concerted effort that 
serves not only selfish purposes for promotion, but also serves as a decisive weapon 
in destroying and supporting governments, ultimately plaguing the nation with social 
and political instability. Burke points to the relationship between money and political 
adventures: "the monied interest is in its nature more ready for any adventure~ and its 
possessors more disposed to new enterprises of any kind. Being of a recent 
acquisition, it falls in more naturally with any novelties. It is, therefore, "t1uid 
wealth" which will be resorted to by all who wish for change. ,,49 Rashleigh and 
William Osbaldistone provide a case in point in this respect. The first works on 
destroying the "firm's credit" of his uncle in a plan to force the lairds in the Highlands 
to join the Jacobite uprising as Jarvie explains to Frank: "the stopping of your father's 
house will hasten the outbreak that's been sae lang biding us." (240) The second 
launches a financial counter attack when he and Frank hurry off to London, where 
they "immediately associated with those bankers and eminent merchants who agreed 
to support the credit of the government, and to meet that run upon the funds, on which 
the conspirators had greatly founded their hopes of furthering their undertaking, by 
rendering the government, as it were, bankrupt." (356) It is the empire of money that 
defends the State, which is, in fact, the State of the few who own the money and not 
the State of nation in the social, moral and patriotic sense. In short, money and 
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business through commercial institutions in close "communication" with the 
administrati ve structure of the state has replaced heroic acts and sacrifice as sinews of 
power. 50 
Rashleigh with his "two faces under one hood" (101) and excessive selfishness, 
perhaps, embodies all the defects of the commercial stage predicted by the 
"philosophical" historians on all levels. At fIrst he worked on destroying his uncle in 
favour of the Jacobites and later "he added treachery and apostasy to his catalogue of 
crimes" (370) by betraying the rebels to the government. Scott, in the person of 
Rashleigh, as Beiderwell points out, seems to dramatize "the worst aspects of a 
sophisticated civil society-the self-centered, dangerous individualism, the lack of 
community, the sense of alienation. ,,51 Scott would suggest that characters like 
Rasbleigh are to be found in every stage of progress, but in the commercial stage, due 
to the nature of mobility in wealth and rank, the multiplication of the like of 
Rasbleigh becomes a sort of fashion to be emulated even by ordinary people, though 
on a limited level, such as Andrew Fairservice and Morris. 
Scott presents Andrew Fairservice as a pragmatic comic character, "being almost 
exclusively concerned with how much money he can extract from the guileless 
Englishman into whose service he has wheedled himself. ,,52 After reaching a good 
bargain to accompany Frank to Glasgow, Andrew makes it clear that his 
"employment" has nothing to do with loyalty or courage. His motto is that of his 
mother: "Be it better, be it worse, Be ruled by him that has the purse." (250) 
Ironically, such policy extends even to Jarvie, although under a different pretext-the 
justification of the Union and the loss of Scotland's independence for the sake of 
economic benefIt. Here lies the danger to society and State. Perhaps, through 
Rasbleigh's opportunism and ability to combine the power of commerce with politics, 
Scott wants to convey Ferguson's message: 
When mere riches, or court-favour, are supposed to constitute rank~ the 
mind is misled from the consideration of qualities on which it ought to rely. 
Magnanimity, courage, and the love of mankind, are sacrificed to avarice 
and vanity.... The individual considers the community so far only as it can 
be rendered subservient to his personal advancement or profit: he states 
himself in competition with his fellow creatures; and, urged by the passions 
of emulation, of fear and jealousy, of envy and malice, he follows the 
maxims of an animal destined to preserve his separate existence, and to 
indulge his caprice appetite, at the expense of his species. 53 
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On the other hand, while Scott denounces "stockjobbers" and "political 
adventures", he seems to advocate the type of commerce in the fonn of investment 
based on profit but, in the mean time, dedicated for improvement and public benefit. 
Here, Scott, like Adam Smith, takes into account the human psyche, which makes the 
overriding motive of man the "desire of bettering om- condition." As Smith argues, 
"An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose 
and wish to better their conditions. It is the means the most vulgar and the most 
obvious. ,,54 Bailie Jarvie wants to "augment his fortune," but in a way that seems to 
enhance public benefit, by "draining the lake and 'giving to plough and harrow many 
hundred, ay, many a thousand acres, from whilk no man could get earthly gude 
e'enow, unless it were a gedd, or a dish of perch now and then." (348) Jarvie's 
interest is no less in the industrial improvement than in the agricultural. When he talks 
about preserving "a portion of the lake just deep enough and broad enough for 
purposes of water-carriage, so that coal-barges and gabbards should pass as easily 
between Dumbarton and Glenfalloch as between Glasgow and Greenock," (348) he 
also shows an insight of the importance of the transport sector for real improvements. 
It seems that Scott, anachronistically, points to "the canal age in Greater 
Britain ... dated between 1732-40,,,55 when the country's economy was booming. 
However, the overall tone of the narrative still reflects Scott's misgivings of the 
impact of this progress/commerce specifically in the manufacturing sector rather than 
commercial society as a whole. If Scott approves Jarvie's liberal and optimistic 
attitude towards the advantages that could be reaped from progress by improving 
agriculture, in the meantime, he shows a sort of reluctance towards Jarvie's ambitious 
industrial project. Scott, in Rob Roy, besides the products of the slave islands, 
introduces another cautionary note expressed in his contempt of commercial 
professions and "mechanical persons." Nevertheless, Scott's fears of industrial 
progress, which surface in Rob's criticism of commercial professions, are mainly 
social and moral in nature, and perhaps anticipate Dickens. 
In one way the division of labour has a tendency to alienate members of the same 
family as well as the same community, while man's happiness depended largely on 
leading a communal life, as argued by Ferguson. In another way, man's interest in 
pursuing lucre makes social relationships more impersonal and less intimate. Of the 
commercial state, Ferguson writes: 
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It is here indeed, if ever, that man is sometimes found a detached and a 
solitary being: he has found an object which sets him in competition ",ith his 
fellow creatures, and he deals with them as he does with his cattle and his 
soil, for the sake of the profits they bring. The mighty engine which we 
suppose to have formed society, only tends to set its members at variance, or 
to continue their intercourse after the bands of affection are broken. 56 
Scott was to argue along similar lines in a letter of 1820 criticizing the shift of 
factories from small-scale country operations, where the manufacturer knew his 
workmen and felt concern for their needs and morals, to larger urban sites where the 
alienation of the individual is complete: "a master calls together 1 00 workmen this 
week and pays them off the next with far less interest in their future fate than in that 
of as many worn-out shuttles. ,,57 
Therefore, appalled by the social and moral effects brought by the nature of 
progress, Scott sought to create a microcosm at Abottsford with his concern for the 
well-being of his tenants and dependants. Recalling that his microcosm is established 
by the money he amassed (fluid wealth) from his business and speculation explains 
the significance of merging new wealth obtained from commerce and old wealth 
inherited from land. The implication of Scott's shift from investment in business to 
land is to sustain the web of relationships between the land-owner and his tenants and 
workers, in an attempt to contain the social effect, which had been foreseen by 
Ferguson and other writers of the Enlightenment. With this point, Scott's ideological 
address in Rob Roy becomes complete and Frank's return to his legal estate becomes 
justified. Scott seems, apparently, to embody Burke's thesis concerning manners, 
commerce, land and aristocracy. Burke, as Pocock points out, believed that order, on 
the one hand, and moral and social responsibility, on the other, can be attained by a 
"union of land and commerce," provided that "the management of. .. commerce must 
be in the aristocratic hands. ,,58 But when we recall that Scott himself is not an 
aristocrat and belongs to the emerging middle class, we immediately realize the 
difference between both. 
With this ending it becomes clear that Scott is neither nostalgic nor apologist for 
the present in absolute terms, but rather an advocate of a paternal order in 
commercialism, much like the feudal structure, but based on voluntary loyalty 
between employer and worker, as Poston argues: 
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Conunerce, for him, was potentially creative force, providing employment 
(which Scott repeatedly regarded as the most important of necessities for 
assuaging working-class discontent in an industrial era); and at its best 
conunerce recreates something like the old bond of loyalty between master 
and servant. To some extent, this was doubly necessary in an era in which 
the inheritors of wealth themselves seemed less sensitive to their traditional 
obligation. 59 
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Chapter Five 
The Heart of Midlothian (1818) 
In the last paragraph of Midlothian, Scott illustrates the moral lesson implied in the 
novel: 
Reader-This tale will not be told in vain, if it shall be fOWld to illustrate 
the great truth, that guilt, though it may attain temporal splendour, can never 
confer real happiness; that the evil consequences of our crimes long survi ve 
their commission, and, like the ghosts of the murderer, for ever haunt the 
steps of the malefactor; and that the paths of virtue, though seldom those of 
worldly greatness, are always those of pleasantness and peace. 1 
The reader does not need much effort to realize that this conclusion in general 
concerns the sisters' history, Jeanie and Effie. Jeanie and her family enjoyed a 
pleasant and peaceful life "in a utopian microcosm of rural Scotland.,,2 Effie, who 
rose to a high social rank, in the end "betrayed the inward wOWld by retiring to the 
Continent" and "Ii ved and died in severe seclusion." (507) Further, both her husband 
and son suffered a tragic end. So why did Scott bother to close his narrative with a 
notice we assume to be taken for granted? Maybe it is an anticipated defense of the 
thematic and structural unity of the book, particularly the fourth volume, which many 
critics treat as mere appendage at worst designed to solve Scott's financial problems 
and at best a peg for Scott to hang his cultural and historical material on. 3 
Cockshut remarks that Midlothian is "the work of an author who has many 
different aims" and "so often tries to achieve them all at once. ,>4 In the light of this 
objection, Scott's note could be seen as a reminder that the ultimate moral lesson of 
the narrative is virtue versus malice, reward versus punishment, and that the 
providential court which he establishes in the fourth volume, which determines the 
fate of his key characters is an extension and completion to his earlier historical task 
that determines the fate of Porteous. The last sections of the narrative are quite 
relevant to the main theme, rather a necessity to rOWld off the narrative than a 
"frivolous and melodramatic contrivance,"s as some critics argue. On the other hand, 
not dismissing this assumption and approaching the novel from various perspectives, 
more recent readings, it seems, have succeeded in presenting Midlothian as a unified 
work both thematically and structurally.6 
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I shall deal with the novel as a whole in an attempt to investigate a framework that 
might accommodate the key issues raised in the novel in a coherent ideology. These 
issues arise from the Porteous riot and its multi-faceted implications politically and 
legally both in terms of authority in its absolute and fragmented forms, and the 
historically tense relationship between England and Scotland within the context of 
colonization~ Robertson's/Staunton's educational background, which extends to 
overseas colonies and calls into question the notions of luxury and trade in slavery 
and their negative impact on morality; Duncan Knockdunder's irregularities, which 
symbolically set an example of the limitation of justice in a totalitarian community. 
Finally, and most importantly, Scott's position on religion as embodied by the 
heroine, Jeanie Deans and her husband, Reuben Butler and its implications. All these 
issues, I would suggest, could integrate when we situate them within the framework 
of Scott's vision of progress and his concern in maintaining civic virtues. These 
virtues, I show, derive their legitimacy from religious education and are defmed in 
terms of religious piety. The narrator's introduction serves as a guide in this 
direction. 
Pattieson's introductory frame-story in Midlothian opens with a discussion of the 
significant recent changes "in the rapid conveyance of intelligence and 
communication betwixt one part of Scotland and another. "( 13) The narrator suggests 
that the increase in the speed and extent of the transportation of news, goods and 
people pose a vague threat in both England and Scotland. He attempts to visualize 
this dramatic change and its potential danger by comparing ancient modes of 
transportation with modern ones. Ancient coaches are "slow, and sure modes of 
conveyance," while modern coaches are speedy: "mail-coach races against mail-
coach, and high-flyer against high-flyer."(l3) In case of an accident, "the ancient 
vehicle used to settle quietly down, like a ship scuttled and left to sink by the gradual 
influx of the waters, while the modern is smashed to pieces with the velocity of the 
same vessel hurled against breakers, or rather with the fury of a bomb bursting at the 
conclusion of its career through the air."(l4) 
Metaphorically, the contrast between ancient and modern modes of transportation 
serves to describe a condition of a society, in its entirety, progressing in two different 
ways~ one that progresses gradually and remains organically integrated, even in the 
case of a disaster and another that progresses rapidly and is fragmented, or "smashed 
to pieces." The narrator develops this metaphor soon after the coach "Somerset had 
made a summer set in good earnest. "( 15) He immediately shifts our attention to 
describing the condition of the minor society in the coach, which has disintegrated, 
and the focus is on three passengers, two young lawyers, Hardie and Halkit, and an 
older, nearly destitute man, Mr. Dunover. 1bis society, the narrator hints, could have 
undergone further disintegration had not the young lawyers shown all generosi ty to 
the stranded poor Dunover: "you must not remain on the pave here; you must go and 
have some dinner with us." (17) Also we realize that Hardie has, on a former 
occasion, released the unfortunate Dunover, whom we discover to be Hardie's (only) 
client, from prison. Treating Dunover benevolently, the two lawyers are rewarded 
through success and fortune after being "engaged in the great political cause of 
Bubbleburgh and Bitem." (26) Even after that, they benevolently intervene to "do-
over" Mr. Dunover, for whom they "obtain a small office for the decent maintenance 
of his family." (26) The disasters and evils of the world that could accompany rapid 
progress-summersetted coaches and fated poverty--are shown to be remediable 
through the benevolent intervention of those fellow-creatures responsible for 
exercising authority. In the voice of his persona, Cleishbotham, Scott fmds the silver 
lining in Dunover's clouded career: 
After a train of constant and uninterrupted misfortune, [Dunover] could 
trace a dawn of prosperity to his having the good fortune to be flung from 
the top of a mail-coach into the river Gander, in company with an advocate 
and a writer to the signet. (26) 
The opening episode emphasizes two key points. It reveals that Progress/speed is 
inevitable, as a natural law of human history, and that social disintegration is possible, 
but through benevolence the three passengers are reunited and the social bonds among 
them remain strong and all are promised prosperity. The second point shows that 
providence, through human agents, works towards recognizing civic virtues such as 
generosity and benevolence, as constructive elements in human affairs both socially 
and morally. Conversely, this recognition manifests itself in the punishment inflicted 
upon those who abstain from such virtues, as the narrative of Porteous in particular 
shows. The Scottish Enlightenment also recognizes the importance of ci vic virtue as 
a social bond and moral value. Hume and Smith assert that even in a market economy 
benevolence or pity and compassion toward the unfortunate would remain natural and 
unprompted motives of action. As Istvan Hont points out, "it was to this discretionary 
sentiment that they looked for the relief of the necessities of the poor in any 
emergency. ,,7 In his account of economic progress and its effect on social 
relationships and morality, Smith talks of an external force, the "invisible hand," of 
course without identifying it with God or religion, which brings balance to economic 
and social life. Similarly, Hume, as John Dunn points out, "had little hesitation in 
subtracting God in thought." For both, "the bonds of human society, human moral 
sentiments, neither depended nor needed to depend for either their prevalence or their 
rationally binding force upon an authority external to human society or to the human 
race as a whole. ,,8 But through the novel's animation of the secular-tinged "invisible 
hand," by identifying it with the notion of "providence" as an absolute conscious 
disposing power Scott apparently adds a religious dimension to civic virtue, or, in 
other the words, suggests a redefinition of virtue in terms of religious morality. 
Within this context, the "paths of virtue" indicated in his note above, are not taken on 
their own terms as concerned with crime and punishment, and benevolence and 
reward can in spirit be expanded to serve as code for honest and humane conduct, 
based on moral autonomy and valid in whatever capacity: familial, political, legal, 
national, economical and so forth. 
Seen in this light, the heroine Jeanie Deans could be viewed as an embodiment of 
civic virtue in its broader sense. When Scott frames Jeanie's narrative within her 
religious education that prevents her from telling a lie, he suggests that commitment 
to telling the truth is, by implication, an absolute commitment to all sorts of civic 
virtues. If not, what qualification can we give to the various qualities that shape her 
character such as loyalty, courage, fidelity, chastity, paternal piety, self-
disinterestedness, independence, benevolence, mercy, integrity and so forth? These 
virtues demand self-consistency, but significantly, in consistence with God's 
commandments. Self-consistency, as imposed by God, in other words, becomes a 
translation of humanized chivalric honour in its broader sense and can operate as the 
foundation of morality in a civil society. Therefore, Scott, within the framework of 
religion, seems to employ Jeanie's virtues in a project that compounds pedagogy and 
ideology. Pedagogically, the narrative suggests that traditional civic virtues could be 
reproduced through progressive spiritual education, which, by stressing religious 
piety, could create the morally autonomous individual, whose supreme determiner of 
action, on whatever level and under whatever circumstance, is his moral conscience 
or the voice of God. Ideologically, the moral autonomy is employed not as a 
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substitute for secular and economic values but rather to guarantee their reliability 
. , 
humanity and durability at all levels and in whatever station. 
Jeanie's virtues do operate on these levels, indeed. Her loyalty to her family, 
though not tinged with clannish or tribal association, fulfils the traditional idea of 
keeping family ties strong and of saving "an honest house from dishonour." (369) 
This, inversely, bears analogy to other disintegrated families in the novel whose 
members lack this virtue, for instance, the families of Robertson/Staunton and Madge 
Wildfrre. Also, in the fictional world of the novel there is an allusion to the loose 
attachment among members of the ruling family in real history.9 Chastity, in 
compliance with Gods' commandments, not romantic love or vanity, defmes Jeanie's 
love relationship with Butler. By invoking religious tradition in the theme oflove the 
novel suggests that when the institution of marriage is founded on religious morality it 
is likely to be immune against dissolution and vice and is more qualified to produce 
the ideal family. Scott points to this issue when he traces the history of each member 
of the Butler family in the last pages of the novel. This contrasts with the romantic 
relationship between Effie or Madge and Robertson that transgresses tradition and 
morality; further, at the highest level, it touches upon the moral corruption and 
debauchery of the court in the figure of the King's mistress, lady Suffolk. 
On the other hand, Jeanie's commitment to her nationality without any malicious 
prejudice towards the Other emphasizes her distinct Scottish identity, in all its cultural 
dimensions, within the union of the British nation and presents her as a model for the 
public heroine. Her civil and moral courage, which she displays in facing dangers 
while seeking for justice, sets the record straight and debunks the failings of the 
judicial system, due to a lack of moral autonomy. Had this system been morally 
independent in pursuing justice, fragmented authority and political manoeuvre would 
not have subverted it. Above all, Jeanie's moral autonomy, notwithstanding that she 
is a humble peasant, endows her with independence and integrity that make her resist 
any concessions that might stain her dignity or spoil her pure love relationship with 
Butler. Last but not least, her benevolent and merciful attitude towards her 
community reflects her public spirit and sympathy in her social transactions. 
Scott's revival of such civic virtues, within the framework of religious teachings, 
particularly the one cmmected with moral independence is revealing in terms of 
ideology. Parodying political power, he seems to make moral independence and not 
economic independence the fOlUldation of civic virtue in the present. We know that 
civic virtues include that of independence. One of the reasons that political power 
was restricted to the wealthy was because they were thought less likel~· to be 
dependent, but this point was under attack in the period because of the perceived 
corruption of the rich and the radical emphasis on moral and intellectual 
independence as the qualification for political agency.lO When we contrast Jeanie's 
education with those whose education has fostered a "bad" independence, for instance 
RobertsoniSaunton, it becomes clear that Scott is re-atTmning the providential 
influence of the familial, religious, and moral framework of traditional civic virtue to 
produce a different kind of independence. Through this ideology, the author offers an 
educational programme in social, economical, moral and political theory in an attempt 
to reconcile old values with progress and, at the same time. to propose possible 
solutions to contemporary challenges. Within this context, the authority of the 
institution of religion, as a source of moral values and as a constructive force, is 
emphasized in the last sections of the novel. But why and on what basis does Scott 
give religion an inherent role in creating what he thinks to be an ideal community 
after he has almost treated it, in Old Mortality and even in Waverley, as an element 
responsible for social disintegration and political dissension? Investigating the nature 
and details of reward bestowed on Jeanie and her family might help us in finding an 
answer to this question. 
Providence, through the agency of Argyle, transfers Jeanie and her family to a 
semi-paradise in the island of Roseneath, but the authority of the novelist seems to 
have contrived this reward for ideological reasons. The general framework of reward, 
that is, choosing a location "beyond the bOlmds of ordinary law and civilization," 
( 410) on the verge of the Highlands bears two assumptions. Either Scott's temper is 
beginning to lose faith in progress and he resolves to withdraw into an imaginary 
world of his own creation, or, through his fictional world, he attempts to take part in 
the debate of his own time in which he offers a model of a "future community." The 
elements of progress employed in the construction of his proposed community such as 
modern farming and a progressive vision of religion make it difficult for us to accept 
the first assumption. Although, like the "philosophical" historians, Scott has 
reservations concerning the negative impact of progress on social and moral values, in 
A1idlothian. he is not at all pessimistic of progress provided that it evol ves from and 
improves on tradition without undernlining it. Accordingly, the second assumption 
becomes more likely, if we interpret Scott's community in Knocktarlitie as a rival to 
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radical communistic Spencean ideas, and particularly to those of Robert Owen, who 
was proposing his Villages of Co-operation to a Parliamentary Committee in 1816. 
V.A.C. Gatrell, in the introduction to his edition of A New View of Society and the 
Report to the County of Lanark (1969) quotes Owen's plan: 
Any plan for the amelioration of the poor should combine means to prevent 
their children from acquiring bad habits, and to give them good ones-to 
provide useful training and instruction for them-to provide proper labour 
for the adults-to direct their labour and expenditure so as to produce the 
greatest benefit to themselves and to society; and to place them under such 
circumstances as shall remove them from unnecessary temptations, and 
closely unite their interest and duty. 11 
Owen publicized his plan extensively in 1817 and it was looked on favourably by 
Southey (who shared some of Scott's views). By 1817 Scott could hardly be unaware 
of the famed model of community of New Lanark and its voluble owner. Owen 
proposed his plan as a means of calming the agitation of the poor-the Blanketeers, 
Derbyshire "insurrection", the Spa Field "riots"-and Scott might have been aiming to 
produce a less radical version of a utopian community. Above all Owen was noted 
for his secularism and, after a famous meeting in the Crown and Anchor in 1817, for 
being an enemy to religion. Scott might have reacted against this in putting religion 
at the heart of his community and reaffmning its value in his central character. Once 
again, if Owen and other radicals are likely to take a hostile position against religion 
and dismiss it from their computation in any thesis that seeks for an adequate 
ideology in social, economical, political and moral theory, why does Scott, in 
contrast, include religion in his ideological address? 
1hroughout history, religion proved to be a rich source of civic virtues as far as 
moral and social values are concerned; in the meantime, politicized religion and 
fanaticism proved to be a main cause in putting these virtues at stake, as we have seen 
in Old Mortality. While Owen is convinced that there is "something wrong in 
religions because of the contradictions between them,,,12 Scott observes that the 
problem has always been not in religion itself but rather in the irrationality of men in 
understanding the moral import of religion and its role in establishing civil society. 
Scott, like Owen, observes that unenlightened religion is socially disruptive, but he 
regards excessive rationality that excludes religion in considering social and political 
theory as no less destructive. Scott's view of religion in this direction arises from a 
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deep insight into history and nature of man and his relationship \\ith metaphysical 
matters as historical precedent. Making an advantage of the virtues inculcated 
through religious teachings and avoiding "contradictions", Scott seems to suggest, can 
be attained through an established church, which tolerates different varieties of creed. 
Burke and Montesquieu, are also advocates of complete toleration of different 
religions. For them, social peace and order requires the establishment of a national 
religion and that the priests of that established religion, whatever their private 
opinions might be, must conform to the official doctrine.13 Burke's thesis has in 
mind Protestantism and the British nation as a homogeneous cultural and national 
identity, while Scott has in mind the specificity of nations-Scottish, Irish and 
English-that constitute the British nation. For Scott, religion has always been part 
and parcel of the Scottish nationality and conforming to Protestantism means 
conforming to the English church and ultimately beginning to lose one of the crucial 
components of the Scottish identity. It follows that when Scott speaks of tolerance 
and conformity he, in fact, has in mind the idiosyncrasy of the Scottish nation and its 
Kirk. 
Butler embodies the idea of conforming to the official doctrine, that is, the Scottish 
established church. On this basis he rejects an offer of preferment by 
Robertson/Staunton who provides that Butler "should take orders according to the 
English church." Butler replies: "I hope I have done, and I am in the course of doing 
my master's work in this Highland parish; and it would ill become me, for the sake of 
lucre, to leave my sheep in the wilderness." Butler's commitment, which anticipates 
public good over private interest and profit, is also an indication of the importance of 
the institution of religion in preserving communal life in a commercial world that 
tends to foster individualism and social alienation. Butler's loyalty to his religion is 
far from prejudice and presents a culture, based on toleration, which prevents him 
from entering "into various debates between the churches" but confmns his 
commitment to his own church: "I was brought up in mine own, have received her 
ordination, am satisfied of the truth of her doctrines." (492-493) 
In Midlothian Scott's rational and liberal attitudes towards religion are different 
from those of Owenism and later Marxism. While both seem to fmd in progress and 
enlightenment a potential to jump over history, to Wldercut human passions and to 
have greater faith in reason and ultimately to ignore God and religion, Scott seems to 
take the other way rOWld. Religion, as Peter Singer puts it, like "Freedom" and 
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"Justice" yields "eternal truths." "Communism," according to Singer, "abolishes 
eternal truths, it abolishes all religio~ and all morality, instead of constituting them 
on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience. ·,14 
It is true that Scott's ideological address in Old Mortality does treat Burle~/s religious 
fanaticism as an obstacle in the way of human progress, but such criticism does not 
deny the moral import of religion. In Midlothian Scott seems, as Singer suggests, to 
constitute religion on a "new basis" and to emphasize its role as a "past historical 
experience" in a sense which makes it even different from Burke's static and archaic 
VIew, 
The way Scott rewards Butler serves the ideology of reconciling the progressi ve 
with the traditional. By appointing Butler minister of the kirk of Knocktarlitie, Scott 
seems to achieve two things. On the one hand, he deals with the Kirk as a "past 
historical experience," that mirrors the Scottish nation's morality, as well as its 
political and social identity. On the other hand, he tries to redeem a "national" 
religion from accusations that have been made, not least by himself. In Waverley, for 
instance, one of the followers of the Cameronian Gilfillan is said to be lineally 
cOIUlected with modern Jacobinism.15 Also, Scottish Calvinism and its antinomian 
tendency had been satirized by Robert Burns and was to provide that classic of Gothic 
Romanticism, Hogg's Confessions of a Justified Sinner. 16 In Midlothian, tmlike Old 
Mortality, Scott seems to be trying t~ show its sectarianism being gradually dissolved 
and brought under the enlightened leadership of Butler and the "learning of St 
Andrews" (85) and is stressing it as a source of social, moral, and familial solidarity. 
While Davie Deans prevails on Butler not to compromise "his former professions, 
either in practice o~ principle," Butler "was frequently of opinion that it were better to 
drop out of memory points of division and separation, and to act in the manner most 
likely to attract and unite all parties who were serious in religion." (449) In spite of 
"their general agreement in strictness, and even severity, of presbyterian principle," 
Butler finds it difficult to stick to irrational formalities associated with the 
Covenanting doctrine which proved to be socially harmful and led to division. He is 
not for "persecuting. old women for witches, or ferreting out matter of scandal among 
the young ones, which might otherwise have remained concealed. " (449) Therefore, 
he is not in need of Dlll1can's warning for him later to refrain from plll1ishing Ailie 
MacClure of Deepheugh as a witch. Taking into account "the risk of ill usage which 
the poor woman might undergo at the hands of the rabble," Butler suggests a more 
192 
civilized way of mending her character-"that he would give her the necessary 
admonition in private, instead of bringing her before the assembled session." (-+57) 
Throughout the narrative Butler proves to be rational not only in handling religious 
matters, but also in his interpretation of natural phenomena (405). 
Further, emphasizing reconciliation in religious matters, the narrator tells us that 
Jeanie having lithe merit of those peace-makers" (451) asserts her ability to bridge the 
discrepancy "related to certain polemical skirmishes betwixt her father and her 
husband." (449) Jeanie's efforts help to some degree in acclimating her father with 
the facts around him by contending that "many devout ministers and professors in 
times past," whom her father always recalls, are not in essence different from those in 
the present, most notably her husband, Reuben Butler. Jeanie simplifies the 
difference in a way: "it wad happen that twa precious saints might pu' sundry wise, 
like twa cows riving at the same hay-band." (450) 
In the course of the narrative, the author makes Davie Deans himself aware of the 
futility of insisting on the old practices, making him recognize that it is in vain to set 
the clock back. In one instance, Davie begins to "feel from experience, that the glen 
ofKnocktarlitie, like the rest of the world, was haunted by its own special subjects of 
regret and discontent," but this discontent never exceeds a personal opinion as in the 
case with Issac Meilehose, who shares Davie's criticism of Duncan Knockdunder's 
smoking the pipe in the kirk. (437-478) The gradual dissolving of Davie's 
Covenanting spirit under the established church culminates when Scott deftly 
obscures Davie's adhesion to one of the main tenets in the covenanting doctrine, that 
is, "to enquire, whether Butler was called upon to subscribe the oaths to government. " 
The narrator leaves this matter vague and unresolved: "Some have insinuated, that his 
neglect on this head was, in some degree, intentional; but I think this explanation 
inconsistent with the simplicity of. .. David's character. "( 438). To distort the whole 
affair, the author suggests that the "books of the kirk-session [that] might have thrown 
some light on this matter ... were destroyed in the year 1746." (438) 
At the beginning of the novel the author is downright in showing Davie's deep 
concern in such matters; partiCUlarly in his refusal "to authorize his daughter's giving 
testimony in a court of justice" on the ground that this act is considered by 
Cameronians as "a step of lamentable and direct defection." (196) Even when Davie 
has proposed to leave the matter to Jeanie's conscience to decide for her self, Davie is 
still not convinced: "God forbid that she should go into defection at bidding nline! I 
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wunna fret the tender conscience of one bairn-no, not to save the life of the other." 
(196) The vagueness with which Davie's attitude toward the issue of the oath is 
surrounded allows Scott to drop a curtain on one of the major issues that could split 
the church and lead to social and political disruption. 
Davie's providential reward also falls within Scott's programme of progress and 
reconciliation. Davie is not at all archaic~ he, unlike Burley of Old Alortality, proves, 
to some extent, to be malleable in admitting progress, which ameliorates tradition and 
does not cut with it. Davie's concessions in religious matters are remarkably 
attributed to his contention that Butler is an ideal compromise~ that is, he holds to the 
principles required from a minister and the Kirk. Similarly, Davie proves to be 
capable of progress through his scientific farming methods lUlder the patronage of 
Argyle. Argyle, in some respects, like Butler, is an amalgamation of the progressive 
and the traditional. Recalling Dumbiedikes's decaying estate in the fust chapters of 
the narrative, we can discern the underlying significance of Argyle's role, as a 
representative of enlightened aristocracy, in leading the community and in enhancing 
tenants' economical and social status. 
For Scott, as for the "philosophical" historians, the economical, the moral, the 
political and the social are interdependent when civic virtue is in question. While the 
nature of economy in a feudal system, apart from injustice and lack of individuality, 
entails patriarchal relationships that define moral, familial and commlUlal life with 
stability and unity, in a commercial world economy depends on division of labour, 
which, potentially, threatens this structure. The Deans's plight and the disturbance in 
this structure, in fact, starts after Effie's movement, for economical reasons, to work in 
Edinburgh where the effect of open market economy is more apparent. In this 
context, we can understand why Scott rewards Jeanie in Argyle's estate as a fust step, 
then enlarges this reward by enabling her to buy her own estate. By doing so, Scott 
seems to suggest that the ideal place that preserves moral, familial and communal life 
is that where there is a balance between market and traditional economies under the 
patronage of enlightened aristocracy. 
Scott seems to find in traditional aristocracy, in the figure of Argyle, a moral, 
social and economical utility, as well as a political and national power, but this view 
is not absolute, in the tradition of Burke. Burke believes that "great families with a 
tradition of many generations of service to the state ... were especially valuable to the 
COlUltrv for they would be the least liable to corruption from the court or to the 
. , . 
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pressure of popular agitations. ,,17 Scott, as we shall see in the fmal chapter of this 
thesis, gives a considerable weight to the emerging middle class as no less important 
than traditional aristocracy, as nationalists and agents of unity and morality. At any 
rate, Argyle, in this vein, provides a source of political power intennediate between 
the Crown and the people, which works on creating harmony between the court and 
the public in cases of crisis. After the Union and in the course of progress, authority 
has become centralized in London; traditional aristocracy also moved to the capital in 
pursuit of their own private interests. The patriarchal system, which allows for a sort 
of direct relationship between people and authority, is now giving way to fragmented 
authority allowing for more disintegration, political corruption and injustice. Perhaps 
the comments ofMr Plumdamas and Mrs Howden on Porteous's reprieve in chapter 
four serve as an explanation for this idea. When the heads of authority, "king, and a 
chancellor, and parliament" are close to Mrs Howden she "could aye peeble them wi' 
stanes when they werena gude bairns--but naebody's nails can reach the lengths 0' 
Lunnon." (44) When Argyle's effective role is restored, through activating his 
communication with the court and the public in Edinburgh, the gap between the 
highest authority and the base is bridged and Scottish national pride is preserved. 
This is translated through Jeanie's interview with Queen Caroline through Argyle's 
agency. Nationally, Argyle proves to be a national hero who is ready to work for 
Scotland's interest (also for his own interest) when threatened by a corrupt court. 
Authority, which appears to be fragmented in the ftrst parts of the novel, as I attempt 
to show below, becomes unifted in the ftgure of Argyle and, indirectly, in his 
representative, Duncan Knockdunder in the Knocktarlitie section. 
Apart from the fact that Duncan's sole principle seems to be his loyalty to the 
Laird, he is full of irregularities. These irregUlarities are, doubtless, cultural, but what 
seems to be cultural contrast in the last sections of the novel and is remarked by some 
critics as irrelevant is not at all thematically dissociated from the issues presented 
earlier when looked at from a sociological and moral point of view. In fact, the 
cultural contrast has a pedagogical intent in which the author reveals the virtues and 
the vices of traditional and progressive systems and encourages his audience to reach 
a real compromise that sins vices and retains virtues. In a sense, Knocktarlitie ceases 
to be a ''utopia'' but, much like the world of Edinburgh. has its own defects in tenns of 
justice, social relationship and individual freedom. The latter shows that 
Progress/rationality \\ithout the essence of heroic and civic virtue is perhaps worse 
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than the fonner in its application of these virtues in their vulgar fonn. In sho~ this 
cultural contrast is an attempt to reach a compromise that binds the morality of 
Knocktarlitie with the rationality of Edinburgh or the traditional with the progressive. 
Nevertheless, the cultural contrast that serves Scott's purpose in the novel is, 
perhaps, nowhere more expressive than in Dtmcan KnockdlUlder's irregularities, best 
reflected, though comically, in his dress: 
[DlUlcan's] pleasure it was to unite in his own person the dress of the 
Highlands and Lowland, wearing on his head a black tie-wig, surmounted 
by a fierce cocked-hat, deeply guarded with gold lace, while the rest of his 
dress consisted of the plaid and philabeg. DlUlcan superintended a district 
which was partly Highland, partly Lowland, and therefore might be 
supposed to combine their national habits, in order to show his impartiality 
to Trojan or Tyrian. The incongruity, however, had a whimsical and 
ludicrous effect, as it made his head and body look as if belonging to 
different individuals; or as some one said who had seen the executions of 
the insurgent prisoners in 1715, it seemed as if some Jacobite enchanter, 
having recalled the sufferers to life, had clapped in his haste, an 
Englishman's head on a Highlander's body. (427) 
Duncan's dress might, apparently, be viewed as a symbolic indication of Scott's own 
dilemma in reaching a compromise between the old and the new, in sticking to his 
Scottish roots and in accepting the demands of progress. It might also suggest that 
Scott wavers between presenting the "modern" Scotsman as the proud descendant of 
the ancient clans and as a half-civilised clown. Finally, it might be an indication that 
the issue of Union has become problematic and Scott himself emerges more doubtful 
of a real union between Scotland and England. Whatever symbol Duncan's portrait 
does represent, it certainly remains a reflection of the author's well known feelings 
toward antiquity and progress. Yet, in another way, it points to the superficiality of 
any compromise not based on a real evolution in mentality and moral education. The 
costume, after all, refers to a national identity and heritage and has never been a sign 
of progress and civilization or the converse. The real compromise of progress and 
reconciliation, the narrative suggests, lies elsewhere in a real combination of 
rationality and morality, which neither Duncan's world, nor that of Porteous seems to 
satisfy. Through Duncan, as through Porteous, authority, law, punishment, justice, 
social relationships, are once again called into question. 
Dtmcan's authority derives its legitimacy from an archaic tradition; his belief in 
"heritable jurisdictions," (504) renders him representative of both legislative and 
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executive powers. The eccentricity with which he proposes to handle law in 
punishing the "banditti" who killed Robertson/Staunton needs to be examined in 
terms of virtue and vice, morality and irrationality. At first, Duncan leaves the matter 
to Butler to "hack off Donacha's head" on the spot. Knowing that Butler's culture 
does not allow him to do so, he proposes to punish Donacha in his own way: 
"[Donacha] will be a greater object of satisfaction to Leddy to see him entire~ and I 
hope she will do me the credit to pelieve that I can afenge a shentleman's plood fery 
speedily and well." (500) Duncan's operation of law, when dealing with a criminal 
act, reflects a sort of moral strictness, and is tinged with a feeling of heroism as a 
result of capability and practicality. When we remember the intricacies in legal 
process in Peter Peeble's case in Redgauntlet and the disrespect for law as reflected in 
Porteous's reprieve, we might look at Duncan's authority, in executing law, as a 
contribution to order, peace and morality~ and, apparently, to some extent, this is true. 
Yet such impression soon fades away when we realize that Duncan is irrational and, 
perhaps, ridiculous. Consider how, in his speech to Butler, he justifies his hanging of 
the members of the "banditti": "I will ... hang these idle people up to-morrow 
morning, to teach them more consideration in their doings in future." (503-504) 
Scott is not jesting here; he and the reader know that the dead cannot learn, but he 
seems, through Duncan, to raise a thorny issue connected with the rationale behind 
punishment and justice. Punishment is a dual operation; while in the short term, it 
sets the record straight by making the criminal pay for his wrong doing; in the long 
run, it serves to teach the living some lesson in morality. Ironically, Duncan's view of 
punishment, more or less, only serves its moral end and fails to achieve its educative 
purpose. While DlUlcan's culture echoes Francis Hutcheson's view which asserts that 
"the end of punishment is the general safety", Scott, I think, seems to support Adam 
Ferguson's view in which he sees that "the object of punishment is to correct the 
guilty, and to deter others." 18 In other words, Scott's point is to show that justice 
needs to be done honestly, but not on an irrational basis as an act of mere revenge~ 
after all, Duncan is not a magistrate proper and he has nothing to do with the 
technicalities of law. When Butler reminds him of the "act abolishing the heritable 
jurisdiction, and that he ought to send them to Glasgow or Inverary, to be tried by the 
Circuit. Dlmcan sconled the proposal." (504) Scott, the sociologist and moralist, 
makes it clear that what concerns Duncan is not a fair punishment in a court, but 
rather to show that Effie's "husband, had been suitably afenged." (504) While 
197 
asserting morality (tooth for tooth and eye for eye), Duncan's world seems to deal 
with justice as a heroic virtue associated with chivalric honour that spoils morality 
with revenge and violence. Duncan cannot imagine "that a shentleman, friend to the 
Duke, was killed in his country, and his people didna take at least twa for ane." (504) 
This equation in its own right is irrational and undermines the concept of the virtue of 
justice as dictated by God and as it should be understood in a progressive world. 
Such episodes reflect the "philosophical" historians' view: less progressive societies 
are strict in dealing with morality but are little acquainted with justice. 
On the other hand, the world of Porteous is more progressive and is supposed to be 
rational. It recognizes separation of authorities, but tmfortunately, in practice it proves 
to be worse than Duncan's world. It is true that the judicial body is independent and 
this, compared to "heritable jurisdictions," is a sign of progress and a contribution to 
law and justice, yet this independence is revealed to be only nominal and impotent in 
implementing law and maintaining justice. When the upper authority of the court 
intervenes to annul a judgement passed by the magistrates, it behaves in a way similar 
to that of "heritable Jurisdiction" with a slight difference in that it operates under 
disguise. Here, the danger manifest in the fact that separation of authorities turns out 
to be an expedient that distorts responsibility and masks political corruption. While 
the narrative seems to argue that rationality and morality need to be linked together 
and that the absence of one of them undercuts the other and puts justice at stake, it 
also points out of the difficulty of reaching this end in practicalhfe. 
In the chapter, "Frustration of Justice in Afidlothian," Beiderwell argues that 
Scott's answer to the question of human justice and law is "hesitant and infInite; for 
Scott, human justice remains imperfect [and] never free from the self-interest, 
passion, and uncertainty of the individuals involved. ,,19 It is not surprising then when 
confidence is lost in human justice one seeks justice from a perfect authority that has 
nothing to do with such considerations-providential justice. Scott's note in the last 
paragraph of Midlothian goes in this direction. Kerr, grasping the content of the 
message, points out: "the fate of this unhappy pair is intended to show that those who 
violate the laws of the state and the laws of God must pay dearly for their sins. While 
Effie and Staunton succeed in evading the force of the law, they cannot escape the 
pattern of fatality,,20 Once again, religious morality, a new version of civic virtue, is 
given the priority in support of justice. 
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Duncan's irregularities are manipulated by Scott to give answers as to why he is 
not fit to represent Argyle as well as Scott's imagined conununity not only on the 
level of authority and justice but also on the level of individual freedom and humane 
feelings. Scott, like the "philosophical" historians, believes in a society of hierarchy 
and social ranks not as separate entities but as integrated body in which each 
individual, within his/her capacity, is morally obliged towards the other in a sort of 
progressive paternal relationship. Both worlds represented by DWlcan and Porteous 
do not meet this qualification. In his relationship with his conununity, DWlcan seems, 
like Redgauntlet, to adhere to old feudal tradition in its worst fonn that retlects 
suppression and tyranny. For him, "parishioners" are almost like slaves; they are not 
allowed even to have "any scruples, which sometimes happen in the mind of sincere 
professors." (482) Butler, as a rational minister, proposes to remove "any scruples" 
through interpreting them and educating "parishioners," while Duncan, as an irrational 
superintendent, has a different view. For him, even "sincere professors" are not "bred 
up to scruple ony thing that they're bidden to do." Anyone who disobeys this tradition 
is tortured by towing him from a boat "for a few furlongs"; water, in his view, 
"washes off Scruples as weel as fleas." (428) DWlcan manifests cruelty and ill 
treatment towards lesser people to the point of slavery. The narrator tells us that if the 
workers were delayed and "were to neglect his pleasure and the Duke's, 'he would be 
tamn'd if he paid them the t'other half either, and they might seek law for it where 
they could get it.'" (433) This impersonal and inhumane relationship between 
Duncan and the tenants of Roseneath is parallel to that between Porteous and the 
public of Edinburgh. Of course, Scott is not an apologist for democracy, but for an 
adherence to intimate and cooperative relationships based on sympathy, benevolence 
and hwnanity regardless of social ranks. Ironically, Porteous and Duncan are 
respecti vely representatives of monarchy and aristocracy but Scott's strong belief in 
them prevents him from a direct criticism of both and he saves this criticism for their 
representati ves. Although the narrative suggests that a virtuous king or aristocracy 
might exercise a paternal authority over lesser men, yet his hope in a real compromise 
seems to shift to an emerging middle class, guided by moral autonomy and embodied 
by Jeanie and Butler. 
However, the novel touches on other issues which surface in almost all of Scott's 
Scottish novels but with various degrees of emphasis. The Union between Scotland 
and England and the notion of colonization and its implications, political, moral and 
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cultural~ smuggling and trade in slavery and the notion of luxury, all are historically 
there and Scott's imagination cannot escape them. In spite of the fact that a century 
has passed on the union between England and Scotland, the tensions remain looming 
in terms of authority and culture. The chain of events that lead to the Porteous riot is 
initially triggered by the act of smuggling prohibited by law. Yet in the last section 
Argyle, though a member of the British political administration, has not "gien orders 
concerning the putting of it [smuggling] down." (430) This does not only reneet a 
Scottish dissatisfaction with the English excise but also may reflect a Scottish national 
feeling of being under an alien authority-English colonization, and that Argyle is 
potentially capable of challenging the political authority in London when the Scottish 
interest, or even his own interest, is ignored. His resistance to retaliatory measures 
against Edinburgh after the Porteous riot is a case in point. His reply to Queen 
Caroline, "I will take leave of your Majesty, and go down to my own country to get 
my hounds ready," is not left ambiguous. Scott clears its import by making the Queen 
understand it as threat in defence of his nation's dignity. (73) Yet in another way it 
shows that Argyle seeks his own interest in the first place. There is an allusion of this 
sort at the feast of Reuben Butler's ordination: 
the Duke's extensive rights of admiralty gave him a title to all the wine in 
cask which is drifted ashore on the western coast and isles of Scotland, 
when shi pping have suffered by severe weather. In short, as Duncan 
boasted, the entertainment did not cost MacCallummore a plack out of his 
sporran, and was nevertheless not only liberal, but overflowing. (439) 
This picture added to an earlier one in which the Duke appears as a cOIll1oisseur of 
cheese and of snuff and tobacco shows that, like Jarvie, Argyle does not seem to be 
put off his luxuries by the iniquities in the trade that brings them to him. If Argyle's 
picture emerges as a national figure as well as reconciling agent, his virtue is 
sometimes questioned. Various episodes in the last section of the novel are also 
thematically meaningful in another direction. For instance, the Whistler's engagement 
in a famous trade with America, kidnapping British citizens to serve on the 
plantations, alludes to minor issues connected with the colonial origin of evil in the 
novel best understood in terms of the hint of Robertson/Staunton, revealed earlier in , 
the narrative. On the assmnption that colonial vices are imported to the mother 
country, then by analogy English vices connected with luxllfY would infect Scottish 
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morality, thus distorting its cultural identity. The remedy concerning all these issues, 
Scott suggests, can be sought in qualifying the individual with a new version of civic 
virtue that combines morality with rationality and is fostered by religious education. 
In the following section of this chapter, I want to examine the relation Scott 
constructs between the public event of the Porteous riot and the theme of providential 
justice, considered politically and morally. My purpose is to show that The Heart of 
Midlothian, in one of its aspects, can be viewed as part of the settlement Scott was 
negotiating with his own historical circumstances, involving the question of political 
authority. I suggest that Scott, despite his adherence to his Scottishness, quite 
deliberately transfers the vexing problem of authority from the spheres of politics and 
history to the transcendent and transhistorical realm of universal values and 
providential authority with emphasis on the moral aspect. In the second section, I 
want to show that Scott's position in The Heart of Midlothian is unlike that in Old 
Mortality regarding the issue of religion. Religious fanaticism, in Old Mortality, is 
depicted as a destructive force, socially and politically. In The Heart of Midlothian, 
Scott, for various reasons, seems to modify his position~ religion mutates to be a vital 
and constructive force that shapes the individual's character and behaviour in a way 
that contributes to creating the morally, socially, and nationally committed citizen. 
Finally, I will consider the key points I hypothesized concerning the last section of the 
narrative in more detail to explore their bearings on contemporary happenings. 
As a depiction of one of the most serious crowd actions of the eighteenth century, 
Scott's representation of the Porteous riot is interesting in itself. The interest lies in its 
validity, whether it is approached from the context of the historical period itself, or in 
the context of Scott's own time. In his interpretation of the early chapters that cover 
the historical event of the Porteous riot, James Kerr seems to take the frrst choice. For 
him Scott gives "a convincing picture of a morally and politically decadent Britain, 
emphasizing this decadence through the sinister pattern of pardons which link the 
plight of Effie Deans with the killing of Porteous. ,m However, in the Porteous 
chapters and those ensuing, Scott gives a didactic reading of a public event, one 
which raises questions about crowd action to obtain justice, and about authority and 
rebellion. Implicit in any account of the Porteous riot, but specially in a historical 
novel conceived as a didactic instrument, we should expect to find traces of the 
author's attitude toward political authority. Brown notes, "we see Scott hedging round 
the incident with enormous individual, political, and moral complexities. ,,22 I believe 
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these complexities are more decipherable if we consider the novel from the 
perspecti ve of the time of Scott's writing rather than the political environment of 
1736. 
These fIrst chapters make readers spectators at various public ceremonies-the 
smugglers Wilson's and Robertson's attendance at the Tolbooth Church, Robertson's 
escape, Wilson's hanging, Porteous fIring on the crowd, Porteous's trial, his aborted 
execution, and the crowd action which followed his pardon and ended in his hanging. 
All these events refer to the administration of justice, and, taken together, insistently 
raise the issue of political authority. Some of the ironic hedging Brown notes is 
attributable simply to the dramatic irony implicit in an account including several 
perspectives. Scott's own perspective emerges rather more clearly, I believe, if we see 
the story of Jeanie's walk and Effie's pardon, not merely as a parallel to Porteous and 
his pardon, but as an interpretation of the story of the Porteous riot written in the 
context of the beginning of Reform agitation. 
At all social levels and within all social contexts, authority is seen to be very 
problematic. Saddletree, the amateur legal pedant, "had a supreme deference for all 
constituted authorities. "( 122) "Recollecting the necessity of keeping up his character 
for domestic rule," Saddletree invokes the grandeur of terms drawn from law and 
monarchy to prop himself in his domestic life: "I allow neither perduellion nor lese-
majesty against my sovereign authority" (130) The irony here is that he is but a 
fIgurehead in his family, executive power resting with his wife. In this single strand, 
Scott shows both the claims and the limits of legal formalism, suggesting operations 
of power beneath the social surface. The conjunction of authority and formalism 
appears even in small but revealing incidents: 
Mr. Butler [church usher], who happened to have some particular occasion 
for the rein of an old bridle (the truants of that busy day could have 
anticipated its application), walked down the Lawmarket with Mr. 
Saddletree, each talking as he could get a word thrust in, the one on the laws 
of Scotland, the other on those of Syntax, and neither listening to a word 
which his companion uttered. "(48) 
We are parenthetically informed that the gentle Butler has plans for enforcing his 
authority in fultilling his office by beating his charges. Further, law, education, and 
the church are comically seen to be in conversation \\ith each other about authority, 
though the conversational structure ironically testifies to actual independence of goals 
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and procedures-a fragmentation of authority produced by the multiplication of 
authorities and institutions in a complex society. 
Butler's and Saddletree's conversation demonstrating the fragmentation of Law 
into laws occurs at the end of Chapter Four, in which we hear of Saddletree's "open 
rebellion"( 45). The phrase is telling, for the chapter depicts the planned execution of 
Porteous and his reprieve by Queen Caroline. This reprieve will soon result in "open 
rebellion" of more public consequence. And finally, also in this chapter, we discover 
that Queen Caroline herself fmds difficulty in exercising her civil authority over the 
crowd in Edinburgh and likewise her domestic authority over her son. (48) In this 
single chapter, then, Scott manages to represent challenges to authority in familial, 
social, institutional, and even national or constitutional contexts. Moreover, authority 
is not unitary and self-consistent; rather it is supplementary. Rival authorities are 
seen to be in sometimes quarrelsome conversation with each other. And as Jeanie's 
struggle with her conscience will show, the setting for this cacophony of institutional 
voices is not only social but also painfully individual. 
ill presenting the Porteous affair to readers, Scott very deftly manipulates 
perspecti ve, thus selecting what and how much we see of public events. The 
rhetorical effect of his control is to shape our responses to the questions about 
authority which he raises. ill Chapter Two we are immediately ushered into an 
Edinburgh which is primarily presented as the theatre for the display and maintenance 
of public authority. The first scene is at the Grassmarket, "the scene of public 
executions. "(27) But in this chapter the authorities remain remote and anonymous; 
the government, the magistrates, the Collector of Customs-all unnamed. The 
occasion for the enactment of public justice is the punishment of the smugglers. But 
Scott makes it clear that smuggling was almost universal in Scotland at the time. In a 
sense, it is tolerated in public opinion: 
Contraband trade, though it strikes at the root of legitimate government, by 
encroaching on its revenues,-though it injures the fair trader, and 
debauches the minds of those engaged in it,-is not usually looked upon, 
either by the vulgar or by their betters, in a very heinous point of view. (28) 
That smuggling, is tolerated by not only the "vulgar" but also by "their betters," 
implies Scottish dissatisfaction with the English excise and a feeling that rejects 
submitting to an alien will. Such interpretation presents Scott's voice as a Scottish 
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citizen. Yet Scott's voice, the la\\-yer and advocate of a British nation, shows that 
smuggling doubly offends authority. Not only does it directly reduce revenues, it also 
debauches public morality by encouraging scorn and resistance to authoritv in 
general. As a particularly thorny problem for the law and for the authority's public 
image, smuggling resembles the statute, which, without evidence, convicts Etlie 
Deans of "presumpti ve child-murder." As in Effie's caseo the victims of the unpopular 
statute are specified in a way that the authorities who punish them are not. Wilson 
and Robertson begin with some of the status of folk-heroes-and Wilson becomes 
more popular when he helps his confederate escape. The effect is to link readers with 
the public's admiration of colourful scamps and against the anon)mous authorities. 
Wilson benefits from public sympathy so much that it was rumored he would be 
rescued from the place of execution. Chapter Three opposes the folk-hero Wilson to 
the folk-villain Porteous. The public's dislike of the Captain of the City Guard is to a 
degree impersonal, in a sense institutional. Yet Scott provides more infonnation 
about Porteous than about any other character in the first seven chapters. While some 
such personal specification made smugglers sympathetic in the second chapter, Scott's 
short biographical sketch of Porteous shows this agent of institutional force as 
disagreeable. His history reveals that he lacks human sympathy usually shaped in the 
first social cell, the family: 
a wild and irreclaimable propensity to dissipation .. .it was only by his 
military skill, and an alert and resolute character as an officer of the police, 
that he merited this proportion, for he is said to have been a man of 
profligate habits, an unnatural son, and a brutal husband. He was, however, 
useful in his station, and his fierce habits rendered him formidable to rioters 
and disturbers of the public peace. (33) 
Scott's emphasis in this censure falls on Porteous's moral failings, even outside of his 
official capacity. The Captain gives evidence of his cruelty in his refusal to loosen 
Wilson's handcuffs. He also shows himself formidable to crowds in ordering his 
troops to fire when someone tries to carry otT Wilson's corpse. Later, soldiers fired on 
pursuing crowds: "it is not accurately known whether Porteous commanded this 
second act of violence~ but of course the odium of the whole transactions of the fatal 
day attached to him, and to him alone." (38) The culmination of Scott's moral censure 
occurs when the Captain's celebration of his reprieve is interrupted by rioters planning 
to carry out his execution: 
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It was, therefore, in the hour of unalloyed mirth, when this unfortunate 
wretch was 'full of bread,' hot with wine, and high in mistimed and iU-
grounded confidence, and alas! With all his sins full blo\\TI when the first 
. , ~lstant shouts of the rioters mingled with the song and merriment and 
mtemperance. (65) 
Scott's language here is religious, even Biblical; this is not the customary enlightened 
tone of the narrative voice in the Waverley novels. At Wilson's hanging, many in the 
crowd had remarked that Porteous "seemed to be fey, a Scottish expression, meaning 
the state of those who are driven on to their impending fate by the strong impulse of 
some irresistible necessity." (36) Porteous's fatedness and the Biblical language used 
to delineate and censure his character combine to support the rioters' claim of acting 
in the cause of a higher justice: the Captain's death is thus transformed into a call to 
judgement. 
Scott's presentation of Porteous invokes Biblical language, an absolute standard of 
justice, and providential chastisement. Thus, the narrative voice echoes the public 
judgement of the Captain: "of course the odium of the whole transactions of the fatal 
day attached to him, and to him alone." But in his police actions he had proved 
himself useful. To whom? At his trial, "he had been described by his counsel as the 
person on whom the magistrates chiefly relied in all emergencies of uncommon 
difficulty." (41) He had been instructed by them to keep order at Wilson's hanging, 
because they expected trouble. But "his patrons the magistrates" (36) remain 
anonymous; only one-Middleburgh-is named, and not until Chapter Eighteen, long 
after the crucial events. Even as anonymous figures, the magistrates remain behind a 
narrati ve screen; we never see their councils or hear their deliberations summarized 
either at the time of Wilson's hanging or of the conspirators' riot. To be sure, the 
magistrates are censured themselves by the public, as when the voice of the 
community wonders "Would they venture to defraud public justice?" (41) Even the 
English authorities are indirectly criticized for usurping ancient Scottish independence 
by Miss Damahoy, Mr. Plumdamas, and Mrs. Howden. But Scott does not present 
the operations of the magistracy as part of his evidence about the Porteous affair. Nor 
does he investigate the difficult situation of the magistrates, forced to contend with 
the etTects of the London reprieve in the streets of Edinburgh. Nor does Scott draw 
readers' attention to authority higher up; Queen Caroline and the Council of Regency 
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are mentioned in the Porteous chapters rather perfunctorily, but their relations \\1th 
each other and their operations in Scotland are not explained lIDtil Chapter Eighteen, 
the same chapter in which Middleburgh fmally gives a name to the authority of the 
magistrates. Why are the higher reaches of authority systematically shielded from 
view in the Porteous chapters? 
I do not want to argue that Scott endorses the unlimited exercise of authority or an 
inequality in the relationship between the English and the Scots even in defence of 
civil society, though this seems to have been his emotional reaction at the time of the 
Peterloo massacre. 23 To the contrary, Scott appears to condemn the Civil Guard's 
firing on the Wilson crowd and carefully documents the relative orderliness and sense 
of justice, which animates the "rioters (if they should not rather be described as 
conspirators)" who execute Porteous. (70) Authorial condemnation is reserved for 
Porteous alone, while higher authorities, though perhaps tactless or impolitic, escape 
serious blame. Like the Edinburgh populace, readers are allowed to enjoy letting off 
the steam of their discontent about the abuses of power without materially challenging 
the continued operations of that power. Political authority is at issue but the issue is 
never directly or systematically scrutinized by Scott. 
When the actual specific agents of authority are at last named (chapter 18) and 
reviewed, their small company includes a diverse lot: Ratcliffe, criminal turned turn-
key and informer; Sharpitlaw, a professional ferret for the law, and Bailie 
Middleburgh, as his name suggests, one of Scott's typical moderates, a generally good 
man forced to act in unpleasant circumstances. The agents of authority, though 
sometimes venal (especially Ratcliff), register some sentiment in the exercise of their 
duty. Both Ratcliffe and Sharpitlaw are touched by Effie's plight and offer sympathy, 
after their fashion. Middleburgh extends his sympathy to Effie and her father, 
encouraging them to bring forth saving evidence. But the Bailie's sympathy is 
compromised by his motives: he strongly suspects that Effie's lover is Robertson, now 
also believed to be the leader of the Porteous conspiracy. His sympathy fimctions at 
least in part to further the operations of authority in the investigation of Robertson. 
But Middleburgh's very interesting mixed motivation is never directly scrutinized or 
commented on by Scott. 
Once Porteous has fulfilled his rhetorical purpose by demonstrating his sinfulness 
and thus serving as a scapegoat for authority in general, Scott radically undercuts his 
early apparent sympathy with the Porteous conspirators. Their leader turns out to 
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have been Robertson! Statmto~ the libertine, smuggler, and seducer of Effie Deans. 
On his first extended appearance, a meeting with churchman Butler, Robertson 
announces himself: 
I am the devil! ... call me Apollyon, Abaddon, whatever name you shall 
choose, as a clergyman acquainted with the upper and lower circles of 
spiritual denomination, to call me by, you shall not fmd an appellation more 
odious to him that bears it, than is my own. (Ill) 
Butler's own combination of gentle religion and vestigial folk superstition prompts 
him to second Robertson's Byronic negative self-assertion: 
Was it the passion of a mere mortal [his] eyes expressed, or the emotions of 
a fiend who seeks, and seeks in vain, to conceal his fiendish designs under 
the borrowed mask of manly beauty? The whole partook of the mien, 
language, and port of the ruined archangel ... it was in such places, according 
to the belief of that period (when the laws against witchcraft were still in 
fresh observance, and have even lately been acted upon), that evil spirits had 
power to make themselves visible to htm1an eyes and to practice upon the 
feelings and senses of mankind. Suspicions, founded upon such 
circumstances, rushed on Butler's mind. (113) 
Though tempted to believe Robertson, Butler soon rationally puts aside any such 
deviations from "the general rules by which the universe is governed." (113-114) 
But here, as in The Antiquary, Scott invokes the supernatural to resonate 
metaphorically. The renegade Robertson's usurpation or rebellion is in a sense a 
heresy, a controversion of his father's authority as religious interpreter. And Scott 
uses the contemporary mentality in which both Robertson! Stallllton and Butler have 
been inculcated to produce a demonology of rebellion (just as he had in The 
Antiquary produced but defused a demonology of social mobility). Given the 
providential "general ru1es by which the universe is governed," Porteous, as a man of 
sin, was fey or fated to be brought to judgement through the agency of the Edinburgh 
mob. Likewise, the leader of that mob, the instrument of Porteous's providential 
judgement, Robertson!Staunton, as another and even more complete man of sin, is 
similarly fey or fated, condemned after long years to die at the hands of his tmknO\VI1, 
unacknowledged son, the Whistler. What initially appeared to be an investigation of 
the tangled skein of fragmented political and social authorities is rephrased (or re-
inscribed) and resolved at a higher level of absolute moral authority. In all this, Scott 
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claims to show Providence operating in what seems to be the actual historical world. 
His answer to questions of political authority is to invoke the ultimate authority of 
Providence. In this recourse, he appears to follow the program of a divine-rightist, 
though he manages to do so without the Stuart dynasty. Still, Scott cannot manage 
without some specified, personalized representation of authority in positive and 
providential guise. 
Queen Caroline is the highest representative authority in the novel. In fact, at the 
time of the narrative events she presides over all Britain while the king is in Germany. 
The council of Regency advises the Queen in the king's absence. Indignant at the 
slight put upon their authority by the murder of Porteous, they dictate stern measures 
to punish the city of Edinburgh. As we soon discover, factions within the court jockey 
for advantage. Even at the highest levels of state we see authority divided. The 
mUltiplicity of authoritative voices had earlier contributed to Effie's and Jeanie's 
dilemma and, in the form of the reprieve, sparked the Porteous riot. But as any 
Machiavel would know, the fragmentation of authority also creates opportunity for 
manoeuvre for one skilled at the game. The Duke of Argyle, first lord of Scotland, is 
just such a canny courtier. He is won over to Jeanie's cause by his obligations to 
Butler's family, Jeanie's own simplicity, and her nationality. Like Bailie Middleburgh, 
however, Argyle has motives beyond the exercise of sentiment in magnanimity. He 
hopes that a Queen's pardon for Effie will undo some of the damage done by the 
Porteous reprieve, reconciling subjects to Queen, Scotland to England. Having 
slipped from the highest favour himself, he might also reasonably expect that such a 
rapprochement might re-establish him in the Queen's good graces (though Scott 
parries such a possibility). So also, as Scott and critics make clear, Queen Caroline 
grants the pardon more for political than for hlUllanitarian reasons. The King had 
Entrusted to her the delicate office of determining the varying degrees of 
favour necessary to attach the wavering or to confirm such as were already 
friendly, or to regain those goodwill had been lost. .. .It was, therefore, of 
the highest importance to retain some hold over so important a personage as 
the Duke of Argyle. (360) 
To keep a channel to Argyle open, the Queen even makes an ally of sorts of her 
husband's mistress. When Caroline, a little moved, grants Jeanie's request for a 
pardon, "the prerogative of mercy here becomes a tainted political weapon," as 
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Cockshut observes, and "it is as if Effie's great appeal to the court had been granted in 
the letter and denied in the spirit. ,,24 Scott's shrewdness as a moral observer of 
history and politics keeps him from sentimentalizing Jeanie's interview with the 
Queen. He has no interest in becoming an apologist for the Queen or for an" other 
specific authority. His interest in the novel is instead to demonstrate that even , 
working with the very imperfect instruments of a fallen world, providence 
accomplishes its design and emphasizes benevolence as virtue. 
Many critics of Midlothian, as I have pointed out earlier in this chapter, have 
remarked the providential rewards which accrue to Jeanie in the fmal third of the 
novel and some have found the Roseneath section of minimal interest. Once again, 
the Roseneath material proves to be necessary to round off Scott's providential design, 
to reward Jeanie, Butler, and Davie Deans and to bring about the egregiously 
histrionic chastisement of that man of sin, Robertson/Staunton and his accomplice 
Effie. But another element in this fmal section frequently goes unmentioned. As 
Fisher cogently observes, Scott's 
Conservative deity fmds its prophet in the Duke of Argyle, whose greatness 
is his ability to supersede faction and control rebellion in the approved 
fashion of chieftain and clan... [he is] the vehicle of the miracle which the 
persistent faith of Jeanie Deans has effected. 25 
Whether or not he supersedes faction and controls rebellion, Argyle stands for 
traditional paternalistic authority. But Fisher tends to emphasize Argyle's actions in 
obtaining the pardon. The truly providential basis of his authority emerges as he 
becomes Jeanie's fairy godfather, establishing her lover in a career and providing her 
and her father with a model farm. These actions are untainted by any conceivable 
political motive; they are purely benevolent. Argyle thus functions as the novel's best 
exemplar of "the cult of the moral father." Fisher uses the phrase in explaining Davie 
Dean's fidelity even to restrictive principles. But Argyle, much more involved in the 
fallen world and therefore much more sorely tempted, supersedes the paternal 
authority of the ineffectual Davie in making the workings of providence manifest in 
the world. Through Argyle, authority is redeemed, but redeemed in its traditional, 
paternalistic form. In short, Argyle embodies Scott's political, national and social 
views that are in the interest of Scotland, as well as Britain. 26 
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Writing just after Waterloo, Scott attempted in The Antiquary to rally the troops of 
civil society in a comic reintegration of social classes, which simultaneously 
celebrated triumphant British nationalism. Writing just before Peterloo, Scott's 
reading of current events, inferred from Midlothian, seems much less sanguine. The 
political questions facing Britain, decipherable in the public and private 
remonstrances of the novel, can be resolved artistically only by invoking traditional 
paternalistic authority and providential rewards and chastisement. The odd 
disjunction between the issues raised early and the facile concluding section may 
stand as testimony to Scott's apparent crisis of confidence not in economic progress 
but rather in moral regress. After Peterloo, he was to write the romantically tragic 
The Bride of Lam mermoor, a novel of disintegration and dissolution. 
Writing of Scott, Fisher claims "liberalism was closely connected in his mind with 
the confident insolence and reckless abandon of those who turned from the ordered 
historical process of providence to the revolutionary historical progress of 'Fate'. ,,27 
At times when no settlement in current events seemed manageable, it is not surprising 
for Scott, though a great historical novelist, to turn from philosophical faith in 
enlightenment to the more traditional consolation authorized by Christian faith, from 
historical progress to the Pilgrim's progress. Such a suggestion leads us to explore 
another central issue in The Hearl of Midlothian: religion and religious education and 
its relationship with ci vic virtues. 
In Old MOrlality Scott, the social scientist and "philosophical" historian, views 
religious fanaticism as an anti-social phenomena that impedes social and political 
progress. This rational tendency justifies the defeat of a politicised religion that does 
not recognize the Other, but not of religion itself. In The Hearl o/Midlothian Scott 
seems to embody Burke's view of religion in telTIls of universality, particularity, and 
fimction. Burke, following Montesqueiu, believes that religion is universal and that 
throughout history it proved to be crucial in maintaining a nation's character and 
morals, though he also thought it should be truly believed in. 28 This seems to imply 
an enlightenment view of religions as of similar validity but he, also like 
Montesquieu, seems to support indigenous national religions on the grOlllld that 
particular religions were naturally adapted to different societies, and especially 
different social structures. He was, therefore, a defender of the Christian 
establishments in Europe, for instance, but saw no reason to interfere with Hinduism 
in India. He disapproved of attempts to reduce particular religious faiths to a so-called 
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"natural religion. ,,29 Knowledge that can be gained by religion, particularly in The 
Heart of Midlothian, is fundamental to the welfare of society because it allows for 
moral choices. Also, while it calls for toleration it emphasizes national religion. Take 
for instance, Butler's remark on Effie's retiring to a convent to practice the Roman 
Catholic religion: 
Jeanie had so much of her father's spirit as to sorrow bitterly for this 
apostasy, and Butler joined in her regret. 'Yet any religion, however 
imperfect,' he said, 'was better than cold scepticism, or the hurrying din of 
dissipation, which fills the ears of worldlings, until they care for none of 
these things.' (507) 
The misleading expression "any religion, however imperfect," can only be 
lll1derstood in terms of the universality of religion as the "mainsprin~o of virtue and 
in terms of Christianity as a suitable religion for Europe. 31 As far as Scotland is 
concerned, Catholicism, though tolerated, remains imperfect. 
The way Midlothian treats the issue of religion embodies Scott's vision of history 
as an evolutionary process which, he suggests, filters the vices of the past but 
accommodates its virtues in the present. Thus, if Scott makes of Davie Deans's 
adherence to the letter in practising his religion (religious fanaticism) an anachronism, 
he makes of Jeanie's application of the spirit of her father's doctrine more than 
contemporary. Here lies one of the focal points in the novel. Without Davie Deans's 
School, though it belongs to the past, it would be difficult for Jeanie to be what she is 
in the present. With this emphasis on the spirit of religion rather than on the letter, 
Scott invokes a traditional element in the history of the Scottish nation, which, in his 
view, would contribute to social and spiritual life under the impact of excessive 
materialism in the course of historical progress. Midlothian, then, could be perceived 
as a parable in moral pedagogy in which religion is at the centre. Scott sets as an 
example Jeanie Deans and her father to highlight the role of education, most 
significantly religious teachings, in shaping the individual's moral conduct, a 
necessary step for acting responsibly in family and being committed nationally. 
Davie Deans, an old Cameronian, belongs to a historical generation, the Covenanters, 
renowned for their religious fundamentalism. History had already determined his 
character and he always remembers his days of challenge and sutTering: 
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How muckle better I hae thought mysell than them that lay saR fed s\veet 
and drank deep, when I was in the moss-haggs and m~rs, \\i' precious 
Donald Cameron, and worthy Mr. Blackadder, called Guessagain; and how 
proud I was 0' being made a spectacle to men and angels, having stood on 
their pillory at the Canongates afore I was fifteen years old, for the cause of 
a National Covenant! (116) 
Although all evidence around Davie attests to the changes that have occurred since his 
prime yet he cannot escape the web of his own history. All that remains for him is a 
sort of nostalgia that cannot set the clock back. However, despite his zeal for the 
Covenanters' cause, Davie's prejudice becomes overshadowed by his personal pride 
when his daughter, Effie, brings shame upon the family name. Davie compromises 
his life-long standards by commenting: "If she [Jeanie] hath freedom to gang before 
this judiciary, and hold up her hand for this poor cast-away [Effie], surely I will not 
say she steppeth over her bounds." (196) Davie Deans is abandoning-through the 
passage of time and the mutation of circumstances-his ardent belief against Oath-
taking before the court. To survive, he needs to comply with the new facts imposed 
by history in the present. 
Yet the stem, old Cameronian father, Davie Deans, who has stood by the most 
unyielding Covenanters, had already carried the zeal of the Covenanting cause to its 
utmost limit, that of instilling uncompromising principles in the fIrst-born daughter, 
Jeanie, to adhere to the Covenanting standards with unbending rectitude and to permit 
her conscience to bow only to God. The narrator, significantly, informs us that 
Davie's way of preparing Jeanie for life was not only religious, though religious 
"instructions and lectures" were the foundation elements in his schooling. He taught 
her how to shoulder responsibility and to be productive within the frame of her social 
class (peasants) as of her early life: 
But Douce Davie Deans knew better things, and so schooled and trained the 
young minion, as he called her, that from the time she could walk, upwards, 
she was daily employed in some task or other suitable to her age and 
capacity; a circumstance which, added to her father's daily instructions and 
lectures, tended to give her mind, even when a child, a grave, serious, tirm, 
and retlecting cast. An uncommon strong and healthy temperament, free 
from all nervous affection and every other irregularity, so often intluences 
the mind, tended greatly to establish the fortitude, simplicity, and decision 
of character. (83) 
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Jeanie, then, is brought up in a peasant milieu associated with hard work and 
religious piety which, potentially, enhances virtue and brings about self-satisfaction, 
in contrast with the upper class or the luxurious life in the city. With such 
characteristics inculcated in Jeanie, she becomes qualified to exhibit all sorts of 
heroism and to meet challenges on all levels, beginning with her meeting with the 
"devil," Robertson, at Muschat's Cairn and ending with her interview \\Jth Queen 
Caroline, in contrast to her sister Effie and even her future husband, Reuben Butler. 32 
Here, it is relevant to raise the question: if, as I have hypothesized, Scott's objective is 
to show that early education pays off in producing the committed and virtuous citizen, 
then why does Deans's school succeed with Jeanie and fail with Effie? Etlle violated 
the religious traditions of her family as well as the conventions of her social class 
through her clandestine love relationship with Robertson/Staunton and attaching 
herself to the aristocratic class. Daiches attributes this failure to Scott's belief that 
history alone can never determine character: "Each [Jeanie and Effie] is influenced by 
the aspect of history to which she is temperamentally most sympathetic. ,,33 Scott 
recognizes individual differences~ that is, the nature of each individual allows for 
some degree of idiosyncrasy, but more importantly, he asserts the role of parents not 
only in setting good example for their children but also in an on-going process of 
controlling their children's conduct: 
And to the good old man, his younger daughter, the child of his old age, 
seemed a child for some years after she attained the years of womanhood, 
was still called the 'bit lassie' and 'little Effie,' and was permitted to run up 
and down uncontrolled, unless upon the Sabbath, or at the times of family 
worship ... [Effie] possessed a little fund of self-conceit and obstinacy, and 
some warmth and irritability of temper, partly natural perhaps, but certainly 
much increased by the unrestrained freedom of her childhood. (97-98) 
Scott, here, lays more emphasis on "unrestrained freedom" in making the individual 
vulnerable to external temptations and excessive individualism than on natural 
inclinations. Natural inclinations of the individual are tamed or set wild in relation to 
the social environment the individual is most exposed to.34 Scott's warning of the 
dangers of uncontrolled social liberty to some degree echoes Burke's argument 
concerning uncontrolled political liberty.35 In the absence of a real control Etlie 
becomes a free agent; spending more time with evil associates than \\1th her family, 
she is rendered an easy prey for any temptation that raises her desires. It is natural, 
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then, for her to commit sin and to convert into a rebellious character against the 
" . . . 36 puntaruc ngor of her home" and to act on her own without even consultino her 
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elder sister. Now shaped by the habit of being "uncontrolled," in response to the call 
of her passions, she becomes a threat to the very existence of the family socially, 
emotionally and morally. Scott highlights the effects of free agency on the social 
order embodied in the family. Consider the exchange between Jeanie and her father, 
Davie, after she knew that Effie left them to live with Robertson/Staunton: 
'The Lord protect usl' said Jeanie.-'Can the unhappy bairn hae left you for 
that villan? 
'It is ower truly spoken,' said Deans--'she has left her auld father, that has 
wept and prayed for her-she has left her sister, that travailed and toiled for 
her like a mother-she has left the bones of her mother, and the land of her 
people' (408) 
As Kerr points out: 
In returning to her seducer [Robertson], Effie places herself outside the 
emotional and social valence of the Deanses and the Butlers, rejecting the 
moral authority of her sister and father to follow the dictates of her own 
passion. In Effie's career, the individual will and the related force of sexual 
desire take predominance over the bonds of family. 37 
Some critics give little attention to the fact that Effie's plight is the result of excessive 
freedom. Instead, they focus on her nature. Francis Hart, following Fisher argues 
that: "The crime for which Effie suffers is a continuing one: it is her nature, as that 
nature is defmed and judged in the context of the book. Fisher sums it up best when 
he refers to Effie as an improvident, fatal character with a 'capricious lack of 
integrity'. ,,38 Hart supports his analysis by quoting Effie's confession towards the end 
of the novel: "for you, my dear Jeanie, have been truth itself from your cradle 
upwards~ but you must remember that I am a liar of fifteen years' standing, and 
therefore must by this time be used to my character." (477) Yet, still we can argue 
that the novel tells us nothing about any deterrent measure taken against Effie's first 
lie, which if it were to happen, it could, potentially, have changed the stream of her 
life. But we are told that she was a free agent at the time her conduct ought to have 
been under control~ meanwhile, we are told that Jeanie was under almost complete 
control. In short, the narrative tends to support the thesis that Providence works with 
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social means~ and that neither Jeanie nor Effie is "fated" bv innate character but 
. , 
character and passion need social control. In a more recent study ofAfidiothian John 
- , 
MacQueen points out that Scott's concern in the novel is " a study of human 
understanding, passions and morals as these had been shaped and directed into action 
by circumstances, particular beliefs, family, companions or surroundings .. .in the 
historical period under consideration, without losing its relevance for contemporary 
characters and happenings. ,,39 This argument highlights Scott's attempt to describe 
an educational programme that inculcates moral principles. 
Scott extends the treatment of education to other characters in the narrative to 
show that excessive freedom and over-indulgence can only spoil the manners and 
foster irresponsible free agency, as George Staunton's history demonstrates. Unlike 
Jeanie and relatively similar to Effie, "he passed the fIrst part of his early youth under 
the charge of a doting mother, and in the society of negro slaves, whose study it was 
to gratify his every caprice ... So that George Staunton acquired, even in childhood, 
the habit of regarding his father as a rigid censor, from whose severity he was 
desirous of emancipating himself as soon and absolutely as possible." (341-342) 
Such education only fosters excessive self-interest and kills all civic virtues that 
would defIne his relationship with his family, society and nation. To make things 
worse, his mother "contrived to place a considerable part of her fortune at her son's 
exclusive control or disposal." Scott, here, alludes to the relation between money, 
luxury and even colonisation in spoiling of character, as I attempt to show below. 
The narrator, moreover, makes it clear that the good qualities George enjoyed "might 
pass well in society," ifhe "was under restraint," (342) but the underworld he attached 
himself to had left its impact on him to produce a morally corrupt character. 4O By the 
same token, it is not surprising, then, for Madge Wildfrre to be what she is when the 
novel reveals her mother, Old Meg, to be the ultimate source of crime. Meg's 
motherly nature is presented as violently uncivilize~ she acts on maternal instincts 
like that of the "she-wolf and lioness." (486) While apparently she shows an attention 
to Madge's welfare, she kills Madge's child and Madge's sanity with it. She also, we 
remember, nursed Robertson/Staunton "at this withered breast" (293) and he later 
comments that "the source from which I deri ved food, when an infant, must have 
communicated to me the wretched-the fated-propensity to vices that were 
strangers in my own fanlily. "(323) In short, early education and the social milieu are 
crucial elements in moulding the character of indi viduals. Scott shows that when 
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religious teachings are included in educating the individual, the individual develops a 
new sort of civic virtue based on moral autonomy rather than economical 
independence. 
Jeanie's history suggests a sort of independence and free agency, yet for Jeanie, 
unlike Effie and other morally dissolute characters in the novel, any step she carries 
out remains calculated as framed within God's commandments, paternal sanction, and 
human dignity. It is true that she is free to love Reuben, but her love relationship is 
pure and virtuous. Given her journal, she learns to channel her emotions or desires to 
comply with God's legislation and social conventions. Her loyalty to her love is a 
matter of principle even in the most critical moments when she is in a bad need for 
money to fund her trip to London. To win her heart, Laird Dumbiedikes, cunningly, 
shows her his "leathem-bags, full of gold and silver coin." (256) She refuses to be a 
commodity in a "market economy. ,,41 Her answer echoes the loyalty of Evan Dhu, 
Dougal and others in Scott's novels: "It canna be, Laird-I have said it---and I canna 
break my word till him [Reuben Butler], if ye wad gie me the haill barony of 
Dalkeith, and Lungton into the bargain." (257) Jeanie here is the same as in the court. 
There, she cannot break a promise with God, similarly, here, she cannot break a 
promise with man. Scott shows here that the individual's consistency with his creator 
necessarily leads to consistency with his fellow creatures. ill this sense, there is no 
contradiction between civil society and religion as far as the fonner restrains moral 
violations. 
The reference for Jeanie's actions, as a heroine, has already been shaped and 
firmly grounded in principle~ a fact that rules out any expectation of changing her 
character. Unlike Waverley and Frank Osbaldistone, Jeanie, as we are repeatedly told, 
"was no heroine of romance. "(251) That is, her vision is not tinged with romantic 
imagination. Therefore, she needs not undergo any romantic experience, which is 
usually associated with a sort of aberration, or falsehood As Jane Millgate puts it: 
"Jeanie Deans is the heroine of truth. She has no need to search for a father or 
identity-her paternity and her selfhood are never in doubt. ,,42 At home, she is very 
much concerned about her family's comfort and honour. She treats her sister, Effie 
"with all the love and care of a mother." (97) When Jeanie observed her sister 
retlrrning home late and with a man, something against the tradition of a religious 
family, she rebuked her. When Effie felt that her response has hurt Jeanie's feelings, 
she regretted: "---and I \vish my tongue had been blistered or I had vexed ye." "Never 
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mind that, Effie," replied the affectionate sister; "I canna be muckle vexed \\ i' on: 
thing ye say to me-but 0 dinna vex our father!" What counts for her is her father. 
This reminds us of Lilias's plea to her brother Darsie not to "vex" her uncle, 
Redgauntlet. Paternal piety is central theme that recurs almost in all of Scott's 
Scottish novels in different guises. Edward Waverley joins the Jacobites in retaliation 
for his father's humiliation at the hands of the Hanoverian government. Henry 
Morton falls into the web of combating fanatics as a result of his loyalty to the 
memory of his father. Frank Osbaldistone risks his life more than once to save his 
father's reputation. Darsie Latimer's deep concern with parentage concerns his real 
identity. Each of these heroes has his own reason that justifies his loyalty to his 
father. Perhaps the closest to Jeanie is Die Vernon who devoted all her life to the 
safety and welfare of her father. However, in the case of Jeanie her loyalty to her 
father is not merely an instinctive drive, but a moral duty. This duty is one of the 
fruits of religious teachings that emphasize the strong bonds among the members of 
the family in a hierarchical order. To emphasize the effect of such hierarchy, Scott 
makes Jeanie's agency at every point in her pilgrimage sanctioned by paternal proxies: 
she moves with the aid of "Daddie Rat's" underworld passport, Dumbiedikes's "siller", 
Mr. Staunton's coach, the Butler's hereditary credit with the Campbells. Even Madge 
Wildfrre, despite her insanity, had contributed to her safety in return of a previous 
charity. Jeanie returns the paternal blessing with complete devotion and obedience to 
her father, but always within the strict religious principles he nurtured. 
In chapter 19, the night before Effie's trial, Scott brings the effect of religious 
principles on the individual to the highest point. It seems, here, that Scott is not only 
concerned in showing that the passage of time is qualified to mitigate the sternest 
principles, but, more significantly, to show the eternal strength of paternal passion as 
a natural instinct more powerful than any abstract commitment. This notion prevails 
throughout the novel in Madge's insanity as a result of her lost child, Effie's burning 
passion to know about her child and Robertson/Staunton tragic end while searching 
for his lost child. Even Meg Murdockson, the emblem of all evil, is overcome by her 
maternal passion. When Levit, one of the robbers, addresses her: "still I say, that if 
revenge IS your wish, you should take it on the young fellow himself 
[Robertson/Staunton]." Meg forcefully refuses the idea because she has ''nursed him 
at this withered breast." (293) 
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I do not want to argue that Jeanie's compassion for her sister is less intense than 
that of her father's for any personal reason (selfishness, jealousy, hypocrisy) because 
her interest is in her family rather than her self. Nor does she refrain from committing 
peIjury because she is doing a social crime. After all, her witness in favour of her 
sister will not do ill for any body. Jeanie's fIrst concern is to tell the truth as she 
"should answer to God at the great day of Judgement." (229-231) Then comes next 
her concern with the moral health of her family as a whole, and her sister forms a part 
of this family. Therefore, her sympathy with her sister is beyond any doubt. Not only 
the ardent pilgrim's progress she carries out attests to that, but also her second 
question, soon after she returned to the Highlands: "'And Eflie?-and Effie, dear 
father!' was an eager inteIjectional question which Jeanie repeatedly threw in among 
her expressions of joyful thankfulness." (407) The grace she seeks is for her father's 
house, since it is to this that she has always referred her identity. Her self-interest is 
only the image of her family'S interest and not the other way round: "You seem to me 
to think of everyone before yourself," remarks the embodiment of that grace, the 
Duke of Argyle. (350) In her plea, Jeanie addresses Queen Caroline: "Save an honest 
house from dishonour." (369) Here, Jeanie echoes her father's voice, Davie: "Thou 
hast redeemed our captivity-brought back the honour of our house. " (407) 
Jeanie's relationship with the society around her also proves to be constant. This 
constancy negates, in some sense, the tradition of the middle-of-road-hero in Scott's 
novels. Scott saves this role for Jeanie's husband. Although Welsh strives to fit her 
into the pattern of the proper social her043 there are many indications that attest to the 
contrary. She refuses to submit to social pressures on all levels. Her trip to London 
suggests that she is dissatisfied with the human law that dooms her sister. Her action 
manifests a sort of protest, though not rebellious, in contrast to the Porteous riot. The 
society around her, implicitly or explicitly, including her father and the magistrates, 
encourages her to witness in favour of her sister. Robertson! Staunton confessed his 
deed and assured her ofEflie's itmocence and urged her by all means to save her sister 
from an unfair law. Her answer is very simple: "I can promise nothing ... which is 
unlawful for a Christian." (153) Ratcliffe upbraided Jeanie over her refusal to say 
three words that would give life to her sister and affirmed that ifhe were in her place 
he would not hesitate to take the oath on the Bible. Yet her religious and moral ideals 
and not the social consensus determine her refusal or agreement. As David Hewitt 
argues: 
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Jeanie regards God's law as the supreme detenninant of human conduct, 
consistently acknowledges that truth and justice abide with God, and strives 
to reconcile herself and her conscience with God through self-examination 
and through prayer. That she might do some thing for her sister comes to 
her as a revelation 'like a sun-blink on a stormy sea.!44 
Further, Scott shows here that the Machiavellian attitude of people like Ratcliffe or 
Robertson/Staunton is only governed by their culture and the way of life they were 
brought up with, robbery and lawlessness. But Jeanie looks at the matter from a 
different standpoint since her culture is different from theirs. Their temptation count 
less for her compared to her father'S, who implanted in her what she is convinced is 
her duty to perform. That is why she interprets her father's pointing out to her how to 
save her sister as a "fearful' temptation." (199) For her, it means, simply, to violate 
the ninth commandment which prohibits telling a lie, which if it were to happen 
would "bring the honesty of her entire life into question, to deny one of the 
foundations of her personali ty-her integrity. ,,45 
Finally, not accepting her father's argument, Jeanie emerges as more fanatic than 
her father in abiding by the spirit of the commandment. 46 Basically, she doomed her 
sister when she answered the judge that Effie had told her "nothing" about her 
pregnancy. (231) Following her conscience, Jeanie has disappointed all in the court, 
including the magistrates, and above all her father. Although Brown emphasizes "the 
confluence of cultural and personal influences of Jeanie's character," yet he points out 
that "these influences are not to be understood as merely 'external' to Jeanie." He 
argues that, through Jeanie, Scott exhibits a deep understanding of the "'internalising' 
influence of education, culture, and religious belief on human beings: through her 
own life and her moral struggle, Jeanie gives these influences an independent status of 
her own. ,,47 To substantiate his argument, Brown cites Lukacs: 
The story of these inner battles and of this struggle to save her sister show 
the rich humanity and simple heroism of a really great human being. Yet 
Scott's picture of his heroine never for a moment obscures her narrow 
Puritan and Scottish peasant traits, indeed it is they which again and again 
fonn the specific character of the naIve and grand heroism of this popular 
figure. 48 
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Even a Marxist critic like Lukacs cannot deny that Jeanie's heroism and her sublimity 
in "rich humanity" is, primarily, triggered by her religious doctrine. It is true as James 
Reed argues that "Scott has shown the heroine and her father to be products of a 
particular locality at a particular time; the finger of history has moulded them. ,,49 Yet 
it seems that Scott, through both, aims to show that fortifying the individual \\lth 
religious teachings serves not only to preserve the individual from moral defection 
and the family from dissolution but also to reinforce the national feelings. In this 
sense, the matter transcends locality to be more universal. 
Throughout history, at least Scottish history, religion and nationality are almost 
always interconnected. Scott makes this point clear when he links religion with the 
notion of nationalism in chapter 34: "With the fanaticism of the Scotch presbyterians, 
there was always mingled a glow of national feeling." (341) Through a written letter 
and in an attempt to repair Effie's misfortune, Robertson! Staunton proposes to Jeanie 
that she deliver him to "the hands of the executioner," in return for saving Effie's life. 
(340). "But Jeanie, in the strict and severe tone of morality in which she was 
educated" has more than one reason not "to make barter between the lives of Staunton 
and of Effie." (340) Most important is that Robertson / Staunton is the leader of the 
Porteous riot which is understood by the government in London as a challenge to its 
authority, whereas "in the eyes of those of Jeanie's rank in life ... the action, though 
violent and irregular [is connected] with the idea of ancient national independence." 
(341) Once again Jeanie is subjected to a bitter test. Now she has to choose between 
a narrow familial allegiance that guarantees her sister's life and a wider national 
allegiance, which if ignored becomes "an act of treason." (341) Her resolution not to 
betray her nation is an indication of her public spiritedness. It is the same spirit, 
which Redgauntlet attempts to implant in his nephew Darsi Latimer. 
If the loyalty of Dougal and Evan Dhu is the product of tribal tradition and 
embodies civic virtue in its crudest form, Jeanie's loyalty to her nation is a conscious 
mixture of religious and social duty. Failure to do this duty is not less shameful for 
her than Effie's career. As a simple peasant girl bred on weighing matters not in terms 
of utility but in terms of morality, her performance often seems embarrassing, yet on 
the whole it is spontaneous and effective and above all reflects moral courage. The 
episode when Jeanie meets the Queen and talks to her is a case in point. The Queen, 
patronizingly, asks Jeanie: "and tell me what a sort of a barbarous people your 
COWltry folk are, where child-murder is become so common as to require the restraint 
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of laws like yours?" Jeanie replies: "if your leddyship pleases ... there are mony places 
beside Scotland where mothers are unkind to their ain flesh and blood." (367) 
Although, apparently, Jeanie's answer represents a natural argument that reinforces 
her position to get a pardon for her sister, yet for Scott, in the context of the royal 
family's history, the purport of the answer becomes purposive. In the meantime, in 
the context of Jeanie's history it is difficult for the reader to believe that Jeanie knows 
about the Queen's quarrel with her son, and Lady Suffolk's position. This suggests 
that Scott has designed the episode in this way for other reasons. As critics argue, 
Scott seems to present a criticism of a corrupt court, both morally and politically and 
that the English, especially the court, could learn something from Scottish morality, 
which is not yet contaminated by the effect of luxury that characterizes a COWltry like 
England in an over-mature commercial state. Yet in another way the Queen's 
language in addressing Jeanie serves to highlight the tense relationship that governs 
the two countries. The language employed by the Queen sOWlds UIlllatural (if not 
arrogant) between subjects of the same country in spite of difference in rank-a good 
counterexample of this is Argyle's sympathetic conversation with Jeanie-but rather 
more natural between two subjects of separate countries only connected by a colonial 
tie (or rather a sense of superiority). Jeanie's argument seems to confirm Scotland's 
superiori ty over England in terms of virtue. 
Following the elite of Scotland's politicians, merchants and philosophers, Scott's 
support of the Union settlement, when seen from a political and economical 
perspective, is indisputable. But his complacency under the authority of the British 
Empire has never suppressed his fears of the abolition of Scottish culture. More 
important, Scott's concern seems, as Kerr points out, to be Scottish moral values and 
how to preserve them from being dissolved under the impact of English commercial 
culture, based on a pure market economy.5O We have seen this ambivalence in the 
writings of the "philosophical" historians and their call to accommodate some civic 
virtues as a guarantee against moral corruption. The Heart of Midlothian suggests 
that to maintain this equation in reality is problematic since the Union "constituted an 
absorption of Scotland into the body politic of England. ,,51 Thus, the national feeling 
which seems to be a call for political independence on the surface is in depth a sort of 
autopsy of the repercussions entailed by this "absorption" on the cultural and moral 
levels. Economical progress accrued to England from its trade with colonies had 
opened the way for wealth, luxury and corruption, which in turn is imported to the 
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mother-country, England. l1rrough this channel colonial vices, also, are transmitted 
to Scotland. In one of its aspects, the narrative asserts the notion of a colonial origin 
of evil, the remedy of which, in Scott's view, can only be achieved through a 
compromise that could be traced in Knocktarlitie. Knocktarlitie becomes a kind of 
model for responsible colonial rule. 
Any reading of The Heart of Midlothian cannot exclude the theme of nationalism. 
Yet Scott's national feelings need not be interpreted in terms of Scotland and England 
as rival neighbours, but in terms of cultures and moral valence. In Rob Roy Scott's 
treatment of the Union is explicit and direct. Jarvie's defence of the Union against 
Fairservice's complaints is motivated by the benefit of economic progress. Generally, 
the narrative stifles Fairservice's criticism of the Union and emphasizes the 
economical progress rendered to Scotland. In Midlothian Scott's treatment of the 
issue of Union takes a different bent, not so much political as moral. Lack of morality 
in English society makes the politicians there "na gude bairns" and they do not 
account for their corruption, but if the corrupt court were in Scotland it could be 
mended on the ground that the Scots are still not morally contaminated. Porteous's 
fate, as an image of the corrupt authority in "Lunnon," provides a good example. It is 
fit here to argue that when the Edinburgh mob executed Porteous they were 
expressing their vengeance not only against Porteous but also against the entire 
corrupt system of London-based, quasi-colonial rule which Porteous represents. In the 
context of civic humanism, the corruption manifested by the authority in London and 
its representative Porteous becomes an allusion to the commercial culture that 
legalizes "warlike expansion" from which "it was argued, arose the corruption which 
destroyed the commercial empires of Athens and Rome. ,,52 What makes Porteous's 
crime intolerable is that he "shed the blood of twenty of his fellow-citizens." (43) 
One of the spectators comments: "Is this to be borne? Would our fathers have borne 
it? Are not we, like them, Scotsmen and burghers of Edinburgh?" (43) The tone does 
suggest a sort of irony because nonnally the citizen soldier is supposed to be the 
defender of his "fellow-citizens" not their executioner. The latter case, at best, does 
reflect a sort of alienation between authority and public and at worst a sort of "quasi-
colonial" relationship that governs two countries with disparate positions on the axis 
of progress. 
Scott seems to approach the "quasi-colonial" relationship between Scotland and 
England irom a moral perspective by drawing a connection between the practices in 
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the American and West-Indies colonies and that in Scotland. In both cases, lllxury 
and free market economy govern the morality of the colonizer and entail moral 
corruption. Robertson/Staunton's history, for instance, highlights the impact of 
imperial expansion morally on both the colonized and the colonizer. Robertson is the 
product of a marriage with a "wilful," "indulgent," and extravagant West-Indian 
planter's daughter and he grows up flattered by the ministration of slaves. The 
colonizer's policy motivated by exploiting slaves' effort for making wealth and 
enjoying luxury is seen to be socially and morally detrimental. Those who acquire the 
mentality of living only to make profit and live luxuriously, can in no way desert this 
way of life even when they are back in their home country. Here, the colonial origin 
of evil in the novel is stressed. In the figure of Robertson the colonial vices come 
home to the mother-country not only through his practices that lead to a tragic end for 
both Madge and Effie but even through his lineage. These vices, however, cannot be 
seen as "foreign" incursions into a pristine metropolitan culture (the Orientalist 
gambit). The last section of the novel presents the Whistler, Robertson's son engaged 
with Donacha dhu na Dunaigh. Through the agency of Donacha dhu na Dunaigh "a 
horrible trade then carried on betwixt Scotland and America, for supplying the 
plantations with servants, by means of kidnapping, as it was termed, both men and 
women, but specially children under age." (502) The Whistler himself becomes a 
commodity for sale and resale. He is sold by Madge to a female stroller who "sold 
him in her turn to Donacha dhu na Dunaigh" (501) who intends, initially, to sell him 
into servitude in America and he does indeed sell him as a slave. (506) The episodes 
of Robertson/son, both hint at the corruption of a pure market economy and English 
misrule in other subject countries. Pure market economy justifies the slave trade as a 
means for securing more wealth and more luxury, even if those to be sold as slaves 
are British SUbjects. If the "philosophical" historians on the whole praise commerce 
and trade as contributive to human progress and economical and social improvement, 
they, on the other hand, call attention to the negative effects of unchecked market 
economy on morals. Adam Ferguson points out the relationship between luxw-y and 
"political corruption," and how this corruption could extend to infect "all orders of 
men, with equal venality, servility, and cowardice. ,,53 
If Scott shares Mrs Howden's view concerning the conupt authority in London, he 
certainly has in mind Ferguson's critique of luxury that menaces the morals of an 
over-mature commercial state. Yet, unlike Mrs Howden, he envisages the remedy not 
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in dissolving the Union, but rather by setting examples of Scottish morality that guide 
the British nation as a whole towards the means that help in containing the evils of 
progress. Such examples represent a sort of compromise best described as founded 
on Burke's notion of "change-in-continuity." Burke, as Pocock points out, is a 
"defender of an aristocratic and commercial order which could be represented as at 
once natural and progressive and defended by reference to a system of civilized 
manners. ,,54 Such configurations apply very much to the order Scott attempts to 
create in Knocktarlitie lUlder the authority of Argyle. Argyle represents the lost 
patriarchal authority. He is enlightened, moderate and finds in the Union a mutual 
interest for both Scotland and England. Allegorically, when Scott presents Argyle's 
characteristics, he seems to suggest how the ruler of the British nation may safeguard 
the Union, and act responsibly, guided by old moral values as a reference: 
He was alike free from the ordinary vices of statesmen, falsehood, namely, 
and dissimulation; and from those of warriors, inordinate and violent thirst 
after self-aggrandisement. .. Soaring above the petty distinctions of faction, 
his voice was raised, whether in office or opposition, for those measures 
which were at once just and lenient. (344) 
Despite the generally idealized portrait of Argyle as an embodiment of compromise, 
his picture is not free from some discord, as I have pointed out in the frrst section. 
However, Scott's emphasis on Argyle serves him in redefining the relationship 
between the base and the top in a hierarchical system whose economy is based mainly 
on modem agriCUlture. In this context, the colony of Knocktarlitie "becomes the 
stronghold of both traditional patronage relationships and modem civilization,,55 For 
the reader this project remains ideal, but for Scott it seems to be achievable. 
Henderson observes that "the very architecture of Abbottsford expresses this dual 
relation" in which Scott puts his earnings from trade (selling novels) "in the service of 
nITal economy. ,,56 
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Chapter Six 
Redgauntlet (1824) 
In Redgauntlet, the last of his major Scottish novels, Scott wrote his third and fmal 
study in fiction of Scotland's Jacobite past. If the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 
employed respectively in Rob Ray and Waverley are derived from the annals of real 
history, the Jacobite event (1765) in Redgauntlet is not, which makes the whole 
narrative fictional in every sense. In the previous novels Scott dealt with times when 
the Scottish nation was in the process of transformation politically, economically and 
socially, or when challenging the English political and cultural hegemony over 
Scotland was a possibility, while in Redgauntlet the process of transformation had 
already been completed and intercepting history to reverse its course was impossible. 
The novel, however, was susceptible to severe contemporary criticism as it was 
viewed to be a repetition of Waverley and Rob Roy.l 
The resemblance in the plot structure is accompanied by variations in the narrative 
techniques employed and of the themes it embodies, as later studies show. In the 
view of some critics and biographers, one of the inferences that could be drawn from 
Scott's return to Jacobitism is his desire to produce a work that, symbolically, 
recreates certain aspects of his earlier self.2 For Daiches, the novel embodies Scott's 
divided personality between Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic nostalgia, 
which fmally pits the party of self-congratulatory progress and "prudence" 
exemplified by Alan Fairford and Darsie Latimer against that of feudalism and 
"heroic violence" manifested by Redgauntlet. 3 The narrative, in other words, like its 
predecessors, attempts to discredit heroic and civic virtues, for instance, loyalty, 
military courage, devotion and self-sacrifice in the present. 
For Graham McMaster, it is "highly dubious" to look to Redgauntlet for 
"continuity of subject and technique" to ~f1averley and the similarity between the two 
novels is only "superficial. ,,4 Waverley, in his view, dramatizes a "contrast of 
cultures," while Redgauntlet "is a difficult and obscure novel, and one that has been ill 
served by being forced into the mould of Waverley, with which it has only very 
accidental connections. ,,5 McMaster's argwnent is directed against interpretations 
that see Scott yet again making a choice between old and new with Darsie as his 
mouthpiece. 6 In his search for thematic clues in Redgauntlet McMaster focuses on 
the narrative techniques employed in enhancing the plot. In Redgauntlet Scott uses a 
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mixture of narrative devices: epistolary, personal journal and omniscient narrator. As 
Scott opens the novel with "character," and the exchange of letters between Darsie 
and Alan, this, according to McMaster, situates the two characters "within an 
economic and social context. ,,7 For McMaster, "the important concepts outlined in 
the opening pair of letters" are about "freedom and restraint, money and the law, 
isolation and community. Much of the rest of the novel is a development of them. 
There is no suggestion of any contrast between the old and the new. ,,8 In other 
words, Redgauntlet, deals with social analysis in Scott's present time. It depicts the 
dialectical relationship between the individual and his society in terms of family, 
class, friendship, economy and politics within the framework of the prevailing 
commercial world. 
Ian Dennis, in a more recent study, seems to read the novel in similar terms. For 
him, "the issue of free will and fatality is a major theme in Redgauntlet." But, in his 
view, Scott treats this issue not as a "purely abstract question," but in terms of 
"rivalrous envy," connected with social class, economy, nationality and familial 
identity as reflected in the letters exchanged between Alan Fairford and Darsie 
Latimer. Dennis, like McMaster, seems to situate the theme of the novel mainly 
within two coordinates-social and economica1.9 But Redgauntlet is not only the 
narrative of Darsie and Alan. As Rohan Maitzen points out: "one of the novel's most 
striking features is its abundance of nested narratives," the narrators of which 
"recognize that conditions have changed, and they endeavor, through narrative, to 
elucidate the alterations." 10 Support for such reading can be found almost in every 
narrative in the novel and is presented either directly or symbolically. Joshua 
Geddes's narrati ve, Wandering Willie's tale and even some of the Jacobites' memoirs 
serve as examples to this effect. This and similar arguments, however, tend to view 
the novel as mainly dramatizing historical change with little indication of any 
ideology or moral lesson that might underlie this dramatization. Nevertheless, Scott's 
own comments on the novel might provide a clue to his real intention behind his 
return to write about Jacobitism and its relevance to his own times. 
In his Introduction to Redgauntlet written in 1832, Scott describes the Jacobi tes as 
"looked upon in society as men who had proved their sincerity by sacrificing their 
interest to their principles. "II Scott cites an anecdote that shows the admiration of 
even George ill for the Jacobites' loyalty to their principles. Hearing of a gentleman 
of Perthshire who still does not recognize the legitimacy of the usurping family of 
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Hanover, the King "commissioned the member for Perthshire to caJT\" his 
compliments to the steady Jacobite-'that is,' said the excellent King, 'not the 
compliments of the King of England, but those of the Elector of Hanover, and tell him 
how much I respect him for the steadiness of his principles." (10) It seems that the 
King's admiration of his opponent's integrity and his adherence to his political creed 
inspired Scott to dramatize a "peculiar and striking feature of ancient manners," (10) 
the notion of loyalty. 
Cockshut, in an earlier study of the novel makes the theme of loyalty central to the 
narrative but, unfortunately, he confmes it to "loyalty at a psychological rather than at 
social level, " which renders the book "a study of memory and nostalgia. ,,12 But Scott 
immediately reminds his reader that, while his narrative aims at showing through an 
array of characters how progress could affect people's adherence to their principles, 
"various circumstances in the composition induced the author to alter its purport 
considerably. " (11) Scott declines to give any reason for this alteration or specify its 
nature leaving it open to speculation or inference. My discussion attempts to 
investigate this issue to fmd possible answers for this alteration and the possible ends 
it serves. 
Perhaps Scott's awareness of the difficulty of applying the Jacobites' version of 
loyalty in the classical sense, as a civic virtue, has dictated the task of devising a 
defmition that makes it acceptable in the present. While the Introduction seems to 
imply that in many cases a surviving Jacobitism is a warrant for integrity, and is 
recognized as a private virtue by the King himself in a 'private' capacity, in the novel 
the link does not seem to be so clear and the survival of the kind of integrity 
associated with "chivalric" honour is problematic in the modern commercial age. 
Alan's choice between a client's case and his own commitment to friendship provides 
an example that reflects this problem. Although through other examples and 
counterexamples we can discern a decidedly problematic air about accepted 
definitions of loyalty, we also feel a strong willingness to reintegrate them in more 
individualistic ways to take the form of integrity. In a sense, loyalty becomes a 
universal term, as a social value, that combines integrity and honour and is redefined 
as doing honourably to and by others as a bond, in whatever station or transaction, 
regardless of any particular sect, rank or period. What Scott has done in his treatment 
of the notion of "honour" and "credit" in Rob Roy seems to recur in Redgazmtlet in his 
treatment of honour and integrity. Scott's own biography, once again, can provide 
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evidence of the possibility of merging honour and integrity in social transactions~ we 
recall that Scott's "honourable" dealings with his creditors is not enacting "loyalty" 
but a similarly "chivalric" rather than legalistically commercial attitude. Support for 
this assumption could be sought in Scott's strategy which seems, through various 
examples, to extricate loyalty from the sphere of dogmatic allegiance-political, 
religious or familial-and to civilize it as a human and social virtue valid in all times 
and under all systems. 
The novel demonstrates that although integrity is best shoml by those who have 
known what "loyalty" was in the past, it also shows that it is not necessarily confined 
to the older order and to the Jacobites in particular. Significantly, the narrative shows 
that those with the most picturesque nick-names for their Jacobite activities are 
sometimes the least honourable in their treatment of Alan, for instance, Maxwell 
Summertrees, alias Pate-in-Peril. The content of the letter addressed to Redgauntlet 
which Maxwell gives to Alan to help the latter find the whereabouts of his friend, 
Darsie, does, in fact, reveal Maxwell's dishonesty as we come to know later from the 
Chevalier himself. We suspect Pate's flaw of integrity earlier when Provost Crosbie 
advises Alan to "take a keek into Pate's letter before ye deliver it" (251) While Pate's 
sense of honour seems to operate within the narrow sphere of his commitment to 
Jacobitism, it proves to be vulnerable as a wider bond. 
By contrast we are introduced to characters, who are, though not ideologically 
committed, astonishingly honest in their dealings. For example, Nanty Ewart refuses 
to betray the Jacobites though he does not believe in them, in contrast to Crista! Nixon 
who is supposed to be a genuine Jacobite. Despite Nanty's occupation and status as a 
smuggler and outlaw, the author asserts that: "his wild ideas of honour and fidelity 
could [not] be shaken even by resentment, or by his Protestant partialities." (383) 
Nanty's integrity transcends any ideology and therefore it is always present in any 
situation that demands self-consistency. This is manifest in his feelings of loyalty to 
the woman whom he loves (in opposition to his father). In this perspective, the 
Chevalier's loyalty-or honourable dealing-to his lady, as well as to Alan might 
seem more integrated with the theme of the book. 
In spite of the Chevalier's knowledge that Alan's political and religious creed is 
that of the Hanoverians', and that he is of a "plebeian descent," the Chevalier deals 
with him honourably on the basis that Alan is " by sentiments and education, a man of 
honour and a gentleman." (297) Redgauntlet also lays emphasis on the role of 
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education and company in creating the honourable and committed individual, though 
he limits it to civic virtue in terms of political allegiance. He views Darsie's 
"deficiency of spirit," as a result of "grovelling habits of a confmed education, among 
the poor-spirited class you were condemned to herd with., that keeps you silent. .. your 
impUlse has not yet learned the genuine throb that answers to the summons of honour 
and of patriotism." (339) Integritylhonour, then, as a moral and social virtue, though 
presented as an individual capacity, could be enhanced and developed by education 
according to the needs of society so that it becomes a code or a habit operative on all 
levels of human life regardless of hierarchy, occupation, wealth or political creed. 
Scott seems to approach integrity, in the same way Hume does in his treatment of 
justice in his An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1777), in terms of 
"public interest and utility." 13 For once integrity is defmed as a manifestation of 
honourable dealing to and by others, then, by implication, a dimension of justice is 
added to it. Justice of any sort involves integrity in performance and the converse 
necessarily holds true. Scott attempts to redeem loyalty from any dogmatism tmder 
which its agent might behave unjustly to the Other, as it becomes an internalized 
social ethics. In this sense, all issues raised in the novel become thematically 
integrated under the umbrella of integrity. Thus we may correlate integrity with 
nationalism or patriotism, law and justice, commitment to family and profession, 
religion, social transactions, or romantic love. It is relevant here to recall Jeanie 
Deans and how all these loyalties surface in her conduct as a result of her integrity, 
though such integrity is owed to religious teachings rather than to any social creed. 
Once again, Scott, as a social and moral scientist, unearths the past, even 
fictionally, to comment on the social-moral failings of the present and to show that a 
real progressive and civilized community is the one that improves on its ancient 
virtues. If, as we have seen in Rob Roy, it is hard to maintain credit as a social value 
without associating it with some sort of ancient honour, it is equally hard, without the 
spirit of loyalty, even in its narrower sense, to imagine integrity as a social merit. 
Pedagogically, Redgauntlet teaches this morality by setting examples of contrast and 
comparison. This fact appears even more clearly when we investigate the "nesting 
narratives" in terms of temporality, present and past. Through this relationship the 
present and the past are made to exchange comments as viewed by philosophical 
history, leaving a space for possible moral lessons to emerge and perhaps intended by 
the "alteration" the author speaks of in his Introduction. 
Here it becomes pertinent to ask the question: what about Redgauntlet, who 
represents and fights for restoring the Stewarts' dynasty to the throne, thus den~ ing 
the legitimacy of the present authority and the way of life it embodies? Can we 
reduce "a man of violence determined to command the tides of history or die in the 
effort,,14 to a competitor who looks out for his own interests as Dennis and others 
claim? Or, can we say that he is an opportunist, like Rashleigh in Rob Roy and Fergus 
in Waverley, using politics as a vehicle to improve his social and fmancial status as 
could be suggested by a commercial mentality and the notion of class mobilit~") Still 
more, can we say that he is there only to emphasize his obsoleteness? Redgauntlet's 
role, I think, is deeper than that and his attempt to change the course of history to 
ratifY the feudal values of the past embodied in his political creed, which he still 
believes to be viable, is not the major issue. The major issue lies in the social-moral-
political implications that underlie his ideology, an ideology founded on the abstract 
notion of "honour," as Redgauntlet defmes it: "Men of honour ... set life, property, 
family and all at stake, when that honour commands it!" (340) Redgauntlet's rhetoric 
about honour is absolute and undefined but clearly it denotes disinterestedness, a 
whole devotion to an idea or to what might be called public or national interest that 
denies the individual any civil right outside this sphere. 
Such idealism and absolute commitment to one's doctrine reminds us, in various 
degrees and various contexts, of the Jacobite Flora, the Royalist Claverhouse and in 
some way the Covenanter Burley and how they are doomed; likewise, Redgauntlet is 
doomed to failure and alienation. As far as patriotism is concerned, we may agree 
with Redgauntlet's thesis, and perhaps Scott, as his biography tells, supports the noble 
moti ve that underlies it provided that it is not misguided and serves the collective 
opinion as to where the interest of a nation lies. Basically, Redgauntlet's view of 
integrity and honour in defending one's own country is not and will not be obsolete; it 
is an eternal truth much like freedom and justice. Given that Redgauntlet stands for 
civic virtue in a wrong historical moment according to the Divine Right doctrine, 
Scott seems to assert and redirect the application of the same principle in the present 
as urgency to defend the nation's interests, politically, socially and morally. 
Politically, therefore, it serves in preserving national solidity against external threats 
and internal dissension. Socially, it provides a code that embodies just dealings 
among individuals. Morally, it helps in curbing selfish and individualistic tendencies 
that shape the commercial age. This attitude towards Redgauntlet's role cannot be 
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revealed in isolation from other characters' narratives particularly those of Darsie, 
Joshua Geddes and Justice Foxley. 
Darsie's narrative in one of its aspects seems to be engineered to polarize \\ith his 
uncle's; as such it endows Redgauntlet's anachronism with some degree of 
acceptability. Darsie's rhetoric, in contrast to that of Redgauntlet's, presents him not 
in the Bildungsroman tradition, nor as a middle-of-the- road- hero (in fact, this role is 
given to Alan) but rather as a type that represents modern thought in terms of 
excessive selfishness, passiveness and individuality. His condition is best described 
in his own words: "Misfortune--early deprivation-has given me the privilege of 
acting for myself." (212) Redgauntlet's call for absolute commitment versus Darsie's 
claim for extreme free agency is one of the crucial problems raised in the novel, as far 
as public spiritedness and patriotism are concerned. The first incarnates civic virtue 
and political involvement, though against the spirit of the age, while the second 
embodies excessive individualism as a symptom of political and social detachment. 
Both are shown to be detrimental socially and morally and the significance of Alan 
lies here as an agent of compromise. 
Redgauntlet's role, therefore, cuts both ways; while it recognizes the death of 
heroism as some critics might argue, it also serves to debunk some moral failings in 
the present. Without Redgauntlet's role it is difficult to understand the political and 
social transformations, in fact, complications, that have already taken place in 
Scottish society in particular and the British nation in general and their impact on 
morals and social relationships. Harry E. Shaw is quite right when he maintains that 
Redgauntlet "depicts with brilliant economy the historical significance of the 
transition from Stuart to Hanoverian rule, so that the process of ideological 
accommodation will be concretely intelligible. ,,15 My fIrst point attempts to show 
that if cultural contrast is not there as a major theme ofthe narrative, as McMaster and 
others claim, its presence at least as an explanation of English cultural hegemony and 
the conduct of the government towards the rebels cannot be ignored. The picture 
Darsie draws of the Highlanders to his friend, Alan, anticipates Redgauntlet's pathetic 
conclusion towards the end of the novel which has to do with the notion of the death 
of heroism in its chivalric sense. But in the meantime it highlights the meaning of 
loyalty associated with it in terms of identity, nationality and personal integrity. 
Secondl y, guided by contemporary intellectual ideas about progress and morali ty, 
Scott, I show, employs each episode and confrontation as a parable to demonstrate the 
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value of integrity in various contexts: family, law and justice, economy, love and 
public interest. 
As the novel unfolds it becomes clear that one of Scott's aims is to show , 
approvingly or otherwise, that: "the cause [Jacobitism] is lost forever" (396) and this 
constitutes the loss of a whole culture associated with it in all spheres of social and 
political life. The narrative shows that the anachronism ofRedgauntlet lies not in the 
absurdity of his ideology that once embodied Scottish culture, but in the fact that it is 
no more advocated by the Scots themselves. As Ernest Breisach puts it: "There were 
two forces of innovation that erupted into history from time to time, the people and 
the great men (heroes). ,,16 On the assumption that Redgauntlet embodies the hero, 
where are the people who share his doctrine of reversing the course of history? They 
are no more in the cultural sense. The absence of the Highlanders, who used to 
symbolize primitive civic virtue; who formed the military backbone in the Stuarts' 
cause and who stood and fought for the Scottish identity and traditions (culture) in the 
previous novels, is highly significant in this respect. Darsie, in his argument with his 
uncle, relates the inevitability of the failure of the rebellion to the disappearance of the 
Highlanders as a unique identity: "how can you, with a body of unarmed and 
disorderly insurgents, propose to encounter a regular army? The Highlanders are now 
totally disarmed." (340) This description of the insurgents applies very much to the 
condition of the Covenanters in Old Mortality whom Scott praises for their courage 
and public spirit. 17 Despite their condition, the Covenanters, as we have seen, were 
able to confront and defeat the regular Royal forces at the battle of Drumclog. Their 
power was derived from their religious doctrine and culture, which they thought was a 
representation of national and public interest, besides their "detestation of the 
oppression of their rulers." Darsie's contrast of the balance of power between the 
Jacobites and the government focuses primarily on nwnber and armour in determining 
victory and neglects any idea connected with public spirit or civic virtue. In fact, such 
an idea may have never entered his consciousness; after all, his education has 
deprived him of any experience of this sort. The narrative would rather argue that the 
balance of cultures and public spiritedness, which ultimately determine social and 
political consensus on a certain issue is the crucial element in determining the 
outcome of any conflict. This fact becomes clear toward the end of the novel when 
we discover that all social fractions are on one side and Redgauntlet alone is on the 
opposite side regarding allegiance to legitimacy and authority, more importantly, the 
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"'usurping" authority shows no sign of "oppression," a fundamental element that could 
arouse people's spirit and instigate them to rebel. 
The Highlanders themselves are now tamed by hegemony of a superior English 
culture to the point of dissolution and loss of national identity and its patriarchal 
system; now they are totally British subjects in the cultural sense. Consider how 
Darsie describes the state of the Highlanders twenty years after the Forty-Five: 
The Pretender is no more remembered in the Highlands than if the poor 
gentleman were gathered to his hundred and eight fathers, whose portraits 
adorn the ancient walls of Holyrood; the broadswords have passed into 
other hands; the targets are used to cover the butter chums; and the race has 
sunk, or is fast sinking, from ruming bullies into tame cheaters. (28) 
This picture tells half the truth about the real change that the Highlanders had 
undergone and about the relationship between them and the Pretender. The other half 
is left for the Pretender himself to complete towards the end of the narrative when he 
refuses the theatrical concern of the Jacobites, in the figure of Sir Richard, about his 
safety. Addressing Sir Richard, he says: "Care not for me, young man ... when I was 
in the society of Highland robbers and cattle-drovers, I was safer than I now hold 
myself among the representatives of the best blood in England." (380) The change 
from "robbers" to "tame cheaters" does not count very much; both activities are 
socially and morally offensive in the view of a civilized community. Yet, as we have 
seen in Waverley, from an anthropological point of view, robbery, as a profession, 
does not necessarily imply dishonesty and lack of integrity, while cheating does. The 
real change, therefore, which is not clear to Darsie and is implied in the Pretender's 
speech, is that the Highlanders in the process of transformation of their culture have 
lost a crucial element that characterises this culture, loyalty as chivalric honour. The 
contrast here is not between "cheaters" or "robbers" and "the best blood of England" 
but rather between a culture that translates commitment as a civic virtue into action at 
whatever cost and a culture that allows bargaining and disengaging when it is costly. 
In Rob Roy we have seen how the English government's main concern was to 
destroy the Highlanders not only militarily by using direct force or by encouraging 
clan conflicts but also culturally by introducing the conceptions of trade and 
commerce into their society. Scott himself notes the impact of "the gradual influx of 
wealth, and extension of commerce" in destroying the clan culture in his preface to 
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Waverley (340). Force alone, Scott's insight seems to suggest, is not a sutTicient 
means for controlling, or quasi-colonizing the Other, so long as the Other adheres to 
his culture. The rebellion of the 45 confirms this fact. Accordingly, the process of 
cultural destruction proceeded even after the Forty-Five in an attempt to dissolve 
Scottish identity, in the cultural sense so that it becomes part of the British Empire 
rather than an independent Scottish nation. 18 
It is possible here to draw analogies between the policy applied by the English in 
ruling India and in SUbjugating Scotland culturally. India as Benedict Anderson 
points out was ruled by a "commercial enterprise-not by a state, and certainly not by 
a nation-state." 1bis project is carried out by introducing into the Indian society "a 
thoroughly English educational system," which, according to Anderson, created "'a 
class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals 
and in intellect. III This "mental miscegenation" premises cultural quasi-colonization. 
The difference in this analogy lies in the fact that in India the agents who carried out 
this sort of cultural implantation were British politicians, whereas in Scotland the 
agents were the Lowland Scots themselves, particularly the elite and merchants who 
thought that Scotland's interest and progress depended on following the English 
example. As Anderson puts it: "Anglicization naturally also offered rosy 
opportunities to armies of middle-class metropolitans (not least Scotsmen!}-
functionaries, schoolmasters, merchants, and planters. ,,19 To borrow Anderson's view 
of nationalism, the "imagined community" now is not the world of romantic Scotland 
of the Highlanders but rather the world of rational commercial Britain in terms of 
culture. 
Redgauntlet's Burkean comment: "the cause is lost for ever," is not only a 
conscious conclusion on behalf of Redgauntlet's romantic vision of nationality, 
identity, independence, traditions and all associated with culture, but also of Scott's 
pragmatism that calls for accepting the present as de facto, though not without a sense 
of bitterness. This bitterness is not nostalgia for a static world that hinders progress; 
Scott is a believer in progress. It is a reflection of Scott's feeling that the sense of 
honour and integrity that characterized the old world is now withering under the 
impact of excessive selfishness. In the last scene Redgauntlet himself, fmally, allows 
this pragmatism, though ironically conditioned, for his nephew, Darsie, but denies it 
for himself. 
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Unlike McMaster and others, David Brown observes that Redgauntlet touches 
upon the issue of culture not in the form of conflict, the case in Waverley and Rob 
Roy, but rather in the form of an end of conflict in the fonn of containment if not 
hegemony in earnest. 20 The last scene is instructive in this direction. Redgauntlet's 
belief in fatality and the necessary accomplishment of his family curse "that the cause 
which they espoused should never prosper" (211) prepares him for the worst, a fate 
similar to that of Dr. Cameron in the Introduction of the novel. But Scott's authority, 
which always tends to reach a compromise, ends the novel differently. Therefore, the 
final failure of the revolt comes as no surprise to Redgauntlet, but the pacific manner 
of General Campbell and the leniency of the King's offer astonish him: "'Is this real?' 
said Redgauntlet. 'Can you mean this? -Am I-are all, are any of these gentlemen at 
liberty, without interruption, to embark in yonder brig, which, I see, is now 
approaching the shore?'" (395) If we are willing to share Redgauntlet's experience of 
the aftermath of the Forty-Five and the harsh measures taken by the Hanoverian 
government against the Jacobites and those who supported them, then we might be no 
less willing to share his astonishment. It is if Scott aims to rectify a historical error 
through suggesting that if the Forty-Five ended in the same way of leniency, then the 
cause would have died of itself as a political movement leaving only sentimentalized 
memones. 
Dr. Cameron's case, in the context of the cost of historical progress, highlights the 
harshness of the terms of this cost, which could have been more humane if Cameron's 
case were handled in the same way as that of Redgauntlet's. Instead of executing him 
on ground of "treason," Scott suggests "limiting his punishment to perpetual exile." 
(5-6) Redgauntlet's denouement seems to support this view although the 
circumstances of the 45 are different from 1765. Scott is able to "attempt to recast 
history, to recreate the past as he wished it had happened, ,,21 for the imagination of the 
novelist allows for containing conflict peacefully, but realities on the ground make it 
difficult for politicians to contain any conflict unless they are assured that they have 
the upper hand. Walpole's general leniency can only be exercised from a position of 
strength and with the conviction that opposition will wither away unless given fresh 
provocation. Most significantly, the narrative suggests that the leniency of the 
government can only be interpreted in terms of cultural containment. 22 Now not only 
the Highlanders are tamed and forced to comply but even the higher representatives of 
the Jacobite movement are not serious in tlle matter of rebellion. Charles's supporters, 
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save Redgauntlet, are more inclined to be pragmatic Jacobites if not Hanoverians in 
deed. Cockshut observes that Charles's reaction to Glendale is meant to cast 
suspicion on Glendale's Jacobitism. The king wants "to prove to Sir Richard that he 
was not really a Jacobite at all. ,,23 This supposition is seconded by the representati ve 
of King George, General Campbell, who summarizes the situation to Redgauntlet: 
"and Jacobite will be henceforward no longer a party name. ,. (398) 
At this point Scott deftly makes wild loyalty in its romantic and fanatic political 
allegiance give way to social integrity that ties persons with mutual honoW". It is 
significant that though Glendale is not ready to fight in defense of the Divine Right 
doctrine, he is presented as ready to die for the safety of the King as a person through 
"honourable resistance," (393) as he announces: "let the King be first cared for." 
(393) The Wanderer is not ready to fight for his own unattainable right but he is 
ready, perhaps, to die honourably to save the souls of his partisans: "I surrender 
myself willingly, to save these gentlemen's danger-let this at least avail in their 
favour." (394) General Campbell's dealing with the conspirators, unlike Claverhouse, 
is not based on political fanaticism. Authority in its arbitrary sense gives way to a 
sort of friendly negotiation that preserves the individual's dignity as well as public 
safety. All display integritylhonour that supersedes partiality and maintains 
confidence but within a social context. Civic virtue, in its new social paradigm proves 
to fulfil its purpose without bloodshed or violence. Scott's final scene seems to 
present a realization of Adam Ferguson's prophesy in which he sketches a picture of 
civilization's potential that makes of integrity almost the second authority that obliges 
people in every capacity to behave honourably: 
So long as the majority of a people is supposed to act on the maxims of 
probity, the example of the good, and even the caution of the bad, give a 
general appearance of integrity, and of innocence. Where men are to one 
another objects of affection and confidence, where they are generally 
disposed not to offend, government may be remiss; and every person may 
be treated as innocent, till he is fOlmd to be guilty. 24 
Authority works not on mere suspicion but on concrete evidence. In theory, the 
conspirators plan to launch a rebellion but in practice none acted against public safety. 
Therefore any harsh measure taken by the government against the conspirators 
(citizens) becomes arbitrary and shakes the confidence between the authority and 
people. 
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The last scene leaves two alternatives for Redgalllltlet; either he has to submit to 
the modem ideology imposed by the Hanoverians like the rest of his hesitant 
comrades, or choose to live in alienation. Consistent with his ideals and integrity. 
Redgauntlet prefers the latter choice. His compromise, even when gi ven the chance 
to choose, is honOlrrable and does not admit alternatives. At this point he becomes the 
gentleman of Pershire whom King George III respects for "the steadiness of his 
principles." If he cannot fight for his cause he "shall never fight for the house of 
Hanover," and therefore he "shall sink it [his sword] forty fathoms deep in the \\1de 
ocean." (398) Scott depicts the last scene pathetically and arouses our sympathy 
towards Redgauntlet simply because he is a captive of fatality, history and above all 
his ideology, we admire his stoicism in accepting his role as representative of civic 
virtue. 
While the last scene seems to pit realism and resilience against idealism and 
rigidity in ideology yet it asserts the essence of loyalty, as self-consistency and 
personal integrity. Consider Redgauntlet's advice to his nephew: 
You pass under the service of the reigning Monarch without the necessity of 
changing your allegiance--a change, however,' he added, looking around 
him, 'which sits more easy on honourable men than I could have anticipated; 
but some wear the badge of their loyalty on the sleeve, and others in the 
heart. (398) 
Redgauntlet is no more concerned that his nephew is in the opposite camp; he is only 
concerned about his personal integrity and his steadiness in committing himself in his 
choice under all circumstances. The last sentence he communicates to his nephew 
reflects this concern: he "will, I trust, now depart from the house of Red gauntlet, since 
its present representati ve has adhered to the winning side. I am convinced he will not 
change it, should it in turn become the losing one." (399) IfRedgauntlet, the archaic, 
has been defeated, as a historical necessity, his integrity has triumphed as a timeless 
virtue. On the other hand, Darsie, the modem, has won but his integrity is still 
questionable. This highlights how each one of the two characters understands his 
relationship to the world around him according to his cultural background, and how 
Scott understands this relationship in the light of progress. 
Redgauntlet's integrity is part of an older culture, one that sees men fulfilling 
predetermined roles, and not free, in contrast to Darsie who is brought up in a libt.--ral 
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environment that prioritizes individual freedom and guarantees it by civil laws. The 
former rejects the notion of romantic freedom and describes it as "the true cant of the 
day" simply because he believes that "the privilege of free action belongs to no 
mortal-we are tied down by the fetters of duty-our mortal path is limited by the 
regulations of honour -our most indifferent actions are but meshes of the web of 
destiny by which we are all surrounded." (212) It is no surprise for Redgauntlet, 
within the context of Divine Right doctrine, to view duty as a "web of destiny" 
determined by tradition and God. Scott views the "web" as social connections, in 
which the opinion of the whole society determines the limits of the freedom of the 
individual. This attitude fmds support in the novel and outside it. In the noveL for 
instance, General Campbell demonstrates that Redgauntlet is not concerned about the 
results his actions will have on society: 
His majesty will not even believe that the most zealous Jacobites who yet 
remain can nourish a thought of exciting a civil war, which must be fatal to 
their families and themselves, besides spreading bloodshed through a 
peaceful land. He cannot even believe of his kinsman, that he would engage 
brave and generous, though mistaken men, in an attempt which must ruin all 
who have escaped former calamities. (395) 
It is immaterial to Redgauntlet whether the return of the Stewarts would even be in 
the interest of Britain. Scott, unlike Redgauntlet, tends to think that it would not be: 
Neither is it probable that Charles Edward, educated as he had been in 
foreign courts, and in the antiquated principles of passive obedience and 
arbitrary power, would have endeavoured to conciliate the affections of the 
great mass of his subjects, by disavowing those sentiments of despotic 
government which had cost his grandfather so dear. 25 
The narrative indicates that more civil strife would have resulted both from the 
opposition and from the Jacobites themselves as they vied for power. Both ideas are 
given support in Redgauntlet, a novel that highlights what forms integrity, liberty, and 
duty may take in a commercial world. 
If in the old order" duty" is an obligation, in the new world freedom is a claim. But 
for freedom to be socially valid it must be a freedom to choose ways beneficial to a 
social order which has developed from the habits and values of its people. 
Redgauntlet is not aware of the fact that people "cannot at this time of day, think of 
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subjecting their necks again to the feudal yoke, which was effectually broken bv the 
act of 1748, abolishing vassalage and hereditary jurisdictions." (330) It could be 
argued here that Scott interpolates Wandering Willie's tale just to depict in 
anticipation the breakdown of the feudal system that forms the foundation of the 
Jacobite movement, with civic virtue at its heart. Wandering Willie is the modenl 
manifestation of his ancestor Steenie Steenson. In his tale, Willie tells of the feudal 
relationship between the earlier Redgauntlets and Steenie, which culminates in 
Steenie's journey into hell and his declaration of not serving. Many critics have 
suggested that this foreshadows Darsie's declaration to the present Redgauntlet. 26 
More likely it helps defme the present Steenson's relationship with Redgauntlet, and it 
is for this reason that Willie tells it. Willie serves Henry Redgauntlet out of choice 
and not feudal duty: 
It was a runaway match betwixt Sir Henry and his lady. Poor thing, they 
would not allow her to see him when in confinement-they have even the 
meanness to leave him without pecuniary assistance; and as all his own 
property was seized upon and plundered, he would have wanted common 
necessaries, but for the attachment of a fellow who was a famous fiddler-a 
blind man-I have seen him with Sir Henry myself, both before the affair 
broke out and while it was going on. I have heard that he fiddled in the 
streets of Carlisle, and carried what money he got to his master, while he 
was confmed in the castle. (244) 
Willie's blindness could be seen as a symbol of the impotence of his role compared 
with the feudal role of his ancestors. Steenie broke the chain and Willie now serves 
voluntarily, for humane reasons. But the amount he can serve and the difTerence he 
can make is slight. This becomes even more obvious in the aid that Willie renders 
Darsie. He plays his fiddle to let him know he is not alone, but he cannot help him 
escape. Darsie hopes for more assistance: 
I must now be on the alert to make my escape, if possible, before I am 
forced on shipboard-Blind Willie will not, I think, desert me without an 
effort on my behalf, especially ifhe has learned that I am the son of his late 
unhappy patron. (336) 
However, "the warning that the 'Campbells are coming' is too late, is irrelevant to the 
outcome of the narrative,,27 His attachment to Redgauntlet himself is even more 
vague, and perhaps purposely so in order to underscore the end of feudal relationships 
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and with it the fierce inner loyalties of clannish and feudal society, Hugh RedgaWltlet 
leads no one any longer, and he alone remains unquestioningly' and anachronistically 
loyal to the authority of the prince. 
The anachronism of Redgauntlet, then, lies in the fact that he works against 
consensus and against evolving tradition. If as Hume argues "the good of mankind is 
the only object of all laws and regulations" and "the safety of the people is the 
Supreme Law,,,28 then integrity outside this formula, according to Scott, would be 
unjustified and detrimental to public good. Darsie's critique of his Wlcle's myopic 
vision, that he fails to observe the circumstances around him objectively, Wlderlines 
this point: 
I look around me, and I see a settled govemment--an established authorit\'-
a born Briton on the throne-the very Highland mountaineers, upon whom 
alone the trust of the exiled family reposed, assembled into regiments, 
which act under the orders of the existing dynasty. France has been utterly 
dismayed by the tremendous lessons of the last war, and will hardly provoke 
another. All without and within the Kingdom is adverse to encouraging a 
hopeless struggle, and you alone, sir, seem willing to undertake a desperate 
enterprise. (339) 
Mindful of the French Revolution, Scott always felt that the history of a people 
was often rejected or ignored in a revolution. The narrative alludes to the Glorious 
Revolution that brought about change and freedom but within the framework of 
inherited tradition, unlike the French Revolution, or what contemporary radicals call 
for. If radicals fight for undermining all that is traditional, calling for democracy, 
equality and freedom in the absolute sense, RedgaWltlet fights to undermine all that is 
progressive and liberal, calling for absolute passive submission, heredity, rank and 
vassalage. It seems that Darsie's character forms a third type that rejects the past and 
lacks commitment, in the positive sense, to the present. 
Darsie's objections in the above quotation are significant, and Scott would not 
disagree with his argument. 29 History, tradition, peace are important to society 
according to Scott, and here he acknowledges that the Jacobite ideology has been 
altered by time and circumstance, and would now be viewed as a disruption of peace 
rather than a restoration of traditional order. But these are not Darsie's thoughts, The 
emphasis of his objections focuses on the futility of the Jacobite cause and balance of 
powers and not on whether it is philosophically or socially just. He tells Redgauntlet 
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that he "will take no step of importance but upon conviction." (367) But it does not 
seem that, politically, he has any convictions except passively to accept established 
authority. Scott, through putting Darsie's credibility under test, attempts to show that 
his integrity is flawed and that, as a type already formed, he would rather endure the 
pains of a "solitary" than take the risk of being committed responsibly, or when 
commi tIDent is hazardous. As Fiona Robertson puts out, 
At first, Darsie wants to repossess his past only on his own terms, and is not 
prepared to accept the demands which it might make of him in return. He 
finds, however, that his past threatens to assimilate, not to complete, him, 
and that he has to struggle against a doctrine of historical determinism 
rigidly adhered to by his authoritarian uncle. 30 
Darsie, unlike Waverley and Morton, represents a modernity that rejects good brave 
causes. His passiveness purchases his personal safety, freedom, leisure and 
selfishness at the expense of family, nation, and even his manliness. But Darsie's 
passiveness and his romantic freedom which has become threatening for himself is 
not isolated from the objective circumstance he is bred in. 31 These have left him with 
no real education to commit him to any ideology in earnest. Here Scott carries 
Darsie's narrative a further step to highlight the role of family and education in 
preparing the committed individual. 
Scott recognizes the role of parents in educating their children but he seems to 
emphasize the effect of the father as a representative of masculine education 
associated with manly virtues. Here splitting Lilias's and Darsie's education between 
uncle and mother respectively becomes suggestive. Darsie's early memories are of 
"unbounded indulgence on my mother's part, and the most tyrannical exertion of 
caprice on my own." (16) Indulgence, coupled with money, entails a failure to utilize 
his natural abilities; in some respect he is similar to Robert Staunton in The Hearl of 
Midlothian. Both cases demonstrate that indulgence might weaken and damage 
character. In the case of Staunton the result is moral corruption; he fmally drifts into 
the world of smuggling and criminality while in the case of Darsie it leads to 
selfishness and carelessness to the world around him. 
Lilias, much like Jeanie Deans or Diana Vernon, has been brought up under her 
uncle's custody who implanted in her a spirit of accepting challenge, and facing 
danger with "intrepidity" and fortitude. (325) 
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However, Lilias's courage and familial commitment, does not impede her 
development of a rational attitude towards politics and religion that tempers the 
fanaticism her uncle could have nwtured. As she grows up she becomes aware that 
"freedom of religious opinion brings on freedom of political creed," and even she is 
prepared "to question the doctrine of hereditary and indefeasible right." (324) Her 
liberal opinions bring her closer to Darsie's view of the futility of her uncle's 
enterprise, but, unlike Darsie, she sympathetically justifies his dogmatic conduct: 
'My dearest Arthur,' answered Lilias-'for that name as well as Darsie , , 
properly belongs to you-it is the leading feature in my uncle's character, 
that he has applied every energy of his powerful mind to the service of the 
exiled family of Stewart. The death of his brother, the dilapidation of his 
own fortunes, have only added to his hatred against the present reigning 
family. He is, in short, a political enthusiast of the most dangerous 
character, and proceeds in his agency with as much confidence, as ifhe felt 
himself the very Atlas, who is alone capable of supporting a sinking cause. 
(323) 
On another occasion she "entreats" her brother to avoid any announcement against 
the family of Stewart, which "would either break the heart" of her uncle, "or drive him 
to some act of desperation." (331) While her position reveals that the world of 
politics is changeable according to times and circwnstances, in the meantime she 
proposes constancy in carrying on with family ties throughout time. This explains her 
strong adherence to her uncle even when his real authority over her is gone. Through 
the affectionate farewell between Redgauntlet and his niece Scott pumps warmth into 
the veins of familial relationship: ''No, sir," said Lilias, seizing his hand eagerly. "You 
have been hitherto my protector,-you are now in sorrow, let me be your attendant 
and your comfort in exile!" (398) 
Redgauntlet has become the surrogate father for Lilias. This paternal piety echoes 
Vernon's and Jeanie's. It is the education of men that inculcates in women what makes 
them worthy of respect. If Lilias shows prudence in rejecting silently a scheme all 
evidence attests a failure, she cannot but preserve her integrity to the one who 
protected her. Lilias's passion that erupts with commitment in the last scene is 
counterbalanced by an absence of genuine passion on Darsie's part. Commenting on 
the incident of the "King's Coronation," Darsie "considered it as an idle tale." (329) 
24~ 
Surprisingly, he addresses his sister: "I little thought how nearly I was interested in 
the actors of a scene so daring-How could you have courage to go through \\ith it?" 
(329) It is clear that the notion of courage is strange to him to the extent that he 
cannot imagine an act that would expose him to any risk regardless of the motive 
behind it. But ironically, this is not his view of the notion of courage when he raises 
it with his friend Alan earlier in the novel. Scott here seems to dramatize what Adam 
Ferguson has warned of in his Essay: the commercial stage of self interest and I uxurv 
with no education that inculcates civic virtue might produce men of weakness and 
effeminacy. 33 Symbolically, forcing Darsie to put on female clothing as a travelling 
disguise aims at emasculating him. Though Redgauntlet might expect Darsie to react 
by "growing" into manly reaction against this treatment, it seems to underline both 
Redgauntlet's high-handed domination of him and his own incapacity to grow into 
such a head of the family as Redgauntlet wishes. Urging Darsie to throwaway the 
dress and restore his manhood, Redgauntlet says: 
I restore you to yourself, and trust you will lay aside all effeminate thoughts 
with this feminine dress. Do not blush at having worn a disguise to which 
kings and heroes have been reduced. It is when female craft or female 
cowardice fmd their way into a manly bosom, that he who entertains these 
sentiments should take eternal shame to himself for thus having resembled 
womanhood. (367) 
Unfortunately, he remains diminished and feminized. Harts suggests: "his sense of a 
mysterious and fateful alienation, his wonder as to his true lineage and his real 
fidelities, make him poignantly equal to Waverley as an exiled wanderer between 
conflicting worlds. ,,34 But whereas Waverley is able to grow from his experiences, 
and at least come to admire the noble sacrifices of the Jacobite martyrs, "Darsie 
experiences no dawn of Prestopans. He has become nothing significant; he has 
performed no act of moral self-assertion. ,,35 There is profound irony, therefore, in his 
letter to Alan in which he writes longingly of "merry England! Of which I boast 
myself a native, and on which I gaze, even while raging floods and unstable 
quicksands divide us, with the fllial affection of a dutiful son." (28) Alan understands 
the filial affection of a dutiful son, but Darsie exhibits little understanding of such 
commitment. And ifhe cannot show that devotion, then by his own analogy, neither 
does he understand the loyal duty required of the patriotism which he claims to feel. 
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Alan, on the other hand, is for Scott the more acceptable compromise between 
traditional and modern. ill his filial devotion, his loyalty to his friend, and his 
diligence and knowledge of law, he fulfils the Bailie Jarvie role in this novel. Hart 
argues that after Darsie becomes the passive prisoner of Redgauntlet, Alan "becomes 
the heroic agent. ,,36 James Kerr reinforces this view by saying that Alan's role 
supplies a critical counterbalance to Darsie: 
Alan is the voice of things as they are inveighing against the romantic 
imagination, exhorting his friend to keep his fancy under control. He is an 
eminently practical young man, trying to keep his fiiend's feet on the 
ground. ill the generic terms established by Scott in his 'Essav on Romance' 
(1824), Alan is at this moment the voice of the novel, endorsing the 
'ordinary train of events' against the fanciful productions of romance. 37 
Although both Darsie and Alan claim integrity in their friendship, Alan's fidelity is 
the more active of the two. Darsie hesitates to reveal his identity when, in disguise, 
he is assisted in dismounting by Alan. Like a child he insists upon seeing that Alan is 
safe when held by Redgauntlet, and "longed to speak, but dared not." (367) Alan is 
more often active. Darsie would have Alan follow him in his romantic excursion, but 
Alan will not. Alan characterizes the difference between the two young men in the 
type of courage each exhibits. Darsie's is, according to Alan: 
What may be called intellectual courage; highness of spirit, and desire of 
distinction; impulses which render thee alive to the love offame, and deaf to 
the apprehension of danger, until it forces itself suddenly upon thee. (25) 
Alan describes his own courage quite differently: 
We have long since agreed, that, quiet as I am, I have the advantage in this 
important particular. My courage consists, I think, in strength of nerves and 
constitutional indifference to danger; which, though it never pushes me on 
adventure, secures me in full use of my recollection, and tolerably complete 
self-possession, when danger actually arrives. (25) 
The desire for fame makes Darsie liable to charges of selfishness, a characteristic 
to which he already has a propensity. That he is not aware of danger means that he 
does not knowingly risk anything. The romantic aspect of Darsie presents him 
'empty' in his lack of commitment, but he feels this emptiness and worthlessness. He 
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shows this in seeking for his identity and seeking for love, but each quest is only a 
'romantic' foray that does not lead to real involvement. He is easily reconciled to the 
loss of his romantic hopes. Alan's "self-possession" is more in keeping with the 
honour that asserts a moral code from within. Such rationality allows Alan to place 
himself in danger to help Darsie. For Alan, the voice of duty to help in saving 
Darsie's life in commitment to friendship sounds even louder than the voice of 
commitment to his father and the law. Accordingly Alan unhesitatingly chooses the 
path of sacrifice, remote from any self-interest. In contrast, Darsie is never placed in 
such a situation because his commitments are not strong enough to govern his actions. 
Alan's courage, unlike Redgauntlet's, is a courage that Scott saw as not only still 
possible in modern Britain, but necessary. It is the same courage with which Alan 
credits his father. 
The circumstances under which Darsie comes to live with the Fairfords shows the 
senior Fairford's strong attachment to his son. Alan's friendship with Darsie is 
allowed to flourish because Alexander Fairford perceives his son's growing 
attachment for Darsie, and Alan's need for such a bond. He encourages the friendship 
despite his reservations about Darsie's whimsical nature. This example serves to 
educate Alan's own integrity, even, ironically, when going against his father's wishes. 
When he learns ofDarsie's critical situation he is quick to act: 
Alan doted on his friend Darsie, even more than he loved his profession, 
and, as we have seen, threw every thing aside when he thought Latimer in 
danger; forgetting fame and fortune, and hazarding even the serious 
displeasure of his father, to rescue him whom he loved with an elder 
brother's affection. (226) 
In his parting letter to his father, Alan explains that his delay in leaving had been a 
"sacrifice to filial duty" but that now he must "obey the calls of friendship." (156) 
Recalling that Alan also sacrificed a case and a client for his romantic commitment to 
friendship, suggests that Scott wants to show that the survival of the kind of integrity 
associated with "chivalric" notion of honour is problematic in the modern commercial 
stage. Although we may admire Alan's loyalty to his friend, yet we might not agree 
with him wholeheartedly that a lawyer should not be kept to a contract like any other 
tradesman. However, the integrity Alan exhibits even earns him Charles Edward's 
respect despite the fact that Alan is of "plebeian descent." In calling attention to class 
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mobility, Scott accomplishes two things, one in terms of its narrative, one political. 
First, he reflects the historical period, a period in which there was greater individual 
freedom for those of the growing middle class, but that meant there was a greater 
responsibility to make choices. Scott acknowledges this as an appeal to his 
readership, especially since its bulk was, like Alan, newly mobile, to recognize the 
responsibility and possibility that accompany such freedom. 38 
As always in Scott's novels, personal integrity is analogous to political integrity. 
The Fairfords are no less patriotic than Redgauntlet. Yet changes in time, in poli tical 
and economic circumstances, have demanded different forms of patriotism. Their 
patriotism, like the courage with which they defend it, manifests itself differently. 
When Darsie questions Alexander Fairford's actions during the revolution of 1745, 
suggesting they were cowardly, Alan is quick to defend his father: 
Imagine this train at your heels, Darsie, and ask yourself whether you would 
not exert your legs as fast as you did in flying from Solway tide. And yet 
you impeach my father's courage! I tell you he has enough courage to do 
what is right, and to spurn what is wrong-courage enough to defend a 
righteous cause with hand and purse, and to take the part of the poor man 
against his oppressor, without fear of the consequence to himself. This is 
civil courage, Darsie; and it is of little consequence to most men in this age 
and country, whether they ever possess military courage or no. (47) 
Alan's assertion that the practice of law involves "civil courage" is associated with 
Scott's own belief that Scottish Law at its best embodied nationalistic sentiments. In a 
discussion of the court system that tended to rely more on "evasion by legal fictions 
and the like" than Scott liked, he wrote: 
The consequence will in time be, that the Scottish Supreme Court will be in 
effect situated in London. Then down fall-as national objects of respect 
and veneration-the Scottish Bench, the Scottish Bar, the Scottish Law 
herself, and-and-'there is an end of an auld sang.' 39 
Alan believes in practices and cherishes the law as an important Scottish institution. 
He is brought to the law by his father's encouragement and despite the fact that he was 
from the middle-class: 
Deprived of the personal patronage enjoyed by most of his contemporaries, 
who asslUlled the gO\\<11 under the protection of their aristocratic alliances 
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and descents. he early saw that he should have that to achieve for himself 
which fell to them as a right of birth. (226) 
"Civil courage" may not match the heroic courage of Redgauntlet in drama, but it is 
what Scott felt was needed as a virtue of the day and as a foundation to maintain 
justice in various aspects of human life. Bruce Beiderwell views Alan's "civil 
courage" as a virtue that "primarily concerns fair dealings in fmancial matters: that is, 
the courage not to cheat for profit. ,,40 But decency alone. the narrative suggests, is 
insufficient. "Civil courage" needs another crucial component, bravery, to support a 
just decision, which if a man of law lacks the result would be putting justice at stake. 
In Alan's words, a man of law should have the courage to accept any challenge 
"without fear of the consequence to himself." 
The episode that connects Matthew Foxley, the Cumberland magistrate, his Clerk, 
Nicholas Faggot, Peter Peebles, Redgauntlet and Darsie provides comment on the 
above issue. Foxley and his clerk represent respectively cowardice and corruption. 
Both contribute to suspending justice and fail to perform their legal duty. which is 
supposed to secure Darsie's right in freedom. Peter and RedgalUltlet both are invol ved 
in legal cases of different types and each one of them follows his own path in 
defending what he thinks to be his own right. The whole scene is a court, in which 
the only absentees are law and justice. Foxley and his clerk are quite sure that 
Redgauntlet is an outlaw and that "there are warrants out against" him (200); 
furthermore, the clerk himself has a warrant in his custody that legalizes arresting 
Redgauntlet. Yet fearing the latter's revenge, and to extricate himself and Mr Justice 
from this dilemma, the Clerk contrives to assassinate the law itself by handing the 
warrant paper to Redgauntlet. Redgauntlet "flung the warrant into the fire with one 
hand and, and fixed the other, with a stem and irresistible gripe, on the breast of the 
attorney" threatening to throw him in the chimney. The author, significantly, alludes 
to Nicholas's (and perhaps Foxley's) anticipation that Redgauntlet would act that way. 
at least, in burning the warrant: "Nicholas placed in [Redgauntlet's] hand a paper, and 
seemed anxiously to expect the consequences which were to ensue." (201) As the 
warrant is turned into ashes Justice Foxley is now relieved of any responsibility 
towards law and in his view "it would not be advisable" to proceed with the arrest. 
(203) The scene ends peacefully but not without Redgauntlet's slipping some money 
into the hand of the attorney as "a little atonement for the rashness with which he had 
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burnt the warrant, and imposed no gentle hand on the respectable minion of the law 
by whom it was exhibited." (204) In other words, cowardice and lack of integrit: go 
hand in hand. 
However, for Redgauntlet, the shortest and quickest way to defend a right and 
settle a legal case is through heroic courage, in contrast to Peter Peebles. Peebles 
believes in law but scores of years passed on his case in the Court of Session "have 
never been able to ding the bottom out of it yet." (198) Alan, through his "civil 
courage" has given him some hope to have the job done. Certainly, Scott would not 
approve the way adopted by Redgauntlet and Foxley yet, from a philosophical view 
of the rules that govern the process of justice, the compromise could be considered as 
ideal. According to Hume "the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the 
particular state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and 
existence to that utility. ,,41 If we have to apply this relativity and "utility" of justice to 
the state in the Solway where the effect of law is almost suspended, then both Foxley 
and Redgauntlet emerge as doing justice to each other by preserving peace. Each one 
recognizes the needs of the other without precipitating further violence. Here 
Redgauntlet's comment: "Judiciously resolved" does not point to the English or even 
the Scottish law but rather to the law that governs the state of the Solway. (203) 
From this perspective, Foxley's conduct towards Redgauntlet, much similar to that of 
Bailie Jarvie towards Rob Roy, tends to be prudent. 
Scott, as Mark A. Weinstein points out, intends to dramatize "the impossibility of 
justice in human affairs, but such suggestion is too much to claim." Yet one cannot 
deny, according to Weinstein, that Scott "is certainly questioning the efficacy of law 
whether on the Border or in a civilized community like Edinburgh. ,,42 This 
"questioning" seems to argue that the judicial system, in whatever stage of progress, is 
only a human artificiality to achieve equity. Any system in its own right, like traffic 
signals, does not afford safety to people, if people lack the integrity and the will to 
support this system in the absence of any external authority. Within this context, the 
moral passion that the Fairfords bring to the practice of law is perhaps the major 
justification of that institution in the novel. In Waverley the attraction of the "new" 
civilization is to a great extent based on the prospect of "equal" laws instead of the 
gracious or brutal arbitrary procedures of monarch and clan chief. In Redgauntlel the 
security of law is as precarious as the sands of the Solway. Divided systems, partial 
interpretation, a politic blindness to treasonable activities compound the obliquities of 
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corruption and sheer domination of force. On the other hand, the fonnal intricacies of 
law processes can become an obsession to such as Peter Peebles and a theatre for 
practice to the young apprentices, but the Fairfords can chart a pathway through the 
quick sands of the Peebles' case by their clarity of mora! concern. The problem is not 
in the system whatever the system is, but in the way the system is applied. It is 
character and integrity that sustain system and secures it reliability. Law, like any 
other institution, could be used to fulfil the objective of its own creation, as the 
Fairfords practice it; and it may be used as a cloak for personal or private utility, as 
Geddes does, to protect exploitation, violence again ingrained in this "parable" 
Quaker's genealogy. 43 
As a "philosophical" historian, Scott's interest in the history of the Geddes family 
provides a sort of social study that invokes the idea of the constant elements in human 
nature, and Geddes's performance is only a variation of this constancy. When Darsie 
proposes to Rachel that her brother, Joshua "ought to avert the danger by compromise 
or submission," she agrees with him, but immediately comments: "even in the best 
trained temper there may remain some leaven of the old Adam." (74) This remark 
convinces Darsie that "the spirit of the old sharers of the spoil was not utterly 
departed even from the bosom of the peaceful Quaker." (74) Joshua's ancestors were 
"famed for successful freeboot ing , robbery, and bloodshed," as a means for making 
profit. (66) While he retains the principle of confrontation in defending his project 
for making profit, he changes the means of achieving his objective. For the modem 
Quaker, the new version of heroism hinges on "courage in enduring," which he 
regards as effective as Redgauntlet's courage of "acting." (56) Darsie confesses that 
Joshua "had the right, when he averred that there was as much courage in sufferance 
as in exertion" (74) but he ignores the real motive behind Joshua's conduct when he 
couples him with Redgauntlet to form "no bad emblem of Peace and War." Darsie 
means to accredit Joshua as a man of peace and to see the other as a man of violence. 
It is true that several qualities are common between Redgauntlet and Joshua 
Geddes-myopic vision, courage, contempt for the law and believe in directness of 
language; yet, given the real moral motives in all this, the narrative tends to depict 
Redgauntlet's violence with more sympathy than it does Geddes's peace. The position 
of Redgauntlet, though obsolete, seems to be more acceptable than that of the Quaker, 
as far as integrity and public interest are concerned. Nowhere is Redgauntlet's 
authority so readily accepted as when protecting the traditional right of the Solway 
spear-fishers against the new capitalist system of netting adopted by the Quaker. 
Joshua, we may say, is a machiavelli an proper; and if he promotes peace, wllike his 
ancestors, it is only because, like all capitalists, his trade will not prosper except in a 
peaceful environment. 
His kindness to the horses and other animals of Mount Sharon is extraordinary, but 
he does not extend the same thought to the men whose livelihood he interferes with 
by his fishing methods. Winning the loyalty of an animal needs minimum care, 
perhaps only feeding. Binding men with the cords of affection and obligation, 
however, demands a sort of schooling and kindness. His argument \"'1th Redgauntlet 
about the legality of his nets is purely materialistic. The nets, he reminds 
Redgauntlet, are constructed with "our own purses." (56) For all of his justification, 
economics control at least some of his actions. It would not be bad for Joshua to 
consider prosperity if he were less hypocritical about his stand and could extend the 
same fmancial consideration to other fishermen. Willie describes the Quaker-trade as 
"Canting and lying," (120) while Redgauntlet interprets Joshua's justifications for not 
resorting to violence to defend his right in the tide-nets as a "cloak to your 
hypocritical avarice." (56) In fact, there is evidence that supports such claims. 
Joshua's religious doctrine admits that "laws and lawyers are evils," yet he is ready, as 
a tactical move to protect his nets, to ally with them as "they are necessary evils in 
this probationary state of society." (59) Apart from Joshua's commercial mentality 
and his flaw of religious integrity, he is not presented as totally bad~ at least he is 
shown to respect bonds of friendship. He does all he can to fmd Darsie and help him. 
He travels "in the sorrow of the soul, and mourning for the fate ofDarsie Latimer as 
he would for his first-born child." (348) 
Scott presents another version of men of religion who, in some aspect like Geddes, 
make of religion a veil to cover their immorality. Tom Trumbull, also called 
Turnpenny, as his name suggests, exhibits a religious hypocrisy that hardly masks a 
profitable smuggling business. Recalling how fanatic religious sects, particularly the 
Covenanters, reject mundane pleasures and choose to lead a mystic life that, in their 
view, secures virtue and guarantees the hereafter, we understand how progress has 
shined a Covenanter's concern from Heaven to Earth. Alan's first impression of 
Turnpenny is a "rigid old Covenanter, who said only what he thought right, acted on 
no other principle but that of duty, and, if he committed errors, did so under the full 
impression that he was serving God rather than man." (256) The picture becomes not 
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only ironical but even shameful when later he finds "himself thus complete 1 y in the 
power of a canting hypocrite." (260) Religious culture, in the moral sense, which 
plays a significant role in the previous novels, at least in sustaining a sense of national 
and public spirit, is now giving way to new concerns that foster lucre and reinforce 
individualism. Tumpenny is committed to an economical world that employs utility 
in its ugliest form. As a smuggler, he violates the laws, threatens economy and above 
all lacks any patriotic feelings; his trade with the rebels would lead to civil war, 
bloodshed, and national disintegration. He is precisely the sort of man the 
"philosophical" historians have warned against who lack all civic virtue that would 
guide his moral choices. Geddes, unlike Turnpenny, though interested in economy, is 
frank in his trade. He invests his money and relies, though reluctantly, on law to 
protect his investment. Although the new techniques he introduces jeopardize the 
fishermen's interest yet they could be also looked at as improvement. 
The old order of Redgauntlet embodied in a patriarchal system is different from a 
commercial world, as the old system has become deconstructed into various 
institutions. Now loyalty in the feudal sense is something of the past but loyalty as a 
form of integrity/honour should form the basis of conduct in every institution as a 
warrant against corruption. Here Alan's role is to show that it is possible, through his 
integrity, to improve on the customs of the ancestors. If Alan alone represents new 
Scotland, or even prospective Britain, it would not be difficult to make a claim for 
Scott's sympathy. Alan is himself sympathetic and essentially shares many qualities 
with Redgauntlet. He even displays integrity towards the Prince though he does not 
wish his return: 
Fairford himself remembered Father Buonaventure, and made little question 
but that he was one of the sons of the old Chevalier de Saint George; and 
with feelings which, although contradictory of his public duty, can hardly be 
much censured, his heart recoiled from being the agent by whom the last 
scion of such a long line of Scottish Princes should be rooted up. (390) 
Alan feels conflicted by the division between the traditional, that which is ingrained 
in his heart, and that which he sees as more practically beneficial to society. Alan, 
however, represents one side of modem Scotland particularly that connected with law, 
but law which observes the public good and not manipulated law that supports 
individual interests. It is important to note here that while Geddes is disappointed that 
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the law will not protect him, Alan tells Darsie that the nets are not generally 
considered legal: 
The legality of the mode of fishing practised by your friend Joshua, is 
greatly doubted by our best lawyers; and that, if the stake-nets be considered 
as actually an unlawful obstruction raised in the channel of the estuary an 
. , 
assembly of persons who shall proceed, via facti, to pull them down and 
destroy them, would not in the eye of the law be esteemed guilty of a riot. 
(84) 
Once again Scott capitalizes on the integrity of lawyers such as Alan and by extension 
every one in whatever system who protects progress and civilization by setting the 
record straight to secure morality as the foundation of political and social stability. 
Even when the narrative deals with integrity among individuals on the private 
level, for instance, friendship and romantic love, it places it within the coordinates of 
moral and social justice. The pri vate is not isolated from the public. Alan's romantic 
integrity, reflected in his response to aid his friend, Darsie, is, perhaps, justified in 
terms of his noble feelings yet socially it is unjust; his conduct breaches a contract, 
leads to a loss of a client's case, disrupts justice, and above all disappoints his father. 
Nanty Ewart's episode touches upon many issues; all are concerned with romantic 
integrity and its impact on justice and morality. Nanty's father, "a true chip of the old 
Presbyterian block," similar to Alan's father, wants him to train in divinity. The 
difference is that while Alan is always kept under his father's supervision, Nanty, who 
is only nineteen and an "innocent lad," (275) is sent to Edinburgh to fall into sin 
through female temptation by a girl, Jess Cantrips. This situation, inversely, reminds 
us of Effie. However, Nanty could have mended his mistake, as he puts it: "I would 
have married the girl, and taken my chance-I would, by Heaven! For she was a 
pretty girl, and a good girl, till she and I met; but you know the old song, "Kirk would 
not let us be." (275) To save his lover's reputation Nanty has to please the "Kirk-
treasurer for a small sum of money" and the next step is to "proclaim" Jess's "frailty to 
the whole parish, by mounting the throne of Presbyterian penance, and proving, as 
Othello says, 'his love a whore,' in face of the whole congregation." (275) All Nanty 
has, "as a penniless dominie," is his integrity; instead of scandalizing his lover, he 
decides to go home. But he comes to understand that his father "did nothing for six 
days but cry out, 'the glory is departed from my house!' and on the seventh he 
preached a sermon, in which he enlarged on this incident as illustrative of one of the 
great occasIOns for humiliation, and causes of national defection." (275) Thus 
shamed by his father, Nanty exiles himself. 
Even in exile Nanty's integrity towards his father and his lover is still alive. 
Returning from exile with "little prize-money" his thOUght is to marry Jess and 
reconcile himself to his father. Once again he becomes the victim of remorse as he 
discovers that his father has passed away affected by what he considers the "falling 
away" of his son. (276) Jess and her mother, Lady Kittlebasket become, indirectly, 
the victims of Nanty's sin. Nanty's sudden departure and his father's death have 
prevented the Lady from the payment of the arrears for lodging. The landlord, who 
lacks any sense of benevolence, and whom we come to know later to be Peter 
Peebles, ejects the lady from her "airy habitation" to be "driven to the workhouse" and 
finally die in distress. (276) Jess's destiny is no less disastrous~ she "had the honour 
to be transported to the plantations, for street-walking and pocket-picking." Nanty's 
integrity to his lover makes him expect "to meet Jess at every turning." (277) His 
only way to express his integrity toward those whom he loves is by gradual self-
destruction. "The remedy" to "qualms" he has is the bottle. (276) Scott, through this 
episode, seems to highlight more than one point. Firstly, he presents a sort of 
criticism of irrational adherence to religious belief which, instead of taking the form 
of enlightened religious integrity that offers practical solutions for moral problems, as 
Butler could have done in a similar case, complicates matters and leads to further 
social and moral damage. In a sense, what is supposed to be religious justice does not 
do justice to anyone of those involved in this episode. Secondly. it shows that 
personal integrity is part of one's character in all capacities. Nanty suffered for his 
integrity towards his romantic love and also died for his integrity that prevents him 
from doing a villainous act of treachery. In either case, he proves to combine 
chivalric honour with integrity. 
Perhaps nowhere are integrity and honour best displayed than in Charles's stance in 
defence of his mistress, Mrs. Wallkenshaw. As far as personal relationship is 
concerned, we might admire and appreciate Prince Charles's gallantry and integrity in 
as much as we do of Alan's, Nanty's or even Redgauntlet's integrity. But Charles's 
integrity towards his mistress concerns not the fate of a single person but a whole 
public cause and this fact in its own right undermines romantic integrity and makes it 
invalid. However, such romantic integrity, though it appears to be ridiculous, if taken 
from Charles's view, who, like Redgauntlet, ignores historical changes arowld him 
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and still adheres to the "spirit of hereditary obstinacy," (8) it arouses our s:mpathy 
towards him. I think Scott's point lies here. Integrity as a civic virtue is always 
needed but what determines its value, validity and justice is the state of society in the 
course of historical progress. Education needs to foster it in terms of public utility 
rather than individual utility. Hume makes it clear that "we are naturally partial to 
ourselves, and to our friends; but are capable of learning the advantage resulting from 
a more equitable conduct. ,,44 
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Conclusion 
Guy Mannering (1815), The Antiquary (1816), The Bride ofLammermoor (1819) 
In the previous chapters we examined Scott's vision of history and progress and 
how it manifests itself in some of his Scottish novels. This vision, in its 
epistemological and ideological implications, we argued, derives from fundamental 
assumptions in the Scottish Enlightenment philosophy about the uniformity, 
progressive and social-political-moral nature of man and the evolution of his social, 
political and economical institutions. Most importantly, we showed that Scott's 
treatment of civic and heroic virtues in contexts of religion, family, social 
relationships, nationalism, law and justice, politics, and economy is based on tIus 
vision. According to this vision, Scott's programme of progress and reconciliation, 
founded on gradual improvement, shows the possibility of and need for 
accommodating ancient virtues in the present. Ideologically, Scott's programme 
fights against selfish philosophy, and the potentially negative impact of Wlbridled 
materialism on integrative social-politi cal-moral values, which Ferguson robustly 
warns against in his Essay. It offers a basis for unity in the evolution of tradition. To 
conclude tllis study, I consider three more of Scott's novels, Guy Mannen·ng, The 
Antiquary, and The Bride of Lammermoor in an attempt to show that Scott's vision of 
progress and reconciliation extends ideologically to the rest of the Waverley novels. 
Within the same context, I give special attention to Scott's treatment of social class 
conflict and social mobility. 
It is obvious that in these novels Scott narrows his scope as he shifts from dealing 
with historical conflicts, political or religious at the level of the nation to minor 
conflicts based on the themes of ''usurpation of property" in The Bride and the "lost 
heir" in Mannering and The Antiquary at the level of families and small commWlities. 
In his treatment of Mannering and The Antiquary, Gordon points out that this shift has 
no effect on Scott's concern in dramatizing the relationship between the past and the 
present. In his view, if anything, it releases Scott from "history's decision on the 
Jacobites" so that he can now freely express his conservative sentiments by making 
"ancient virtue" triumph over "modern rascality. ,,1 In The Bride, according to 
Gordon, where economic virtues triumph over ancient virtues, Scott expresses himself 
as a Tory pessimist, sceptical of progress and commercial values. 2 
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As far as the romance plot is concerned, in Mannering and The Antiquary, Gordon 
and most recent critics seem to underestimate any thematic role of the protagonist 
simply because they assume that Scott was writing a Bildungsroman. For Ian 
Duncan, the private plot in Mannering "weaves itself around no central SUbjectivity or 
even a single protagonist, but a miscellany of characters and voices and discourses 
[which are] brought together not by a single human experience but by the allegorizing 
order of the plot." The hero's progress in his view receives "minimal psychological 
attention" and Harry Bertram, unlike Edward Waverley, "undergoes no spiritual 
conversion, disenchantment self-reconstruction, but a realization of his original 
identity.,,3 Duncan's argument is extended to Lovel in The Antiquary, whom Harry 
E. Shaw qualifies as "the weakest and least interesting protagonist in the Waverley 
series.,,4 
Unarguably, the focus in these novels is on the relationship between ancient and 
modern virtues, but Scott's interest in highlighting this relationship, I would suggest, 
can be understood not in terms of Scott's sentiments, conservative versus liberal or 
optimistic versus pessimistic but rather in terms of Scott's historicism, and his attempt 
to work out an aesthetic solution for the paradox of the impact of 
progresslimprovement on civic and heroic virtues, registered in the writings of the 
"philosophical" historians. This solution suggests that the contradiction or tension 
that might arise in the course of progress can be resolved and must be resol ved, for 
the sake of establishing a genuine progressive community, by adopting a culture 
whose very foundation is active humanism. Along the same line I suggest that while 
Scott was not writing a Bildungsroman here, his heroes are not devoid of ideological 
significance. In Mannen'ng and more apparently in The Antiquary, the hero's 
significance lies in his role as a type that represents a new adaptive ideal for the 
present in many ways, The hero, unlike Edward Waverley, ignorant of his roots, 
earns his social status not by virtue of heredity or birthright but, as a middle class 
representative, through his own struggle and exploits (talent, skill, moral autonomy, 
manly virtues and so forth) before he is re-established in his real social position as an 
aristocrat. In Mannering the hero, Harry Bertram, makes this point clear when he 
writes to his friend in the military: "we have fought our preferment, and gained that 
by the sword which we had not money to compass otherwise,,,5 Similarly, the hero, 
LovellNeville, in The Antiquary is no less self-reliant, as he indicates to Oldbuck: "I 
owe no man anything-I have the means of maintaining myself with complete 
independence. ,,6 
Thus, as a type, the hero seems to be employed to achieve two purposes. The flfst 
is to bridge the gap between the upper and lower social classes caused by the nature 
of economic progress, while the second is to redefme the conception of hierarchy by 
prioritizing personal merit over heredity in assuming social and political 
responsibilities. In a sense, unlike Burke, and much like the "philosophical" 
historians, Scott confidently legitimizes crossing social boundaries within a 
recognized but almost seamless hierarchy, providing that social mobility is propelled 
by honourable means improving on heroic and civic virtues. As for Edgar 
Ravenswood, the hero in The Bride, I attempt to show that his role does not indicate 
his obsoleteness but his validity. Echoing Ferguson's views, he serves to comment on 
and debunk the defects of both the ancient and modem worlds, paving the way for a 
future ideal community. 
To begin with I want to examine some of the activities, sayings and doings of 
symbolic characters that would support my argument regarding Scott's position 
towards Progress/improvement and his vision of reconciling ancient and modern 
values. Scott, as we have argued in chapter one, believes in progress as something 
inherent in human nature and its institutions but the way he envisages progress 
deserves some attention. Progress might improve many defects of an old order but it 
takes in its way many good things too, as Oldbuck expresses it bluntly in his 
justification of the French Revolution: "It might be likened to a storm or hurricane, 
which, passing over a region, does great damage in its passage, yet sweeps away 
stagnant and unwholesome vapours, and repays, in further health and fertility, its 
immediate desolation and ravage." (277-278) Yet, guided by the turbulent and 
violent history of Scotland and the peaceful settlement of 1688, Scott has always 
displayed reluctance to any change that comes by effect of the "hurricane" of 
rebellion or revolution. Therefore Scott might agree with Oldbuck in principle but the 
first few chapters in Mannen'ng demonstrate disagreement with the means. 
In these chapters Scott presents us with a sort of rebellion, when Godfrey Bertram 
chases the smugglers and evicts the gypsies from his estate in the name of 
improvement. Although Bertram exercises his personal and legal rights in his 
enterprise yet he is ex-posed to severe criticism. The general impression of this 
criticism makes us, as many critics do, believe that Scott's conservatism aligns him 
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with Burke, who fights for continuity and rejects change. But the case is not simple. 
The measure taken by Godfrey is legal and in real life Scott did not oppose 
improvements that would lead to economic progress. His support for the act of 
Clearances, which parallels in some sense the eviction of the gypsies, attests to that 
even though, as quoted by John Sutherland, this support goes "in contradiction" to his 
"better judgment.,,7 This suggests that Scott's social-moral-Iegal-economical 
analysis, taken in context of the consequences of Godfrey Bertram's overnight 
improvements and the damage he did for himself, his family and his community, 
serves only as a method for highlighting the contingent risk of change on the organic 
links that hold individuals together. 
In chapter si~ we seem to hear Burke when Scott comments with characteristic 
humanity on the impact of Bertram's reforms on the local relationships as they disrupt 
irremediably the long-standing pattern of life in the Ellangowan community: "We are 
not made of wood or stone, and the things which connect themselves with our hearts 
and habits cannot, like bark or lichen, be rent away without our missing them." (54) 
On evicting the gypsies, Scott asks: "Ought the mere circwnstances of Bertram's 
becoming a magistrate to have made at once such a change in his conduct towards 
them?" But lest we think that he is reactionary and against improvement, in the 
tradition of Burke, Scott proposes that "some means of reformation ought at least to 
have been tried, before sending seven families at once upon the wide world, and 
depriving them of a degree of countenance which withheld them at least from 
atrocious guilt." (64) 
It is obvious that Scott is not against Bertram's individual right in progress and 
improvement but his eye is on the community's interest~ the damage to which Scott 
refers is significantly to Bertram's lack of human sensibility. It is true that "certain 
qualms of feeling had deterred Ellangowan from attending in person to see his tenants 
expelled" (63) but this is not the type of sensibility that concerns Scott. Passive 
humanity incarnated by the "Man of Feeling," as we have seen in Waverley, has been 
a target for Scott's critique. It follows that Scott's proposition that Godfrey should 
have behaved humanely instead of exercising his authority with "more severity than 
mercy" (52) refers to active human sensibility, which in some sense improves on 
heroic and civic virtues, as the antithesis of selfishness and villainy. This humanized 
civic virtue, as a compromising and defining frame for progress in various social and 
political institutions that fits for a wider allegiance, can be seen at work in all 
activities in the novel, suggesting that refonn may be necessary but it should be 
humane refonn that recognizes traditional and popular values. 
The loss of the Bertrams' right, the anarchy, the conflict and violence that have 
shaped the Ellangowan community are but a direct result of applying laws 
mercilessly, on the one hand, and manipUlating laws on the other. In this case, hwnan 
affections are suspended in social transactions. We recall how Scott makes this idea 
central in Old Mortality when he links the destruction of social ties to the suspension 
of human affections in context of political and religious fanaticism. Thus, to restore 
lost right and justice means fIrst and foremost to restore the spirit of the community 
by reactivating human affections among its members, each in his own capacity, and to 
translate them into action. Here Scott seems to envisage a community or even a nation 
as a sort of civilized tribe on a large scale in tenns of social relationships~ strong 
primiti ve kinship relationships are transferred to communal relationships and 
sponsored by humanized law under a new and broader nomenclature, active dutv-
right commitment, as Ferguson would suggest. 
As far as the institution of law is concerned, Scott, as a lawyer, is aware that 
modern law in the hands of a lawyer is like the sword in the hand of a soldier~ in 
either case decency and humanity are needed if justice and military spirit are to be 
dissociated from amorality, crime and savagery. Junius Pleydell, the Edinburgh 
attorney in Mannering, seems to speak for Scott when he defmes ci vic virtue in terms 
of human affections at large: "we lawyers are not of iron, sir, or of brass, anymore 
than you soldiers are of steel ... But the devil take a soldier whose heart can be as hard 
as his sword, and his dam catch the lawyer who bronzes his bosom instead of his 
forehead!" (256) Pleydell, as a compromising agent, much like a "philosophical" 
historian, studies the past only to shun its irrationalities and improve on its virtues. 
For instance, he adheres to his ancestors' religious doctrine but he implicitly rejects 
their fanaticism: "I love to pray where my fathers prayed before me, 'without thinking 
worse of the Presbyterian fonns, because they do not affect me with the same 
associations." (259) Similarly, in his career as a lawyer, Pleydell argues that the past 
is important in directing the present, which explains his interest in the history books 
of law. "These," says PleydeU, "are my tools of trade. A lawyer without history or 
literature is a mechanic, a mere working mason~ if he possesses some knowledge of 
these, he may venture to call himself an architect." The implication is that laws may 
evolve over time, fItting themselves to new social circumstances but the principles of 
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justice from which they derive remain the same. The challenge for a la\\;;er, then, is 
to abide by the spirit of law and to fmd the possible means that approximate justice 
with humanity, accuracy and practicality. 
In this respect, Pleydell is no mere mason but an "architect," indeed. On one 
occasion, he applies Rob Roy's law of limited justice, which is based on family and 
tribal allegiance, guided by instinctive human affections, and defended by chivalric 
honour. On another, he applies the Fairfords' modem law of universal justice, based 
on rationalized human affections and supported by probity, skill and civil courage. In 
which case, he seeks to set the record straight in a pragmatic and humane way. 
Dandie, a simple peasant, who disputes with Jock 0' Dawston over a trivial piece of 
land, like Peter Peebles, in Redgauntlet, insists on pursuing a lawsuit against his 
neighbour but Pleydell, who knows about the emotionally frustrating proceedings of 
law and, in most cases, the dishonesty of lawyers who seek lucre, proposes that he 
either settles the matter by following old ways or quit the whole idea. For Pleydell 
this could have been a good opportunity to make money yet he reminds Dandie that: 
"justice, like charity, should begin at home. Do you justice to your wife and family, 
and think no more about the matter." (253) Pleydell's altruistic and chivalric 
response towards Dandie is reminiscent of Rob Roy's similar compassionate attitude 
toward poor people in his business transactions. By contrast, Pleydell, as a 
progressive and professiona1lawyer, resorts to modern sophisticated law, exerting all 
his skill to uncover the complications surrounding Bertram's case and to gather strong 
evidence that confmns Glossin's involvement in the criminal acts connected with this 
case. Only after establishing a strong case against Glossin does he order a warrant 
against him, though not without expressing his sympathy. "I am sorry for Glossin," 
he tells Mannering. But Scott, the moralist, amplifies this human feeling by adding a 
twist of moral philosophy to it. Given the fact that the authority of law like any 
authority could be doubly employed, Pleydell deplores Glossin's lack of professional 
integrity, which presupposes also a lack of human sensibility. According to Pleydell, 
"Glossin would have been a pretty lawyer, had he not had such a turn for the roguish 
part of the profession." (411) 
In a commercial world where laws and the written word are crucial in organizing 
transactions among people and because, unlike inherited norms, they can be 
manipulated or misinterpreted, the virtue of "honour" remains a necessary component 
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of a lawyer's character. Commenting on writers and partnerships in the world of 
business, Oldbuck pronounces: 
In a profession where unboWlded trust is necessarily reposed ... it is the more 
to the honour of those ... who unite integrity with skill and attention, and 
walk honourably upright in that profession where there are so many falls 
and stwnbling-blocks for those of a different character. To such men their 
fellow-citizens may safely entrust the care of protecting their patrimonial 
rights, and their country the more sacred charge of her laws and privileges. 
(338) 
In short, Scott shares Ferguson's view that "the influence of laws ... is not any magic 
power descending from shelves that are loaded with books, but is, in realty, the 
influence of men resolved to be free; of men, who ... are determined, by their vigilance 
and spirit, to make these [laws] be observed.',g If active humanity in applying the 
spirit of law is the way for maintaining justice, it is no surprise to find in it a way for 
maintaining social solidity and protection in a given community. 
Mannering who remembers his first visit to Ellangowan Estate and Godfrey's 
generosity toward him "could not restrain his tears" (10) for the wretched condition of 
the homeless Bertrams but this sentimental act alone is not sufficient to elevate their 
distress. Thus he substantiates this passion into activity, as he becomes a surrogate 
father for Lucy Bertam and offers her and her loyal satellite, Dominie Sampson, 
pennanent shelter. So does the Sherrif-substitute of the county, Mac-Morlan, whose 
defense of the right of the Bertrams is "chivalric" by all standards. Taking the 
challenge, he shows civil courage and moral responsibility to adjourn selling 
Bertram's estate in an attempt to thwart Glossin's selfish scheme for purchasing the 
estate at the lowest price. His conduct, much like that of Mannering, presents him as 
an embodiment of integrative humanitarian ideals of altruism. 
Ideologically we feel it hard to separate Mannering's magnanimity and his 
readiness to enact benevolence and charity from his career. Scott seems to suggest a 
relationship between military education and heroic and civic virtue in general. 
Nonnally, military life besides inculcating patriotic feeling that exacts self-sacrifice in 
defense of national security, also inculcates manly virtues that swface as heroic acts. 
This military altruistic spirit, Scott seems to suggest, becomes a second nature and 
manifests itself as moral and social responsibility in the protection of public interest 
and safety even in times of peace. Within this cootext, Scott once again asserts that 
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the spirit of civic and heroic virtues of the past can be transferred into the present and 
operate within a new code best described as social and national duty. Given this 
suggestion, Mannering's role, as an upper-class leader and agent of unity is further 
highlighted by setting an example in military courage and self-sacrifice in the 
protection of the community from external depredations, and in confounding all social 
distinctions. 
In chapter 30, writing to her friend, Matilda, about the circumstances of the 
confrontation between her father and the smugglers, Julia points out that her "father 
had served the king, he would not refuse to protect the servants of the government, 
when threatened to be murdered in the discharge of their duty." (201) Such patriotic 
sentiment could be seen as a sort of advanced tribal commitment that operates not as 
an instinctive reaction on a narrow level but rather as a conscious institutionalized one 
in response to public interest llllder the banner of law and duty. The "military 
loyalty" and courage, which Mannering displays in challenging thirty smugglers is 
enough to spark public spiritedness. Charles Hazlewood, son of the passive aristocrat, 
Sir Robert, seconds "with great spirit" Mannering's readiness to fight, and even the 
simple Sampson "seized upon a fowling-piece" to take part in resisting the smugglers 
(201-202). 
The analogy between Mannering and the hero, Harry BertramlBrown, begins here. 
Harry is also in the military, and he reacts in a similar way as he interferes to support 
the peasant Dinmont when attacked by the robbers on a deserted road. Although the 
robbers beg him to "follow his nose over the heath ... for they had nothing to say to 
him," (156) yet the captain finds it his duty to engage heroically with them in a deadly 
fight to save the life of the peasant. The episode tests the hero's legitimacy as a 
middle-class member in terms of social and moral commitment before he earns his 
real rank. In the meantime, it shows, in the light ofDinmont's assistance for Harry 
later, the significance of social unity in facing dangers. 
As agents of compromise, Mannering and Pleydell, each in his own station, 
interact positively and responsibly in unison with all social ranks, including the gypsy 
Meg Merrilies in an effort to restore justice, unity and order to the Ellangowan 
community. Baron Robert Hazlewood is shown to be of little help to the Ellangowan 
estate precisely because he takes his inherited position too seriously. He hates all the 
Bertrams of Ellangowan "because a certain baron of that house was traditionally 
reported to have caused the founder of Hazlewood family hold his stirrup until he 
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mounted into his saddle." (296) His adherence to past formalities, worse still, makes 
him resent the present because progress has rendered justice distributive and not 
selective. For him, crime should be judged differently "according to the just 
gradations of society, the guilt of an injury is enhanced by the rank of the person to 
whom it is offered, done, or perpetrated." (300) Finally, his social discrimination 
makes him complain that "now ... the clouted shoe of the peasant galls the kibe of the 
courtier." (302) As a degenerate Baron, Sir Roberes representation of the old order 
stands in sharp contrast with Baron Bradwardine. We recall, when Baron 
Bradwardine's feudal sensibility is put on trial in the case ofpoor Janet Gellatley, on 
accusation of witchcraft by the Whig gentry, he attends to ensure "fair play between 
the witch and the clergy." In fact, it is this spirit of moral and social responsibility 
among social classes, which Scott wants to transfer into the present. Mannering, in 
this context, serves as a critique of Sir Robert's unenlightened and irresponsible 
attitude towards his community. 
Mannering is also wealthy and no less enthusiastic than Sir Robert about 
prejudices "in favour of birth and rank" (120) but, unlike him, and much like 
Bradwardine, he breaks social bOlmdaries when he descends from his ivory tower and 
venerates the peasant Dandie for his manhood, generosity, honesty, and altruistic 
support for Harry Bertram. Mannering not only receives Dandie with "heartily 
welcome," but also adds that "he was sure his rough coat and thick soled boots would 
honour a royal drawing room." (361-362) This spirit of social hannony takes 
additional dimensions in the cooperation between the protagonist and Meg Merrilies. 
Meg, as a gypsy and thief, has no place in Scott's progressive community and 
therefore she has to pass away, but not before she accomplishes her job in helping 
Harry restore his right. Yet her performance and rhetoric are significant in terms of 
moral implications. As a symbol of "the savage virtue of fidelity," (12) she spares 
no means for helping and protecting Harry against possible dangers until fmally she 
pays with her own life at the hands of Hatteraick in the course of clearing Harry's 
identity and right. Throughout her short relationship with Harry, she acts as a guide 
for him, enriching his experience by setting one example after another in 
disinterestedness so that he will not repeat his father's mistakes. Meg's influence 
upon Harry materializes as he tells himself: "she has been upon honour with me if she 
were the devil, and I will be equally upon honour with her." (192) Meg anticipates 
that Harry shall be ''the best laird that Ellangowan has seen for three hundred years." 
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(332) The implication is that Hany represents an updated version of his father. He 
has experienced the meaning of loyalty in the person of Meg, manhood in the person 
of Dinmont, integrity in the person of Pleydell, and generosity in the person of 
Mannering. Above all, unlike his father, he understands that one cannot survi ve 
without the help of the community. This understanding qualifies him in the future to 
establish a relationship with his tenants based on mutual loyalty, humanity and 
respect. 
Scott's emphasis on inculcating such a culture appears to be more urgent in The 
Antiquary. This is no surprise, for The Antiquary, according to Scott, "refers to the 
last ten years of the eighteenth century." (4) By that time, portents of class com1ict 
potentially threaten the social and political structure of the British nation. Also class 
mobility has opened the way for the emergence of the middle class as an im1uential 
power in social and political life. This perhaps could explain Scott's focus on the 
middle class in The Antiquary and his attempt to define its role, in terms of virtue, as a 
leading and unifying force. 
The Antiquary is similar to Mannering in terms of the private plot. The 
protagonist, Lovel-Neville, like Hany Bertram, is originally displaced in the social 
context. The protagonist's problem in either case is primarily connected with loss of 
identity. This impedes his union with the heroine, but Scott undercuts the theme of 
romantic love by laying emphasis on the hero's relationship with symbolic characters 
in the public plot, as most critics note. Through this relationship we come to know 
about the hero's ideological position in terms of the various issues raised in the public 
plot. These symbolic characters take much of Scott's attention at the expense of the 
hero. For instance, Oldbuck, the Antiquary himselC as an upper class representative, 
and agent of both virtue and communal values takes a central position in the novel, 
much as Edie, the beggar, does. Both provide a new defmition of social-moral-
economical values that cope with the spirit of the age. These values favour personal 
merit over lineage and are conferred on Lovel, as an aristocrat. 
Before we discover the social and moral implications of Oldbuck's role, Scott 
interpolates the gothic tale about Oldbuck's German predecessor, "Aldobrand," in an 
attempt to defme Oldbuck's social status and to draw an analogy between Aldobrand 
and Lovel. The tale reveals that Oldbuck is a descendent of one whose mobility in the 
social hierarchy is the result of personal attainment rather than lineage or privilege. 
Aldobrand's motto, which is in fact, Oldbuck's, is: "KUNST "MACHT GUNST-that 
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is, skill, or prudence, in availing ourselves of our natural talents and advantages \\ ill 
compel favor and patronage, even where it is withheld from prejudice or ignorance." 
(85) Lovel has seen these words in his dream and Oldbuck translates their meaning 
to him and points to how Aldobrand wins the hand of his master's daughter through 
his skill in printing, which ultimately, brings him close to his master in terms of 
family station, rank and wealth. In the context of the private plot, Lovel, like 
Aldobrand, looks forward to winning Isabella, whose father, Sir Arthur, capitalizes on 
"purity of birth" (99) and heredity as criteria for social rank rather than skill and 
prudence. In the context of the public plot, the implication of the story encourages us 
to see social mobility as rational, progressive and legitimate, even though the gothic 
tale about "The Fortunes of Martin Waldeck" seems to argue to the contrary. What 
seems to be a contradiction, however, could be solved when we realize that Scott's 
objecti ve in both tales is to show that social mobility is one of the fruits of progress, 
but the means employed to prop it, and the end to which it is employed, in terms of 
virtue remains the arbiter in legitimizing it. 
Oldbuck's narrative supports the assumption about the legitimacy of social 
mobility and asserts the positive role of the middle class, as a buffer zone that would 
prevent friction between the upper and lower classes. His sympathetic interaction 
with and the services he offers to his community attest to that. His conduct at the 
funeral of Steenie, son of the poor fisherman, Saunder Meiklebackit, presents him as 
an enlightened antiquarian who is able to employ virtues of the past to remedy 
potential ills in the present. Crown informs Oldbuck on his proper role in Steenie's 
funeral according to local customs: "ye ken in this country ilka gentleman is wussed 
to be sae civil as to see the corpse afIhis grounds ... it's no expected your honor suld 
leave the land ... [just] a step and half ower the doorsane." (237-238) Oldbuck 
approves the custom by incorporating it into philosophical history: "It comes from 
ancient times, and was founded deep in the notions of mutual aid and dependence 
between the lord and cul ti vator of the soil ... the feudal usages mitigated and softened 
the sternness of classical times. No man, Caxon, ever heard of a Spartan attending the 
funeral of a Helot." (238) Not limiting himself to the form of custom, as is the case 
with the aristocrat, Sir Arthur Wardour or Sir Robert, who takes from the past only 
family prejudice, Oldbuck attends the funeral. Steenie's father is so overcome with 
grief that he is unable to enact his part in the funeral according to custom, that of 
supporting the head of the coffin. Oldbuck, undertaking an extra step beyond that 
272 
required of him, informs the mourners ''that he himself, as a landlord and master to 
the deceased, "would carry his head to the grave." (252) 
This gesture shows that the middle-class Oldbuck endorses feudal practice not 
simply as a person bound to tradition (like Bradwardine who insists on removing the 
boots of the prince after the battle) or as guarantor of privilege but as a man rationally 
committed to mitigating the strains of social hierarchy. Further, though he announces 
his position in the familiar language of feudal law, he undertakes this partly because 
his sentiments are moved. The community asserted by his act, then, is not simply one 
of law-feudal custom or enlightened-but of human sentiment translated into action. 
The result for British social cohesion could not have been better if calculated: "bv this 
instance of compliance with their customs, and respect for their persons, Mr. 
Oldbuck gained more popularity than by all the sums which he had yearly distributed 
in the parish for the purpose of private and general charity." (252) 
Many critics interested in asserting that Scott offers a serious criticism of life and 
exhibits an acceptable social conscience adduce as evidence the outburst against 
"gentles" by Saunders Mucklebackit in chapter 34. The scene and language are 
indeed powerful, among Scott's best work. Oldbuck happens on Mucklebackit 
patching his boat and moralizes: "I am glad ... that you feel yourself able to make this 
exertion." (267) Mucklebackit's response, partly to Oldbuck and partly to himself, 
reveals his sense of class grievance and antagonism: 
And what would ye have me to do ... unless I wanted to see four children 
starve, because ane is drowned? It's weel wi' you gentles, that can sit in the 
house wi' handkerchers at your een when ye lose a friend~ but the like 0' us 
maun to our wark again, if our hearts were beating as hard as my 
hammer ... There is a curse either upon me or on this auld black bitch of a 
boat, that I have hauled up high and dry, and patched and clouted sae mony 
years, that she might drown my poor Steenie at the end of them, and be d-
d to her. .. She maun be mended though again' the morning tide-that's a 
thing 0' necessity. (267-268) 
'Ibis may well be Scott's most effective portrayal of lower class resentment, 
wonderfully expressed in folk-rhetoric. But Mucklebackit's remarks are virtually 
without direct political or economic reference~ his grievance against "gentles" is 
expressed in very general social terms. In fact, his motive for speaking, like the 
excuse for not carrying his son's cotlin, is an excess of human sentiment. Thus, Scott 
raises the specter of class antagonism only to dispel it by invoking humanized civic 
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virtue as the remedy for what might become a reality. Oldbuck, who embodies such 
virtue, recognizes the fishennan's grief and necessity by offering to pay for the local 
carpenter to do two day's work. Mucklebackit responds with wannth: 
I t~ank yeo Ye were aye kind and neighborly, \\hatever folks says of your 
bemg near and close; and I hae often said in thae tiems when they were 
ganging to raise up the puir folk against the gentles-I hae often said, ne' er 
a man should steer a hair touching to Monkbarns while Steenie and I could 
wag fmger-and so said Steenie too. (268) 
Ironically, this speech of reconciliation and fellow-feeling gives far stronger evidence 
of class hostility than the earlier and much more frequently cited passage~ since it 
points clearly to dissatisfied peasants or labourers and their attempt to revolt against 
their landlord. But Scott seems to allude to social discrimination as one of the 
dangerous illnesses that potentially foment rebellion and suggests that benevolent 
paternalism displayed by Oldbuck towards lower classes is the cure. The 
reconciliation of classes enacted socially at the ftmeral and individually between 
Mucklebackit and Oldbuck is further highlighted in the shape of a wider allegiance 
when the Earl of Glenallan, who has ceased to be a social agent after retreating to 
quietism, resumes his social responsibilities. The Earl willingly joins Oldbuck' s team 
in the effort of rescuing poor Edie, the beggar, from jail. Oldbuck is now a link 
between lower and upper classes. 
By annulling differences and discontents among the social classes, Scott not only 
rescues communal values but also establishes a model for a progressive commllllity in 
which middle class values become unifying elements, and could be adopted by the 
nation at large. The design of an imagined French invasion at the end of the novel 
serves as a test for this social solidity. Here Scott makes of proportional economic 
interest for all classes a premise for enhancing political and national consensus in the 
face of external threats. As Oldbuck points out, in his address to Edie, "the country's 
in little ultimate danger, when the beggar's as ready to fight for his dish as the laird 
for his land" (346). Oldbuck, who is opposed to the "democraws" of Fairport reacts 
to political tension by transferring it into a sort of "social democracy," but is 
essentially integrative. This communal spirit is reemphasized in Baillie's Littlejohn 
speech: ''take the horses into our warehouses, and the men into our parlours,-share 
our supper with the one, and our forage with the other. We have made ourselves 
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wealthy under a free and paternal government, and now is the time to shew we know 
its value." (350) Scott's expedient not only dissolves class differences but also mutes 
political authority by using "government" as a general term to identify it. Under the 
word government Scottishness and Englishness, Stuart and Hanoverian, protestant 
and catholic all disappear and the authority of "government" becomes synon~mous to 
that of community/nation. Besides, by combining ''freedom'' \\ith "paternity," Scott 
stresses unity in tradition; paternity is a traditional Tory thesis and freedom is a 
progressive Whig term. In The Antiquary, written just after Waterloo and set at the 
time of the French Revolution, this assertion of emotional and symbolic connection 
between the lowest and highest orders of hierarchy (not conceived as opposed poles) 
is meant to rescue British social arrangement from the rising tide of radical 
republicanism. 
More importantly with relevance to our study, this test proves Scott's assumption 
of the possibility of updating a virtue lamented by the agent of antiquity, Elspeth 
Cheyne, in her nostalgic speech about the race of Glenallans. She recalls the times 
when they "stood shoulder to shoulder-nae man parted frae his chief for love of gold 
or of gain, or of right or of wrong-the times are changed, I hear, now." (262) For 
Scott, the times are changed, indeed. Yet the spirit of the times could be restored and 
employed in a civilized manner. All ranks are now standing "shoulder to shoulder" 
but not in the old tradition, in which allegiance is motivated by all sorts of fanaticism 
and directed towards intenlal conflict. Nor is it dictated by virtue of economical 
dependence, reflected in the relationship that links vassal to master, but as a quasi-
militia that represents a unified community, whose individuals move willingly 
according to a progressi ve vision of patriotism. 
However, if Scott fmds some sense in feudal loyalty, as a unifying social bond, he 
exposes and rejects the irrationalities associated with it. Such irrationalities, Scott 
shows, Wldermine the social-moral import of loyalty at the level of humanity and 
justice. In compliance with feudal loyalty, Elspeth "hated what [her] mistress hated." 
Accordingly, she treats Eveline Neville, "a being so innocent and gentle," with utmost 
cruelty. As Elspeth ''wad not hae spared the blood of [her] body, or the guilt of [her] 
soul, to serve the house of Glenallan," (261) she remorselessly commits perjury and 
swears "upon the gospels" (264) in a plot the result of which is disastrous to Lord 
Glenallan and his family. Applying present moral standards, we most probably reject 
this paradigm of loyalty for its flagrant vulnerability in terms of humanity and justice, 
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as it is almost akin to tyranny. Yet Elspeth's position, Scott seems to suggest, is 
understandable when taken in historical context; after alL she is a vassal whose 
economic dependence on her mistress could be seen as a sufficient reason for her 
blind obedience and lack of free conscience. Elspeth alludes to this point in her 
confessions to Lord Glenallan: "when she [her mistress] lived, wha dared to speak 
what it would hae displeased her to hae noised abroad?-But she's gone-and I \\ ill 
confess all." (256) 
Elspeth's case suggests that Scott breaks company with Burke halfway. Burke's 
thesis espouses a system based on patronage as a warrant for social cohesion and 
stability. According to Burke, making lower classes economically dependent on their 
superiors, a tenant or a slave would not think of rebelling against his master. Scott, 
although no less concerned about social cohesion than Burke, seems unlikely to 
endorse this thesis literally, at least for its moral consequences. If a master is fanatic, 
unjust, indecent or cruel, then his dependants, given their limited economic options, 
become perforce morally vulnerable. Thus Scott's vision for solving this problem 
could be sought in Edie Ochiltree's philosophy. Edie offers a possibility for creating 
a community whose citizens are economically independent and in the meantime 
socially and morally committed. 
Edie rejects all offers that could put restrains on his economy because he is aware 
that such step would undercut his virtue, as it "would be a public loss." (93) 
Moralizing on this issue he tells Miss Isabella: "na, na, Miss-it's because I am mair 
independent as I am-I beg nae mair at ae house than a meal 0' meat, or maybe but a 
mouthfou o't-ifit's refused ae palce, I get it at anither-sae I can be said to depend 
on naebody in particular, but just on the country at large." (92) Depending on his 
community at large for his living, Edie becomes, to a great extent, economically 
independent. His loyalty, in return, becomes community oriented, and this grants him 
a free margin to exercise his moral courage consistently, justly and humanely to 
defend what he sees in the interest of the whole regardless of class or rank, and most 
importantly without having to be a "rebel." (90) In other words, through Edie Scott 
seems to suggest a new social-economical consciousness based on viewing a given 
commlUlity as an integrated union in which the well-being and survival of each 
individual in his own capacity depends on all rather than on a particular person or 
class. 
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The episode of rescuing Sir Wardour and his daughter Isabella from the rising tide 
seems to be designed to this effect. Wardour appeals to Edie "Good man ... can you 
think of nothing?-of no help"-I'll make you rich-I'll give you a farm." Edie 
replies "Our riches will be soon equal. .. they are sae already; for I have nae land, and 
you would give your fair bounds and barony for a square yard of rock that would be 
dry for twal hours." (58) Edie's message is clear. If riches and rank are helpful in 
some cases, they are ineffective in other cases, so is individual effort. Real help 
always comes from a joint effort defmed by the interdependence of all social 
segments in the community, each in hislher own station not from lineage. As 
Oldbuck cynically makes it clear to Sir Arthur, "a pedigree of a hundred links is 
hanging on a twalpenny tow." (64) Miss Isabella, who seems freer than her father 
from the complex of rank and family pride is quick to understand Edie's hint when 
she confidently asserts in a communal voice: ''they must be aware of our situation, 
and will raise the country to relieve us." (58) Significantly, among the rescuers is 
Lovel and Edie attests to his gallantry: "he's behaved this blessed night, as if he had 
three lives to rely on, and was willing to waste them a' rather than endanger ither 
folks." (64-65) Lovel's effort in this episode plus Edie's comment above pit the 
spirit of community against individualism. But most importantly they contribute to 
the value of the hero. 
The meaning and importance of Lovel's character emerges only inferentially, 
through the thematic resonance between Aldobrand's tale and Lovel's present 
situation. Like Aldobrand, Lovel is a suitor rendered hopeless by questions about his 
family station, even his identity. Yet he has already exhibited his skill in the rescue of 
Isabella and her rank-obsessed father; thus the motto adopted by Aldobrand seems to 
predict a happy ending for Lovel. This association with the skillful middle-class 
Aldobrand, makes clear that, if Love! is himself a lost treasure, the treasure revealed 
will be not merely, nor principally, Lovel's true rank and fortune, but his already 
evinced merit. Towards the end of the novel Lovel is revealed as qualified citizen, 
able to lead his community in a fight against the French. More importantly, he turns 
out to be the agent who extricates Sir Arthur from his economical dilemma. The point 
of the Aldobrand-Lovel conjunction then is to confer middle-class virtues and values 
on the upper-class hero, thus implicitly showing that this aristocrat, at least, deserves 
his privileges. Favor and patronage are not scorned in the novel but, as in the case of 
the hopelessly incompetent Sir Arthur, they are sho\\TI to be insufficient \\lthout 
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merit, a virtue oriented to the present, not the past. If Scott breaks company \\ith 
Burke's absolutism, by legitimizing crossing social boundaries, he also seems to be 
aware of the dark aspect associated with mobility when it is not founded on virtue, as 
could be inferred from the tale about "The fortunes of Martin Waldeck." The tale. 
according to the author, is fundamentally didactic, in that it highlights "the miseries 
attendant upon wealth, hastily attained and ill-employed." (146) Symbolically, 
however, it could be seen as a parable on the consequences attendant upon failure to 
accommodate civic virtue, in context of social mobility, rather than reflecting 
skepticism about mobility itself. 
By linking Martin's economical and social progress to the world of demonology, 
which generally symbolizes evil and alienation, Scott's focus becomes more on 
Martin's merit in terms of talent, skill, prudence, and virtue, as pre-requisites for 
normal mobility in a free market economy. Martin's character and conduct show that 
he possesses none of these virtues. F or instance, apart from his courage, the author 
describes him as submitting to "the fiend of avarice," "pride," "cruelty," and 
"oppression." (144) Contrasting Martin's view of life and his inhumane conduct 
with that of Oldbuck's in terms of virtue, we realize that Martin serves as a critique 
for agents of mobility who focus in their progress exclusively on the economic aspect 
and neglect the moral one. Martin not only alienates himself from his community, but 
also emerges as an agent who aggravates social class antagonism and threatens social 
cohesion in his milieu. As the author points out, Martin's "prosperity soon made him 
odious, not to the nobles only, but likewise to the lower rank, who saw, with double 
dislike, the oppressive rights of the feudal nobility of the empire so remorselessly 
exercised by one who had risen from the very dregs of the people." (144) Had Martin 
taken the preaching of the priest seriously, or had his conduct been guided by 
religious virtues he might not have been an easy prey for the demon of materialism 
that divested him of his humanity. Further, by presenting the priest as a rational 
preacher who denounces superstition, Scott emphasizes the authority of progressive 
religion as a crucial element for inculcating and enhancing morality, as he does later 
in The Heart of Midlothian through Reuben Butler and Jeanie Deans. Butler, we 
recall, is presented as a rational minister and Jeanie, unlike Martin, is shown to be 
able to improve economically and socially by opening herself to divine guidance 
rather than yielding to the demon of materialism. 
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The demon of materialism and ambition in The Bn'de9 is presented not as an 
individual pestilence but rather as the thriving culture of an emerging commercial 
society, guided by excessive selfishness whose doctrine is perfectly Machiavellian. 
Scott seems to employ the state of affairs that surrounds the usurpation of the 
Ravenswood's castle and its extensions, as well as the tragic end of the love romance 
in all its ramifications to give a comprehensive portrayal of all the issues he already 
raised in the rest of his Waverley novels in terms of virtue. In a sense, the world of 
the novel reveals that it suffers a crisis of virtue on all levels. Whether this crisis 
expresses the author's pessimism and nostalgia, it still adduces a sort of empirical 
study in social-moral and political history, in which Scott seems to link genuine 
progress with progress in morality. This study suggests that although progress leaves 
no chance for the older order to survive literally, the modem world still has much to 
learn from past experience to remodel social-moral and political theory on a new basis 
that rests on accommodating ancient virtues, as Ferguson would suggest. 
The background in chapter two of the novel against which the events of the novel 
unfold seems employed to argue from the past to support this suggestion. Here Scott 
invites us to read a chapter from Scottish history which depicts a makeshift radical 
change in politics after the departure of James VI. To fill the political vacuum, as the 
narrator notes, power was delegated to political parties as if in a state of quasi-
democracy. But as each leader of these "contending parties" set himself in 
competition with the others, his main power was "employed in rewarding his 
partisans, in extending his influence, in oppressing and crushing his adversaries." 
Further, as the political and social are morally interrelated, "the administration of 
justice, in particular, was infected by the most gross partiality," to the extent to which 
the judges adopted the adage: "show me the man, and I will show you the law." 
Worse still, Scott points out, credibility and decency in handling justice gave way to 
lucre in its most demeaning form; the "purse of the wealthy was too often believed to 
be thrown into the scale to weigh down the cause of the poor litigant," and "the 
subordinate officers of the law affected little scruple concerning bribery." (28-29) 
Nevertheless, Scott's critical exposition of the state of affairs in Scotland presents 
him as conservative-liberal; for, despite his compassionate attitude toward the Stuart 
family, he is sufficiently rational to reject the rule of the Divine Right doctrine. It 
follows that his contrast between a state of absolute monarchy and no monarchy 
serves only as a method to alert his readers to the potential risk connected with 
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republicanism or democracy (without naming it, of course). The substitute for the 
authority of the king under whatever pretext, he asserts, presupposes fragmentation of 
political authority and hence social disunity and moral deterioration. As a result, 
political activity would deflect from its presumed original task that rests on serving 
pUblic/national interest and becomes only a medium for achieving personal ambition, 
power and self-aggrandizement. 
But absolute monarchs, Scott reminds us, are also liable to corruption. An 
"indolent" and "selfish" king is "disposed to arbitrary power" and at some point he 
might violate people's interest. But "in a free country" where the king's "own 
interests are clearly connected with the community at large" (28) reformation 
becomes a necessity or a mutual interest. This could be done, in his view, by limiting 
the authority of the king not by replacing a whole system by a new one based on 
speCUlation. The dangers of speculation in political theory, that is, total discontinuity 
with the past, Scott would say, are conspicuous in the atrocities committed in France 
during the Revolution and perhaps in more recent events, for instance, the Peterloo 
Massacre. Thus when Scott invokes history his objective is to diagnose the sources of 
divisiveness in the present and to assert unity in tradition. 
Equally, Scott transfers the idea of political unity in tradition to social and family 
institutions. Tradition, for Scott, most often refers to ancient virtues that are natural to 
man, which defme him as a social-political-moral creature and make his social and 
familial life better protected. These virtues are in general humanitarian, altruistic and 
communal in nature. In this context, the picture of the villagers at Wolfs' Hope could 
be seen as diagnostic and didactic at the same time. Before progress has taken its 
way there, the social ties that used to connect them with each other and with their lord 
were strong and based on reciprocal obligations that defme a patriarchal or feudal 
system. Yet the sense of individuality in the context of economic thralldom was 
almost absent. Now they are "emancipated from the chains offeudal dependence, and 
free from the various exactions with which, under every possible pretext, or without 
any pretext at all, the Scottish landlords of the period, themselves in great poverty, 
were wont to harass their still poorer tenants at will." (136) But instead of adapting 
their progress in economy in a way that preserves their social solidity, their 
community becomes a mere gathering whose individuals are disconnected, as each 
one pursues his own selfish interest inhumanely and, worse still, with predatory zeal. 
For instance, just as the attorney David Dingwall, eagerly looks forward to the death 
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of the COlUlty'S sheriff-clerk to replace him, (273) so Gibbie Girder seeks an easy job 
as cooper to the queen's stores and happily profits from the death of the incumbent. 
(151 and 153) Even the clergyman Bide-the-Bent is said to have his eye upon "a 
neighbouring preferment, where the incumbent was sickly. "(74) TIlls new culture 
demonstrates the social and moral failings of purely economic values that feed on 
extreme utility. 
This, however, does not imply that Scott is against improvement in the economic 
conditions of the villagers. In fact, he devotes a whole page to describing the plenty 
of food, cleanliness, warmth, furniture, luxury and comfortable life in the cooper's 
house in an attempt to highlight the change in economic independence, in contrast 
with the miserable condition at the Castle of Wolfs Crag, the lodging of Edgar and 
Caleb, where the food is scarce and life is hard. But, didactically, he alerts his readers 
to the risk that lUlderlies this commercial spirit in terms of social W1ity and humanity. 
Any thought of returning to patriarchy in its old version is totally rejected. TIlls is 
apparent in chapter 12 through David Ding Wall's and the cooper's strong denial of 
Caleb's argument in which the latter appeals to "antique custom and hereditary 
respect" in his attempt to obtain food for Edgar's depleted pantry. David reminds 
Caleb that "new times are not as old times," pointing to the authority of both civil law 
and government (139), while the cooper expresses the same idea in terms of 
economical change: "that their hens had caickled mony a day for the Lords of 
Ravenswood, and it was time they suld caickle for those that gave them roosts and 
barley." (173) Times have changed in terms of feudal obligations, but, what 
difference would it make had Caleb been given the food as form of charity or 
benevolence? Had they done so, David and the cooper would have done a social and 
moral service and they can still feel comfortable that they are economically free. 
Their act in this case could be seen as a humanitarian response rather than imposed 
upon them as a feudal exaction. The issue, then, is not in rejecting the feudal order, 
for it is no more there in effect but the real problem is in abstaining from 
accommodating its virtues in the present. Scott seems to show that the crisis in the 
modern world is a crisis of virtue. 
The private plot deals with this crisis on family level in terms of economic values 
and absolute authority. In a patriarchal system the authority in a family, much similar 
to that of an absolute monarchy, is traditionally ascribed to father, and the child-
parent bond, like that of the wife-husband bond, all too often make of submission an 
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unquestionable religious and social duty. An extreme conservative like Burke would 
find in this pattern a way that reinforces the uni ty of family. Yet Scott's liberal 
attitude seems to view absolutism in directing family affairs by either parent not only 
despotic but also does no help in maintaining genuine unity, as it might appear from 
delegating to Lady Ashton the absolute authority over her family. F or instance, we 
are told that Sir William Ashton and Lady Ashton ''work in concert" in the public but 
"without cordiality," and "the lady looked with some contempt on her husband, and 
that he regarded her with jealousy and fear, rather than with love or admiration. '" (30) 
This suggests that the real bond that should bind husband and wife should be based on 
mutual love and respect not on hegemony or "domestic thralldom," (30) as is the case 
with Sir William who becomes the present-absent father/ husband, as Lady Ashton 
usurps his role and employs it to enhance her selfish schemes. Similarly, Scott 
suggests that the child-parent bond should not be defmed in terms of enforced 
obedience but rather on natural feelings, which allows a margin for individuality, 
particularly in matters that concern private life, for instance, marriages. This 
arrangement fmds support in the denouement of the love romance in which Lucy is 
pushed into a marriage designed by her mother. 
Lucy Ashton falls in love with Edgar Ravenswood who represents all values 
connected with chivalry. When William catches the opportunity and encourages this 
step he uses Lucy for his own advantage, but the author seems to show that whatever 
interest William might reap from their union it remains morally and socially 
acceptable as long as it fulfils a common interest for the father and the daughter. 
Regarding Lucy, William shows respect for her feelings and recognizes her right to 
choose her future husband. Regarding himself, this marriage is a key for 
reconciliation with Edgar that puts an end for feudal enmity with him. Besides, 
Ravenswood is a blood relative to the Marquis of A-who occupies a key position in 
politics, and this would be promising for William's political career. But no less 
important, for William and perhaps for Scott, is Edgar's manhood, which reveals the 
author's attitude toward manly virtues as a binding force that legitimizes the authority 
of husband/father over family affairs (but of course not absolute authority). Consider 
Scott's comment on this point "then his daughter-his favourite child-his constant 
playmate-seemed fonned to live happy in a union with such a commanding spirit as 
Ravenswood; and even the fme, delicate, fragile form of Lucy Ashton seemed to 
require the support of the Master's muscular strength and masculine character." (181) 
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Out of context, this romantic and chi valric picture seems to argue against Scott' s 
realism but within context it acquires different meanings. It acts as a critique of 
William's lack of masculinity, which proves to be humiliating and destructive in more 
than one occasion. The fIrst, when his wife acts \\ith "incivility" as she insults Edgar 
by bidding him to leave her house while he is in her husband's hospitality. (239) The 
second is, when he bows unwillingly to his wife's authority and leaves his daughter 
all alone to meet her tragic end. Within this context masculinity, as a manly virtue, 
becomes a warrant for defending human, social and familial justice. 
Lady Ashton's denial of her daughter's right to individuality leads to the tragic 
conclusion, in which Lucy, having stabbed Bucklaw, the man who has been chosen 
for her, dies in complete insanity, taking with her Edgar's will to live. Lucy is shown 
to be the victim of her mother's dictatorship. Yet besides rejecting the logic of 
absolutism in the parent-child relationship, Scott touches on other relevant points 
through Lady Ashton's character. Lady Ashton views the entire world around her in 
terms of economic values that are extremely utilitarian and devoid of all natural 
affection. As the narrator points out, she "was seldom mentioned in the terms of love 
or affection. Interest'-the interest of her family, if not her own interest,-seemed 
too obviously the motive of her actions." (30) Unfortunately, her interests are 
economically oriented and fanatic. She views her "alliance" with Bucklaw as an 
opportunity to promote her eldest son, Sholto, politically. (228) On the other hand, 
her enmity to Edgar arises from an aggregation of political, religious, and economic 
prejudices that foment division and impede reconciliation. She, for instance, 
denounces him because historically his family fought against "the immunities of 
God's kirk" (288). She also hates him because he is poor, as she characterizes him as 
a "beggarly Jacobite bankrupt" (238) When discussing Edgar, Peter Bide-the-Bent, 
Lady Ashton's own minister and spiritual guide, remarks: "the seed of the righteous 
are not seen begging their bread ... " (150) This reminds us that the heroic indignation 
and zeal exhibited by the Presbyterian warriors of Old Mortality-men who fought 
and suffered for the doctrines that lady Ashton now espouses vehemently-have been 
corrupted by an ignoble materialism. 
Against all this it is a mistake to see the protagonist, Edgar RaVeSll\vood, and his 
loyal servant, Caleb Balderstone, as mere representatives of the feudal and heroic past 
whose values are outmoded and that he retains "nothing of value from the past except 
an lmjustified pride. ,,10 It is true that Caleb resorts to all tricks in an attempt to save a 
lost pride and honour of his master's house. But his conduct, which might seem 
eccentric, could be seen as noble when viewed from a perspective of instincti ve 
loyalty, which he has internalized over the years and has become inunutable. The 
author's, as well as our sympathy towards him arises from our realization that he 
clings to ancient virtues in a world that abandoned those virtues. Caleb reminds us of 
Meg Merrilies, Evan Dhu, Dougal, and many others, as symbols of fidelity. The last 
scene in the novel dramatizes Caleb's loyalty in its most passionate and humanistic 
way. Edgar in his last moments asks Caleb not "to cling to a falling tower" but the 
latter gives a pithy reply: "I was born for the family-1 have lived for them-I would 
die for them." (346-47) Caleb's "fidelity" to Edgar is felt even after the latter had 
passed away in the quick sand. Caleb "ate without refreshment, and shnnbered 
without repose." (348) Caleb, unlike the villagers at Wolfs' Hope, cannot change 
simply because he knows no other track to follow except the one he has committed 
himself to. In the light of changes around him, this track leads him to nowhere and he 
is completely stuck in the web of history that gives no attention to his virtue of 
loyalty. 
But Edgar's role, unlike Caleb's, is more complex than it might appear. Although 
chivalric in his transactions, he is not archaic. When discussing Edgar most critics 
seem to forget his rationality and his awareness of the changes taking place around 
him, which render him ahead of his time, much like Henry Morton in Old Mortality. 
Most often he seems to speak for Scott himself, as a philosophical historian, whose 
consciousness of human nature and the workings of historical process motivate him to 
adopt a frank, pragmatic, moderate, and reconciliatory position in all his dealings. 
For instance, unlike Caleb, he is never ashamed of his poverty. Also there is strong 
evidence to believe that he breaks away from the tradition of his ancestors concerning 
the notion of revenge, as a means for maintaining justice. He makes it clear to 
Bucklaw that his confrontation with William will not go beyond upbraiding him "with 
his tyranny and its consequences" to shake "his soul within him," (81) while, on the 
other hand, he asserts to William that he will seek justice at the "British House of 
Peers, a cowt of equity." (162) This rational and progressive attitude towards 
implementing justice is further emphasized in his speech with a former tenant to the 
Ravenswoods, Alice, who misinterpreted his rapprochement with the Ashtons as a 
means for revenge: "You drive me to madness, Alice ... are you such a wretched 
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Clrristian as to suppose I would in the present day levy war against the Ashton family, 
as was the sanguinary custom in elder times?" (20 I) 
Edgar's toleration of Mr. William seems to be linked with his love affair but had 
he not had this aptitude of rationality his love to Lucy would not have been a 
sufficient reason for him to make a reconciliation with his enemy. Consider Edgar' s 
reasoning in justifying himself to take a moderate step towards William: "those from 
whom we won our ancient possessions fell under the sword of my ancestors, and letl 
lands and livings to the conquerors; we sink under the force of the law, now too 
powerful for the Scottish chivalry, let us parley with the victors of the day, as if we 
had been besieged in our fortress, and without hope of relief. This man may be other 
than I have thought him; and his daughter-but I have resolved not to think of her." 
(160) What we hear here is Scott's voice in his Introduction to Waverley about 
"passions common to men in all stages of society" and the "great book of Nature, the 
same through thousand editions." (5) This means that either Edgar has to give up and 
admit historical defeat or fight William using the weapons of the age, the law. Yet 
Edgar, as a pragmatic, prefers to reach a compromise based on toleration and 
moderation, two terms too dear to Scott's heart. 
Scott views political activities not as a career for securing private profit or personal 
influence, or even for gratifying personal pride, but rather as a social-moral virtue. 
For Scott, the crucial issue is not who is in power, Tory or Whig, as long as the 
concerned party shows integrity and commitment in handling the nation's interest. As 
David Hewitt points out, Scott's praises Pitt in his poem Marmion because of the 
latter's defence of Britain's interest in the face of the French threat. Hewitt reports 
Scott's view that Pitt ''was interested only in serving his country, not in private 
rewards."ll Similarly, Edgar tells Bucklaw that a day will come when Tory and 
Whig become "nick-names as at a trumpet sound. As social life is better protected, its 
comforts will become too dear to be hazarded without some better reason than 
speculative politics." (101) Edgar's voice is the voice of a "patriot" (100) who 
elevates common interest or "social comfort" above personal advantage, national or 
party prejudice. Edgar's tragedy, in short, cannot be viewed as the result of his blind 
adherence to obsolete ideals but rather as result of his rationality which makes him 
look beyond his time. If I am correct, Scott emerges not as an apologist for the old 
order as much as an ideologist, considering Edgar's virtues as the antidote for what he 
diagnoses as the ills of modern life. 
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